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Abstract 
Triggered by the state of the housing market and a change in the housing association 
subsidy system, housing affordability became a topical issue of discourse in Britain 
towards the end of the 1980s. Yet, there is little research both on the extent of the 
problem at the national level and how affordability should be measured. This research 
attempts to advance understanding in these issues based on data from the 1991 Family 
Expenditure Survey and the 1988 General Household Survey. In this thesis, a new 
definition of the residual income measurement has been proposed and threshold 
affordability ratios has also been established using a composite approach to affordability 
measurement combining the ratio and the residual income measurement, in additional to 
an experimentation on a behavioral approach to the measurement of affordability. 
Findings in this thesis suggest that, measured by the ratio measurement and the 
traditional residual income measurement, about a quarter of households in 1991 were in 
unaffordable housing. Social tenants and tenants in the unfurnished private rented 
sector, lone parents, the elderly persons and households with unemployed household 
heads and claimants of housing benefit were more likely to be in unaffordable housing. 
However, there is no evidence in support of distinct patterns in household expenditure 
between households who were affordable to housing and those who were unaffordable. 
It is also controversial to regard households who were unaffordable to housing but at the 
same time over-consuniing housing to be in voluntary unaffordability problem owing to 
the difficulties such households would have in adjusting their level of housing 
consumption. This thesis also points to the close relationship between housing 
affordability, housing benefit and social tenancy which suggests the inadequacy of the 
housing benefit system and state provision of housing in protecting households from the 
problem of housing affordability. A section of this thesis was devoted to the examination 
of the ability of tenants to buy in the late 1980s where tenure preference has been 
incorporated in the measurement of such ability. It was found that the majority of 
tenants in 1988 could not afford to buy and tenants living in London and the South East, 
single person households, lone parents and households on a low income were the least 
able to afford buying. Though the Right to Buy scheme would improve the capacity of 
these households in council housing to become home owners, they are still households 
who were the least able to buy. 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE CONCERN 
Housing is a popular concern in most societies, regardless of whether they are in the 
West or in the East, in prosperous economies or in countries where most people are still 
struggling for survival. It is particularly so in my home town, Hong Kong, where over 
six million people are crammed into an area ofiust one thousand square kilometres (350 
square miles) of which only about MY% is inhabitable. It is no wonder that acquiring 
decent shelter in the territory becomes almost a formidable task. 
The past two decades saw Hong Kong's thriving economy develop into one of the 
wealthiest areas of the world, and the cost of securing a decent home has risen in a 
similar way. The price of an ordinary two bedroom apartment in a middle class area 
may cost more than ten to fifteen years the annual salary of a recent university graduate. 
Most people have no choice but to tolerate the living conditions that can, at best, be 
regarded as third world standards. This is the problem of affordability I encounter 
which motivates my concern about the issue, in addition to the five folds increase in 
price I would have had to pay for the flat I am living in if I haven't bought it eight years 
ago. 
Yet, doing research on the affordability in England, a country which seems familiar as 
well as remote (as Hong Kong is a colony of Britain but the two places are thousands of 
miles apart), is very much a demanding challenge. Deterred by the difficulties of 
comprehending the housing, economic and social systems that were completely 
unfamiliar to me, but tempted by the extensive research mateirials, the scholarly 
environment and rich data, I made the decision which might be one of the most difficult 
one in my life. 
1.2 THE PROBLEM 
I then realised that affordability is not a problem only in Hong Kong where there is too 
little land to accommodate too many people, but it is also a problem shared by other 
areas of the world. The problem is particularly interesting in England in the 1980s. 
Changes in housing and social policy, together with the boom and bust of the housing 
market as well as the fluctuations in the economy, provide an invaluable arena for the 
academic study of affordability. 
The state of the housing market and the change in housing association finance were 
believed to have triggered the concern of affordability in the UK in the 1980s. 
Mortgage arrears and property repossessions has increased by respectively 20 and 23 
folds in the 1980s whereas house price peaked in 1988-89 which experienced a three 
fold increase over the beginning of the decade (DoE, 198 1; 199 1). This aroused 
concern over the affordability and access as well as the sustenance of home ownership. 
On the other hand, an introduction of a new housing association financial regime 
aroused concern over whether rent levels would be affordable to the increasingly 
residualised and marginalised social tenants. 
Changes in other areas of housing and social policy might also produce some latent 
effects on affordability. Deregulation in the private rented sector, a new policy in setting 
local authority rents, the new housing benefit system which was introduced in 1988, a 
growing income inequality, worsening employment market and an unstable economic 
could also precipitate a new wave of affordability problems. 
Notwithstanding the significance claimed for the problem, it soon gave the impression of 
playing a game at a Christmas party: everybody was asked to guess the height of a tall 
Christmas tree but no one was allowed to actually measure it. The case of the study of 
affordability is even worse: no yardstick e)dsts and there is not even a conversion table 
from imperial to metric, not to mention the Chinese foot I used to use. Housing cost to 
income ratio was originally used as a measurement of affordability in the United States 
which subsequently became popular in other countries such as Canada and Australia. 
All of the commonly adopted threshold ratios, which are pivotal to the measurement, 
was believed to have been set only as "a thumb of rule" (Lane 1977). The absence of 
any scientific or empirical basis for the threshold ratio attracted the most critical 
comments when it was "imported" into the UK in the 1980s (Maclennan et al, 1990, 
Hancock, 1993). To rectify the alleged weakness of the ratio measurement, the residual 
2 
income approach was proposed (Brownill el al, 1990; Hancock, 1993). However, 
evidence in the literature does not provide a satisfactory conclusion on which 
measurement approach is more appropriate. Thus, some of the attention of this thesis 
has to be diverted to methodological issues on the measurement of affordability. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Affordability, if interpreted in a simplistic sense, can be reduced to the problem of a 
mismatch between the personal aspiration of consuming housing of a quality for which 
the present resource of the person is inadequate. While this is a problem at the personal 
level it has far more associations with, and implications for, other areas of social and 
housing policy. It is therefore the intention of this thesis to also examine the issue from 
a social and housing policy perspective. 
The main concern of this thesis is to inquire into the issue of affordability in England in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, so as to capture the position after a decade of rapid 
changes in housing and social policy. It is an attempt not only to advance the 
understanding of this issue, but also as a reflection of its impact on wider policy issues. 
The additional focus on measurement issues forms another equally important area of 
study. It seeks to offer a thorough study of the measurement issues and aspires to 
provide a scientific basis from which to reconcile the controversies on such issues. 
There are a number of key issues on which an exploration is attempt in this thesis: 
0 The extent of the affordability problem in the early 1990s and its implications for 
other areas of housing and social policy. 
0 The inadequacy of current affordability measurements and the development of a 
scientific basis for measuring affordability. 
In the exploration of such issues, a quantitative oriented approach is favoured. 
Measurement issues dictates this option for a research approach. Additional concern 
about the lack of understanding of the extent of the issue at a national level also 
supports the use of a quantitative approach. The Famfly Expenditure Survey and 
General Housing Survey will be used. It is expected that the secondary analysis of these 
survey data at the national level could best serve this purpose, apart from the 
convenience and economy such an approach has. 
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter two presents a description of the policy context of the affordability issue. It 
traces the origin from which the issue attract significant attention in the 1980s despite 
the fact that it had rarely been discussed, and the term unheard of, before the 1980s. 
The chapter continues to explore other areas in housing and social policy which are 
closely related to the issue but which may not yet being perceived as being directly 
connected. 
Chapter Three provides a comprehensive review of the approaches and operational 
measurement of affordability, not only those used in Britain, but also internationally. 
The strength and weakness of such approaches and measurement are discussed and new 
measurement approaches are explored. 
An account of the research methods, data sets and samples used is presented in chapter 
four. There is a description of the definition of the concepts used in the analysis and of 
the methodological issues encountered by the quantitative analysis. 
A profile is presented in chapter five of the distribution of housing costs and housing 
cost to income ratio, of the households selected for analysis. It serves as a preliminary 
exploration to guide the analyses in subsequent chapters. 
There is an exploration in chapter six explores the use of a residual income approach to 
measure affordability. This begins with a presentation of the profile of residual income 
and develop into a comparison of the distribution of households in unaffordable housing 
as assessed by the three versions of residual income measurement used in this thesis. 
An attempt is made in chapter seven to fix a set of threshold housing costs to income 
ratios. This is achieved by a composite method which combines the ratio approach to 
affordability with the residual income approach. When a household would be in poverty 
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has its housing cost to income ratio reached a particular ratio, that ratio would be 
considered the threshold ratio. 
A behavioral approach to the measurement of affordability is used experimentally in 
chapter eight. The basic principle of this approach is adopted from similar procedure in 
poverty study, but a new method of implementing the procedure is employed in this 
chapter. 
Chapter nine is a summary of the results of the analysis in the preceding three chapters. 
It presents a general picture of the extent of the affordability problem, as well as 
examining the relationship between affordability with the housing and socio-economic 
characteristics. There is also an investigation of the expenditure pattern of households 
with an affordability problem, and of the issue of over and under-consumption of 
housing in relation to affordability. 
Chapter ten explores another related issue, which is the access to home ownership, in 
which the concept of mortgage potential is used as a measurement concept. To provide 
a fine tuning of the measurement, the preference of the household for home ownership 
is incorporated. Sensitivity analyses are conducted on the mortgage potential 
measurement to test its sensitive to changes to the chosen parameters. Finally, chapter 
eleven provides a summary of the conclusions presented in the thesis on the extent of 
affordability, and implications of the analyses for the measurement of affordability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLICY CONTEXT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Before mid 1980s, the term 'affordability' was virtually unheard of in the literature of 
housing in the United Kingdom, but since then it has become newsworthy in the media 
as well as being a topical issue in both academic and professional discourse. Such 
unprecedented attention was exemplified, for instance, in the academic arena, by the 
focus of a number of international conferences held in the late 1980s: "The Affordable 
Housing: from Participation to Self-help" in Hamburg in 1987, "Affordable Housing 
Policy in the UK and USA" in London in 1990, and the subsequent collection of 
conference papers (Friedrichs, 1988; Maclennan and Williams, 1990). At the same time, 
heated discussions also prevailed among the housing professionals, noticeably the 
housing association movement, from which a series of research reports was produced 
(Randolph, 1992). 
The discourse on affordability was at first focused mainly around two tenures: owner 
occupation and housing association tenancy (Maclennan and Williams, 1990; Hancock, 
1991). Whilst the initial episodes of affordability, which were described as a crisis by 
the media, may have passed away subsequently, many of its consequences were more 
enduring than were once thought (Bramley, 1994). It has also induced repercussions in 
other areas of housing policy, and it is likely that such discussions will advance robustly 
well into the mid 1990s. 
Whilst the technicality of measuring affordability and characteristics of the incidence of 
affordability will be described in the chapters that follow, in this chapter an attempt is 
made to lay out the context within which the issue emerged and developed. There will 
also be an examination of the repercussions caused by the affordability issue in other 
areas of housing and social policy. First, the scale of the affordability problem in the mid 
and late 1980s, which attracted attention, will be examined. This involved the problem 
of mortgage arrears and property repossessions, access to home ownership and the 
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related issue of a preference for owner occupation, as well as the introduction of a new 
financial regime for housing associations. This is followed by a description of the 
repercussions of the issue of affordability in other areas of housing and social policy: in 
the public and private rented sectors, the problem of homelessness and issues related to 
the current housing benefit system. Finally, some general issues concerning 
affordability which are relevant to policy will also be highlighted. Discussions in this 
chapter is not intended to be a critical evaluation of the concept but to facilitate 
discussion in later chapters. 
2.2 THE CRISIS OF SUSTAINING HOMIE OWNERSHIP 
Perhaps the rapid increase in house prices in the mid-1980s and the appalling situation of 
mortgage arrears and property repossessions towards the end of the 1980s are the major 
events which triggered public concern about affordability in relation to owner occupied 
housing. Despite an upward trend in both repossessions and mortgage arrears since 
such statistics were available in the early 1980s, the increase towards the end of the 
1980s is stiff regarded as dramatic (figure 2.1). In 1990, there were over 40,000 cases 
of repossession and another 150,000 mortgagors had significant arrears in mortgage 
payment (over 6 months of arrears) (DoE, 1993), which were respectively a 177% and a 
971/o increase over the previous year. The increase from 1990 onwards, though less 
dramatic, was equally striking. The first two years of the 1990s produced a 56% 
increase in repossessions and a 121% in mortgage arrears. Hence, by 1992, there was 
already a 20 fold increase in repossessions and a 23 fold in significant mortgage arrears 
over the year 1980. 
Reasons for both mortgage arrears and repossessions are complex. At the macro- 
economic level, arrears can be reasonably modelled by the disposable income, 
unemployment rate, loan to income ratio of the first time buyers, unwithdrawn equity 
and the debt service ratio (debt service relative to income) (Brooks et al, 1991). Based 
on Brooks! model, Breedon and Joyce (1992) also show that there is a lagged effect of 
some of these factors. Repossessions, on the other hand, can be explained by the rate of 
arrears, unemployment and marital breakdown (Brooks et al, 199 1). 
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Figure 2.1 Arrears and Repossessions, Britain 1980-1992 
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At the micro-level, home owners experiencing arrears or repossession problems and the 
building society industry both quoted the inability to continue paying mortgages as being 
attributable to unemployment and the reduction of working hours; to financial 
mismanagement and relationship breakdown (Ford and Wilcox, 1992; Coles, 1992). It 
supports many of the economic linkages mentioned above. 
Figure 2.2 Seasonal Adjusted Rate of Unemployment, Britain 1978-1992 
1978 1990 1982 1984 1986 
Year 
Source: Dept of Employment (Various years) Employment Gazette 
1999 1990 1992 
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These factors which influence both arrears and repossessions all deteriorated very 
rapidly at the same time towards the end of the 1980s. Whether it was purely a 
coincidence, as suggested by Bramley (1994), or the legacy of economic 
mismanagement in the 1980s is still debatable, but it is unequivocal that such dreadful 
conditions put together would have a devastating impact on the situation. Figure 2.2 to 
figure 2.4 show that unemployment rose very rapidly in 1989 (figure 2.2) whilst housing 
outgoings of home owners increased sharply from 1988 onward (figure 2.3). At the 
same time, the nominal mortgage rate also hit a record high in October 1990 (figure 
2.4). 
Figure 2.3 Average Net Mortgage Outgoings as Percentage of Income 1970-1991 
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Whilst it is debatable that many such factors are not within the scope of control by social 
policy, the relaxation of building societies' lending criteria in the 1980s and the 
subsequent response to the arrears problem are clearly deliberate policies. Building 
societies have long been a dominant provider of mortgage finance, and until the early 
1980s, they had been practising a conservative, but safe, lending policy. A loan was 
granted usually at an amount considerably lower than the capital value of the mortgaged 
property (Merrett, 1982) so as to avoid capital default. Borrowing was also subjected 
to a maximum loan to eligible household income ratio (Jones and Maclennan, 1987) to 
ensure initial repayment would not exert an excessive burden on households' outgoings. 
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At the same time, building societies enjoyed a special arrangement, the composite tax 
rate, for setting investors'tax liability enabling them to set a rate at a competitive level. 
Such competitive advantage was further reinforced by the exemption from credit 
restraint to which commercial banks were subject, which greatly hampered the banks' 
ability to expand their market share in the mortgage lending market (Boddy, 1980; 
Holman, 1979). 
Figure 2.4 Nominal and Real Mortgage Rate 1975-1991 
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Since the early 1980s, such positions were under threat. Partly because of innovations 
in banking technology and largely owing to deregulation in the financial sectors, building 
societies were facing increasing competition on several fronts: the commercial banks on 
mortgage lending and other financial institutions and the government on the attraction of 
savings. It is not surprising that building societies had to relax their lending policy to 
attract borrowing. Despite the upsurge in house prices in the mid- 1980s, house price to 
income ratio to first time buyers continued to increase throughout the 1980s. 
However, the increase of housing price to income ratio was not unprecedented. The 
level of housing costs to income ratio was high in the mid 1970s when there was a house 
price boom. The difference was that before the 1980s, whenever house price to income 
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ratio increased above the norm, which increased the risk of repayment default (the 
mortgagor was unable to repay the debt according to schedule), such risk would be 
offset by a corresponding decrease of capital default (value of the repossessed property 
not enough to offset the outstanding debt) by decreasing the price to advance ratio. The 
1980s saw an increase in both ratios to a high level (figure 2.5). Thus, it increased both 
the risk of capital and repayment defaults. 
Figure 2.5 Average Advance to Price, Price to Income Ratio, First Time 
Buyers, Britain 1974-1992 
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In fact, the increase in price to advance ratio was even more spectacular. Although the 
average level reached its peak in 1985 and has been adjusting downward ever since, 
many first time buyers could still obtain a mortgage at a large proportion of the capital 
value of their properties. In 1989, just before the arrears crisis surfaced, nearly 60% of 
first time buyers could get a mortgage at 95% of the capital value and over a third could 
even get over 100% (Bank of England, 1992), albeit the average loan to value ratio of 
first time buyers in that year was only 83% (DoE, 1990). It is argued by some 
sympathetic commentators that such a relaxed policy was pushed along by the strong 
competitive pressure of the 1980s, and there was a lack of awareness of the dangers this 
unprecedented fall in nominal house prices would have on such a lending policy 
(Bramley, 1994). Nevertheless, such lending policy is still unusual, and would perhaps 
never have happened in any other part of the world. 
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On the contrary, when the phenomenon of mortgage arrears emerged in the late 1980s, 
without adequate warning, building societies reacted with considerable vigour. Instead 
of tolerating the arrears whilst working on recovering the debt, many chose to repossess 
the properties quickly and put them up for sale. In 1989, when the crisis emerged, there 
was respectively a 79% increase in six to twelve months arrears and a 140% increase in 
arrears over twelve months, but repossessions increased even faster at 176%. It was not 
until the subsequent year that there was a clearer understanding of the impact of the 
repossessed sales on house prices and the continuing deterioration of mortgage arrears, 
after which the repossessions orders were restrained somewhat (Ford, 1992). Lenders 
tended to tolerate longer mortgage arrears and be cautious in making repossession 
orders. This is reflected in the correspondingly large increase in arrears over the twelfth 
month in 1992 which had increased 60% over the previous year compared with 
repossessions, which decreased by 9% (DoE, 1993). The empirical findings of Breedon 
and Joyce (1992) also support such analysis. Their model of repossessions, which 
matches the empirical data quite well before the end of 1990, breaks down in its 
prediction of the situation in the first half of 199 1. At the same time, when this 
assumption of a change of repossession policies was fed into their model of arrears, the 
predicted incidence of arrears increased over the previous predicted level - 
2.3 ACCESS TO HOME ONVNERSHEP 
The last thirty years have seen three boom periods in housing price with peaks in 1973, 
1980 and 1989. The most recent price boom was exceptional in its intensity as well as 
in the down-turn that followed. Not only was the level of real house prices in the 1989 
boom considerably higher than the two preceding booms but it was also of longer 
duration. The most striking effect is that the phenomenon of a downturn in real house 
prices after the boom turned out to be a fall in nominal house prices, which was 
unprecedented in previous boom and bust cycles in the post war period (figure 2-6). 
Although the latest downturn, in terms of the magnitude of the real price fall, was not 
very different from the earlier cycles, it was the low level of inflation that pushed down 
the nominal price. Nevertheless, such a nominal fall has a psychological impact on the 
already fragile confldence in the economy as a whole and the housing market in 
particular. 
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In the long run, house prices are determined by incomes, wealth, user costs (mortgage 
rates and tax rates etc), the general level of prices, financial deregulation, demography 
and house supply; but in the short term, it is also influenced by the component of wealth 
and perception of future capital gain (Breedon and Joyce, 1992). It is not surprising 
when incomes, wealth and general level of prices are all on the increase, that there is a to 
a general rise in real house prices. It is also not a coincidence that the'ripples' in the 
house price cycle coincide largely vAth the growth of the population aged 25-30 who are 
the most likely first time buyers (Bank of England, 1992). 
Figure 2.6 Change in House Price, First Time Buyers 1969-1992 (Adjusted by RPI) 
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Notwithstanding the continuous upsurge in nominal house price, it has largely kept in 
pace with the rise in real income throughout the 1970s and early 1980s (figure 2.7). The 
latest boom, towards the later part of the 1990s, put increased house prices well above 
the increase in wages. This has an immense effect on access to owner occupation for 
many potential first time buyers. 
As a protection against capital default, home buyers are expected to pay a deposit which 
is the difference between the loan advance and the transaction price of the property. 
This deposit may pose a formidable barrier to access to home ownership. Take 1980, a 
year of house price boom, as an illustration of the burden- a first time buyer on the 
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average income of all first time buyers of that year, granted a loan at the average 
advance to price ratio towards buying a house at the average price, had to pay a deposit 
which was equivalent to one and a half years of the household income. If the cost of the 
transaction, moving house and furnishing were included, the amount was even larger. 
As house price increases, so does the deposit required and the barrier to owner 
occupation will be higher. 
Figure 2.7 Index of Housing Prices and Earnings, Britain 1970-1992 
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To minimise the risk of repayment default, a maximum household income to price ratio 
should be set. Again, a higher house price would mean a higher household income in 
order to be eligible for a loan, which also implies a high hurdle for first time buyers. 
This was particularly true before the 1980s when mortgage funds were in short supply 
and mortgage loans were rationed. Mortgage finance created a seller's market and home 
buyers had little choice. Jones and Maclennan (1987) even discovered that low income 
was in fact the most common reason for loan refusal. 
As a result of the financial deregulation and increased competition, the lending policy of 
many building societies was relaxed in the late 1980s. Although on the one hand this 
was one of the causes of the crisis of mortgage arrears and repossessions, on the other 
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hand it helped to bring down the barriers of access to owner occupation since building 
societies were more ready to lend. It pushed up both the advance to price as well as the 
price to income ratio so that a smaller deposit was required and a large loan could be 
obtained with a given household income. In 1989-90, during the peak of the price 
boom, the average advance to income ratio for first time buyers was at its highest (DoE, 
1992). At the same time, it virtually put an end to the informal 'redfinir4 practice of 
many building societies, in which houses in poor areas were excluded from any loan 
applications so that choice for low income families was further lin-dted because of the 
lack of supply at the lower end of the market (Jones and Maclennan, 1987). 
This increasingly easier entry to owner occupation also brought two undesirable 
consequences. First, it created the crisis of mortgage arrears and repossessions which 
has been described in the previous section. In fact, a considerable proportion of 
households with arrears problems or repossessed homes bought their houses in the 
boom period of the late 1980s (Coles, 1992). Second, it raised the burden of repayment 
on many home owners who bought their homes in the latest boom period, whereas 
arrears and repossessions previously were extreme cases in which households had been 
stretched beyond their coping capacity. 
The effect of housing prices on housing outgoings for first time buyers is fairly 
straightforward at a particular moment in time: a higher price means higher outgoings. 
But making comparison over a period of time is not easy due to changes in both interest 
rates and lending policies. Suppose a household on the average income of all first time 
buyers for that year managed to obtain a loan at the current average advance to income 
ratio from a building society in 1979, which was neither at an ebb nor a peak of the price 
cycle. The household, with the loan given, was enabled to buy a house at the average 
price paid by other first time buyers. Assuming it was a repayment mortgage and the 
interest was charged at the average rate for that year, the household would have paid a 
deposit equivalent to 30 weeks of its income whilst at the same time having to commit 
about a quarter (24%) of their income to mortgage interest and principal repayments. 
Another household in 1989 on an income equivalent to the previous household in 1979 
(adjusted by the index of earnings), which was 6% higher than the average income of 
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first time buyers, and with the relaxation of lending policy, could have obtained a loan 
which enabled them to buy a house at 106% of the average house price paid by all first 
time buyers. The household only had to pay 23 weeks of its income as a deposit. 
Because both real house prices and mortgage rates were higher in 1989 than a decade 
age, the outgoings were increased to 29%. Even if the mortgage rate was kept at the 
1979 level, the proportion was still 28% ', an increase of 17% over the level in 1979. 
This indicates that even at a higher house price level, the relaxation of lending policy still 
enabled households on a lower income to buy a home because the cost of entry is lower. 
Nevertheless, such first time buyers had to devote a much higher proportion of their 
income to housing, thus increasing the risk of an affordability problem. 
However, this simplified illustration takes no account of the changing pattern of income 
distribution over time and the diversity of regional house price distribution as well as the 
increase in outgoings which simply reflects the improvement in the quality of housing. 
The former problem was taken up by Bramley (199 1) who shows that the affordability 
situation of first time buyers during the 1980s actually deteriorated, taking into account 
the distribution of income over time and the cost of provision at the local level. The 
latter problem is more complicated owing to the lack of a comprehensive index 
comparing house prices at a fixed quality (such as the quality adjusted house price index 
suggested by Wilkinson (1976)). 
Housing outgoings of current home owners are less dependent on current house prices 
than on the historical price of the house and the 'front-loading effect of mortgage 
finance which would have eased the burden of housing outgoings in subsequent years 
even at a low level of inflation (DoE, 1977b). Because most mortgages in the UK are 
on adjustable mortgage interest rates, the housing outgoings of current home owners are 
more affected by a change in interest rates. Figure 2.3 has shown the movement of 
housing outgoings as a proportion of household income over the period 1970 to 1991. 
A general upward trend is apparent and whilst the peaks and ebbs of the cycle coincide 
mainly with the boom and bust in the housing market, high interest rates in 1985 also 
had the effect of pushing up housing outgoings. When mortgage rates were increased 
from the relatively low level of 10.5% in July 1987 to a record level of 15.4% in 
February 1990, keeping other conditions unchanged, housing outgoings would have 
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increased by 38%2 
. 
The increased reliance on the interest rate as a regulation tool in 
macro-economy and the withdrawal from the ERM implied that there was a possibility 
of rapid changes in interest rates, especially in a period of economic difficulties. Given 
the exceptionally high mortgage debt to GNP ratio and home ownership proportion, 
such fluctuations would affect the budget of many households and was likely to become 
an increasingly sensitive political issue. 
2.4 TENURE PREFERENCE AND HOME ONMERSHUP 
Much of the previous research on affordability on prospective home buyers (e. g. 
Bramley, 1990,199 1) seems to have assumed that owner occupation is the desired form 
of tenure for the vast majority of households (Whitehead et al, 1993). Households 
which are not currently home owners would eventually become so provided their 
income capacity permits it. Such an assumption would over-estimate the demand for 
home ownership, albeit the main purpose of such research being primarily the estimation 
of the demand for social housing. First, not all households which could afford to buy 
actually prefer home ownership. Second, not all households which prefer home 
ownership can afford to buy. Third, there are some home owners who would prefer to 
swap to renting instead. Studies on tenure preference would help to estimate 
households in the first and the third case, and thus assist in the fine tuning of the demand 
for home ownership. 
Research on tenure preference is not in scarce supply. Between 1967 and 1991, surveys 
on tenure preference on a national basis have been conducted every few years. Amongst 
the eight surveys at the national level documented during that period (BSA, 1983,1986, 
1989; Coles, 1991; OPCS, 1979,1989)', six of them were commissioned by the 
Building Societies Association (BSA). The enthusiasm of the BSA is apparent given the 
immense market value of the survey findings to the industry. 
Apart from the few recent surveys commissioned by the BSA, which have a coherent 
questionnaire structure and sampling frames, where the results could be roughly 
compatible, surveys are basically not comparable technically. Despite these technical 
difficulties, such surveys indicate a clear trend in tenure preference over time. From 
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1967 onwards, there was a growing preference for home ownership. In 1967, two 
thirds of households would like to be an home owners, increasing to 81% in 1989, at the 
peak of the price boom. Despite the fact that the rate of owner occupation increased 
from 48% to 66% during the same period, the gap between the desire to own and being 
able to do so in 1989 was still as large as it was two decades previously. The market 
slump in the early 1990s seemed to discourage such desire a little, and the gap be 
narrowed slightly (figure 2.8). 
Conversely, demand for renting diminished despite the fact that private rented property 
had already been in a long process of decline since early this century and local authority 
property since the early 1980s. The recent upturn in preference for renting can largely 
be regraded as a negative response to the preference for home ownership in 1991 
(Figure 2-9). Likewise, research at the local level showed evidence of a similar 
preference pattern in both the preference for home ownership and renting (e. g. Jones, 
1982; Harrison and Lamos, 1980; Saunders, 1990). 
Despite the inordinate preference for home ownership, such preference was not equally 
robust in every tenure group or across age groups. Whilst the overwhelming majority of 
home owners, over 90% in 199 1, prefer owner occupation as an ideal form of tenure, 
only about one third of local authority tenants and less than one half of private tenants 
shared a similar vision (Coles, 199 1). Likewise, less than two thirds of young people 
aged 16 to 24 would prefer owner occupation. These groups are the main sources of 
prospective home owners. Hence, the inter-relation between tenure preference and the 
ability to buy should not be seen as a trivial issue. This issue will be pursued in more 
detail in chapter ten of this thesis. 
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Figure 2.8 Preference for Home Ownership 1967-1991 
Figure 2.9 Preference for Local Authority Renting 1967-1991 
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2.5 NEW FINANCIAL REGIME FOR HOUSING 
ASSOCIATIONS 
The issue of affordability has emerged as a focus for debate in the housing association 
movement since the government disclosed its plan to introduce a new subsidy system for 
housing associations in the white paper on housing in 1987. Despite the relatively small 
size of the sector, which constituted only 3.3% of total housing stock in 1992 (DoE, 
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1993), its importance as a major provider of subsidised housing has grown since the 
early 1980s. Meanwhile, there has been a reduction in public investment in local 
authority housing, with a drastically reduced output of new dwellings and massive sales 
of council houses, such that the stock of local authority housing suffered a 35% 
decrease from 1991 to 1992. Conversely, there was an increase of 72% in housing 
association dwellings during the same period (DoE, 1993). 
Such trends will continue well into the 1990s. Under the new government policy to 
encourage local authorities as enablers rather than providers of housing, responsibility 
for the provision of subsidised rented accommodation would fall to the housing 
associations (Cmnd 214). It was promised that capital spending to housing associations 
would increase three fold in cash terms during the first few years of the 1990s (Cmnd 
1008,1990). The growth of housing associations will be further enhanced by the Large 
Scale Transfer of local authority stocks, which allows local authority tenants to opt for a 
new landlord. In the majority of cases this is likely to be a housing association. 
However, such change is a mixed blessing for the housing association movement. 
Whilst it provides opportunities for development, the 1987 proposal and its subsequent 
legislation, the 1988 Housing Act, introduced a new financial regime for housing 
associations. The 1988 Housing Act put an end to the finance system that has been in 
operation since 1974, which provided a very generous Housing Association Grant 
(HAG), to cover over about 90% of the capital cost of development. 
At the same time, the old system obliged housing associations to charge tenants a fair 
rent which was set by the rent officer and was not within the control of the housing 
association or the Housing Corporation. A complex finance system was also developed 
to supplement later loss or to claw back subsequent surplus. The major objective of 
such a mechanism was to ensure that it would be in a financially neutral position and, 
consequently, housing associations did not have to bear any of the financial risk of 
development (Hills, 1991). 
Whilst the new proposal promises to boost development in the this sector, greater 
output is achieved not only by the injection of public money but also by the involvement 
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of private finance. The new funding system also reverses the previous grant setting 
procedure by fixing HAG first according to a set of Total Costs indicators (TCI), some 
assumed costs of development, and grant rates, both set by the Housing Corporation. 
The difference between the actual development costs and the grant is expected to be 
covered by rent and borrowing from the private sector. Unlike the old system which 
gave housing associations tighter control but safer financial security, under the new 
regime associations are given more freedom of development but at the same time have 
to bear the risk of fluctuation in the costs of development. This gives associations more 
incentive to expand their lettings and to deliver more cost-effective housing and services 
(NFHA, 1992). Smaller associations and more risky projects, unattractive to private 
finance, would be given more financial security or a residual loan but at the same time 
cannot enjoy the comparable freedom as in the tariff projects (Hills, 1991). 
Under the new financial regime, if fair rents were to be continued, future revenue would 
be beyond the control of the associations and there would be uncertainty in fulfilling 
future loan servicing. Such a risk would be unattractive to private finance. Thus fair 
rents were also abolished for new lettings and housing associations are free to set the 
rent level. In addition, grants for future major repair and maintenance was also to be 
replaced by a shiking fund provided from the rent income of the association. This policy 
is intended to encourage associations to build at a higher quality in the first instance and 
to keep good maintenance practice in order to save major maintenance costs in the 
future. 
The increased risk premium through borrowing from private finance and the need to 
accumulate funds for future repair and maintenance created increased pressure on 
housing associations to maximise their rent income. Together with the freedom to set 
rent, it is not surprising that such financial pressure would push up the level of rent. The 
Continuous Recording (CORE) system introduce by the National Federation of Housing 
Associations (NFRA) to monitoring new lettings since 1988 indicates that from the first 
quarter of 1988 to the second quarter of 1991, the average rent of new lets had 
increased by 63% whilst that of the relets by only 40% (NFHA, 1992). 
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Given the economic and household characteristics of housing association tenants, 
increased rent would push more households into housing benefit. Whilst the percentage 
of new tenants out of work was quite stable during the period 1988 to 1990-91 at, 
respectively, 54% and 53% (NFHA, 1993), working households estimated to be eligible 
for housing benefit increased from 29% to 45% from the first quarter of 1988 to the 
second quarter of 1992 (NFHA, 1992). It is thus not surprising that the government 
also has a vested interest in influencing how housing associations set their rents as there 
is a danger that the intended savings from a reduced HAG rate are to be offset by the 
increase in housing benefit expenditure. 
Whilst housing associations are "expected to maximise rental income on all their 
properties" (Housing Corporation, 1989), they are also encouraged to observe the 
principle of rent setting.: rent levels for housing association tenants are "subject to 
overriding requirement of the Tenants' Guarantee that rent must be set and maintained 
within the reach of people in low paid employment" (Housing Corporation, 1989). This 
is where "affordability" enters the rent setting formula. Likewise, it is also in the interest 
of the associations to keep rent affordable to their tenants - which they regard as their 
traditional role in providing housing for people on low incomes. Yet trapped in the 
seemingly irreconcilable demands of keeping rent low and balancing the costs poses a 
fortnidable task for many associations. 
Notwithstanding constant demand from the housing association movement, the 
goverment was initially very reluctant to express explicitly the criterion of affordability. 
Instead, the responsibility was passed back to the associations : 
affordability is for associations to determine. They should take account of a range of 
factors, including the housing market and housing needs locally, like rent levels of 
neighbouring housing associations, the means available to their client groups and the 
ability to pay without hardship. (Housing Corporation, 1989: 2) 
Although it is widely reported that David Edmonds, chief executive of the Housing 
Corporation, mentioned that 33% of income devoted to rent was regarded as affordable 
at the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust conference on 'Affordable Housing' in 1989 
(NFHA, 1989; Maclennan et al, 1990)", it was denied a week later (Housing 
Association Weekly, 21 July 1989). It was not until 1993 when Sir George Young, the 
Housing minister, gave evidence to the Select Committee of the Environment that the 
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working definition of an affordability ratio at 35% used by the Housing Corporation was 
disclosed for the first time. (Select Committee of the Enviromnent, 1993). 
Without any explicit guidelines from the Housing Corporation, the NFHA has developed 
a set of indicator rents as a reference for the member associations. The calculation of 
the indicator rents was mainly based on income data from the CORE surveys and an 
assumption of the proportion of income which should be spent on housing (the 
affordability ratio). The affordability ratio is central to the calculation of the indicator 
rents but since 1989 when the first affordability policy of the NFHA was launched, there 
have been two finther changes to it. Fixing the affordability ratio involved some 
technical description; the relevant detailed discussion is deferred to chapter three. 
Nevertheless, it indicates the complexity of fixing affordability ratios. 
To strike a balance of keeping rents low on the one hand and to recover the costs of 
development on the other hand is already a demanding task right from the beginning of 
the new financial era. It is even more burdensome after a series of cutbacks in housing 
association grant rates, from over 90% before the start of the new financial system to 
the proposed rate of 55% for 1995 to 1996. Against the backdrop of a worsening 
economic position among incoming tenants such a drastic reduction would only 
exacerbate the problem of affordability among housing association tenants. 
2.6 AFFORDABILITY AND COUNCIL TENANTS 
Affordability amongst local authority tenants is not yet an issue, partly because rents of 
local authority lettings are still low compared with other sectors and partly because the 
proportion of tenants claiming housing benefit is relatively high. in 1992, local authority 
tenants on an average spent 121 on housing (including rent, rate and poll tax) while 
home owners with a mortgage had to pay L67 on housing (which includes mortgage 
interest payment, rate, water charge and poll tax) and private tenants in the unfurnished 
rented sector had to spend 141 (CSO, 1993). 
Although rents are low, so is the income of the majority of council tenants. The average 
household income of local authority tenants was only f 153 in 1992 as against an average 
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of 13 90 for mortgagors and 12 10 for private tenants in the unfurnished sector (C SO, 
1993). Thus the majority of council tenants, 52% in 1992, were on full or part housing 
benefit (DoE, 1993 Table 11.3). The present housing benefit system operates in such a 
way that it protects low income tenants from high housing costs, and ensures that the 
problem of affordability in an absolute sense can be avoided, but it also creates 
undesirable side effects. 
However, the seemingly favourable affordability situation amongst council tenants is 
fragile. First, there is a notable proportion of tenants in rent arrears which may indicate 
financial vulnerability among many local authority tenants. Second, the new financial 
regime is exerting upward pressure on rents and may have an adverse effect on 
affordability for council tenants. 
In 1992, over 1.6 million of council tenants were in rent arrears, representing over 4(yYo 
of tenants who paid rent, with an average arrear amounting to seven weeks of average 
rent. Although there is already some stabilisation in both the average arrears and the 
proportion of tenants in arrears in recent years (table 2.1), there was a sharp increase in 
rent arrears in 1998-1989 (Audit Commission, 1989). However, the true position of 
rent arrears is masked by two factors: efficiency of the local authority and the operation 
of the housing benefit system. 
Table 2.1 Local Authoritv Tenants Rent Arrears. Enjkland and Wales 1989-1992 
Year Number in Affem (million) Percentage Avera ge Amount of Armar (f) 
1989 1.97 42.3 152 
1990 1.78 41.8 193 
1991 1.18 40.9 284 
1992 1.60 40.3 212 
Source: CIPFA (1990-1993) Housing Rent Statistics. 
III-managed local authorities are particularly vulnerable to rent arrears. In 1983,22 
local authorities amongst the 95 local authorities surveyed by the Audit Commission 
accounted for half of the total amount of rent arrears. The arrears situations of these 
local authorities appeared to have worsened in a subsequent survey in 1986. Better 
management practice, especially a more rational division of responsibility amongst 
different departments of the local authority, more timely information and designated 
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staff for arrears management were recommended to improve the arrears situation (Audit 
Commission, 1986). Yet the cause of arrears in the first place remains unclear. 
At the same time, many of the arrears cases are actually tenants on housing benefit or in 
the process of being assessed for benefit entitlement. The Audit Commission found that 
in some authorities, only about one third of arrears cases were truly in arrears whilst the 
others were either awaiting assessment or in the process of arranging bank direct debit 
(Audit Commission, 1986). On the other hand, even when housing benefit pays the rent 
in full for tenants on fiffl benefit, many authorities still have to collect a small amount of 
service or other charges from these tenants, whose chance of falling in arrears was no 
less than the other tenants. 
The delay of housing benefit in the 1983 and 1988 surveys can probably be attributed to 
administrative problems of the housing benefit system introduced in 1982 and 1983 
which lasted for a few years (Kemp, 1984). The new housing benefit system introduced 
in 1988 incorporated a series of admiriistration arrangements to rectify the problems 
extant in the old system. The 14 days statutory limit to make housing benefit payment in 
the new system should prevent the problem of delayed payment, though there is no 
mechanism to ensure that it is the right amount of payment (Kemp, 199 1). Thus, rent 
arrears caused through delayed housing benefit payments should have improved 
substantially. The causes of the renudning rent arrears warrant further investigation. 
Another recent change that may have an adverse effect on the affordability of local 
authority tenants is the new financial regime introduced in the 1989 Local Government 
and Housing Act. Although the changes made in this latest legislation did nothing to 
change the policy and basic structure of the subsidy system already in place in 1980, it 
has had the effect of strengthening control from the centre, and aiding the advance 
towards more market like rents. 
Since the Conservative government took office in 1979, there has been a policy strand 
which aims to cut back capital and current spending on housing. Rent increase was one 
of the instruments used in achieving this aim. Subsidy to the local authority under the 
1980 Housing Act depends on the state of the Housing Revenue Account of the 
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authority as well as the assumed changes in both income and expenditure in each local 
authority. The assumed changes in both rents and cost of management were fixed by the 
central government through a series of ministerial determinations which were fixed 
amounts which applied across all authorities in England (Malpass, 1990). 
Such determinations were solely for the purpose of calculating the subsidy. Local 
authorities still had discretion in setting their own rents and subsidised the deficit 
through other sources, notably from rate income. However, financial pressure on local 
finance would make it difficult for local authorities not to follow the determinations in 
rent increase. As Malpass (1990) commented: 
payment of actual subsidy was to be related to assumed movements in income and 
expenditure, an approach which combined powerful leverage on rents ...... whilst at 
the same time putting them [local authorities] in a position where a response more or 
less in line with the centre! s aspiration was hard to resist. (Malpass, 1990 138-139) 
Ministerial determinations of assumed rent increase throughout the 1980s were 
consistently higher than the rate of inflation, which pushed up the real level of rent. 
These increases were particularly high in 1981-82 and 1982-83 (Malpass, 1991 table 
7.1), inducing a steep rise in local authority rent in those two years. in general the 
notional rent increase set by central government had its anticipated effect on the actual 
level of rent. The level of rents adjusted by the retail price index continued to increased 
after 1979 (figure 2.10) and the rate of increase was sharper when the assumed rent 
increase was also steep. In 1983 the steep increase witnessed in the previous two years 
was lightened, albeit with no indication of a U-turn in policy. There was speculation 
that the reduction was the result of a compromise between the Department of the 
Environment, which wanted greater rent increase and lower subsidy on the one hand, 
and the Treasury and the Department of Health and Social Security on the other hand, 
which demanded a halt to the sharp increase in housing benefit expenditure (Malpass, 
1990). 
The impact of the 1980 subsidy system began to lose impetus towards the latter part of 
the 1980s as more and more local authorities fell below the subsidy floor and out of the 
subsidy network. In 1981-82,95% of local authorities in England received a subsidy 
but by 1986-87, three quarters of local authorities were no longer eligible (Ifills, 1991). 
Such authorities thus had no incentive to follow the guidelines on either rent or 
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management cost increases. In order to regain some leverage over local authority 
housing, the 1989 Local Government and Housing Act was introduced. This 
immediately ensured that virtually all local authorities would have complied with the 
national policy criteria. 
Figure 2.10 Local Authority Rent, England and Wales 1979-1992 
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Source: CIPFA Housing Rent Statistics (Various Years) 
There are two key features in the new financial regime- the 'ring fencing' arrangement of 
the HRA, and a major redefinition of housing subsidy (Malpass, 1990ý- Hills, 1991). The 
'ring-fencing' arrangement forbids local authorities to transfer to and from the general 
account, thus ensuring that there is no leeway for the local authority to bypass the 
financial leverage on the subsidy system. Subsidy to HRA is also redefined to include 
subsidy to housing benefit for local authority tenants. Since the majority of council 
tenants receive housing benefit, virtually all local authorities have to revert to the 
subsidy system. There is practically no future opportunity for any local authority to fall 
out of the subsidy system because even if rents rise to a level which would out-balance 
expenditure on housing, the aggregate amount of subsidy would still be increasing; this 
is because subsidy on housing benefit would increase with the increase in gross rent 
(Malpass, 1990). 
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The system of a notional rent increase is still in operation under the new system, as is the 
pressure on real rent increase. In fact, the level of a notional rent increase as fixed by 
the ministerial determinations was already at a much higher level towards the end of the 
1980s than in mid 1980s (Malpass, 1990 table 7.1). At the same time a more diverse 
rent relativity, both nationally and at the local level, was encouraged. Notional rent 
increase is no longer a flat rate across all authorities in England and Wales but is relative 
to the average Right to Buy (RTB) valuation of the existing stock. An average national 
increase in rent is still issued every year, but subsidies to individual local authorities are 
further adjusted by the average RTB valuation. Local authorities are also encouraged to 
set rent differentials on a similar principle. 
This latter change put particularly high pressure on rent increases in areas where there 
were large increases in house prices during the 1980s which pushed up the RTB 
valuation, notably in London and the South East. London already has an increase in the 
real level of rent over the past decade, which has increased faster than the national 
average (Figure 2.11). Greater relativity would surely push rents up further. Although 
a damping measure has been introduced to slow down the impact, there is no intention 
within the government to reverse the trend. The anticipated further rise in rents raises 
the problem of affordability amongst local authority tenants. 
There is also a change in rhetoric in government policy on local authority rents. The 
latest policy statement on rent, revealed by the 1988 consultation paper on new financial 
regimes for local authority housing (DoE, 1988a), though still reiterating the principle of 
setting rents which "[do] not exceed levels within the reach of people in low paid 
employment" DoE 1988a p5) also stressed that "[rent] should, however, be set by 
reference to these two parameters: whatpeople can pay, and what the property is 
worth. " (DoE, 1988a p5-6 emphasis added) It represents a subtle departure from 
previous policy rhetoric that "no one in genuine need would be asked to pay more rent 
than he can reasonably afford" (MOHLG, 1963: 16) or "They [local authority tenants] 
should not have to face high and disruptive increases in costs totally disproportionate to 
changes in their ability to pay. " (DoE, 1977a: 7) 
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Figure 2.11 Change in Local Authority rent, England by Region 1979-1992 
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This new rhetoric involves the issue of affordability (what people can pay) as well as the 
issue of equity: "what the property is worth". Traditionally, rent differentials among 
local authority lettings largely reflect the historical costs rather than the current 
conditions. It remains an issue of "how existing variation on rents can be transformed 
into a more equitable pattern, related to current values" (Malpass, 1990: 176). The 
latter change would inevitably pose a question about affordability for tenants who are 
currently paying rents which are more favourable to them than they would have to pay 
under a more rational valuable system. Thus "questions remain as to the method of 
determining affordability and value, and whether these should be related to incomes 
generally or more specifically tied to conditions in each region or locality. " (Malpass, 
1990: 176) 
2.7 AFFORDABILITY IN THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR 
The private rented sector has experienced a process of decline and decay during the past 
ninety years. Unfike the public rented sector and most countries on the Continent, the 
private rented sector in Britain was not subsidised by public money, but rather was 
characterised by seventy years of rent control and regulation (Stafford and Doling, 
198 1), albeit arguably through indirect subsidies from landlords to tenants 
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(Cullingworth, 1965). It was not until the latter part of the 1980s that this sector 
received both increased public attention and indirect subsidies from government, as well 
as some signs of revival. 
When rent control was first introduced in the 1915 "Increase in Rent and Mortgage 
Interest Act", it was intended as a temporary measure in response to the social unrest 
and crisis in the housing market (Stafford and Doling, 198 1). It was decontrolled, re- 
enacted and decontrolled again several times in the subsequent sixty years until rent 
control was replaced by the fair rent system in 1965. During the period of control and 
regulation, the average rent level in the unfurnished private rented sector (always the 
focus of rent control measures) was consistently lower than that in housing association 
lettings, although it was higher than average local authority rents (DoE, 1991 figure 
I la). 
The 1989 Housing Act, which incorporates and expands new measures introduced in the 
1980s, practically put an end to rent regulation in this sector. Whilst tenants who had 
their rents registered before January 1989 can still be protected by the fair rent system, 
lettings after January 1989 can only be either assured tenure or shorthold assured tenure, 
on which market rents will be charged and tenants have only very limited security of 
tenancy'. There are also signs of an upturn, or at least a stabilisation, from the century 
long decline. The absolute numbers of the stock in the sector (which includes houses 
tied to a job) have been increasing marginally since January 1989 (DoE, 1993). 
However, the decay in housing quality in the private rented sector still continues (DoE, 
1993a), and whether such an upturn is sustainable remains to be seen. 
Perhaps it is rent deregulation in the 1988 Housing Act that has the most important 
implication for affordability. The average rent in the private rented sector has risen by 
43% over the year 1988 to 1990 (DoE, 1991 table 11.5). In the south of the country, 
where demand for rented housing is believed to be more acute, the increase over the 
period was nearly 50% (figure 2.12). Such a large increase was mainly attributable to 
the high rents charged for shorthold assured lettings. This was introduced in the 1988 
Act (to be more precise, a modification of an earlier version of tenure form) which stood 
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at an average of L66 per week (DoE, 1991 table 11.4) - nearly three times the average 
rent for local authority hosing. 
Figure 2.12 Average Rent in Private Rented Sector, England by Region, 1988 and 
1990 
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However, whether such evidence confirms the anticipated outcome of the deregulation 
proponents that decontrol would allow rents to rise to a higher level, and allow a more 
reasonable return for the landlord, is still inconclusive. First, it is argued that before the 
introduction of the deregulation measures in 1980, there were already a considerable 
number of regulated lettings which did not have a registered rent. Such lettings already 
had rents negotiated between the parties concerned, in other words, it was the market 
rent. Deregulation would have little impact on the rent level of such lettings (Kemp, 
1988). In fact lettings in the regulated sector without a registered rent actually have an 
unchanged level of rent in money terms which implies a fall of rent in real terms (DoE, 
1991 table 11.4). Second, new assured lettings created by the Business Expansion 
Schemes were at the high end of the market and of considerably better quality (Crook et 
al, 1991). Thus part of the rent increase was attributable to the improvement in housing 
quality. Third, there is a trend away from unfurnished to furnished lettings (Kemp, 
1992a), whereas the proportion of fumished to unfurnished lettings has increased from 
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1: 4 in 1971 to 1: 1.3 in 1991 (OPCS, 1972,1992). The increase in the average level of 
rent may simply reflect this trend. 
Nevertheless, the effect of changes in the BES and the furnished lettings should not be 
magnified, and the increase in the level of rent in the remainder of the sector still has to 
be accounted for. Probably the level of rents in the rest of the assured lettings released 
from the regulated sector after 1988 has increased substantially. As the proportion of 
assured lettings increases, and these make up over a quarter of all private renting in 
1990, so did the pressure on the general level of rent in the private rented sector. An 
average rent level of 166 for shorthold assured letting which stood at three times the 
average level of local authority lettings cannot be regarded as affordable by the majority 
of tenants on medium or low incomes. It is not surprising that the question of the 
necessity of supply-side subsidy is raised in order to create a commercially viable 
investment environment, in which a reasonable rate of return for landlords and 
affordability for tenants can be balanced (Kemp, 1992a). 
Concomitant with the increase in rent level in the private rented sector is an increase in 
the proportion of income devoted to rent. Ratio of average housing cost to average 
income amongst private tenants in the unfurnished sector 1979 was 9% but in 1992 it 
was 20% (CSO, 1989,1993). They rely increasingly on housing benefit. Despite there 
being several occasions when the generosity of housing benefit has been reduced since 
1983, especially the 1988 housing benefit reform in which 77% of current claimants lost 
out (Kemp, 1992b), the number of private tenants claiming housing benefit is still on the 
increase (figure 2.13). From 1988 to 1992, over three hundred thousand more private 
tenants were claiming housing benefit, an increase of 27%. 
Such an increase is mainly attributable to the remarkable increase in claimants who were 
on income support at the same time during the same period (an increase of 51 %). Given 
the design of the current housing benefit system, which offers full protection for tenants 
on income support (and also tenants whose income level is comparable to those eligible 
to income support) against high rent and, by default, has shielded such tenants from the 
problem of affordability. It nevertheless also creates the undesirable problem of a 
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poverty trap and a disincentive to work when high rent pushes tenants on a relatively 
high income onto housing benefit. 
Figure 2.13 Private Tenants Claiming Housing Benefit, England and Wales 1983- 
1992 
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2.8 AFFORDABELITY AND HOMELESSNESS 
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There has been an upsurge in the number of households accepted as homeless in the last 
decade. The magnitude of the increase is alarming: homeless families increased nearly 
three fold from 1978 to 1990 (figure 2.14). Affordability is also readily perceived as 
being associated with homelessness: people are without a home because they cannot 
afford one. People who are vulnerable to homelessness- the poor, the unemployed, a 
member of an ethnic minority or a lone parent (Greve and Currie, 1990) are also 
common among those who are likely to have an affordability problem. 
However, the direct linkage between homelessness and affordability is not 
straightforward. First, on an aggregate level, there was already an upsurge in the 
number of people accepted as homeless before the crisis of affordability began to 
surface. In fact, the number of homeless people had fallen marginally by the early 
1990s, when the problem of affordability is thought to have been more serious. In 
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addition, affordability was found to be a weak factor in explaining the aggregate level of 
homelessness among local authorities, compared with the much stronger factor of 
ethnicity and other socio-economic characteristics. The effect of affordability on 
homelessness was also found to be unstable over time, or between rural and 
metropolitan regions (Bramley, 1993). 
Second, on the individual household level, the alleged direct causes of homelessness 
appeared to have a weak association with affordability. In 1992, amongst households 
rehoused by local authorities in England, nearly two thirds were the result of eviction by 
friends, relatives or because of relationship breakdown, while just over a tenth were 
related to mortgage default or rent arrears (OPCS, 1994 figure 8.13). At the same time, 
no drastic change in the main causes of homelessness has been observed over the past 
decade. 
Nonetheless, these arguments are not strong enough to refute the connection between 
the two. Reasons given by those rehoused are too crude to explain fully the real cause, 
because "often the actual moment of becoming homeless under the [ 1977 Housing] Act 
is the latest stage in a chain of events that may be far from straight forward" (Clapham et 
al, 1990: 13 1). Likewise, official statistics are believed to be an underestimate of the true 
problem of homelessness. Not only is it simply an administrative classification which 
depends on the discretion of individual local authority, but also there are many other 
homeless people, noticeably the young single homeless, who are not eligible to be 
rehoused within the area. In 1992 less than half of the households applying for homeless 
status were accepted as homeless, besides the 62,900 households living in temporary 
accommodation awaiting permanent rehousing (OPCS, 1994). 
Hence, despite the lack of conclusive evidence of a direct fink between homelessness 
and affordability, the high level of homelessness still serves as a reminder of the acute 
problem of both access to housing and the inability to pay for a decent home. 
Homelessness is believed to be an interplay of demographic, social and economic forces 
(Greve and Currie, 1990). Affordability may well be an intermediate cause of 
homelessness, albeit the exact relationship has yet to be explored. 
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Figure 2.14 Homeless Households Accepted by Local Authority, England 1978-1993 
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2.9 ASSISTANCE WITH HOUSING COSTS 
In most industrialised countries, it is inevitable that the consumers' costs of housing will 
be influenced by government intervention in one form or another (Clapham et al, 1990). 
Such interventions can be classified into two broad types- supply side subsidies and 
demand side subsidies with the latter type gaining more prominence over the past two 
decades (Hills et al, 1990; Kemp, 1990). Demand side assistance is more directly linked 
with affordability. 
Demand side intervention takes the form of subsidies to people, often income-related 
and aiming at enhancing the ability of people to pay for their housing costs (Clapham et 
al, 1990). However, in practice the distinction between supply and demand side 
intervention is less clear-cut because of the close relationship between different elements 
in the housing system. There are roughly four types of demand side subsidies in Britain: 
housing benefit to renters, help for home owners on income support to repay mortgage 
interest, tax relief for home owners and council tax benefit. 
First, tenants on income support, or those whose income is at or below the income 
support applicable amount, are eligible for housing benefit which will cover their rent in 
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full. Whilst tenants whose income is above the applicable amount are still eligible, 
benefit will be withdrawn at the rate of 65p in the pound until benefit ceases when 
payment is less than 50p. In addition, eligible rent for private tenants is subject to an 
assessment by the rent officer to ensure that it is not unreasonably high or the property is 
not unreasonably large. Although such an assessment only affects the reimbursement 
which a local authority can claim from central government, the local authority has 
discretion to go against the recommendation of the rent officer. In practice, it is unlikely 
the local authority would do so very often (Kemp and McLaverty, 1993 a). 
Second, home owners who are buying their home while in receipt of income support can 
claim extra help from income support towards their housing costs. During the first 
sixteen weeks of claiming income support, only half of the mortgage interest payment is 
covered by social security, but from the seventeenth week onward the interest payment 
is covered in full. However, repayment of capital is not covered in either case. 
Third, all home owners repaying their mortgages can receive a 25% reduction in interest 
payment up to a ceiling of a 130,000 loan under the Mortgage Interest Relief at Source 
(MIRAS) Scheme. Home owners are also considered to have received benefit from the 
tax exemption of imputed income. The is the income they earn from letting the property 
to themselves, and exemption from capital gains tax (Enquiry into British Housing, 
1990; Hills, 1991). It is argued that which tax exemptions can be regarded as a housing 
subsidy depends on whether housing is a consumption or an investment good, yet it is 
more appropriate only to include mortgage tax relief (NMUS) as a subsidy to home 
owners (Clapham et al, 1990) 
Finally, a new council tax was introduced in April 1993 to replace the notorious poll tax. 
The new council tax liability is assessed partly on the value of the property and partly on 
the composition of household. Thus it is regarded as a hybrid of property tax and 
household tax (11iffs and Sutherland, 1991; Giles and Ridge, 1993). It can be regarded 
as a part of housing costs since at least some of the tax is related to the cost of housing 
consumption. A new benefit, the council tax benefit, was introduced together with the 
council tax. It is administered by the local authority and has the same rule of eligibility 
as housing benefit. Unlike the poll tax benefit which it replaces, council tax benefit 
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would cover the full tax liability (after adjustment for non-dependents and other 
deductions), and the rate of withdrawing the benefit is set at 20p in the pound (20% 
taper)(CPAG, 1994). 
With the exception of NURAS, all the afore mentioned benefits are means-tested. The 
N1IRAS is granted to all home owners whatever their need and level of income. In fact, 
it is regarded as regressive and many recent studies show that it benefits the rich more 
than the poor (Clapharn et al, 1990; Warburton, 1990; 11ills, 199 1). Despite a two fold 
increase in the total cost of MH? _AS over the decade 1979 to 1999 (Hills, 1991), the 
amount each mortgagee receives is too meagre to render any substantial help to those in 
affordability problem. Conversely, home owners who are in need cannot get any extra 
help from MIRAS. Since all social security payment towards interest repayment are net 
of interest relief, any benefit from MIRAS is simply offset by a corresponding deduction 
in social security benefit. 
Means tested benefits, on the other hand, are targeted at those who are in need, at least 
they are designed to be so. Such benefits, however, suffer from two problems: take-up 
and the poverty trap (Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983). The problem of take up occurs 
because people who are entitled to the benefit do not apply for it. In 1987 it was 
estimated that 88% of eligible tenants took up housing benefit (DSS, 1992). The 
implication is that more than 10% of tenants in need of help received no housing benefit. 
The factors affecting take up are rather complex (Kemp, 1992b) but it nevertheless 
suggests that the benefit system cannot prevent those in need suffering from a problem 
which benefit is intended to mitigate. 
Hence, although both housing benefit and council tax benefit provide full protection 
against the costs of housing (subject to the test of reasonable rent and space), it is not 
unusual to find tenants unable, or who find it difficult, to meet their housing costs, 
because of the problem of take up. For home owners on benefit, even if the take up is 
100%, there is no guarantee that this will overcome all difficulties in repaying their 
mortgages, because new claimants have to pay half the amount of their interest payment 
and all claimants have to make their capital repayment. 
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The poverty trap arises from the interplay between the tax and benefit systems. As the 
gross earning income of a claimant increases, both tax and the withdrawal of benefit 
entitlement would eat up pan of the increase. They may therefore achieve only a small 
gain in net earning: a small increase in net income may cover a relatively large range of 
gross income (a plateau in the graph linking net income and gross income). Under a 
high tax rate or a steep taper, the plateau will be flatter, and under some special 
interaction of the design of the tax and benefit system, an increase in gross income may 
even result in a decrease in net income at some point in the income range (an example is 
the rent rebate system before the 1988 reform). The extent to which the plateau 
stretches up the income scale depends on the design of the benefit system. The poverty 
trap has an adverse effect on the incentive to increase earnings, since it is difficult to 
justify extra effort which results in only a marginal gain in net income. 
A taper of 65% in the current housing benefit would have produced a very severe 
poverty trap. Hills (1991) shows that under the housing benefit, tax, national insurance 
contribution, poll tax benefit and family credit systems from 1989 to 1990, there could 
only be an increase in net income of f 14 over a range of increase of 113 1 in gross 
income. Over some ranges of gross income, there could be a gain of only 4p for every 
extra earned pound. Changes have been made in the early years of the 1990s: tax rates 
have been reduced, the new council tax benefit is more generous than the poll tax 
benefit, but it also has a steeper taper. If this is assessed with the introduction of VAT 
on fuel (where the cost of heating can be regarded as pan of housing costs), higher 
national insurance contributions and other tax increases in 1994, the situation of the 
poverty trap has to be re-assessed. 
Likewise, home owners on benefit are trapped in the even more severe rule of benefit 
withdrawal. The taper for income support is 100% and the claimant will end up with no 
improvement in net income over a very large range of gross income. There is an 
additional work disincentive for a claimant on income support, particularly for home 
owners repaying a mortgage. Since a claimant has to be out of fidl time employment, or 
in part time work working less than 16 hours a week, in order to be eligible for income 
support, there is no incentive for a home owner on income support to take a low paid, 
full time job even if it is available. For a tenant, taking a full time job would not affect 
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the benefit entitlement very much because he or she can still be eligible for housing 
benefit and family credit. But for a home owner Still repaying a mortgage, switching to 
family credit means the loss of social security support to pay off the mortgage interest 
which may be very substantial. This unemployment trap may have prevented many 
home owners from improving their standard of living by increasing their earned income. 
High housing costs have a detrimental effect on both the poverty and the unemployment 
trap. For a given portfolio of design of the tax and benefit systems, the level of gross 
income at which housing benefit is withdrawn depends on the cost of housing, since it is 
the only parameter in the benefit formula which is not fixed. The poverty trap will only 
cease when the entitlement is withdrawn and it would stretch finiher up the income scale 
with the increase of housing costs to the claimant. Thus, even if housing benefit can 
protect tenants on full benefit from high rent, there is a side effect exacerbating the 
problem of the poverty trap. Likewise, a home owner paying off a comparatively large 
mortgage would have to take up a highly paid full time job before the increased earning 
could compensate for the loss of benefit entitlement. 
The present system cannot protect both tenants and home owners who spend a large 
proportion of their income on housing. FMs (1991) shows that even for a modest level 
of rent (130pw), which was at a level in-between the average rent of local authority and 
the private rented sector, the net rent to net income ratio can be as high as 35% for a 
single person aged 25 or over. The higher the rent the claimant has to pay, the higher 
the possible maximum rent to income ratio will be. For a home owner on income 
support, the net housing cost to net income ratio depends on whether mortgage 
repayment is regarded as a part of housing cost. If it is not, the net ratio is always zero, 
but if it does include capital repayment, the ratio would depend on the amount of capital 
repayment, which may be very substantial. 
There are alternative means to rectify, or at least to mitigate, problems within the benefit 
system (see Enquiry into British Housing, 1990; Hills, 199 1; Kemp, 1992b; Wilcox, 
1993). Most of them are not designed specifically to mitigate the problem of 
affordability but would still have an impact on the problem. Hills (1991) proposes a dual 
taper system for housing benefit under which the maximum net housing cost to income 
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ratio would be reduced, compared with the present single taper system. Extending 
housing benefit to home owners was also proposed (Enquiries into British Housing, 
1991; Webb and Wilcox, 1991), which would mitigate the problem of affordability for 
home owners in low paid work. 
2.10 SOME GENERAL ISSUES 
Apart from the above mentioned issues related to specific tenure and area of social 
policy, there are also a number of general issues concerning affordabHity raised in the 
literature which worth fimher examination. They are whether affordability is one issue 
or a manifestation of several issues, whether the issue of affordability is only cyclical or 
enduring, whether it is myth or reality and whether it is an income or a housing problem. 
A brief discussion of such issues will be provided in this section and will also be further 
examined in the concluding chapter in fight of the empirical findings in this thesis. 
One Issue Or Several 
Bramley (1994) argues that affordability, at least as far as politicians and the media are 
concerned, features two separate issues: "One dealing with the mainstream tenure of 
owner occupation and its relations with the national economy, and the other with 
financing the social sector" (Bramley, 1994: 118), rather than various manifestations of a 
single underlying issue. Whereas some other phenomenon, notably homelessness, 
"forms a bridge between these two arenas" (Bramley, 1991: 118). 
Likewise, SERPLAN (1990) (The London and South-East Regional Planning 
Conference) also distinguishes two levels of the affordability problem: the primary level 
at which households are unable to get access to any tenure owing to the lack of 
resources, and the secondary level of the problem which arises because of short term 
fluctuations in the housing market. 
In addition, Linneman and Megbolugbe (1992) portray a more complex picture of 
affordability entangled in the interlocking elements of the housing system, and every 
aspect of the system can be a potential manifestation of affordability. 
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A counter argument to these is that there is one underlying cause of the affordability 
problem, namely the increasing reliance on market forces, witnessed by an accelerated 
shift from supply side subsidy to demand side subsidy. Because of the imperfections of 
the housing market and underlying maldistribution of income, market forces are not 
capable of fulfilling the housing requirements of those who are in greatest need 
(Whitehead, 1991). Analysis the issue of affordability in such a way implies that it is in 
fact a single issue. 
Whether It Is Cyclical Or Enduring ? 
Bramley (1994) also argues that despite continual public attention on affordability in the 
owner occupied sector throughout the past few years, the focus has actually undergone 
several changes: from the difficulties of access to home ownership in time of house price 
boom, to the concern of the home owners vulnerable to arrears and repossession, then 
the repercussion of the market slump on the performance of wider economy. Queries 
about the integrity of the affordability issue thus arise. Although the present concern 
can still be regarded as an issue of affordability, but in a broader sense, the cyclical 
fluctuation of the housing market has already shifted the nature of the issue. 
On the other hand, whilst the issue of affordability in the social rented sector still 
remains a technical one, it has an enduring policy impact. It appears to be developing in 
a direction favoured by the housing professionals and lobbies: a halt to the expected 
decrease in the Housing Association Grant and a continuation of injecting public money 
into the social rented sector. These not only demonstrate "a legacy of recognition that 
the affordability problems were serious" (Bramley, 1994: 122) but also signify 
affordability as an enduring problem. 
A Myth or Reality 
Whilst traditionally affordability was perceived as a problem of households who are 
unable to pay their housing costs, the recent focus of the affordability crisis on owner 
occupiers and the high house prices that triggered the concern, this traditional 
perception is under challenge. Drawing mainly from experience in the United State, 
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Linneman and Megbolugbe (1992) suggest that affordability is no longer an "issue solely 
the province of the very-low-income households; it is now a middle-class issue" 
(Linneman and Megbolugbe, 1992: 3 70). 
Notwithstanding that the affordability issue has been extended into the middle class, 
Linneman. and Megbolugbe (1992) argue that the affordability problem among the 
middle class is only a myth: "an issue manufactured by middle-class and affluent young 
adults with ever-growing expectation .... much of the perceived affordability crisis simply 
reflects changes in tastes for housing amenities and unrealistic expectation for house 
price appreciation" (Linneman and Megbolugbe, 1992: 388). 
Whilst such a proposition has yet to be validated in a British context, empirical findings 
suggest evidence in its favour. Ford and Wilcox (1992) reported that in their 1992 
survey over two thirds of the households whose homes were repossessed had a net 
income in excess of L200 per week, a level of income above what is regarded as a low 
income. 
There is an additional dimension to the myth. The wide spread of the preference for 
home ownership, fuelled by easy borrowing and financial incentives from the 
government (for example tax incentives and the RTB), may have driven many 
households into owner occupation, regardless of their long-term prospective 
affordability. Saunders (1990) quotes "an appreciating asset" as one of the most 
popular reason why households in his samples bought their homes, an aspiration which 
goes beyond the real use of the property. Whereas Yip and McLaverty (1993) show that 
there has always been an excess of demand for home ownership among renters in the 
past two decades, but in both 1978 and 1988 the majority of tenants who wanted to buy 
would not be able to sustain home ownership. The recent fall in nominal house prices 
may have broken the myth of a house as an ever-appreciating asset (Bramley, 1994) and 
already had an unfavourable effect on the preference for home ownership (Coles, 1991). 
Those low income households which have been misled should not have been driven into 
home ownership in the first place. 
An Income Problem or a Housing Problem ? 
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Whilst affordability for low-income households remains a real issue, it is not yet clear 
whether it is an income problem or a housing problem. Whitehead (1991) argues that 
the present housing benefit system has little to do with housing policy. Neither does the 
benefit assume that claimants can change the quality of their housing, nor incorporate 
the objective of improving quality in its design; the benefit acts simply as an income 
supplement. 
Likewise, the residual income approach, arguably a superior approach to measuring 
affordability (e. g. Brownill et al, 1990; Bramley, 1994; Hancock, 199 1) regards the cost 
and the quality of housing as unimportant. The ultimate assessment refers to a poverty 
fine which is essentially a measurement of poverty. In fact, an approach similar to that 
for residual income is used in the DSS Households Below Average Income series 
OFIBAI) (DSS, 1990), but such indicator is used to measure 'poverty' instead of 
'affordability. It also signals the underlying perspective on affordability as an income 
problem among those who favour this approach. 
However, Whitehead (1991) also points out that, contrary to the income supplement 
program in general, which usually involves cash transfer without reference to any 
particular kind of consumption, housing benefit is linked to the cost of housing. This is 
also a common feature of income-related housing allowances in other industrialised 
countries (Kemp, 1990). It reflects the special characteristics of housing, which cannot 
be satisfactorily coped with a general income transfer programme. The affordability 
problem, in this aspect, exhibits the functioning (or malffinctioning) of the housing 
system as well as warranting a policy response that is distinctive to housing. 
2.11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The concern of affordability in the 1980s was initially focused on two tenures: owner 
occupation and the housing association sector. It was the state of the housing markets 
and the change of government policy that provoked such concern. A more detailed 
analysis in this chapter reveals repercussions which go beyond the initial concerns into 
other tenures and other areas of housing and social policy. 
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Perhaps the alarm on affordability was first raised when the rate of both property 
repossessions and mortgage arrears rocketed towards the end of the 1980s. The causes 
attributed to these problems were complex but it is argued that the relaxation of lending 
policy by building societies in the 1980s, coincident with the worsening economic and 
employment conditions, were to blame. 
The unprecedented high level of house prices in the late 1980s also aroused concern 
about the entry to owner occupation. In the climate of a relaxed housing finance regime 
and high house prices, it was less the barrier of an initial deposit that hampered entry to 
home owners than the burden of a high amount of initial repayment. Subsequent high 
interest rates and deteriorating employment markets pushed many new home buyers into 
financial difficulties. Those in the worst situations were forced to fall behind with their 
repayments or had their homes repossessed. The luckier ones would have a large 
proportion of their income sunk into mortgage repayments. The price fall early in 1990 
did not ease the burden of the financially stretched, but instead created the problem of 
negative equity that makes it difficult to sell homes to gain any relief. 
Previous studies on the entry to home ownership largely ignore the interplay between 
the preference for becoming a home owner and the ability to buy. This tends to over- 
estimate the demand for home ownership. Incorporating preference in the estimation of 
demand for home ownership would help to fine-tune the accuracy of estimation. 
Besides the access to owner occupation, the other initial concern of affordability was 
among housing association tenants triggered by the introduction of a new financial 
regime and is still robust. The debate on how housing associations can attract private 
finance and maxmuse their rent income on the one hand and keep rents affordable to 
their tenants on the other hand are continuing. Recent cut backs in the housing 
association grant rate and the disclosure of the government's working affordability ratio 
has refuelled the impetus of the debate. Yet there is still no satisfactory method by 
which affordability can be measured. 
Likewise, local authority tenants who were traditionally perceived to be immune from 
any affordability issue are increasingly jeopardised through problems of affordability. 
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The new financial regime introduced in 1990 reiterated the government's intention to 
push up rents. This latest legislation is also equipped with two additional weapons: a 
redefined subsidy system which pre-empts any future breakaway of local authorities 
from the subsidy system and escape from central control; and a new system of assessing 
notional rent increases which are based on the average RTB valuation. The latter 
measure creates pressure for further rent increases and creates the issue of affordability 
among council tenants. 
If social tenants could not immune form the problem of affordability, their counterparts 
in the private tenants should be a more obvious group to experience an affordability 
problem in recent years. Deregulation in the rental markets in the late 1980s has pushed 
up both rents and the proportion of income tenants have to spend on rent. An absence 
of any sign of a halt in the increase in rent and the deterioration of economic conditions 
among private tenants will increase the dependency of private tenants on housing 
benefit. 
Whereas the problem of affordability signifies difficulties in paying for housing, the 
problem of homelessness indicates a problem of physical access to housing. The number 
of homeless families in official statistics has shown a three fold increase in the 1990s, not 
including the concealed homeless people and those not counted in official statistics. 
Yet, whilst the problems of affordability and homelessness have close links with each 
other, there may be no direct causal relationship. They both reflect the increasingly 
difficult access to housing, the diminishing ability to pay for housing costs and defects in 
the housing system. 
Affordability, at least in principle, should not mist under the current housing benefit 
system since tenants on a low income who are having difficulties in paying for their 
housing would have full protection against high rent. However, because of the problem 
of low take up, such protection cannot be extended to all those in need. It also creates a 
poverty trap which hampers work incentives. Under the present social security system, 
home owners out of work can get help from social security towards their mortgage 
interest payment but unlike tenants on housing benefit, they are not offered full 
protection against high housing costs, and instead the social security system constructs 
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an unemployment trap on top of the poverty trap. High housing costs exacerbate the 
magnitude of both poverty and unemployment traps and under the present system there 
is no guarantee for either tenants or home owners against having to spend a high 
proportion of their income on housing. 
Beside the aforementioned manifestation of affordability in different tenures and 
Merent areas of social and housing policy, there are still some general issues on 
affordability that worth further investigation. It is debatable whether affordability in its 
various expressions is simply different manifestations of a single underlying issue, or of 
several phenomenons. Neither is it clear whether the problem is cyclical or enduring. in 
addition, some commentators regard the issue itself (or issues themselves) as partly a 
real problem of the poor and partly a reflection of merely an aspiration of the middle 
class. Finally, whether the issue is an income problem or a housing problem would have 
direct implications for the policy response it seeks. 
One important question remains. Malpass (1990) points out that to implement the new 
rent setting policy, a method of determining affordability for local authority tenants must 
be developed. The National Federation of Housing Association (NFHA) has been 
muddling with this for the past few years and despite a third change in its affordability 
policy, the task still seems to be continuing. The chapter that follows win examine, in 
more detail, how attempts to define and measure affordability have been made and to 
explore the possibility of establishing a more coherent way to determine affordability. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPT AND MEASUREMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the increasing concern about affordability in the last decade, and given the 
importance of a clear definition and precise measurement of affordability, there is still no 
consensus on how affordability should be defined and measured, or even about whether 
it is a helpful concept. Whilst housing practitioners in the UK embrace the housing cost 
to income ratio as an indicator of affordability, similar to their counterparts on the 
continent and across the Atlantic, academic discourses in the UK are still sceptical about 
the contribution of the concept of affordability regarding housing policy, and about the 
relevance of the housing cost to income ratio as an effective measurement. Rather than 
being accepted as a real policy issue (Whitehead 1989) the importance of affordability is 
either dismissed as mere rhetoric or, at best, is considered to be an extension of the 
concept of need (Whitehead et al 1993). At the same time, the housing cost to income 
ratio is often regarded as a second-rate indicator of affordability compared to residual 
income measurement (Bramley 1990b, Brownill 1990, Hancock 1993). 
in other industrialised countries, notably the United States, the use of the housing cost 
to income ratio has been used exclusively as an indicator of affordability since the 1920s 
(Lane 1977). However, despite its long history of usage, vigorous examinations of the 
concept are still uncommon and the choice of the cut-off ratio still remains largely a 'rule 
of thumb' (Lane 1977). Conversely, discourses on affordability in the UK, although 
relatively new, are beginning to advance beyond the mitial tenure-specific deliberations 
and involve more sophisticated economic analyses (e. g. Hancock, 1991). Thepurposeof 
this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of both the concept of affordability 
and of past attempts to implement the concept and thus to further contribute to 
advancing the discourse. 
This chapter consists of five sections. First, various definitions of affordability will be 
reviewed, to extract some basic principles on defining affordability connnon to those 
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definitions. This is followed by an analysis of affordability in relation to the notion of 
merit good and opportunity cost, two econorr c concepts which are considered essenti Ii al 
in the understanding of affordability. The third and fourth sections will systematically 
review and critically examine the various approaches and definitions of affordability. 
The last section is a re-examination of the concept of affordability in which possible 
alternatives to the present measurements are explored. 
3.2 DEFINMON 
Many discussions on affordability proceed without a stated definition of the concept; 
others rely only on an operational definition, notably among academic studies in North 
America, which is no more than an arbitrary ratio. Even where a definition is provided, 
it is sometimes not easy to offer a stand-alone definition: 
affordable housing is defined as: that which is accessible to people whose incomes are 
insuf1ficient to enable them to afford adequate housing locally in the open market. 
(SERPLAN 1990: 2 italic added) 
Without becoming subject to such entanglement, Howenstine (1983) defines 
affordability in a concise way by relating household income to housing outgoings: 
the ability of the household to acquire decent accommodation by the payment of a 
reasonable amount of its income on shelter. (Howenstine 1983: 20) 
In Howenstine's definition, what a reasonable amount of a household's income should be 
is not explicit. It could be understood in terms of the distribution of household budget 
on housing and non-housing expenditures as Fallis (1986) describes it: 
Households can be said to afford their housing cost if those costs do not extract an 
unreasonable share of the household budget, leaving the household with sufficient 
income to meet other needs such as food, clothing, transport, medical care, 
education, etc (Falfis, 1986: 144) 
Maclennan and Williams (1990), on the other hand, offer a more elaborate definition 
which expresses 'decent accommodation! and 'reasonable amount' in a more elegant 
manner: 
Affordability is concerned with securing some given standard of housing (or dfferent 
standards) at a price or rent which does not impose, in the eyes of some third party 
(usually government) an unreasonable burden on household incomes (Maclennan and 
Williams, 1990: 9) 
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Likewise, 'given standard of housing' and 'unreasonable burden', can be interpreted in a 
more specific way: 
Households should be able to occupy housing that meets well-established (social 
sector) norms of adequacy (given household type and size) at a net rent which leaves 
them enough income to five on without falling below some poverty standard. 
(Bramley, 1990a: 16) 
Notwithstanding the difference in emphasis of these definitions, they possess several 
shared common elements. First, affordability deals with the user cost of housing of an 
individual household. The shift of housing subsidy away from the supply side towards 
the demand side has contributed to directing increased attention onto affordability 
(Whitehead and Kleinman, 1993). 
Second, the household should be consuming housing to some given lowest standard, 
albeit it is referred to as 'decent' or 'at some social sector norms'. Third, the opportunity 
cost of non-housing consumption is an important concern of affordability. Part of the 
expenditure of the household on non-housing goods and services has to be forgone in 
order to acquire adequate housing goods and services. 
Fourth, affordability also embraces the notion of merit good. It is apparent that non- 
housing goods and services are regarded as a merit good since a household is expected 
to have guaranteed sufficient resources left for non-housing consumption. Whether 
housing is seen as a merit good or not is unclear. Whitehead (1989) argues that recent 
changes in housing policy in the LJK indicate "an apparently important shift in political 
attitude, away from treating housing as a merit good... towards treating housing more as 
a private good" (Wbitehead, 1989: 877). On the other hand, Hancock (1993) opines that 
"any approach [of affordability] which does not take housing to be a merit good is likely 
to be unreasonable" (Hancock, 1993: 129). 
Finally, treating non-housing consumption as a merit good suggests a close relationship 
between affordability and the concept of poverty. Households should be left with 
'sufficient income for other need' (Fallis 1985) which'does not impose an unreasonable 
burden on a household's income'(Maclennan and Williams, 1990), orwithout falling 
into some poverty standard' (Bramley, 1990a). However, affordability should be a 
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concept distinct from poverty. The discussion of such a distinction will be further 
deliberated in a later section. 
Whilst affordability is related to the concept of poverty, as suggested by Bramley 
(1990a), the resulting financial burden on the household need not inevitably involve the 
judgement of a third party. The normative approach to poverty measurement is only 
one among several approaches to defining poverty. Likewise, it will be argued later in 
this chapter that other approaches are possible in the measurement of affordability. 
What the concept of affordability does not address is the effect on the supply of housing, 
which is traditionally encompassed by the concept of need, and its implications for the 
underlying maldistribution of income. Moreover, affordability is also focused on the 
user cost of housing and treats housing as a private good which would strongly incline 
towards a market oriented policy prescription. 
3.3 THE CONCEPT OF AFFORDABILM 
The definitions of affordability presented in the preceding section link a household's 
expenditure on housing explicitly with its income and, implicitly, with its expenditure on 
non-housing goods and services. The housing cost of which a household is prepared to 
pay relates also to its demand for housing. This demand can in turn be derived from the 
utility function of a household. Suppose a household's utility (U) depends on its 
consumption on housing (H) and other goods and services (Y), a utility function can be 
expressed in terms of the consumption quantity of these two kinds of goods (Formula 
3.1). Subject to a budget constraint in which the combined consumption of these two 
goods cannot exceed the total income of the households (Z) (Formula 3.2), maximising 
the utility function would yield the demand function of the household as in formula 3.3. 
The demand for housing can be expressed as a function of the household income and the 
unit price of housing (Malpezzi and Mayo, 1985, Groodaeft and Dulois, 1986): 
U- U(H, Y) 
Whffe U- Houmhold 's Utdily (3.1) 
H- Hawsft ConswWtim 
Y- Non-Howft Comsortion 
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Z 'PHH-pyY 
Where Z- Household Income 
PH - Un't Price of Housing (3.2) H- Housing Consunraim 
py- Price Index for Non -housing Goods 
Y- Consumption of Non -housing Goods 
H- h(Z, pff) 
Where H- Homing Constimption 
(3-3) 
Z- Howehold Income 
PH ' UK" Pr'Ce of HOUS'Mg 
This thesis does not intend to go into detailed discussion of economic concepts, but to 
stimulate discussion later in this chapter, it is helpful to illustrate further the relationship 
between housing affordability, housing and non-housing consumption. Such an 
illustration was offered by Hancock (1993) who presented an excellent graphic 
visualisation of this relationship; it is illuminating to replicate the illustration here. 
Hancock (1993) used a simplified dichotomy Figure 3.1 Minimalist Definition of 
of the level of consumption of housing (H) 
Affordability 
Non-Howing 
Y 
and non-housing (1) goods and services to # 
illustrate the concept of affordability in 
relation to household consumption. From a 
normative perspective, there exists levels of 
the consumption of both housing and non- 
housing goods and services appropriate to 
the size and characteristics of the household, 
below which life is considered to be 
intolerable. These levels are denoted respectively as H' and ), and are represented by 
the point E on a graph showing housing (H) and non-housing (Y) consumptions as the 
axes (figure 3.1). The position of point E on the axes is determined by the relativity of 
the prices of housing and non-housing goods and services. Evidently both housing and 
non-housing consumption are regarded as merit good because )' and E* are the level of 
consumption society regards as the minimally accepted level and by definition, merit 
good. 
Hancock (1993) provides a minimalist definition of affordability. This only regards the 
consumption possibility in area A of figure 3.1 as an indicator of housing unaffordability 
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since the household is not able to consume either housing or non-housing goods and 
services at the minimum accepted level. Region B is an unambiguous indicator of 
affordability since the household is consuming both housing and non-housing goods and 
services above the minimum level. The affordability status of both regions C and D is 
unclear and more information is required to clarify the affordability position of 
households with consumption combinations in both regions on the preferences and 
constraints such households face (Hancock, 1993). 
The minimalist definition clearly has not taken into account possible consumption 
combinations imposed by budgetary constraints on a household. The budgetary 
constraint imposes on the household a limit number of consumption combinations, given 
the income level and the corresponding relative price of housing and non-housing goods 
and services. The consumption combinations can be represented by a straight line with 
negative slope on the graph whose slope would depend on the relative prices of both 
goods and services. The line can also be used to demonstrate the opportunity cost of 
housing and non-housing goods (figure 3.2). 
Considering the budget constraint on a household whose income is just large enough to 
allow it to consume at level H* and r, with some given relative price of housing and 
non-housing consumption, the line FG 
would represent all the possible 
consumption alternatives at that given 
income level. The consumer with 
consumption combinations in the shaded 
areas FYE and GH*E cannot reach the 
point E because of income constraint. 
Thus, a household with consumption 
combinations in the two shaded triangles 
should also be regarded as being in 
unaffordable housing (Hancock, 1993). 
Figure 3.2 Affordability for an Individual 
Household 
Non-Housing 
Y 
h'* .-. ____,.. 
H 
a Housing 
Hancock (1993) also argues that it is important, for the purpose of policy response, to 
distinguish under-consumption of housing because of perverse choice or under- 
52 
consumption of non-housing goods and services through the constraints faced by the 
household in adjusting to its housing consumption. The former case occurs when an 
individual's preference does not conform to the judgement of society. The individual 
household would still choose to consume housing at a level lower than the socially- 
accepted standards even if it is given, in the first instance, minimum standards of housing 
through allocation or some other mechanism. Possible policy intervention should be 
geared towards persuading or inducing households to adjust their housing consumption 
to socially defined standards. 
On the other hand, over-consumption of non-housing goods and services might result 
from the inability of a household to adjust its housing consumption downwards to a level 
above the socially defined minimum standards. Such inability may arise because of 
indivisibility in the consumption of housing or some other non-income constraint on 
housing consumption. It could be impossible for the household to adjust housing 
consumption to the optimum point E because that level of housing consumption is either 
unavailable (because of the functioning of the housing markets) or the household is 
unwilling to adjust to an alternative level of housing consumption (for example because 
of the emotional attachment to a house). 
The above arguments illustrate the complexity of disentangling reasons leading to the 
consumption combinations in areas C and D in figure 3.1. Budgetary constraints on 
households have put those with consumption combinations in the triangles F)IF, and 
GH*E in figure 3.2 in unaffordable housing. The unshaded area of region D in figure 
3.2, albeit being referred to as a perverse choice, actually represents the discrepancy 
between social and private preference in Figure 3.3 Extended Definition of 
housing consumption. Likeikise, the Affordability 
unshaded area of region C may arise from 
non-income constraints on housing 
consumption or imperfections in the housing 
market. 
Given such complexity and the additional 
difficulties of determining relative price and H' 
),. H Howing 
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Non-Housing 
y 
income distributions in different localities, Hancock (1993) argues that it is preferable to 
adopt a broader definition of affordability. Households with consumption combinations 
in region B in figure 3.1 which are unambiguously able to consume both housing and 
non-housing goods and services beyond the socially defined minimum standards should 
be regarded as affordable. Whilst households with consumption in the regions C and D 
should be reclassified as unaffordable (shaded areas in figure 3.3). Furthermore, such 
redefinition would inevitably include households which could afford to consume at both 
H' and )' but which choose not to. It is suggested that affordability should no longer be 
regarded as a dichotomous concept but that some grey areas in the definition should be 
recognised (Hancock, 1993). 
Similar analysis can be applied to the two Figure 3.4 Ratio Measurement of 
most commonly used measurements of 
Affordability 
Non-Housing 
affordability, ratio measurement and residual Y 
income measurement. A household is 
i 
deemed to be in unaffordable housing, 
DD 
Y 
measured by the ratio definition of - ------------ - 
X 
affordability, if the housing costs of the AC 
household exceed a threshold ratio. Using D-- H 
the same definitions of both Y and H as in 
HO Housing 
previous figures, the ray OJ in figure 3.4 represents combinations of housing and non- 
housing goods in which the proportion of housing consumption to total household 
budget is at the target ratio. The slope of the ray depends on the relative price of H and 
Y as well as the target ratio. It is possible to choose the target ratio so that the ray 
passes through the point E. The shaded part of the graph represents housing 
consumption which takes a proportion of the household's income in excess of the target 
ratio and so is unaffordable. 
In a similar debate, in figure 3.1 to 3.3 Hancock (1993) argues that there are logical 
flaws in the ratio measurement of affordability. The region D, which is considered to 
require more information to clarify the situation of affordability, is regarded as 
unambiguously affordable by the ratio measurement. Likewise, the region C, also an 
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ambiguous area in the previous definition, is clearly classified as unaffordable by ratio 
measurement. 
Perhaps the most forceful illustration of the anomaly of ratio measurement, argued by 
Hancock (1993), is the comparison between the household in consumption combinations 
x and y. The household at x clearly consumes both housing and non-housing goods 
below the socially accepted minimum, yet is considered to be in affordable housing. 
Conversely, the household at y is classified as experiencing unaffordable housing when it 
is in fact much better off than the previous household. 
Another commonly used measurement, the Figure 3.5 Residual Income 
residual income measurement, can be 
Measurement of Affordability 
Non-Housing 
illustrated in a similar way. Hancock 
(1993) referred to the 'official definition' of 
affordability which is based on the 
operation of the housing benefit system. A 
household is eligible for housing benefit if 
its income after housing costs are paid is 
less than the applicable amount of income 
support. It is argued that the income 
:E 
------------------ ---------------------- --- 
----- --- ----------- H me Hw Housing 
support scale rate constitutes an official poverty standard for non-housing goods (Y. ) 
since the full housing cost is covered by housing benefit for a household having an 
income below that level. Housing benefit would cease if the cost of housing were 
considered to be unreasonable through either high unit cost or over-consumption. Thus, 
according to the official definition households consuming non-housing goods less than 
r and housing goods less than the maximum permitted level (H.,,,, ), the shaded region in 
figure 3.4, experience unaffordable housing (Hancock, 1993). 
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3.4 THE MEASUREMENT OF AFFORDABILITY 
Both definitions of affordability delineated by Maclennan and Williams (1990) and 
Branfley (I 990a) in section 3.2 emphasise the normative judgement of a socially 
desirable level of housing and non-housing consumption. The two commonly used 
measurements of affordability, ratio measurement and residual income measurement, 
operationalise the concept with reference to some normatively defined cut-off level. 
However, the normative approach to affordability is not the only possible framework. 
Like the development of a poverty measurement in its early stage, which was dominated 
by normative approaches around the issue of human subsistence, it is not surprising that 
the development of affordability is also overshadowed by a normative approach. 
Recently, new approaches to affordability measurement have been suggested (e. g. 
Bramley, 1994) or have already been implemented (e. g. Kearns, 1993). This section 
attempts to review the various approaches to measuring affordability. However, 
because of the absence of any fi-amework for classification of the approaches to 
affordability, and given the close relationship between the concepts of affordability and 
poverty, this section will draw on the classifications used in poverty measurement to 
shed light on measurement issues relating to affordability. 
The operationalisation of affordability can roughly be classified into three broad 
approaches: normative, behavioural and subjective. The normative framework is the 
most developed and embraces a number of different measuring strategies. The two 
other approaches are either primitive in their method or unsophisticated in their 
conceptual basis. 
Normative Approach 
Normative measurement defines the limits or norms of affordability in terms of certain 
threshold values. The two most commonly used norms are, first: the housing cost of a 
household should not exceed a certain proportion of the household's income and second: 
income remaining after housing cost is paid for should not be lower than the poverty 
56 
line. The former is referred to as the ratio measurement, and the latter the residual 
income measwetnent of affordability. 
Measured by the ratio approach, a household is experiencing unaffordable housing if the 
ratio of housing cost to income, the affordability ratio, exceeds a certain threshold ratio 
(formula 3.4). 
TH ' r*INC 
if r> r* Hmmft Is upsWordabk 
Where Yff - Hmeft Coit 
r- Vordabday Ratio 
r'- Thrmhold Ratio 
MC - Rompehold Incomw 
(3.4) 
The use of the housing cost to income ratio has a long history of development in the 
United States. As early as the 1920s the Public Work Administration used a target rent 
to income ratio as a guideline to assess the need for public intervention in the housing 
markets. The 1937 Housing Act also used target ratios for setting eligibility as well as 
rent for public assisted housing programs (Lane, 1977). 
Such measurement continued to be used throughout the 1960s and 1970s in the United 
States (Sueke et al, 198 1) as weft as being adopted by the Canadian government (Fallis, 
1985). The 1980 Housing Act of the Reagan Administration and the 1990 Housing 
Affordability Act of the Bush Administration still retained ratio measurement as an 
indicator of housing affordability (Nelson, 1992). Similarly, the Australian government 
uses the ratio measurement as an affordability indicator in the planning of housing 
strategies (The National Housing Strategy, 1991). Many European countries also 
employ some kinds of housing cost to income ratio as a reference in developing their 
housing policy (Kearns, 1992). 
The use of ratio measurement in the UK was pioneered by the National Federation of 
Housing Associations in the late 1980s in response to the change in the government 
subsidy system to housing associations (NFHA, 1989,1990). In his research on housing 
association tenants, Kearns (1988,1992,1993) employed the ratio approach to 
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measuring affordability. The Housing Corporation also uses the housing cost to income 
ratio as an indicator of affordability among housing association tenants - although the 
Corporation was reluctant to disclose its target ratio until early 1994 (Housing 
Corporation, 1992,1993; Select Committee of the Environment, 1993). 
In the late 1980s, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation commissioned one of the largest 
studies on housing finance in recent years, covering the local housing markets of six 
cities. The ratio measurement was used as the only indicator of affordability in the 
summary report (Maclennan et al, 1990) despite the general scepticism of the research 
team towards the credibility of this measurement in their individual reports. 
The ratio measurement described in the previous section, which can be referred to as the 
traditional ratio measurement, does not mention the quality of housing. This is, 
apparently, not a fiill operafionalisation of the definitions delineated in section 3.1. 
Lerman and Reeder (1987) modified the ratio measurement to accommodate quality of 
housing into the affordability measurement. As with the traditional ratio measurement, a 
household is expected to spend no more than a certain target proportion of its income 
on housing. This measurement remains distinct from the traditional ratio measurement 
through making reference to potential consumption, rather than the actual expenditure 
pattern of the household (formula 3.5). 
Yj; -r -INC 
f r>r* Hmuft is wqrm-A" 
Wlwv Yj; - Cost of a MbdWalk A&qxate Bouse (3.5) 
r- Affor"dW Ratio 
r*- 77jrwhoM Ratio 
INC - Houselidd Income 
A household is deemed to be in unaffordable housing if it must spend above a certain 
threshold proportion of its income on a minimally adequate house in the locality. If a 
household is currently spending less than the prescribed proportion but is, at the same 
time, occupying sub-standard accommodation, housing is still regarded as unaffordable 
if more than the target ratio would need to be spent in order to raise the standard of 
housing to the minimally adequate level. 
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Conversely, even if a household is spending above the target ratio, it is regarded as 
being in a voluntary affordability problem if the household has only to spend a lower 
amount than the target proportion of its income on minimally adequate housing, 
(Lerman and Reeder, 1987). 
The quality based ratio measurement is closer to Hancock's concept of affordability 
under income constraint expressed in figure 3.2, rather than the traditional ratio 
measurement of affordability. This can be illustrated in figure 3.6. Suppose the cost of 
acquiring a minimally adequate house is H. With reference to a pre-determined target 
affordability ratio r, the corresponding resource that can be spent on non-housing 
consumption can be calculated, say r. The point E at (H*, Y) would represent the 
socially defined minimal standards of housing and non-housing consumption 
The ray OJ represents the consumption Figure 3.6 Quality based Measurement of 
combinations in which the quotient of 
Affordability 
Non-Housing 
housing expenditure to income equal to the F Y A 
prescribed affordability ratio. The 
consumption patterns below the ray OJ 
DB 
would be in unaffordable housing according ----------- -------------- ---------- 
to the traditional ratio measurement (refer to 
- 
C 
figure 3.4), but because the unshaded region 
Jýf -- - --- -- - o. H of C is now regarded as being in a voluntary 0 HO a Housing 
affordability problem, only the triangle OH*E and the shaded area of region C' (H *EG) 
is unaffordable. 
At the same time, consumption patterns in triangle OY*E' and the shaded area of region 
D (Y*HE) will now be in unaffordable housing because households with consumption 
combinations in these areas, which are occupying housing below the minimum defined 
standard, have to spend more than the prescribed ratio of their income on adequate 
housing (figure 3.6) 
Thus, households experiencing unaffordable housing have consumption combinations 
in the region A plus the shaded areas of region C and D. This is identical to 
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Hancock's (1993) description of affordability under income constraint illustrated in 
figure 3.2. 
Another variation of the traditional ratio measurement is the Core Need Measurement 
developed by Sueke and colleagues (198 1) and adopted by the United States and the 
Canadian Governments. Unlike the Quality Based ratio measurement, which 
incorporates the dimension of housing quality into the cost of acquisition at the 
minimally adequate quality, the Core Need measurement retains housing quality as a 
separate dimension which includes the physical quality of the dwelling as well as over- 
crowding. 
A household is deemed to be in unaffordable housing, or in "core housing need", an 
alternative term used by proponents, if it is occupying inadequate or unsuitable housing 
regardless of the proportion of the household's income committed to housing. 
Adequacy of a dwelling is measured against a reference list of standard structural 
conditions, facilities and amenities, and suitability for the number of persons per room. 
Alternatively, housing would be considered unaffordable for a household which had to 
spend above the threshold affordability proportion of its income on housing. Formula 
3.3 represents algebraically the Core need measurement . 
The Canadian Federal Government makes use of the aggregate data based on the Core 
Need Measurement in allocating federal housing assistance to provincial governments. 
But in addition to the basic criterion of core need measurement, an income test was 
incorporated. A household is classified as in core need only if it satisfies the conditions 
set out in formula 3.6 and is, at the same time, in receipt of income lower than the norm 
income appropriate to the size and composition of the household (Fallis, 1990a). 
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Tjr - r*MC 
Hamoft is wkoordabk fP< P* or S> S* or r> r* 
Whem T, - Hooft Coit 
mc - incom 
r- 4ffordakkiy Rado 
r* - ThmAdd Rado 
(3.6) 
P- Hooft Adequacy Meamm 
P- - Hmft AdequaW Standff& 
s Owr-cmwdft meýv 
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The residual income measurement is another common approach to affordability, which 
was developed in the UK in the late 1980s, but its use is as yet confined to the academic 
community in the UK. Residual income refers to that income remaining after the 
housing costs of a household are paid. Housing is affordable if, after housing is paid for, 
it "leaves them enough income to live on without falling below the poverty standard" 
(Bramley, 1990a: 16) (formula 3.7): 
. 
Dvcx - MC - 
r,, 
4Y Ncjt < PL Hoaft & UMfbPdabk 
Rum DWjt - AftiAd hWM (3.7) 
MC - HawwWd Immm 
TjV - Hooft Cad 
PL - PMWftY rbw bw~ 
Research on affordability using the residual income approach is limited to surveys at 
local level, the majority of which are produced by researchers involved in the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation QRF) Housing Finance Project. Despite the fact that in the main 
report of the project only the ratio approach was used as an indication of affordability, 
four out of the six of the local area reports reject the notion of ratio as an appropriate 
representation of affordability. Exceptions were the Sheffield report (Crook et al, 
I 
i g9o), which used ratio measurement, and the Newcastle report (Cameron et al, 1990) 
from which any discussion on affordability was absent. 
Partial measurement of affordability using the residual income approach was provided in 
the JRF Glasgow report (Hancock et al, 1990) in which residual income per equivalent 
adult was computed but with no explicit classification. Similar treatment was endorsed 
by Brownill et al (1990) in the JRF London report. Likewise, based on data from the 
JRF Housing Finance Project of Glasgow, Hancock and Munro (1992), employed a 
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similar analysis by expressing the residual income as a percentage of the income support 
level. This latter method was also adopted in the JRF Bristol report (Bramley et al 
1990) and the JRF Birmingham report (Walker et al, 1990) although there was, again, 
no explicit classification of affordability in these studies. 
An assessment of the affordability situation of a household can be achieved by 
comparing the residual income against a poverty line. The most frequently quoted 
poverty line is the "income support" level (Bramley et al, 1990; Walker et al, 1990; 
Kearns et al, 1993), which is often referred to as the "official" poverty line, albeit the 
government never admits to having established an official poverty line. Kearns and 
colleagues (1993), on the other hand, used the benefit level: 140% benefit level and a 
relative poverty line which is set as a percentage of the median income, as the poverty 
line. 
The residual income approach described so far only partially operationalises, the 
definition of affordability described in section 3.2 because it does not include any 
indication of housing quality. Hancock (1993) supplements this by her minimalist and 
extended concept of affordability (residual income approach) which has been described 
fiffly in section 3.3. The minimalist definition of residual income approach considers 
only households with consumption of housing and non-housing goods both below the 
socially defined minimum level as an affordability problem. Further information on 
preference and constraint is required to determine the affordability position of 
households which are consuming one component of the consumption portfolio above the 
minimum level and the other below the minimum level. 
An extended definition of the residual income approach would include households with 
either housing or non-housing consumption under the socially accepted minimum as 
experiencing unaffordable housing. This is because of the difficulties of disentangling 
preference from constraint, as well as the inherent and practical problems in the housing 
system of adjusting for the level of housing consumption which the household prefers. 
Hancock (1993) attempted to implement such definitions empirically using survey data 
from the Glasgow region of the JRF Housing Finance Project. The income support 
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applicable level was employed, with 140% of that level used as the minimally adequate 
level of non-housing consumption, whilst the Census definition of over-crowdedness 
provided a definition for the minimum standard of housing consumption (Hancock, 
1993). 
Most first time buyers have to rely on a mortgage to buy their home. In making 
mortgage lending decisions, building societies and other lenders are typically making 
decisions about whether an applicant can afford the loan requested. Thus building 
societies and other lenders employ an affordability notion when making lending 
decision. To assess whether a prospective buyer can afford home ownership, "die 
most appropriate approach seems to be to follow the normal custom and practice of 
the main lending institutions, since they will not lend beyond a certain level most new 
buyers will not be able to buy beyond that same level" (Bramley, 1990b: 6). A 
similar approach was adopted by Littlewood (1986) who referred to this concept as 
the "mortgage potential". 
Mortgage potential is defined as a multiple of a household's annual income which is 
assumed to be the maximum loan the household can borrow from a lender. A 
household is deemed to be in a position to afford to purchase if this maximum loan is 
larger than the reference house price (Formula 3.8): , 
MP .a -INC 
If AP > P. Home OwnwwA4p is 4ffordable 
where MP - mmvage Pountial (3.8) 
a. immm Mdtipk 
INC - Income 
p*- )Wwwwe Hamm p*o 
This is perhaps the earliest method used to assess affordability in the UK. As early as 
1971 the London Research Foundation (197 1) used a similar method to estimate the 
number of households who could afford home ownership at that time. Variations on this 
method were employed in the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s to assess the situation of 
access to owner occupation (e. g. Littlewood, 1986; London Research Centre, 1989; 
SERPLAN, 1990; Bramley, 1990a, 1990b, 1991). 
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The main differences between various implementations of the method are the choice of 
parameters in formula 3.8. The choice of the income multiple factor could be influenced 
by the prevailing practice of the main lenders whilst the choice of the threshold price 
would reflect the focus of the particular research. Nevertheless, the degree of 
sophistication of both parameters would vary between studies. 
Littlewood (1986) used a multiple of three for the income of the head of household and 
his partner. The multiple was reduced as the age of the head of household increased to 
take into account the shorter period of mortgage repayment for an older borrower. The 
threshold house price employed reflected the transaction price at the middle and lower 
end of the housing market in the buyers' region. At the same time, data on tenure 
preference was incorporated to assess the likely demand for home ownership. Yip and 
McLaverty (1993) employed the same method to investigate the demand for home 
ownership in the late 1980s and a more detailed analysis will be presented in chapter 
nine of this thesis. 
Likewise, Bramley (1990b, 1991) employed a multiple of 3 for single earner households 
and 2.5 for double earner households. The threshold prices were not the transaction 
price but were based on the estimation of the development costs of a range of home 
Wes: market sale, low cost sales and shared ownership. As the author considered 
investigation at the county level to be a more appropriate representation of the access 
problern, both the threshold price and household income distribution were adjusted to 
that level - 
The mortgage potential measurement is effectively a variation of the ratio measurement 
of affordability. It can be shown that with a given interest rate and repayment terms, the 
ratio of mortgage repayment to household income can be expressed as a function of the 
income multiple in formula 3.5'. If the income multiple is set at 3 and the household is 
assumed to take up a 25 years repayment mortgage at 8% (after MIRAS), the equivalent 
affordability ratio will then be 28%, that is the interest and principal repayment together 
will constitute 28% of the household's income. 
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The mortgage potential measurement is also close to the quality based ratio 
measurement discussed in the previous section. If the threshold price is set at the price 
of acquiring a physically adequate house in the locality, the two measurements are 
effectively equivalent. Nevertheless, the relation between the ratio measurement and the 
mortgage potential measurement are more complicated than this description, and a more 
detailed analysis of their differences will be offered in the next section. 
Most research (e. g. Littlewood, 1986; Bramley, 1990b, 1991; Yip and McLaverty, 
1993) using the mortgage potential measurement assumed a loan of I WYo of the house 
price. Although this assumption was not far removed from most buyers' situations in the 
19gos, given the high advance to price ratio in that period, (refer to section 2.3 for a 
more detailed discussion), a more general discussion of access to home ownership 
should reflect the dfference between the mortgage loan and the purchase price. 
In Australia, the cost of becoming a home owner is considered to be distinct from the 
ability to meet ongoing repayment. The latter is referred to as affordability, using the 
same assessment as mortgage potential described earlier in this section, whilst the former 
is termed accessibility (National Housing Strategy, 1991). Accessibility is measured in 
terms of the deposit gap which is "the difference between the purchase price of a house 
and borrowing capacity of a household" (National Housing Strategy, 1991: 4). 
The Deposit Gap index, established by the National Housing Strategy, is the difference 
between the median house price and the borrowing capacity of a household on average 
earnings which is purchasing the house at a median house price. The borrowing 
capacity is the loan for which the household is eligible, assuming it is to be repaid over 
25 years at the current interest rate, with a quarter of the household's income expected 
to be devoted to the payment of interest and principal. The deposit gap is then 
expressed as a proportion of the median income. No threshold value is set and the 
deposit gap index is expected to be used as an indication of the long term trend of 
accessibility. 
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BehaWoural Approach 
Besides evaluating affordability against some normative standards, such a concept can 
also be appraised by people's behaviour. One way is to "focus on normal housing 
decisions, looking at what households with given incomes and characteristics, facing 
given prices, choose to spend" (Bramley, 1994: 105). Alternatively, affordability can 
be viewed as the situation in which the problem of paying for housing begins to 
emerge. Thus, to "analyze the evidence of housing problems, people who appear to 
exhibit problems actually paying for their housing" (Bramley, 1994: 105), is another 
way of measuring affordability. 
There have been a munber of attempts to look at the former aspect of behavioral 
approach to affordability from the perspective of how much people choose to spend 
on housing. The National Federation of Housing Associations attempted to fix an 
affordability ratio for housing association tenants by looking at the proportion of 
income home owners spent on housing (NFHA, 1990). Fein and colleagues (1977) 
investigated in some detail the ratio of housing expenditure to income, although no 
conclusion was drawn regarding the relationship between them, nor was there any 
discussion on threshold affordability ratio. Maclennan and colleagues (1990), based 
on the JRF six cities surveys, concluded that the relationship between income and 
housing outgoings was so weak that furffier investigation was unlikely to be fruitful. 
However, based on a similar but more sophisticated method of investigation along 
lines similar to those of Maclennan et al (1990), a conclusion different from that 
outlined by them will be argued for in chapter seven of this thesis. 
Another behavioural approach to affordability looks at the problems of mortgage 
arrears and repossessions. These were topical issues in the early 1990s and 
investigations into mortgage repayment difficulties, both at macro- and micro- 
economic levels, are available (e. g. Brooks et al, 1991; Bank of England, 1992; 
Breedon and Joyce, 1992; Bramley et al, 1990; Ford and Wilcox, 1992; Kearns et al, 
1993). However, there was little significant contribution to the threshold ratio, or to 
the general understanding of affordability, from these studies. Largely this is because 
few addressed affordability as a specific issue, and partly because the available 
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empirical data was not rich enough to allow a thorough investigation (e. g. Bramley et 
al, 1990; Keams et al, 1993). 
Unfortunately, in addition to the lack of thorough investigation of the behavioral 
approach of affordability, there was an absence of theoretical base from which to 
guide the development of measurement theory in affordability from a behavioural 
perspective. As a starting point to the development of the behavioural approach to 
affordability, experience can be borrowed from the behavioural study of poverty. 
The S-curve method, one of the earliest attempts to investigate poverty from people's 
behaviour, can be adapted to investigate the feasibility of a behavioural approach to 
affordability. The S-curve method originated from the attempt to establish a poverty 
line for the United States by the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). Mitchell 
(1985) employed a similar technique in an endeavour to construct a poverty line for 
the United Kingdom. Results from the latter research were incorporated into the 
works of Bradshaw and colleagues (1987) as a preliminary work to establishing 
modern budget standards for the UK. 
The basic principle of the S-curve method is to use the quantity of consumption of a 
particular or a group of goods and services to income elasticity to determine, from 
household expenditure surveys, standards of the adequacy of those goods and 
services. It was implemented, by the BLS, by plotting the amount of consumption of 
the relevant goods and services against household income. The adequate budget level 
was established at the point where an increase in consumption showed a tendency to 
decline relative to income. Beyond that adequate budget level, households were 
deemed to be in poverty (quoted in Mitchell, 1985). In chapter seven of this thesis, a 
similar method will be used on housing expenditure and household income to 
determine a cut-off level of affordability. 
Subjecdve Approach 
A completely different approach to affordability was pioneered by Kearns and 
Colleagues (1993) in their study of housing association tenants in Scotland. 
Respondents in their survey were asked about the subjective evaluation of their own 
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affiordability situation along a Likert scale from "very difficult to afford" to "very easy to 
afford". Such qualitative assessments were then checked against the information of 
income, the financial position of the household as well as other quantitative indicators of 
the respondents for any anomalies between the subjective assessments and objective 
evaluations of affordability. Their ultimate objective was to make use of the subjective 
assessment data to determine the threshold level of other quantitative affordability 
indicators which are more relevant to policy. 
Kearns and colleagues (1993) did not put forward any theoretical explanation of this 
method, which shares many similarities with what is termed the Leyden approach to 
poverty measurement. The latter approach is based on the assumption that "the 
individual is the best judge of their situation" (Van Praag et al, 1980: 462) and was 
developed by research workers in Leyden University in the Netherlands in the 1970s and 
1980s. Several variations of this method have been used (Hagenaars, 1986; Hagenaars 
and de Vos, 1988) towards the ultimate aim of converting a set of subjective evaluations 
of the poverty situations of the respondents into a set for a national poverty line 
measured by income. 
3.5 AFFORDABILITY MEASUREMENT: DISCUSSIONS 
Validity of the Rado Measurensent 
Notwithstanding the long history of the ratio measurement of affordability in the United 
States and Australia, it is confronted by housing academics in the UK from three 
positions. First, the ratio measurement is not an appropriate representation of household 
burden. Second, the concept of opportunity cost, which is important to the concept of 
affordability, should not be measured in proportional terms. Finally, a single housing 
cost to income ratio should not be applied across households of different size, 
composition and highly varied circumstances. 
Since financial burden is an important indicator of affordability, a good measurement of 
affordability should be able to indicate such a burden. Yet very little information about 
financial burden can be provided by housing cost to income ratio and financial burden. 
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As Hancock (1993) noted, there is a possibility that a household consumes very little on 
both housing and non-housing goods and services but is still regarded as living in 
affordable housing as long as the ratio between housing cost and income is below the 
normative level, regardless of the financial pressure on the household because of the 
meagre resources it can spend on both types of consumption. Another household, 
which may enjoy a high level of both goods, is considered to be in "unaffordable" 
housing because its housing cost to income ratio is higher than the norm value (as 
illustrated in figure 3.4). 
Fallis (1985) criticised the use of ratio measurement as a poor indicator of affordability 
based on the argument of merit good. He speculated that the significance of the ratio 
measurement is that it represents societies'view on merit good: 
[affordability ratio is] a proxy for the values that food, clothing, and so on are merit 
goods ... if a low-income household spend more than 25% of its income on housing, then it will not have enough money left over to buy adequatefood, clothing, 
transporwfion, medical care, education, and so on: therefore there is a social 
problem because society hohis the value that allpeople are entitled to the necessities 
fistedabove. (Fallis, 1985: 144)(Original italics) 
However, employing the ratio measurement as a representation of merit good is 
deceptive because "the italic portions of the sentence are omitted in much writing on 
housing" (Fallis, 1985: 144). He finther opined that if affordability is just a proxy for the 
notion that non-housing consumptions are merit good, this was not a qualified proxy. 
,, [affordability ratio] is a poor proxy because it treats the problems of a group of 
merit goods as a housing problem, and housing policies are a poor way to ensure the 
adequate consumption of all merit goods" (Fallis, 1985: 145) 
Fallis (1985) did not suggest any alternative to the ratio measurement. It was academics 
in the LJK, following this line of criticism, who proposed an alternate measurement of 
affordability: 
.... the notion of affordability 
is much more logically define in terms of the absolute 
amount of income remaining after housing costs have been met, rather than in terms 
of ratios (Hancock et al, 1990: 43-44) 
The residual income of a household after housing cost is paid for should also be related 
expficitly to the poverty standard: 
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.... the most coherent normative concept of affordability 
is one that links normative 
judgements about housing needs, standards with judgements about minimum income 
requirements for non-housing consumption. This implies that housing affordability is 
closely bound up with the definition of a poverty line, and that the key ratios are 
likely to be expressed in terms of residual income (after housing costs) relative to that 
line (Bramley, 1994: 104). 
Likewise, the concept of opportunity cost, which is regarded as important to the 
definition of affordability, is considered inappropriate if it is expressed in ratio terms: 
...... a ratio measurement says nothing about what might 
be an acceptable opportunity 
cost of that which is being consumed. Any statement about affordability has 
essentially to be a statement about opportunity cost... the value of the foregone 
goods and services is measured in terms of their total cost, and not in terms of the 
fraction of consumers' incomes absorbed. It therefore makes little sense to define 
affordability in terms of the ratio of housing costs to incomes if it is believed that 
opportunity cost is important. (Hancock, 1993: 133) 
Furthermore, a minor criticism of the use of ratio measurement is the inappropriateness 
of using a single ratio across tenures and households of varied size and composition. 
Some such comments are based on the normative judgement that: 
A single ratio of [housing] costs to net income is not an ideal way of measuring 
affordability in all cases (Bramley et al, 1990: 83) 
Others are supported by empirical study that there are substantial differences in housing 
cost to income ratio amongst tenure groups as well as households in difference 
circumstances, so that: 
...... no single ratio could apply over time to people on varied incomes, in different types of household and tenure (Brownill et a], 1990: 47) 
Whilst many of these criticism may appear to be qualified, some of them are based on 
incomplete understanding of ratio measurement, while others are founded on the 
comparison with the allegedly superior residual income measurement whose superiority 
has yet to be proven. 
Notwithstanding the lack of theoretical deliberation on the concept of ratio measurement 
and the seemingly arbitrary threshold ratio based only on "rule of thumb", the origin of 
ratio measurement is unmistakenly empirical. It stems from empirical studies on housing 
expenditure in household budgets by Ernst Engel and Hermann Schurake dated back to 
the nineteenth century (Lane, 1977). 
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The proportional approach to poverty, based on Engel's law which states that the 
proportion of expenditure on necessities in household budgets decreases as household 
income increases, is a popular approach to the study of poverty in North America and 
Australia. For instance, poverty lines in the United States, CamWa and Australia are all 
established from the proportional approach in one form or another. Poverty is 
unmistakenly the study of the financial burden of a household and if the use of 
proportional approach in such study is valid, it seems that there is no reason why a ratio 
approach cannot be adopted in the study of affordability. Nor is it surprising that the 
study of affordability in North American and Australia inclined towards the proportional 
tradition. 
The inappropriateness of employing a proportion to represent the notion of opportunity 
cost is also debatable. The opportunity cost of other commodities may be better 
expressed in terms of the total and absolute values of the commodities concerned, which 
may be Merent for the study of income and household budgets. There is evidence 
showing that the variation in household income and expenditure on many household 
expenditure items is not linear (e. g. Prais and Houtakker, 1971 and chapter seven of this 
thesis). In addition, Kearns and colleagues (1993) show that the subjective 
measurement of affordability has a closer relationship to the percentage change, rather 
that the absolute change, in equivalised income. These two empirical pieces of evidence 
both point to the postulate that proportional representation of opportunity cost among 
household expenditure items may be more appropriate than a linear representation as 
claimed by Hancock (1993). 
The last criticism of the inappropriateness of using a single ratio is in fact based on an 
incomplete understanding of the use of ratio measurement, probably only based on the 
proposition of the NFHA. Like the use of a set of poverty lines rather than a single line 
in poverty study, affordability measurement need not necessarily be based on a single 
fine that applies to households of dfferent characteristics. Threshold affordability ratio 
can also be a set of ratios for Merent tenures and types of household. 
in fact, right from the early development of ratio measurement in the United States, 
threshold ratio has never been a single ratio (Lane, 1977), It can very across tenure; for 
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instance in Australia the threshold ratio is set at 301/o for owners and 25% for tenants 
(National Housing Strategy, 1991) or be restricted to households within certain income 
bands, like the HOME programme established under the 1990 Housing Affordability act 
in the United States which set a threshold ratio of 30*/o for households whose income is 
below 75% of the local median (Nelson, 1992). 
Moreover, many of the criticisms of mtio measurement are based on the comparative 
superiority of the residual income measurement. Such relative superiority is less 
appealing under scrutiny. An exposure of the weaknesses of residual income 
measurement will be presented in the section that follows. 
Inadequacy of the Residual Income Measurement 
Besides the contrasting empirical evidence presented in the preceding section, which 
cast doubt on the alleged superiority of residual income measurement over ratio 
measurement as the representation of opponunity cost, the choice of poverty line poses 
another problem for the residual income measurement. Since residual income is only an 
intermediate measurement, the affordability status of a household has to be determined 
against a yardstick, the poverty line, that represents financial burden. 
However, there is no consensus on how a poverty fine could be established. Surveys of 
poverty measurements show that there are over 10 Merent measurements which can be 
grouped into three broad categories (Hagenaars, 1986; Spicker, 1993). Some of them 
are based on the proportional principle which is opposed by the proponents of the 
residual income approach. No superiority of residual income measurement can be 
claimed if the poverty fine also uses the proportional approach. 
The use of the "official" poverty line as the yardstick, which proponents of residual 
income approach favour, may free the residual income measurement from a proportional 
approach to poverty, but may be unable to indicate accurately either the financial burden 
or the inadequacy in the command of resources as intended. Although the official 
poverty fine has, allegedly, undergone a democratisation process and is thus supposed to 
represent socially accepted minimum standards of living, it lacks a strong scientific base 
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from which to demonstrate this capacity (Hagenaars, 1986). In addition, in the case of 
many continental European countries, it is unable to reflect rising prices owing to its 
infrequent update (Hagenaars, 1986). Even when it is routinely updated in Britain, with 
reference to the rate of inflation, it fads to keep up with rising living standards. 
Perhaps the most serious weakness of the residual income measurement is its 
entanglement with the concept of poverty. In fact, the implementation of residual 
income measurement is identical to the "income after housing costs" measurement used 
in the Households Below Average Income (HBAI) (DSS, 1990) series. However, 
"income after housing" in the HBAI series is obviously intended as a poverty indicator. 
Thus, the same measurement could have a very dfferent interpretation and would have a 
detrimental effect on the integrity of the concept. Despite the proposition that 
affordability is bound to have a close relationship with the concept of poverty, the 
proponents of this approach have yet to explain how a measurement of poverty can be 
used to measure housing affordability without modification. Otherwise, there is no need 
to develop a separate measurement of affordability. 
Shortcomings ofMortgage Potential Measurement 
Bramley (1990b) differentiated the mortgage potential measurement from the traditional 
ratio measurement, (he had no specific terms for these two measurements) and regarded 
the latter as less stable with reference to fluctuating interest rates than the former. As 
interest rates increase or the size of the loan and the income of the household both 
change, the affordability ratio will also change. 
Bramley's differentiation of two measurements of access to home ownership is 
misleading since it was shown in section 3.4 that the mortgage potential measurement of 
affordability is in fact a variation of the ratio measurement. The latter criticism of 
instability, on the other hand, depends on which parameters in the mortgage potential 
formula are supposed to be fixed - It can be shown that the threshold affordability ratio 
is directly proportional to the income multiple and interest rate but inversely 
proportional to the length of the repayment period in the mortgage potential formule. 
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Bramley's conclusion of instability of the ratio measurement as applied in this context 
presumed that both the income multiple and the length of repayment are fixed, so the 
amount of repayment will vary together with the affordability ratio. Whilst this may be 
the only mortgage repayment arrangement in the W in other parts of the world a fixed 
monthly repayment is possible, either by a fixed interest loan or by allowing the length of 
repayment to vary with the variation in interest rates. In this case, variations in interest 
rates do not necessarily lead to fluctuations in repayment amounts and so do not create 
fluctuations in the affordability ratio. 
Nevertheless, Bramley (I 990b) points out a weakness in the mortgage potential 
measurement. Whilst it is effectively a ratio measurement, the associated threshold 
affordability ratio is not explicitly stated and the ratio is extremely sensitive to the 
structure of the mortgage loan. If the threshold ratio is made explicit, the traditional 
ratio measurement can be an alternative to the mortgage potential measurement. This 
alternative puts the measurement of access to home ownership more in fine with similar 
indicators in other industrialised countries, such as the United States and Australia. 
in addition, the potential of a prospective home owner to afford to buy is sensitive to the 
threshold house price chosen. It is a disadvantage if house prices in different localities 
are dispersed over a large range as this would make the error of estimation very large. 
This is why price distribution over a smaller area is preferable to distribution over large 
regions. For example, Bramley (1990b, 1991) preferred county level data to the more 
conveniently available regional level data '. 
However, there are still reasons for retaining the use of mortgage potential in its present 
form. First, comparison with earlier research is easier if the same measurement is used. 
Second, it is more convenient to compare the lending practice of mortgage loans using 
mortgage potential measurement, since they use similar parameters in their assessment. 
Retaining the mortgage potential measurement would not pose any problem for 
comparison with research using the traditional ratio measurement providing the 
parameters in the mortgage potential measurement can be easily converted to the 
traditional ratio measurement. 
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Moreover, there are limitations in the use of mortgage potential and the accessibility 
measurement as indicators of affordability, such as the deposit gap. Deposit Gap can 
only assess the potential of a prospective buyer to overcome the barrier of becoming a 
home buyer, while mortgage potential can be used to indicate the ability of a home 
owner to sustain home ownership at the beginning of repayment. Whether such 
potential indicators are effective depends on other fkctors. 
First, for the potential to be realised depends on the preference of the prospective buyer 
to become a buyer. Thus, if the majority of prospective buyers deemed to be in an 
affordable situation do not realise their potential, the initial estimation will be misleading. 
This is one reason why the estimation of preference for home ownership is essential. 
Second, the notion of unaffordability in the mortgage potential measurement is a 
redundant concept. Households considered to be in an unaffordable position for home 
ownership may not have attempted to buy and thus affordability regarding home 
ownership is iffelevant. Those who are in an unaffordable position but who proceed to 
buy, may have overcome the problem employing alternative methods, such as buying a 
house in a lower price range, or with an inheritance, gift or savings. 
Third, there are practical difficulties in estimating the demand for home ownership from 
new households, which constitute a major source of prospective buyers. There is 
overdependence on the projection of household fonnation, income estimation of the new 
households and speculation on the likely preference for home ownership of these 
households. 
Thus, mortgage potential and accessibility measurements are best used only to compare 
the trend of access to home ownership and should not be used to assess affordability of 
individual prospective owners. In addition, the importance of the deposit gap should not 
be understated. This is an important barrier to access to home ownership and although 
the requirement of a deposit to buy a home was not a problem in the UK in the 1980s, 
this could change. The accessibility measurement should be combined with mortgage 
potential in assessing the affordability of prospective owners, 
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Housing Cost and Housing Quality 
The traditional form of both ratio and residual income measurements of affordability 
take no account of the quality of housing being occupied. In commenting on the 
limitation of ratio measurement to affordability, Sueke and colleagues note : 
It [ratio measurement] fas to reflect the total magnitude of housing need, since it 
does not reveal whether the accommodation occupied is physically adequate. 
Households often keep housing costs within reasonable limit by living in physically 
inadequate housing as an alternative to paying higher rent for adequate housing 
(Sueke et al, 1980: 8). 
At the same time, it also fails to differentiate households which choose to consume a 
higher quantity of housing than they would otherwise be able to afford because of 
preference or taste (Sueke et al, 1990; Fallis, 1985; Lerman and Reeder, 1987). These 
contentions apply also to residual income measurement. 
The analysis of Hancock (1993) on the relationship of housing under-consumption as 
weU as over-consumption described in section 3.3 is illuminating in these aspects. Her 
minimalist and extended residual income measurement regards households which are 
under-consurning housing as having an affordability problem, regardless of their 
affordability position by the respective measurement. At the same time, the American 
version of core need measurement has a similar effect. 
The problem of over-consumption is rectified by a number of alternatives: the quality 
based ratio measurement, which only considers households' potential for housing 
consumption rather than real consumption; the Canadian version of core need 
measurement which sets a ceding on household income; and the official residual income 
definition proposed by Hancock (1993) which adopts the maximum. housing expenditure 
allowed by the housing benefit system as a ceiling for housing consumption. On the 
other hand, Hancock (1993) argues that there may not be a clear cut solution to the 
problem of housing over-consumption. It is best regarded as a grey area in affordability 
measurement which requires more information on preference and constraint within a 
household. 
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Despite the various solutions to the problem, measurement of housing quality rernains a 
formidable task: the relationship between housing cost and housing quality; the lack of 
accurate, convenient and comprehensive data; the difficulties of assessing quality and so 
forth, all contribute to the complications. Discussion of the methodological problems 
involved will be further elaborated in the next chapter. 
Afternadves to Normwdve Measurenwnt 
Most of the measurements of affordability developed so far fall into the category of a 
normative perspective, which presumes the e3dstence of norms, or some socially 
accepted standards which may be an optimal proportion of housing cost to household 
income or the minimum level of non-housing consumption. However, there is little 
consensus on what the optimum ratio should be for housing cost to income. The use of 
ratio measurement as a representation of affordability continues to be controversial. 
The residual income measurement suffers from similar problems. The British 
Government never admits to the eNistence of an official poverty fine; nonetheless, the 
level of income support, which is often referred to as the official poverty line, is 
criticised as being inadequate. Inevitably, there is ongoing heated debate on how 
poverty should be defined and measured. With no consensus on the poverty fine, there 
is no yardstick against which residual income can be measured. The lack of consensus 
on norms ofjudgement poses a serious problem for the implementation of normative 
affordability measurements, since "normative need-type statements lose much of their 
force if they do not reflect consensus" (Bramley, 1994: 104). 
As in the early development of poverty measurement in which the normative approach 
dominated, it is not surprising that the normative approach over-shadows other 
approaches to affordability measurement. Normative need-type statements, which tend 
to approach the problem from some form of expert or authoritative opinion, are more 
comprehensible. 
However, there is a trend in the development of Poverty measurement toward a more 
diversified approach based on the behavioural and subjective perspectives. Poverty 
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studies and official statistics in the EC, OECD and UK increasingly adopt a poverty line 
which is relative to the national average income. Budget standards in poverty 
measurement used to be a typical normative approach, but a modernised budget 
approach developed by Bradshaw and colleagues (the work of the Family Budget Unit 
FBU, 1990 and Bradshaw and Ernst, 1990) embraced a composite approach 
incorporating elements of the behavioral approach. This suggests a possibility of 
measuring affordability by alternative approaches. Some of these alternatives will be 
explored in the next section and finther elaborated in later chapters. 
3.6 AFFORDABELITY MEASUREMENT: A RE-EXAMINATION 
It is argued in the previous section the the residual income measurement is not superior 
to the ratio measurement, and the normative approach to affordability is just one of 
several perspectives in affordability measurement. Therefore a definition of affordability 
should be general enough to embrace different approaches to implementing affordability. 
It is apparent that not all the definitions explicated in section 3.2 can fulfil this criterion. 
most of them apparently incline toward a particular approach. For instance, Bramley's 
definition (I 990a) reflects only the residual income approach, whilst that of Fallis (1985) 
appears to incline toward ratio measurement, whereas the delineation of Maclennan and 
Williams (1990) represents only the normative approach. 
However, Howenstine's (1983) definition, though it appears to be over-simplified, has 
the potential to be used as an all-ernbracing definition of affordability which can 
encompass different approaches to implementation. Nonetheless, what constitutes a 
"reasonable amount" in his definition needs further elaboration, whereas the 
interpretation of Maclennan and Williams (1990): "an amount not causing unreasonable 
burden on household incomes", can be borrowed as an appropriate alternative in this 
context. Thus a modified version of Howenstine's provides an alternative definition of 
affordability encompassing different approaches for implementation. 
"Affordability is the ability of a household to acquire decent accommodation by the 
payment of a reasonable amount of its income on shelter without causing an 
unreasonable burden on household incomes". 
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It is ftindamental to the concept of affordability in the acquisition of decent 
accommodation that its quality should be, at least, at a socially defined minimum. As an 
element of housing policy, affordability should entail housing quality and embrace 
housing as a merit good. Thus, households living in dwellings below certain pre-defined 
standards should be regarded as experiencing unaffordable housing. Such standards can 
be defined normatively or subjectively, and be absolute or relative. However, a 
normative definition of minimally accepted housing quality is considered appropriate and 
simpler to manipulate given the current conditions of the housing stock, of which a 
substantial minority of dwellings need major improvement. 
The problem of pervasive choice described by Hancock (1993) will still e)dst, where the 
preference of individual households does not coincide with what is favoured by society. 
However, households occupymg housing below the socially defined minimum but which 
should have the capacity, judged by an affordability standard, to acquire housing above 
that standard should still be regarded as being in an unaffordable situation. This is due 
in part to a housing policy which aims to improve housing quality to a socially 
acceptable level, and in part to the grey area involving available choice and imposed 
constraint. 
A household may be unable to adjust the quality of consumption to any degree as the 
quality of dwelling appropriate to the type and size of the household may be unavailable 
in the locality (Hancock, 1993). The capital cost needed to improve the quality of 
housing to a favourable standard may be beyond the capability of the household. 
This latter argument can also be applied to over-consumption of housing. As Hancock 
(1993) argued, in the extended version of residual income measurement, it may not be 
appropriate to classify households as being in a voluntary unaffordability situation when 
they are deemed to be unable to afford housing but are, at the same time, over- 
consuming housing services. It may not be possible for a household to adjust its housing 
consumption to the appropriate level required to avoid an affordability problem. This 
would more properly be regarded as a grey area in affordability measurement and such a 
household would be classified as experiencing unaffordable housing. 
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The measurement of the financial burden on a household should not be restricted to the 
normative approach, either a normative, a behavioural or a subjective perspective can be 
adopted. A subjective evaluation of affordability can be implemented by the self 
assessment of a household on its affordability situation. This can be conducted by more 
divergent and sophisticated means than the pioneer work of Kearns and colleagues 
(1993). Such subjective assessment may then be used to fine tune or validate 
measurement results acquired by other methods, and produce a subjective assessment 
which is closer to the current discourse on affordability. 
From a behavioural perspective, affordability can be measured using the S-curve 
technique. The point where a household begins to experience unaffordable housing is 
where the increase in housing cost shows a qualitatively different pattern in its 
relationship with household income. This is similar to the method used by Townsend 
(1979,1991,1993) in his poverty research where a household is regarded as being in 
poverty as the index of relative deprivation increases disproportionately as income 
decreases. 
Unlike the concept of relative deprivation in poverty research, there is an absence of 
comparable theoretical basis in the study of affordability. A second best alternative is to 
resort to empirical experimentation where experience of previous research on Engel's 
curve (e. g. Leser, 1961; Prais and Houthakker, 1971) can be drawn upon. A more 
detailed description of this will be presented in chapter six. 
Nonetheless, the normative perspective may provide a popular approach to affordability 
owing to it being a well established concept which provides easy visualisation of the 
measurement. Whilst the ratio and the residual income measurements win continue to 
be used in parallel with each other, disputes over threshold or target values remain. 
Such threshold or reference values can either be defined "officially", by taking the 
income support level as the official poverty line, or by adopting the "official" housing 
cost to the income ratio used by the Housing Corporation. Alternatively, it is possible 
to fine tune the normative approach by referencing the threshold values established by 
alternative methods of measurement, from either a behavioural or a subjective 
perspective, or a combination of the two. 
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Threshold ratios can also be established by a composite method combining the 
normative and the behavioural approaches. Then housing cost to income ratio can be 
interpreted as an indication of high housing cost whilst the residual income is an 
indication of household financial burden. Employing empirical findings that housing cost 
to income ratio decreases as household income increases (e. g. Maclennan et al, 1990), 
when the income of a household decreases, the housing cost to income ratio would 
increase. A threshold ratio can then be established where the housing cost to income 
ratio would correspond with a high probability of the household being in poverty. 
Detailed implementation of this method will be elaborated further in chapter six. 
in the residual income approach, besides using the official poverty line, poverty lines 
established by other means can be also be exploited, be they normative, behavioural or 
subjective. Nonetheless, regardless of which poverty fine is used, the concept of 
affordability using residual income measurement in such a way is, effectively, a 
measurement only of poverty. To retain the integrity of the concept of affordability, it is 
essential to differentiate poverty from affordability. 
Within the framework of residual income measurement, one way of differentiating is to 
define poverty as the result of a lack of resources, so that the household is unable to 
consume both the housing and non-housing goods and services above the minimum 
levels. Unaffordable housing is a consequence of high housing cost which imposes a 
financial burden on a household. 
One way to implement the above differentiation is to use total household income as a 
representation of total household resources, and non-housing expenditure as a proxy for 
financial burden. Together with the expenditure on housing, these three parameters are 
classified into the simple dichotomous categories of 11igh" and "Low" against a set of 
socially defined minimum levels. Low level of non-housing expenditure Will denote 
financial burden on a household because there are not enough resources left for non- 
housing consumption. 
Likewise, a high level of household income indicates the ability of the household to 
consume both housing and non-housing goods and services above the minimum level. 
81 
Assuming there is no saving/non-saving effect, these three parameters will combine to 
create six scenarios as in table 3.1 (note that the combinations HIFIL and LLH are not 
possible) : 
Table 3.1 Affordability Classification: Household Incmc, Housing and Non-housing 
Consunwtion 
Housing Expenditure Non-housing 
Exixmditure 
Household 
111CO10C 
Classification 
I High High High Affordable 
2 LOW LAW LOW Poverty 
3 High U)W LOW Poverty 
4 High LOW Ffigh Unaffordable 
5 LOW High LOW Unclassified 
6 I. Anv High High Affordable 
In scenario 1, there is no financial burden on the household and the income allows 
expenditure both on housing and non-housing consumption above the minimum 
standards: housing is apparently affordable. In Scenario 2 there is financial burden on 
the household, not as a result of high housing cost but rather because there is inadequate 
income available for both consumption items to a level higher than the minimum 
standards: this represents a case of poverty. 
Although housing cost in Scenario 3 is high there are insufficient resources for both 
housing and non-housing consumption, therefore this also represents a case of poverty. 
In scenario 4, the household has the potential to consume both housing and non-housing 
goods and services at above the minimum level, but because housing cost is high, the 
household is left without adequate resources for non-housing consumption. Therefore it 
is a case of housing unaffordability. 
Situations in scenario 5 and 6 are unclear. A low level of housing consumption may be 
an indication of inadequate housing, in which case the households in scenarios 5 and 6 
are in unaffordable housing, as argued at the beginning of this section. However, 
households in scenario 6 will be in affordable housing because there is no indication of 
financial burden, as measured by the level of non-housing consumption. More 
information needs to known about households in scenario 5. They may be classified as 
being in poverty because the total resources do not enable them to have both housing 
and non-housing consumption above the minimum level, and it may be a case of 
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deliberately under-consuming housing in order to release more resources for non- 
housing expenditure 
On the other hand, it may be the result of some special housing arrangement, such as 
rent free accommodation, which makes housing costs low. Thus a low household 
income may not result in hardship in either housing or non-housing consumption. 
Scenario 5 must be termed unclassified. Re-arranging table 3.1, the parameters of 
housing consumption can be absorbed by other parameters (table 3.2): 
Table 3.2 Affordability Classificafion: Household Income and Non-housing Consumption 
I High High Affordable 
2 LOW LOW Poverty 
3 High Low Unafforclable 
4 LOW ffigh Unclassified 
To employ terminology commonly used in the current literature of poverty (e. g. BBAI 
series), total household income used in table 3.1 and 3.2 can also be renamed as income 
before housing and non-housing consumption can be re-termed income after housing. 
Whereas nfinimum standards apparently refers to the poverty line, households at an 
income level below the minimum standard are regarded as poor. A new classification 
may then be formulated in table 3.3. This later classification is easier to implement by 
either a normative or a relative approach to poverty. If a normative, or absolute 
approach, is used housing cost is then compared in absolute terms, and in relative terms 
if a relative approach to poverty is used. Detailed implementation of this classification 
will be presented in chapter five. 
Table 3.3 Affordability Classification: Poverty Before And After Housing Costs 
Poverty Before Housing Costs Povertv After Housing Costs 
Poor Not Poor 
Poor Poverty Unclassified 
Not Poor Unaffordability Affordability 
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3.7 SUNEWARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the importance of clear and explicit definitions as well as clear measurement of 
affordability, there is no consensus on either aspect. Amongst the various definitions 
delineated in affordability literature, several common elements can be identified. First, 
affordability deals with the user-cost of housing; second, the notion of merit good and 
opportunity cost are pivotal to the concept; third, affordability presumes a minimum 
standard of housing consumption and the concept of affordability maintains a close 
relationship with the concept of poverty. 
However, in the literature on affordability, both definitions are delineated and the 
popular methods of implementation, the ratio and the residual income measurement, 
incline strongly toward the normative perspective. The traditional ratio measurement 
refers to the housing cost to income ratio against a threshold ratio above which the 
household is considered to be in unaffordable housing. On the other hand, the residual 
income approach, which was advocated mainly as an alternative to the ratio 
measurement, measures affordability according to the amount of income remaining after 
housing is paid for. If it is below the poverty fine, then housing is unaffordable. 
A modified version of the traditional measurements has been developed to include the 
quality of housing in affordability measurement. The quality based ratio measurement 
relates the ability of the household to acquire housing at a minimally adequate condition 
instead of the actual consumption on housing. Likewise, the core need measurement 
also takes into account the quality of the housing in terms of the standard of occupancy 
as well as physical adequacy. Hancock (1993) proposed extensions of the residual 
income measurement, the minimalist and extended measurement of affordability, to 
incorporate quality of housing into the concept. 
The potential of prospective buyers to acquire their home is measured by their mortgage 
potential. it is effectively a variation of the ratio measurement. A more general 
measurement of access to home ownership should also incorporate the accessibility 
measurement which indicates the barrier to paying a deposit. 
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Beside the normative approach, the behavioral and the subjective approaches to 
affordability are also feasible. The S-curve method adopted from poverty research can 
be used to explore the behavioural aspect of affordability. A subjective evaluation of 
affordability is a viable alternative in which experience from poverty research can be 
relied on. However, these two methods lack the appropriate theoretical base and are 
likely, at best, to be a complement to the normative approach. 
Although ratio measurement has a long history and is widely adapted, it has been 
challenged in various aspects. One accusation is that it is not an appropriate 
representation of both household burden and opportunity cost, and that a single ratio 
should not be applied across households in different tenures and of various sizes and 
characteristics. 
While many of the comments on ratio measurement are valid, there is contrasting 
evidence that supports the use of ratio measurement. Its basis, in Engel's Law, makes 
use of ratio as a representation of household burden more robustly than opponents 
suggest. Empirical evidence also supports the proportional property of opportunity 
cost. Moreover, different ratios can be established for households in different tenures 
and with different characteristics to overcome the shortcomings of using a single ratio. 
On the other hand, the implementation of the residual income approach is less 
straightforward than is claimed, Its dependency on poverty measurement exposes it to 
criticism similar to ratio measurement, since many of the poverty lines are in fact 
established from proportional, behavioural or subjective perspectives. However, the 
most serious weakness of residual income measurement may be its entanglement with 
poverty measurement since residual income is apparently nothing more than a poverty 
measurement. Although housing affordability can be regarded as a form of poverty, yet, 
the discrete use of the concept of affordability has to be demonstrated. 
The main weakness of mortgage potential measurement is its lack of explicitly stated 
threshold ratio and its sensitivity to both the choice of threshold house price and the 
change in interest rates. Although it is a variation of the ratio measurement, it is not a 
good indicator of prospective buyers' ability to sustain home ownership nor can it stand 
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alone as a measurement to assess the difficulties facing prospective buyers. It needs to 
be used in conjunction with measurements of accessibility. Nevertheless, its power to 
indicate a change in prospective buyers' ability to purchase over time is valuable. 
In order to allow the concept of affordability to embrace different methods of 
measurement, only two elements of the definition should be specified: the acquisition of 
adequate housing and the burden on household income caused by high housing cost. 
Households living in accommodation below minimum standards should be considered to 
be in unaffordable housing, whereas the burden on household resources can be assessed 
by methods based on either the behavioural, subjective or normative approaches. 
Methods based on the normative approach will continue to be the mainstream form of 
measurement, whereas the ratio and the residual income methods can be used to 
complement each other. The normative standards used in the measurement may either 
be based on some kind of official definition, which is assumed to be a result of 
democratisation, or by seeking a sociafly acceptable level of standards. 
Alternatively, some composite method may be employed based on empirical data. One 
method is to combine ratio measurement with residual income measurement so that the 
housing cost to income ratio, as an indicator of relative level of housing cost, is used to 
predict the status of financial burden on the household which is measured by residual 
income. 
If residual income measurement is to be used alone, differentiating the concept from 
poverty measurement is essential. One method is to compare the poverty status before 
and after housing cost, where households would be considered to be in unaffordable 
housing only if they are not poor before housing cost, but are poor after housing cost. 
Detailed methods of implementation will be developed further in subsequent chapters. 
In this chapter it is argued that affordability is a complex and diverse concept, in which 
scientific and empirical exploration of the concept is as important as conceptual 
discourse. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
it is argued in chapter three that s6entific and empirical exploration of affordability is as 
important as theoretical discussion of the concept, since many of the new measurement 
methods have to be validated empirically. Considering the importance of empirical 
investigation, it is surprising that there is so little research on this topic. 
The few empirical works which mdst are either focused on a particular tenure, notably 
housing association tenants (Best, 1990 ; Bramley, 1990a, 1990b, 199 1; Kearns et al, 
1993), or based only on local area surveys, such as the JRF Housing Finance Project in 
six cities (e. g. Maclennan et al, 1990). An empirical investigation of affordability which 
covers all tenures and regions would provide valuable information on the issue. it is the 
intention of this thesis to achieve this. The methods used for the empirical investigation 
will be described in detail in this chapter. 
The research questions, and the chapters which relate to each, will be described in the 
first section. This is followed by a description of the data sets on which the analysis is 
based, and the samples that will be selected for further analysis. The third section 
addresses the methodological issues involved in such an empirical investigation, and 
definitions of the measurement concepts used in the analysis. A brief discussion of the 
limitations of the data sets used will be presented in the fourth section. 
4.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research will focus around five main areas. Analyses in subsequent chapters will 
attempt to answer questions encompassing these areas, which are: 
1. A modified definition of the residual income approach to affordability: To preserve 
the integrity of residual income measurement, the concept of affordability has to be 
dfferentiated from poverty. What will be the methodological issues involved in such 
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a differentiation, and their possible effects on residual income measurement? These 
questions will be examined in chapter six. 
2. A composite approach to normative measurement of affordability: Is it possible to 
determine a threshold affordability ratio using a composite method combining the 
ratio measurement and the residual income measurement? What methodological 
issues are involved? These questions will be investigated in chapter seven. 
3. The behavioural approach to affordability: Is it feasible to adopt the S-curve method 
to explore the threshold affordability ratio? What problems of operationalisation are 
involved? What is the most appropriate strategy for operationalisation ? Results of 
this analysis will be presented in chapter eight. 
4. A comparison of affordability measurements using different measurement approaches 
and the extent of affordability measured by these approaches: What are the 
differences and similarities in classifying affordability using different measurement 
approaches? Is it possible to combine some of the measurement approaches? What 
are the merits and drawbacks of different measurement approaches? These 
questions will be examined in chapter nine. 
5. Extent of the affordability problem: What is the extent of affordability in England in 
1990 and what are the household and housing characteristics of households 
experiencing unaffordable housing? Is there a life cycle effect on affordability? will 
there be differences in the household expenditure patterns among households with 
different affordability statuses? What will be the effect on different measurement 
approaches if the quality of housing is incorporated as one of the measurement 
parameters? These problems will be examined in chapter nine. 
6. Access to home ownership: How many tenants in 1988 could afford to buy? Who 
are they? How many tenants who would prefer to be home owners could afford to 
buy? What is the relationship between a preference to own and the ability to buy ? 
How sensitive is mortgage potential upon the choice of parameters ? Chapter ten will 
examine these questions. 
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4.3 THE DATA SETS AND SAMPLES 
The Choice of Data Sets 
This thesis is an attempt to conduct an empirical investigation of affordability at the 
national level and across all tenures. Given the constraint on both time and resources, a 
secondary analysis of national surveys is the most productive as well as the most cost- 
efficient means of achieving this. Data sets suitable for such an analysis should have a 
national sample frame and contain detailed information on income and housing costs, as 
well as a reasonable amount of data on the households' housing and socio-economic 
characteristics. The Household Resources Survey commissioned by the Department of 
Social Security is an excellent source which contains all the relevant information, but 
unfortunately data from this research was not available for secondary analysis at the start 
of this study. 
The Family Expenditure Survey is another fruitful source. It is a national survey that 
contains information on both income and expenditure, including details of housing 
related expenditure. There are also data available on household characteristics, 
economic status, durable goods and tenure. It is considered more suitable than other 
national surveys such as the New Earnings Survey, which collects detailed information 
on income but lacks information on expenditure. Likewise, the 1988 Labour Force 
Survey, with its housing trailer, provides rich information on housing. However, the 
information is considered to be out of date, and it lacks information on expenditure. 
The 1991 English Housing Condition Survey supplies an excellent assessment of the 
physical quality of housing, but lacks the necessary information on household 
characteristics and reliable income data for detailed analysis. Hence, the 1991 Family 
Expenditure Survey, the latest round of this survey available at the time the research 
commenced, is used for analysis. 
However, the Family Expenditure Survey does not provide essential information for the 
analysis of affordability and tenure preference in chapter ten. This is instead provided by 
the 1988 General Household Survey, which also contains income information, thus 
enabling the investigation of access to home ownership for prospective buyers. Indeed, 
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information on housing is better provided for in the General Household Survey than in 
the Family Expenditure Survey. Data on tenure preference and affordability in the 1988 
General Household Survey also allows comparison with the situation in 1978, when the 
same set of questions on tenure preference was asked. 
Although housing policies in the LJK are formulated by central government, there are 
substantial differences in housing legislation between the four countries in the UK owing 
to the Merent constitutional status of each. Furthermore, although England and Wales 
generally share the same legislation on housing, some of the policy implementation 
mechanisms are different, notably the subsidy system for housing associations and the 
administration of such subsidies by different agencies. To facilitate a more coherent 
discussion of affordability within the current policy context, only households in England 
will be selected for analysis. 
Family F. Venditure Survey 
The Family Expenditure Survey is a continuous survey carried out by the Office of 
Population Census and Surveys (OPCS) with samples carefully selected to ensure they 
are representative of the population in the UK. The survey covers only private 
households and excludes people living in institutions. Fieldwork is carried out by 
interviewers from the OPCS; information is collected by face to face interviews and each 
individual in the household is also asked to keep a diary record of expenditure over a 
period of two weeks. 
The 1991 Family Expenditure Survey covers the period from January to December 
1991, with successful responses from 7056 households, which represents a success rate 
of about 700/c. Anonyn-fised data of the 1991 Family Expenditure Survey is supplied by 
the ESRC Data Archive at Essex University. Owing to the necessity of preserving 
anonymity, information on local authority districts and poll tax were withheld. The 
embargo on the poll tax data was later relaxed, yet the actual poll tax amount was still 
withheld. instead, an estimate was supplied based on the average poll tax levied by 
neighbouring authorities. Information on poll tax benefit was unavailable. 
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There are a total of 7056 households in the UK sample for the 1991 FES; of these, 5019 
were in England. However, not all households in England are considered suitable to be 
included in the analysis. "Non-Paying" households are considered to be inappropriate 
for inclusion. There are 1465 home owners who have paid off their mortgage who 
would thus have incurred an insignificant amount of current housing outgoings. It is 
therefore results of their past investment which is reflected rather than their current 
outgoings as these are not suitable for comparison with households in other tenures 
where current housmg outgoings are the focus of concern. Also excluded were 115 
households whose accommodation was tied to their job or business, and was thus not 
normaUy open to the market. 
There were another three households which did not provide information on income and 
a ffirther two for whom there was no information on mortgage payments. The absence 
of such information would hamper most of the subsequent analysis and these households 
were thus excluded. Also excluded were two households whose housing cost to income 
ratio was negative and 51 households with a ratio of over 100%. Households 
experienced such extremes of housing cost to income ratio either because, during the 
period of survey, they received a large sum of rebate or refund in rent or payment of 
utility, or they were on a very low income or had very high housing costs. These cases 
are obviously unusual and cannot be taken as the normal condition of the household. 
In addition, the inclusion of such households distorted the distribution of housing cost to 
income ratio. It is shown in Appendix Al that excluding these 53 household would 
greatly reduce the deviation and the skewness of the distributions of both income and 
housing cost to income ratio and thus the distortion caused by these extreme cases is 
reduced (Appendix Al table Al. I). In total, 4272 households were retained in the 
sample for the main analysis. 
Most of the excluded households were outright owners who were most likely to be 
single and elderly. This influences the household and socio-economic characteristics of 
the sample selected for analysis so that they skew towards families, who are relatively 
young and in full time employment. A breakdown of household and economic 
characteristics of both the selected sample and the excluded households is shown in 
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Appendix Al. 
It can be seen that heads of households aged under 50 and in fiM time employment are 
over-represented in the selected sample. There are also more married couple 
households in the sample, but the regional distribution of the sample is more even, with 
only households from London and the North slightly over-represented (table Al. 2, 
Al. 3). Households selected have a higher than average income as wen as higher 
housing costs. Not surprisingly, the housing cost to income ratio is on average higher 
among the selected households, apart from those which were excluded because of 
unreasonably high ratios (Appendix Al table AIA). 
General Household Survey 
The analysis of access to home ownership and tenure preference is based on data from 
the 1988 General Household Survey. The General Household Survey is also a 
continuous survey on representative samples from Great Britain covering individuals in 
private households. Information on the respondents' housing, household, education, 
income and health is recorded in every survey, with dfferent additional topics being 
included each year. In 1988, respondents were asked about their tenure preference, 
preference for type of dwelling and satisfaction regarding their current accommodation. 
The 1988 General Household Survey was conducted between April 1988 and March 
1989 covering a sample of 19,716 individuals from 10,242 households, who were 
interviewed either in person or by proxy. The anonymised data set was also supplied by 
the ESRC Data Archive in Essex University. 
A sample of 8,603 households in England was drawn on for analysis by tenure 
preference. The evaluation of mortgage potential, a key concept in the analysis of 
tenure preference, did not assume any mortgage potential for householders over the age 
of 60. Thus only households with a head of household aged under 60 were included. 
Since the evaluation of mortgage potential requires information on income, age, and 
region households for whom there was no such information were not included for 
analysis. Tenure preference is a focus of this thesis, therefore households with no 
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definitive tenure preference were also excluded. Housing association tenants were also 
excluded, mainly on technical grounds '. The exclusion of households which did not 
provide income information is believed to generate no significant bias in the quality of 
the sub-sample (Appendix Al). Hence, the size of the final sample after all exclusions is 
1,117 households. 
4.4 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Unit ofAnalysis 
The selection of the unit of analysis is neither simple nor straightforward. An individual 
person is unlikely to be the best choice where housing issues are concerned because it is 
apparent that the sharing of resources on housing among individuals in a household is 
high. This poses particular problems in assessing the share of housing cost for each 
individual in a household. 
The nuclear family, or benefit unit, is another frequent selection. It is particularly 
relevant in the study of benefit issues or income transfer because of the relatively safe 
assumption that intra-familial resources are sharedý and thus it is compatible with the 
benefit system. However, the expenditure pattern of a nuclear family living with other 
adult members is likely to be influenced by the resources, both consumed or contributed, 
by other adult members (Whiteford, 1985). For example, a seemingly poor young adult 
living with his or her well off parents may not be poor because of the presumed 
contribution from his family (DHSS, 1988). Furthermore, changes in the 1988 Social 
Security reform, which assumed a familial responsibility for young adults in benefit 
calculations, makes using the nuclear family as the unit of analysis problematic. 
As a compromise, the concept "housing group" was proposed by Hancock (1993) in 
analysing problems of affordability. The housing group is basically a nuclear family, but 
it includes adult children who are either in M time education or unemployed. It is 
argued that "the analytical usefidness of housing group concept is that it is the core 
housing group making the long run housing investment decisions" (Hancock, 
1993: 136). Yet no convincing analysis was provided to illustrate that it is the housing 
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group which is making decisions on housing investment nor why the housing group 
should be defined in such a way; the concept thus seems to be arbitrary. Furthermore, 
education and employment status, key parameters in the definition of a housing group, 
are unlikely to be permanent. The stability, and thus the usefulness, of the concept is in 
doubt. 
This thesis will adopt the household as the unit of analysis as a less than perfect but 
acceptable altemative. Using the household as the unit of analysis has been criticised as 
undermining the complexity of shared intra-household resources in the light of the 
growing diversity of household fonnations (Hancock, 1993). However, it is equally 
difficult to argue for a total absence of resource sharing within the household, especially 
in relation to housing consumption. Moreover, analysis is less complex if both income 
and housing consumption are assumed to be shared equally among all the individuals in a 
household. This assumption is also adopted in the analysis of household resources in the 
DSS Household Below Average Income series. 
Household Inconte 
The measurement of household income is crucial to the measurement of affordability, 
but measuring income involves controversy. Income can include both cash and benefits 
in kind, and even income from the appreciation of assets. However, the latter two 
sources of income pose considerable measurement difficulties. There may not be a 
market for benefit in kind and thus no cash equivalent of the benefit is available whilst 
income from the appreciation of assets may only be an expected amount that cannot be 
easily realisable for consumption. 
The other argument involves the debate on permanent income and transitory income. 
The former represents the average expected Income earned over a lifetime, and the latter 
the current income over a particular period of time. It is argued that permanent income 
is the major determinant of consumption, and especially those consumption decisions 
which have a longlasting effect, such as housing (Cloodman, 1988). 
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Despite the apparent usefulness of the concept of permanent income, its measurement is 
not straightforward. A number of methods have been suggested, among them the 
lagged income model and the human capital model (Goodman, 1988); perhaps the most 
popular approach is the use of consumption expenditure as a proxy for permanent 
income. It is based on the argument that since permanent income is the total lifelong 
income, it should be the same as lifelong consumption. Since consumption can be 
represented by expenditure, current expenditure can then be used as a proxy for 
permatmt income (Hancock, 1993). 
On the other hand, opponents of the use of permanent income argue not only against its 
methodological imprecision, but also on the ground that it is the inadequacy in current 
income that creates an affordability problem. Thus, current income should be the focus 
of concern in the study of affordability (Linneman and Megbolugbe, 1992). Hancock 
(1993) argues that if permanent income is used to indicate resources, "the problems of 
myopia, difficulties created by unfiMed expectations and access to capital markets on 
unfavourable terms are more likely to be experienced by those for whom housing 
affordability is most problematic" (Hancock, 1993: 137). When permanent income is 
closely associated with a 'housing groups' (the unit of analysis used by Hancock (1993)) 
expected future income, those on low incomes with, possibly, erroneous expectations 
would suffer the most. 
The handling of earned income, benefit and tax in the calculation of income also creates 
substantial debates. Net disposable income, which is the cash income from all sources 
with housing benefit, tax and national insurance contribution deducted, is the most 
favoured definition of income. For example it is used by Best (1990), Hills (199 1), 
Kearns (1992), Hancock 0 993), the Housing Corporation (1993) and in the revised 
affordability policy of NFHA (HA Weekly, 17 Dec 1993). It is argued that tax and 
national insurance contributions are usually deducted at source and do not form part of 
the disposable income. 
Whether housing benefit is part of disposable income depends on whether the housing 
costs of households on housing benefit are easily adjustable. It is argued that housing 
benefit which is tied to housing, at least where rent rebate to local authority tenants is 
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concerned, cannot be used for other consumption and housing benefit could at best 
cover the cost of housing but provides no additional spending power for the household. 
It is thus better regarded as a housing subsidy and should not be included as a source of 
income (Hancock, 1993). Furthermore, it enables easy comparison with the level of 
income support where the fiffl cost of housing is covered (DHSS, 1988). 
Conversely, it is argued that housing benefit is actually tied to the household (benefit 
unit) and not to a physical dwelling and it is possible for the household to adjust housing 
consumption in the medium to long term. Thus, the level of housing benefit, like other 
sources of income, can influence the level of housing consumption (DHSS, 1988). 
Hence, housing benefit should be included as part of income, whilst simply discarding 
housing benefit in both income and housing cost calculations would be misleading where 
the effect of housing benefit on housing consumption is concerned. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that gross income is equally as powerfid as net income in explaining 
housing expenditure (Maclennan et al, 1990). Consequently, there are still a number of 
studies on affordability that use gross income, which is the cash income from all sources 
including housing benefit, as the numerator in calculating the affordability ratio (for 
example, Maclennan et al, 1990, NFHA, 1992). 
in this thesis cash income from all sources wifl be used as the definition of income. The 
reasons for this are partly pragmatic, owing to difficulties in identifying and quantifying 
benefit in kind, but are also due to the fact that benefit in kind cannot be realised to pay 
for the cost of housing. It is thus irrelevant to the problem of affordability. Likewise, 
the notion of permanent income is of little relevance to the issue of affordability because 
of the relative importance of current income to financial burden. 
Owing to the lack of definitive evidence on whether gross or net income provides a 
superior measurement, both definitions of income will be used. Gross household income 
is defined as the total cash income of all household members from all sources, which 
includes housing benefit and assistance from income support to home owners to pay for 
their mortgage interest repayment. Net income is the disposable income of the 
household with housing benefit, tax and national insurance contributions deducted. 
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Unfortunately, unlike housing benefit for tenants, the mortgage interest element of the 
income support payment was not separately coded in the Family Expenditure Survey 
1991 data file. It has to be estimated from information on income support payments. 
Home owners receiving income support for less than seventeen weeks are assumed to 
have half of their mortgage interest payment included in their income support payment 
and the fidl amount if the period exceeds seventeen weeks. However, such estimates 
result in 46 out of 151 home owners on income Support whose interest payment element 
would be greater than their actual total income support payment. Some special 
circumstances of such home owners is believed to have led to the deduction of 
assistance. Yet the absence of information on such special condition made it difficult to 
assess the exact amount of such assistance. Thus it is safer to assume that these 
households were not eligible for any assistance towards their housing costs rather than 
to over-estimate the amount. 
In the 1991 Family Expenditure Survey data, the amounts of both current income and 
normal income were recorded. Current income is the actual amount received in the last 
payment whilst normal income is basically equivalent to the current income if the 
individual is in work; if the respondent is unemployed or has been sick for less that 
thirteen weeks, his or her normal pay will be considered instead of the actual earning 
replacement social security benefits. When the period out of work exceeds thirteen 
weeks, the relevant social security benefits will be considered. In this thesis, normal 
income will be considered. 
Two finiher modifications will be made to the data available from the Family 
Expenditure Survey. First, because of the lack of information on the poll tax and poll 
tax benefit, household income will not include poll tax benefit. This is an unsatisfactory 
method for examining income but it is the best available. Second, income for home 
owners in the Family Expenditure Survey incorporates a notional amount of imputed 
income from renting one's own home to oneself This is regarded as a benefit in Idnd 
and will be deducted from the income of home owners. 
The definition of income in the General Household Survey is less sophisticated. Only 
the current gross income is available, which is the sum of gross current earnings from all 
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sources, plus state benefits and income from other sources, or usual income if the last 
payment is unusual (OPCS, 1991). Because of the absence of information on social 
secunty benefit, calculation of net income is not possible. 
a 
rv 
Housing bsts 
There are considerable complexities in determining the cost of housing. Two definitions 
of the cost of housing, the cash-flow definition and the economic definition, are 
proposed (Hancock et al, 1990). The cash flow definition represents cash outgoings as 
payment for the cost of housing. The economic cost should include not only current 
cash expenditure on housing, but also the cost of depreciation, of physical upkeep, the 
opportunity cost of capital tied up with the dwelling and the capital gain that is 
associated with the appreciation of housing value. 
Yet the economic deftition of housing cost in a study of affordability may not be 
appropriate. First, it is commonly accepted that current rent, rather than the econon-dc 
rent (which have similar definitions as the economic cost described above), may be more 
relevant in the current policy context (except where the economic return of renting or 
the level of economic subsidy are concerned). It is thus not proper to use different 
definitions of housing cost for home owners and tenants. Second, if economic cost is 
used, there should be an equivalent approach to permanent income. However, the use 
of permanent income was r0ected in the previous section on the ground that current 
income better represents the immediate burden of affordability. Similar arguments apply 
to housing cost. Hence, a cash flow approach to housing cost will be adopted in this 
thesis. 
Nevertheless, determining the cash flow cost of housing may be complex owing to the 
nature of housing. Housing is not simply the acquisition of a physical dwelling, but is 
also the consumption of housing goods and services: shelter, living space, access to 
some facility, and even a place for entertainment, provision of a sense of security or a 
symbol of status. Different mixes of such attributes imply different costs of acquisition. 
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A statistical procedure, the hedonic analysis pioneered by Rosen ( 1974), has been 
developed to standardise the cost of housing according to different mixes of attributes. 
However, this procedure is not completely satisfactory in solving the problem of cost 
diversity. This is partly because it is not easy to identify all relevant and significant 
attributes, and also because dwellings with similar attributes may have various costs of 
acquisition even in the same locality. Fo r example, the hedonic price model of 
Maclennan and colleagues (1990) can only 'explain! (in a statistical sense) about two 
thirds of the variations in the housing cost of dwellings in the owner occupied sector and 
only one third in the public rented sector among households in their six city surveys. 
The model developed by Hills (1990) can explain only slightly more than half of the 
variations in the prices of dwellings sold in 1988. 
Furthermore, it is not always possible to derive the standardised cost based on the 
hedonic procedure owing to the absence of relevant data. A hedonic model, developed 
by this author on data from the 1991 Five Percent Sample Survey on Building Society 
Mortgages? and using attributes common to FES 1991, can explain only approximately 
half of the variation in the data. As a compromise, the unstandardised housing cost will 
be used but the cost of some attributes will be included in the current outgoings. 
Hence, housing cost will include gross rent for tenants which includes service charges 
(but not meal charges) or mortgage interest repayment for home owners, together with 
the cost of acquiring the mix of attributes associated with the use value of the dwelling: 
the cost of repair and maintenance, water and sewerage charges, fuel and power and 
structural insurance. 
Whether the cost of commuting should be included as part of housing cost is 
controversial. A high cost of commuting may be a result of the remoteness of the 
dwelling or the inconvenience for access to shops, entertainment or work areas, and thus 
may be reflected in a lower housing cost. But the actual expenditure may relate only to 
the mode of transport the household uses or the relative costs of public and private 
transport in the area. In view of such complexity and the difficulty in differentiating 
between commuting costs which are associated with the location of the dwelling and 
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those that are not, it is considered more appropriate to exclude such costs in the 
calculation of housing cost. 
Repayment of the principal of mortgage loans, which is apparently part of current 
housing outgoings, is discarded from the calculation of housing cost. Instead, it is 
regarded as the cost of acquiring an asset. Meanwhile, poll tax, unlike domestic rates 
before 1989 or the council tax after 1994, is unrelated to the consumption of housing 
and thus should not be counted as part of housing cost. Hancock and colleagues (1990) 
treated it simply as a form of tax in the calculation of net income. Nevertheless, 
unavailability of the wnount of poll tax in the present data set does not allow any 
manipulation involving poll tax and poll tax benefit. The absence of such information 
does affect the level of housing cost, but the effect on the level of net household income 
for most of the households may be slight. 
Information available in the 1991 FES poses difficulties in the calculation of housing 
costs for some home owners. There were 272 home owners buying their homes who 
gave no information on the amount of mortgage interest payment. Because they 
constitute 10% of mortgagors, to simply recode these cases as missing data would 
jeopardise the accuracy of the analysis. Instead, the imputed rent was used as a proxy 
for the mortgage interest payment for these owners. Despite the fact that this will be an 
underestimate of the housing cost to income ratio of these mortgagees", it is 
nevertheless the closest available estimate, given the limitation of the current data set. 
For reasons discussed in the previous section, both gross and net income will be used in 
this analysis. To be compatible with the income definition used, gross and net housing 
costs are also used in calculating the corresponding housing cost to income ratios. 
Gross housing cost is the current outgoings whilst net housing cost will have both the 
amount of housing benefit and the mortgage interest element of income support 
deducted from the gross household cost. 
On the other hand, it is not apparent which defmition of housing cost should be 
employed in the analysis of access to home ownership. Only the cost of purchase is 
included in the mortgage potential formula. However, chapter three of this thesis shows 
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that the concept of mortgage potential, a measurement of access to home ownership, is 
implicitly a ratio approach to affordability, albeit the threshold ratio is not spelled out. It 
indicates the ability of the prospective buyer to afford the burden of mortgage repayment 
at the initial stage of repayment. In this sense, it refers to current housing outgoings 
which include both the repayment of mortgage interest and principal, but exclude any 
other housing related expenditure, unlike definitions in the earlier part of this section. 
Moreover, whether gross or net housing cost should be used is irrelevant in this context 
because the access measurement should have considered prospective buyers who have 
to rely on social security benefit to sustain home ownership as being in a position of 
unaffordability. 
Household Size and Equivalence Scale 
it is apparent that the size and composition of a household will make varying demands 
on resources; a larger household requires more resources to achieve the same standard 
of living as a smaller household. A household with more adults will also need more 
resources to maintain the same standard of living as another household of the same size 
but with more children. At the same time, larger households can share facilities or 
equipment, such as a car or the kitchen, enjoying economy of scale in joint consumption, 
for exwnple the preparation of food. Consequently, fewer resources than expected are 
required to maintain the standard of living than if there were no shared consumption. 
To accommodate the complex relationships of size, composition and the degree ofjoint 
consumption of household resources, several procedures have been developed to 
standardise these elements. One method of standardising is to employ regression 
analysis which incorporates household size and composition as explanatory variables so 
that, with the help of the regression equation, the effect of size and household 
composition can be identified (e. g. Maclennan et al, 1990). This has the advantage of 
making no prior assumption on the effect of either size or composition on a household's 
resource sharing, but suffers from the serious drawback of being too complicated and 
inflexible to have a wider application. 
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Another common alternative is to employ an equivalence scale to standardise the effects 
of size and composition on a household in the calculation of resources. A large number 
of equivalence scales has been developed based on different assumptions of the needs of 
household members at different ages, and the effect ofioMt consumption and the 
resulting econornies of scale (Whiteford, 1985). A major advantage of employing an 
equivalence scale is its simplicity, it compares the "equivalised" resources of households 
with different sizes and composition. Nevertheless, because of the lack of consensus on 
which is the best equivalence scale, comparison between analyses based on different 
equivalence scales is not easy. It is noteworthy that the equivalised household resources 
generated from different equivalence scales is sensitive to the choice of scale (Whiteford, 
1985). 
This thesis will employ the McClements, scale, which is used by the DSS in its 
Households Below Average income Series, in which there are separate scales for 
income both before and after housing costs. Both scales are presented in table 4.1. 
They will be applied to residual income (income after housing cost) and gross income in 
the evaluation of affordability using the residual income approach. Unequivalised 
residual income will also be used to enable a comparison of residual income with the 
income support level, which has its own implicit equivalence scale embedded within it. 
it is also desirable to use equivalised housing cost in the investigation of housing cost to 
income ratio, yet most equivalence scales are developed for household income or total 
expenditure. Although the HBAI series provide equivalence scales for total household 
expenditure both before and after housing cost which implied an implicit equivalence 
scale for housing cost, inferring an explicit equivalence scale for the cost of housing 
requires additional time and effort which this thesis may not be able to afford, in addition 
to the Miculty of validating such a scale. Thus, as a compromise, only unequivalised 
housing cost and income are used in evaluating the housing cost to income ratio. 
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Table 4.1 McClemmts' Scale 
Households Member E 
Before Housing 
quivalence Scale 
Costs After Housing Costs 
Household Head 0.61 0.55 
Spouse of Head 0.39 0.45 
Other Second Adult 0.46 0.45 
Third Adult 0.42 0.45 
Subsequent Adult 0.36 0.40 
Dependent Child Aged 0- 1 0.09 0.07 
Dependent Child Aged 2-4 0.18 0.18 
Dependent Child Aged 5-7 0.21 0.21 
Dependent Child Aged 8- 10 0.23 0.23 
Dependent Child Aged II- 12 0.25 0.26 
Dependent Child Aged 13-15 0.27 0.28 
Diencndent Child ARed Over 16 0.36 0.38 
Source: DSS 1993 Table 4.1 
Housing quality 
It was argued in chapter three that quality of housing is an integral part of the concept of 
affordability. Ifformation on housing under- and over-consumption is essential to an 
&%sessment of the affordability status of a household. Thus the standard of housing 
consumption is crucial to the measurement of affordability. 
official standards of minimum physical adequacy of a dwelling can be used as a 
yardstick for the assessment of housing under-consumption. Such standards exist in the 
United States where a thirteen item checklist developed by the Congressional Budget 
Office provides a practical and easily comprehensible instrument for assessment (Yazar, 
198 1). In the UK, Section 83 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 sets out 
conditions in which a dwelling is unfit for human inhabitation (Whitehead et al, 1993). 
In Canada, such information has to rely on survey data from households' self assessment 
of the need for major repair (Fallis, 1990a). 
These standards, if incorporated into the empirical measurement of affordability in the 
UK, have to rely on survey data which provides information on both the physical 
condition of the dwellings and other relevant social and economic data about the 
households. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to obtain high quality information on 
both aspects in a single survey. For example, the English Housing Condition Survey 
supplies high quality information on the physical conditions of dwellings, but lacks 
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relevant information on other aspects of the household. Whilst the Family Expenditure 
Survey presents rich information on household social and economic conditions, there is 
no information on the physical condition of the dwellings. 
It is equally difficult to achieve this with specially designed surveys. The JRF Housing 
Finance Project, conducted between 1986 and 1988, collected information on both 
household income and housing conditions, but only information on banded income could 
be acquired, whilst the physical condition of the dwellings was either based on self- 
assessment by the respondents or was assessed by the interviewers against a rough 
checklist of physical conditions. 
Another commonly used indicator of physical adequacy is the availability of facilities in 
the dwelling, such as a bathroom, a sink in the kitchen, inside toilet, hot and cold water. 
Such information is available in detail in the English House Conditions Survey and the 
General Household Surveys. However, no such information is available in the Family 
Expenditure Survey. 
Since information on physical conditions and facilities is often not supplied by social 
surveys, overcrowding is frequently used as a proxy for housing under-consumption. A 
Household is considered to be under-consuming housing if the household is living in 
overcrowded conditions, measured against some socially defined standard or norm. In 
Canada, overcrowding is part of the definition of core need measurement and is assessed 
against an official standard, the National Occupancy Standard (Fallis, 1990a). In the 
M Section 326 of the Housing Act 1985 provides a table of rooms and square footage 
per person as a statutory over-crowding standard (Whitehead et al, 1993). Yet this 
latter standard is difficult to implement using information from survey data. 
Instead, Hancock (1993) uses room density as an indicator of overcrowding in which a 
density of over 1.5 persons per room is regarded as overcrowded, allegedly described as 
the standard for overcrowding used in the Population Census. In fact, this ceased to be 
used in the Census in 1991 as a standard since there were only 0.3% households having 
a room density of over 1.5 persons per room in 1991 (OPCS, 1993b). 
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Another indicator, the occupancy norm, is used by the Census to assess overcrowding in 
Scotland. The rule set Out in the Census Occupancy Norm assumes that a single person 
household needs only one room whilst for households with more than one member, a 
living room and one bedroom is needed for each of the following combinations of 
household members (OPCS, 1993b: 20): 
" Each married couple 
" Each single person aged 21 and over 
" Each pair aged 10-20 of the same sex 
" Each pair formed from a remaining child aged 10-20 with a child aged under 10 
of the same sex 
each pair of children aged under 10 remaining 
Each child unable to form a pair 
Given the limitation in the Family Expenditure Survey, it is only possible to assess 
housing under-consumption with reference to overcrowding and the occupancy norm is 
considered the most appropriate measure of assessment. In addition to the use of the 
occupancy Norm, the results of room density of a household will also be displayed as a 
reference. 
The assessment of housing over-consumption is not straightforward. Whilst there is a 
standard for physically adequate dwellings, there is no consensus on what constitutes a 
luxurious dwelling. Nor does any standard exist for over-provision of facilities. 
Hancock (1993) suggests the use of the official maximum level of housing consumption 
in housing benefit application where it refers to the number of rooms allowed for by rent 
officers in assessing whether the size of the property associated with the application is 
unreasonably large. 
There exists a maximum level of housing consumption above which rent officers are 
required to regard consumption as unreasonable, either in terms of space occupied or 
unit cost paid. The rent officer is obliged to recommend such a rent level as 
inappropriate. However, to assess a definitive level of such a standard from empirical 
data may be difficult. First, it is only the recommendation of the rent officer and the 
recommendation only affects the amount of housing benefit with which local authorities 
were reimbursed; not necessarily the actual amount of housing benefit granted. Thus, 
information on housing benefit does not necessarily reflect the decision of the rent 
officers. Second, such assessments, admittedly based on some explicit standards, are 
105 
sensitive to the special conditions of the applicant as well as to the availability of 
alternative acconmiodation of appropriate size or tufit price in the locality (Kemp and 
McLaverty, 1993a). 
It is probable that housing benefit above that normally allowed would be granted owing 
to the special conditions mentioned, and this would affect the maximum size so inferred. 
Thus, using these methods to assess housing over-consumption could underestimate the 
number of households which are over-consuming. 
Instead, it is revealed that in the assessment of reasonable size associated with housing 
benefit applications, there is a set of explicit size criteria to which rent officers must 
adhere (Kemp and Mdaverty, 1993b). The terms of such size criteria are similar to the 
occupancy Norm described in the previous paragraph, and will be used to assess 
housing over-consumption in this thesis. However, owing to the practical consideration 
of availability of one all-purpose room in a house or a flat, a single person occupying a 
house or flat with one living room together with a bedroom will not be considered to be 
over-consuming housing services. 
Nonetheless, the assessment of over-consumption using the Occupancy Norm will over- 
estimate the number of households over-consuming housing, since the occupancy norm 
fails to include households with special needs. Households with special housing need 
usually require extra space for special purposes and are thus considered to be over- 
consuming housing services. There is no ready solution to rectify such shortcomings in 
the data and thus the interpretation of over-consumption should be made with caution. 
4.5 MUTATION OF THE DATA SETS 
There are many advantages in employing the method of secondary analysis in empirical 
investigations. Besides being economic in both time and resources spent on data 
collection, the quality of survey data is also considered to be stable and reliable, 
especially when large scale national level surveys are used. The Family Expenditure 
Survey and the General Household Survey have nearly thirty years of experience of 
implementation; methods of data collection, accuracy of the data collected, as well as 
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the representativeness of the sample, have improved substantially over the years. 
Although the Family Expenditure Survey is still accused of under-representing 
households on very high incomes (DSS, 1993), such defects do not affect the analysis of 
affordability in the present thesis when this problem is likely to be concentrated in 
households on median to low incomes. 
However, Whilst the Family Expenditure Survey has rich data on income and 
expenditure, it lacks important information on the quality of housing and on the house 
value to be evaluated using the hedonic technique. The quality of information on 
mortgage repayment is also poor. Not only are there too many missing cases of 
mortgage interest repayment, but even less infonnation is available on term of mortgage 
loan. information on the majority of mortgagees' length of current mortgage loan is 
missing and it is thus impossible to locate the position of a mortgagee in the course of 
repayment. 
On the other hand, the General Household Survey has sufficient information on both 
amenities and relevant information in assessing house value. Information on income is 
inadequate, apart from the complete absence of expenditure information. Both these 
data sets lack information on debt and housing payment arrears, so that housing- 
associated stress cannot be investigated. 
These defects illustrate the main shortcomings of secondary analysis, namely the absence 
of control over the infonnation being collected and the sample frame used. The data 
collected may not necessarily be exactly suited to the secondary analyst's research 
questions as the original survey will have been designed for a Merent task. Thus, 
beside difficulties in the operationalisation of research concept, this research has also to 
work within the limitations imposed by the information available in the data sets. 
4.6 SUAINL4, Ry 
This chapter describes the method used in the research, which is an empirical 
investigation of affordability based on surveys at a national level. The research 
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questions focus mainly on issues surrounding the implementation of different 
approaches to affordability measurement and access to home ownership 
The investigation is based on the 1991 Family Expenditure Survey and the 1988 
General Household Survey. The latter data Set has been Used to examine access to 
home ownership and the former for the remaining topics. Only households in 
England are included in the analysis; in the FES, nOn-paying households are 
excluded, whereas in the GHS a sub-sample of tenants in local authority housing and 
the private rented sector who were under the age of 60 have been selected for further 
analysis. 
The household has been employed as the unit of analysis. Normialised current income 
was used, which has been adjusted to take into account short absences from work. 
Meanwhile, gross and net income were used in parallel in the empirical investigation. 
Gross income includes current cash income from all sources, in addition to housing 
benefit to tenants as well as help towards mortgage interest payment from Income 
Support. Where net income excludes tax, nadonal insurance payments and assistance 
from social security were put towards housing costs. 
Housing cost is defined to include rent or mortgage interest payment, in addition to 
the cost of repair and maintenance, fuel and power, structural insurance, water and 
sewerage charges. Mortgage principal repayment is regarded as the cost of acquiring 
an asset and is excluded from housing cost. Poll tax is considered to be unrelated to 
housing and so is excluded as part of housing cost. However, the embargo on actual 
poll tax charges and poll tax benefit has not allowed for fine adjustment of the 
amount of such benefit on either gross or net income. 
The McClements' scale is used to equivalise the income of households to adjust for 
the differences in needs of households of different size and characteristics, as well as 
to reflect the effect of economies of scale and sharing of resources. Meanwhile, 
quality of housing cannot be measured directly using the present data sets and only 
the dimension of overcrowding can be inferred indirectly by using the Occupancy 
Norm. 
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CHAPTER 5 
HOUSING COST AND HOUSING COST TO 
INCOME RATIO: A GENERAL PROFILE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the housing cost and housing cost to income ratio will form the core 
part of subsequent investigations. A general profile of both variables will be 
described in this chapter before starting a detailed analysis. This will provide a 
background of the distribution of both variables in relation to the households' socio- 
economic characteristics that are relevant in this thesis, and will also enhance the 
formulation of the structure of future analysis. Subsequent analyses will proceed with 
the gross and net quantity of both housing cost and housing cost to income ratio; 
therefore this chapter will be focused on these four variables. 
This chapter will proceed with the analysis of housing cost followed by an 
examination of the housing cost to income ratio. Whilst the main objective of this 
chapter is to describe the distribution of these variables in relation to households, 
housing and socio-economic characteristics, a contrast between the gross and net 
quality will also be highlighted. This latter analysis may shed some light on how 
subsequent analysis should be formulated. Gross housing cost used in this thesis 
includes the gross rent or mortgage interest repayment, together with expenditure on 
fuel and power, utilities, repair and maintenance and structural insurance. Gross 
income is defined as the total income of all member of the household from all sources 
which includes earned income and income from state benefits. Where net housing 
cost and net income exclude, respectively, gross housing cost and gross income, 
housing benefit and help from social security to pay off mortgage interest repayment 
5.2 HOUSING COST 
it was shown in chapter three that the demand for housing can be expressed as a 
ffinction of household income and the unit price of housing (formula 3.3). Yet empirical 
investigation of housing demand is hampered by the difficulty in observing directly the 
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quantity as well as the unit price of housing consumption. Instead, housing price and 
quantity can be jointly observed as the household expenditure on housing which can be 
expressed as a function of household income, household size and other demographic 
characteristics as shown in formula S. I (Groodaert and Dubois, 1986; Malpezzi and 
Mayo, 1985).. 
H b(Z, pff) 
R r(Z, F) 
Where H- Roueft Conswwdon 
Z- Boumhold Income 
PH - Unit Price of Howft 
R- Fjýý* on Houaft 
P- Hounhold Site and Odur Demographic Variables 
Housing cost can then be examined in more detail in relation to household income and 
other household and demographic variables. This will be explicated in this section, in 
which a general profile of the relationship will be explored, while a more elaborate 
investigation, involving a more exact specification of the functional form of the equation 
will be pursued in subsequent chapters. 
it is not uncommon for the analysis of housing demand or housing cost be conducted 
separately for households in the market and non-market sectors because of the 
dfference in the underlying operation of these two sectors. This may be valid in 
England where over a quarter of the housing stock is in the social rented sector, where 
the market mechanism does not apply in general. 
Whilst the distinction between market and non-market provision of housing is noted and 
there may be advantages in separating the analyses for the market and non-market 
sectors of housing provision, yet conducting the analyses in such a way may generate 
other complications. First, a choice between owning and renting in the market provision 
of housing would have different implications for the cost of housing. Second, the 
furnished and the unfurnished private rental markets are quite distinct market sectors. 
Third, owner occupation in the UK does not operate in a perfect market, but is distorted 
by tax benefit to home buyers, which alters the relative costs of owning and renting. 
Fourth, the fair rent system, a form of rent control which would have a serious distortion 
on the operation of the market, still applies to a considerable minority of tenancies in the 
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private rented sector. In addition, claimants' housing consumption decisions would not 
be the result of market operational factors in the private rented sector, but of the 
provision of housing benefit. 
Fifth, since the social rented sector is beginning to adopt a more market like policy of 
rent setting, the dfference in the underlying mechanism which influence housing costs 
between market and non-market promston may be smaUer than before. 
To cater for such complications, a more complicated division of market provision than a 
simple dichotomy must be used. For example, the distinction between renting and 
owning, as well as between furnished renting and unfinmished renting, is required, so as 
to fiffly distinguish between the market and non-market provision of housing, This 
would greatly increase the burden of analysis in this chapter, which aims to provide a 
simple profile of housing cost in relation to households' socio-economic characteristics. 
Thus, there will be no attempt to run separate analyses for dfferent modes of housing 
provision in this chapter. Rather, it is expected that the tenure variable will capture many 
of the variations in different modes of housing provision, and could be used as a proxy 
for the market and non-market provision of housing. 
In 199 1, the average level of gross housing cost, at 172 per week, was significantly 
higher than net housing cost, which was L67 per week. This reflects the mediation of 
housing benefit which led to a more even distribution of net housing cost where it 
reduced the level of housing cost of households on low incomes. On the other hand, 
because housing benefit reduced housing costs for the poor, it widened the gap between 
the net housing cost paid by poor and wealthy households. This is captured by the 
increased standard deviation of net housing cost over gross housing cost (table 5.1). 
The difference in the distribution of gross and net housing cost is also shown in figure 
5.1. The distribution of both forms of housing cost was uneven with more households 
concentrated at the lower end of the distribution, which reflects the uneven distribution 
of income. Without help from housing benefit, the gross and net housing costs of the 
medium and high income households were identical. The mediation of housing benefit 
reduced the net housing costs of many poor households and thus biased its distribution 
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more towards the lower end. Yet a bimodal distribution of net housing cost is apparent. 
The higher mode reflects the reduction of housing cost for households around the peak 
of the distribution of gross housing cost, the lower mode was probably the effect of the 
portion of housing cost not covered by housing benefit, partly owing to the failure of the 
households to get full support and partly due to the amount included in the definition of 
housing cost besides rent and mortgage interest payment, which housing benefit to 
tenants and social security benefit to home owners are not supposed to support. The 
amount of the housing cost of such households, relative to their households income, 
exerted a considerable financial burden on them. 
Table 5.1 Housing Cost: DesmatLive Statistics 
statistics Gross Cost fvw Net Cost fpw 
Mean 72.2 66.5 
Standard deviation 53.1 56.3 
Median 55.2 51.4 
S 3.2 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of Housing Cost 
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Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Meanwhile, there was a large difference in housing costs between tenure groups. This 
largely reflects the effect of market and non-market provision of housing on housing 
cost mentioned earlier in this section. Mortgagees had the highest level of both gross 
and net cost and they benefited least from social security benefit on housing; there was 
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Housing Cost (Pounds pw) 
practicaRy no difference between the level of gross and net housing cost. Tenants in the 
social rented sector and those in rented private unfurnished accommodation had a much 
lower level of both gross and net housing cost, whilst the housing costs of tenants in the 
private furnished sector were at a level between the two former groups. 
Housing costs paid by tenants in the social rented sector and the private unfurnished 
sector varied much less than costs paid by home owners or tenants in the private 
fin-nished sector. This represents the range of variation in the level of rent in the public 
and the regulated private sector against the open market. A more market-like rent 
structure in the social sector and continued deregulation in the private rental market 
would surely have the effect of widening the range of housing costs. 
The mediation of housing benefit not only reduced the level of housing cost paid by 
tenants, especially those in the social sector, but also widened the range of variation in 
housing cost amongst tenants. This was probably a result of the widened gap between 
tenants on full benefit whose housing cost was supported in fitu by housing benefit, and 
those whose income was just above the level eligible for benefit. The high taper of 
housing benefit withdrawal would make this difference (figure 5.2 )(refer to Appendix 
A2 for the interpretation of the box plots). 
Regional variation of housing cost was less apparent, but London and the South East 
were obvious exceptions. The level of both gross and net housing costs in these two 
regions were significantly higher, while there was no difference in the average housing 
cost between other regions in the country (F test at 5% confidence level). Housing cost 
in the South West, because of the relatively larger standard deviation, showed no 
definite relationship with the rest of the country. Although housing costs showed less 
variation among regions, the magnitude of variation within regions was large. Thus the 
statistically identical level of average housing costs between regions in the North and 
Midlands might only reflect this relatively large within-region variation which over- 
shadowed the between-regions variation (figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.2 Housing Cost by Tenure 
H" 
0 200 
u 180 
s 
i 160 
n 140 
9 
120 
C loo 
0 80 T 
s t 60 40 
20 
LA HA 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Figure 5.3 Housing Cost by Region 
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Married couple households had the highest level of both gross and net housing cost, but 
they also had the largest variation of both types of housing cost. This is because of the 
high concentration of home owners in married couple households and this pattern 
largely reflects the situation of home owners. At the same time, housing costs paid by 
single person and lone parent households were significantly lower than costs paid by 
married couple households. Lone parent households benefited most from housing 
benefit where the reduction of gross housing cost was greatest. On the other hand, 
variation in housing costs among single person households increased after the mediation 
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of housing benefit (figure 5.4). It reveals the differential effect of housing benefit on 
single elderly people who benefited from it more than young single people who were 
either not eligible for the benefit or could only get a smaller amount of help. 
it is not surprising that, given the contrast of the level of housing cost between single 
person and married couple households, single person households had a significantly 
lower level of housing cost than larger households. However, among larger 
households, there was no significant difference between the level of housing cost. in 
fact, it was the difference within households of the same size that overshadowed the 
difference between households of different sizes (figure 5.5). Yet, it contrasts with 
what is expected on the influence of household size on the housing demand function 
found in other empirical studies of housing demand and housing cost. This may suggest 
the effect of income and other household characteristics was larger than expected.. 
Figure 5.4 Housing Cost by Household Type 
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The age of the householder had a close association with the average level of housing 
cost. Householders of retirement age and over paid the lowest level of housing cost, 
followed by householders approaching the age of retirement, whilst middle aged 
householders paid the highest level. At the same time, variation of housing cost within 
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Couple 
households for older householders was considerably lower than for younger 
householders (figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.5 Housing Cost by Household Size 
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Figure 5.6 Housing Cost by Age of Head of Household 
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Where housing cost and employment status is concerned, the most obvious observation 
in figure 5.7 was the high level of both gross and net housing costs among households 
where the householder was in full time employment (FT+FT) as well as the substantial 
dispersion of housing cost within such groups. At the same time, there was no 
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difference in the level of housing cost regardless of the employment status of his partner 
for an employed householder. When the householder was working part time, the level 
of net housing cost paid by a household was, statistically, at the same level as for those 
who were unemployed, whilst the level of gross housing cost was marginally higher (F 
test at 5% confidence level)(figure 5.7) 
The pattem of housing cost distribution of households with different economic status 
reflects, to a large extent, the effect of housing benefit on housing cost. As a result of 
the mediation of housing benefit, the average level of both gross and net housing cost 
for housing benefit claimants was much lower than that for non-claimants (figure 5.8). 
Housing benefit assisted only those on low incomes, who usually had very low housing 
costs. Thus the dispersal of housing cost for claimants was much lower than for non- 
claimants. 
Figure 5.7 Housing Cost by Economic Status of Head of Household and Partner 
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Note: FT (Full Time) PT (Part Time) Uno/Unocc (Unoccupied) 
It is apparent from figures 5.9 and 5.10 that an increase in income was strongly 
associated with an increase in housing cost. This matches what is expected from 
formula 5.1 that household income bears a close relations With housing costs. The 
direction of moving also agrees with the sign of the income elasticity of housing demand 
found in other empirical studies (Maclennan, 1982). This is not surprising, given that 
117 
households on higher incomes were more capable of paying a higher housing cost. 
What is noteworthy is the increased dispersal of housing cost among high income 
households. It suggests that wealthy households had a wider choice in their level of 
housing consumption whilst the freedom of choice of poor households was much limit. 
Figure 5.8 Housing Cost by Housing Benefit 
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Figure 5.9 Housing Cost by Gross Income Decile Group 
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Detailed analysis (oneway ANOVA test and SchefE6 procedure at 5% confidence level) 
also indicates that the level of gross housing cost among the bottom three decile groups 
and net housing cost among the bottom two decile groups waer statistically identical. 
The levels of the rest of the decile groups were significantly different from each other 
(with the exception of the seventh and eighth decile groups). This observation has 
implications for the threshold affordability level since it suggests a different relationship 
for level of housing expenditure with reference to income between poor and rich 
households. However, this needs to be confirmed with more detailed analysis. 
Figure 5.10 Housing Cost by Net Income Decile Group 
N 
e 
t 
C 22ý 
0 20 
s 18 
t 
16 
141 
120 
100 
80- 
601 
40 
20, 
O. 
-M4M-M Low 2345678 
Income Decile Group (Net Income) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
5.3 HOUSING COST TO INCOME RATIO 
Mentioned in the beginning of the preceding section, household expenditure on housing 
can be expressed as a function of household income and other socio-economic factors of 
the household (formula 5.1). Under some specific assumptions of the relationship 
between housing expenditure with household income and other socio-economic 
characteristics (for instance, an assumption of a log-log relationship which is not 
uncommon among empirical studies), housing cost to income ratio can be expressed as 
a function of the households' socio-economic characteristics (formula 5.2). This allows 
a preliminary investigation of housing cost to income ratio in relation to the socio- 
economic characteristics of the households while more detailed examination of the 
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housing cost to income ratio wifl be pursued in subsequent chapters.. 
R- r(ZP) 
L? - ff(p) 
Mom H- Howaft Cmit 
*- HavembW Inmw (5.2) 
*- Arwadaro an Hooft 
*- HAvmWWd SAW md OAw DmopWhic VotsUm 
Q- Houdw Cow to Immo RAmo 
In 1991, households in England spent, on average, around a quarter of their income on 
housing. This mean value does not vary regardless of whether gross or net housing cost 
to income ratio is used. Because both gross and net ratios skew towards the lower end 
of the distribution, the median value was lower than the mean value at approximately 
22% (table 6.1). This indicates that the majority of households spent only a fifth of their 
income on housing; not a high level, especially when housing cost includes expenditure 
on maintenance, insurance, utility charges, and the cost of fuel and power. 
Table 5.2 Housing Cost to Income Ratio: Descrivtive Statistics 
Statistics Gross ratio % Net Ratio % 
Mean 25.7 25.4 
Standard deviation 15.7 14.4 
Median 22.0 22.1 
S 1.48 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Distributions of both gross ratio and net ratio were close (figure 5.11), but the 
dispersion of the net ratio was more uniform than that of the gross ratio. This reflects 
the effect of housing benefit, which helps to reduce the housing burden on tenants on 
low incomes. At the higher end of the income distribution, the tax system reduced the 
net income of such households and thus raised their corresponding net housing burden. 
The definition of housing cost used in this thesis, though not common in the literature on 
affordability, has the advantage of avoiding too many households which have no net 
housing payments as a result of receiving full housing benefit. Nil Housing cost poses 
computational difficulties on many statistical procedures and thus hampers empirical 
examination of the housing cost to income ratio. Furthermore, the distribution of both 
gross and net ratio are roughly log-normal, i. e. the logarithm of the ratios are normally 
distributed. This distribution pattern will have implications for subsequent statistical 
analyses. 
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distributed. This distribution pattem will have implications for subsequent statistical 
analyses. 
Patterns of distribution of both gross and net ratios exhibited a substantial contrast 
between tenure groups. The average level of gross housing cost to income ratio among 
social tenants was the highest, while among mortgagees it was the lowest. The 
difference of gross ratios between owners and tenants was statistically significant, but 
within tenants there was no significant difference in mean gross ratios between private 
and social tenants (figure 5-12). At the same time, the dispersion of gross housing cost 
to income ratio was large among both private and social tenants. 
Figure 5.11 Distribution of Housing Cost to Income Ratio 
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The distribution of housing cost to income ratio was different after the mediation of 
housing benefit and the tax system. Mortgagees on the average had to spend a higher 
proportion of their net income on housing because of the effect of the tax system. 
Despite social tenants having lower mean net ratios, there was no significant difference 
in the mean level of private tenants or mortgagees because of the large variations of net 
ratio within mortgagees. On the other hand, in contrast to the large variation of gross 
ratio within social tenants, the variation of net ratio was smaller owing to the effect of 
housing benefit - 
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Figure 5.12 Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Tenure 
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Regional differences in both gross and net ratio were insignificant, with London as the 
exception, whereas both the mean gross and net ratios were significantly higher. The 
lack of significant difference in the mean ratio between regions does not imply 
uniformity of housing cost and income across regions. It is the comparatively larger 
variation within regions which overshadowed the regional difference. Furthermore, the 
effects of housing benefit and the tax system were quite uniform across regions and 
produced no significant contrast between net and gross ratio (figure 5.13) 
Housing cost to income ratio varies substantially between different types of 
households. Both single person and lone parent households had a significantly higher 
gross ratio than that of married couple households. Mediation of the housing benefit 
and tax systems reduced the variation of housing cost to income ratio among lone 
parents and single persons whilst it increased that of married couples. This can be 
explained by the tenure composition within the household types: there was a higher 
concentration of social tenants among single people whilst more married couple 
households were home owners. 
Still, the average level of net ratio was higher among single person households. At 
the same time, the within group variation was also greatest compared with other 
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household types. It probably reflects the gap between the affordability situation of an 
elderly single person who tends to have lower ratio because of assistance from 
housing benefit whilst the younger elderly had to devote a high proportion of their net 
income to housing (figure 5.14). 
The age of the householder demonstrated a close relationship with the level of housing 
cost to income ratio. Households headed by middle aged householders had the lowest 
gross as well as net ratio whflst householders over the age of 60 had the highest housing 
burden measured by gross ratio. However, the latter group also benefited from housing 
benefit and thus had their level of net ratio reduced to a level lower than that which 
younger householders (aged under 30) on average had to pay (figure 5.15). 
Figure 5.13 Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Region 
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Household size was related to both gross and net ratio. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients between gross and net ratio of household size were, respectively, -0.3 and 
-0.18 (p<0.01). Although the correlation is not strong, the negative magnitude of the 
correlation coefficients indicate that large households tend to have low housing cost to 
income ratios. 
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Figure S. 14 Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Household Type 
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Figure 5.15 Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Age of Head of Household 
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However, a closer scrutiny reveals a more complicated pattern. It was single person 
households which had a substantially higher mean value of both gross and net ratio than 
larger households. The mean ratios of two person households, although the second 
highest, were only marginally higher than larger households. Household size bore no 
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relationship to either gross or net ratio for households with three persons or more 
(figure 5,16). 
Whilst the size of a household was related, to some extent, to housing cost to income 
ratio, the number of children in the household had little association with such ratios. 
Although there was a significant difference in both gross and net ratio between 
households which had dependent children and those which had not, neither the number 
of children nor the presence of school age children showed a relationship with gross and 
net housing cost to income ratio. The difference in housing cost to income ratio 
between households with and without dependent children was attributed to the presence 
of pre-school children where households with pre-school children would have a lower 
level of both gross and net ratio. 
Figure 5.16 Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Household Size 
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The economic status of the head of household and his partner displays a noticeable 
relationship with the level of gross ratio. When both the head of household and his 
partner were in full time employment, the average gross ratio was the lowest. The gross 
ratio would increase with a decrease in the householder's degree of involvement in the 
labour market. When the householder switched from full time employment to part time, 
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and then unemployment, whilst the employment status of his partner remained 
unchanged, the average gross ratio would increase by, respectively, five percentage 
points and ten percentage points. Contribution from a second eamer, on the other hand, 
did not produce a significant improvement in the level of gross ratio. 
Unlike the gross ratio, there was no simple pattern relating the level of net ratio to 
economic status. Only households with both the head of household and his partner in 
employment had the lowest level of net ratio, but the difference was very small. 
Meanwhile, the average levels of net ratio for the rest of the households were 
statistically identical (figure 5.17). 
Figure 5.17 Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Economic Status of Head of 
Household and Partner 
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These distribution patterns between employment status and housing cost to income ratio 
were reflected in the distribution of housing cost to income ratio among housing benefit 
claimants and non-claimants. Households which were in receipt of housing benefit had 
an eighteen percentage points higher gross housing cost to income ratio than households 
which were not; on the other hand, they had a two percentage points lower net ratio 
(figure 5.18). 
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As housing benefit bears a close relationship with the employment status of the head 
of household and his partner, it is not surprising that households which were more 
likely to be housing benefit claimants had householders who were unemployed, 
retired or working part time. They were likely to have a higher gross ratio. On the 
other hand, housing benefit would have a relatively larger effect on the reduction of 
housing cost among claimants than its effect on net income; thus there was a 
considerably greater reduction of net ratio among claimants than non-claimants. 
Figure 5.18 Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Housing Benefit 
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It is apparent from figure 5.19 that the level of gross ratio decreased with an increase 
in gross household income. Every gross income decile group had a significantly 
different level of gross ratio, with the exception of the top three decile groups. 
Whilst the three top income decile groups all had significantly lower mean ratios than 
the remaining households, their average gross incomes were statistically identical. 
This indicates a trend of decrease in housing burden relative to income as the 
household income increases, but this relationship did not hold among the top income 
households. It is suspected that the relationship between housing cost to income ratio 
and household income in the top three income decile groups was different from that 
of the rest of the households. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the bottom two 
decile groups had the largest variation of gross ratio within the group (figure 5.19). 
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This signifies that the mean gross ratio may not be a fair representation of the 
housing burden of households on a low income. Other statistical analysis which also 
takes into account the variation between households should be employed. 
Figure 5.19 Gross Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Gross Income Decile Group 
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Because of the differential effect of housing benefit and the tax system on households at 
different income levels, net housing cost to income ratio exhibited a more complex 
pattern in relation to net income. Although the general pattern found in gross ratio still 
held where the topmost decile group had the lowest net ratio and the bottom group had 
the highest, the comparison would be different if assessed by the median net ratio of the 
net income decile groups instead of the mean net ratio. It is the second, third and fourth 
decile groups which had the highest median net ratio (figure 5.20). 
Such a pattern emerged because of the operation of the housing benefit system which 
gives claimants on full benefit protection from high housing cost. Because claimants 
on full benefit were also likely to be in the lowest income decile group, their net 
housing cost might be lower than another household in an upper income decile group 
but who received only partial help, or no help at all, from housing benefit. This 
problem is particularly important regarding households in the third and fourth decile 
group where housing benefit begins to be withdrawn. 
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Figure 5.20 Net Housing Cost to Income Ratio by Net Income Decile Group 
90 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
LD 20 
10 
0 Hiph 
Income Decile Group (Net Income) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
5.4 SUAEMLARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Distribution of both gross and net housing cost in England in 1991 was uneven and this 
uneven distribution appears to be associated with a number of housing and socio- 
economic characteristics of the households. The effect of income was particularly 
apparent. Both gross and net expenditure on housing increased with the rise in 
household income. On the aggregate level, households which were buying their own 
home, couple family households, households with a middle aged householder or a 
householder in full time employment and households which were not in receipt of 
housing benefit (or help from social security in paying for their mortgage interest) were 
those which would be more likely to be spending more on housing. The average level of 
net housing cost for these groups was very close to the corresponding average gross 
housing cost and both costs spread over the same range. 
On the contrary, social tenants, the elderly, single person and lone parent households, 
those with an unemployed or unoccupied householder and households in receipt of 
housing benefit or help from social security to pay their housing costs, were more likely 
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to spend the least on housing. The aggregate level of net housing cost was even lower 
than the gross housing cost of these households. 
There are several factors attributed to this observation. First, housing is basically an 
elastic commodity and it is not surprising that households on a high income could spend 
more on housing while the reverse holds for low income households. Second, the level 
of spending is distorted by the differential supply side subsidy in housing where social 
tenants are enjoying a comparatively low rent level compared with their counterparts in 
the private rented sector or home owners who are repaying their mortgages. Third, the 
housing benefit system further favoured tenants as they get help towards their housing 
cost but home owners not on income support do not. Housing benefit may reduce the 
level of net housing cost relative to the amount of gross housing cost. Fourth, the 
residualisation and marginalisation process results in a concentration of the young and 
the single elderly as well as households which lose out in the labour market. They are 
likely to be poorer and to have to rely on state benefit. The effect of such factors will be 
fi, uther examined with reference to the problem of affordability in later chapters. 
In addition, there are two observations which should be mentioned. First, groups of 
households which had a high level of housing cost also exhibited a much larger range of 
variety in housing expenditure within the group. It suggests that many such households, 
whilst being able to spend more on housing, actually chose to spend less. This reflects 
the range of choice such households enjoyed which was not shared by households who 
had to restrict their housing consumption. Second, regional differences in housing cost 
were not apparent. Yet this may be attributed to the fact that intra-region variation in 
housing cost was so great that it overshadowed the difference between regions. 
Whilst there was a sharp difference in housing cost between households with different 
characteristics, the difference in housing cost to income ratio was relatively blurred. The 
pattern of distribution of gross housing cost to income ratio still displayed an observable 
pattern of difference, yet there was no obvious pattern for net housing cost to income 
ratio. It suggests that the gross housing cost to income ratio may be a better indicator in 
the pursuit of affordability study. 
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Households on the lowest income on average spent the least on housing, their average 
level of gross housing cost to income ratio was, conversely, the highest. Social tenants, 
the elderly, single person and lone parent households, households with unemployed or 
unoccupied householders and households which were on housing benefit were more 
likely to have to spend a higher proportion of their gross income on housing. Yet, they 
were also likely to spend the least, in absolute terms, on housing. Households which 
were on a higher income were Rely to have a lower level of housing cost to income 
ratio and the characteristics of households which had a low ratio were very close to 
those who were able to spend, in absolute terms, more on housing. 
The gap in net housing cost to income ratio between households narrowed considerably. 
poorer households, which had a higher level of gross ratio, had their level of net ratio 
reduced and the level of net ratio for better-off households went the other way. Such a 
pattern was largely retained when brealdng the households into different socio-economic 
characteristics. Thus, a difference in net housing cost to income ratio between 
households with different characteristics, was bluffed and far from obvious. 
The relationship between gross housing cost and income and the current housing benefit 
system is believed to underpin the pattern of housing cost to income ratio distribution. 
it was noted earlier in this chapter that expenditure on housing increasedwith an 
increase in household income. Thus it is not surprising that housing cost varied in a 
systematic way with household income and was evident in the relationship between 
housing cost to income ratio and household income. 
At the same time, it was also observed that households on a higher income had more 
freedom regarding the level of housing expenditure which allowed them to adjust to a 
level of housing consumption they thought to be optimum for their level of income. 
Whereas at the lower end of the income distribution, a high proportion of households 
were on housing benefit. The amount of housing benefit entered both in the numerator 
and the denominator of the formula for gross housing cost to income ratio resulted in an 
apparently more systematic relationship. However, it is suspected that the observed 
systematic relation between housing cost and income only applied at the aggregate level 
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and this is why a less obvious pattern could be observed between gross housing cost to 
income ratio and gross income. 
In the case of net housing cost to income ratio, the relationship between net housing 
cost and net income is far from systematic. For households on low income and in 
receipt of housing benefit, while their eligibility for benefit was dependent on their level 
of net income, the amount of actual benefit received related largely to the level of rent 
charged. On the other hand, households on medium or high incomes, who were unlikely 
to receive any help from housing benefit, would have a level of net income dependent on 
the level of tax deducted which bore no relationship with the level of housing cost. 
Thus, it is not surprising that there was no systematic relationship between net housing 
cost to income ratio and net income. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESIDUAL INCOME MEASUREMENT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Despite the short history of the residual income approach to affordability, this form of 
measurement has been depicted as superior to alternative methods (Hancock, 1993; 
Bramley, 1994). Nevertheless, in chapter three of this thesis, doubt is expressed 
regarding the superiority of the residual income approach over other measurement 
approaches. There are intrinsic problems associated with the residual income approach, 
and in particular its confusion with the concept of poverty. A modified version of the 
residual income approach has been suggested in chapter three to disentangle this 
confusion. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the methodological issues involved in 
operationalising the traditional and modified versions of residual income measurement, 
as well as the implications of these different classifications for the measurement of 
affordability. This chapter consists of five sections. It begins with an examination of 
residual income measurement and details of the implementation of the two versions of 
the measurement. This is followed by a discussion of the choice of a poverty line, which 
is crucial to the classification. A general profile of residual income in relation to 
household and socio-economic characteristics will also be presented. Then follows an 
examination of the housing and socio-economic characteristics of households in 
unaffordable housing classified by the traditional and the modified versions of residual 
income measurement, 
6.2 A REVIEW OF RESIDUAL INCOME MEASUREMENT 
As described in chapter three of this thesis, the residual income measurement of 
affordability has been depicted as being a more appropriate indicator of opportunity cost 
as well as providing a preferable representation of the financial burden on a household, 
especially for those on low income (Brarriley et al, 1990; Brownill et al, 1990; Hancock, 
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1993). Both concepts are regarded as crucial elements of the notion of affordability. 
Thus, residual income measurement is regarded as a superior indicator of affordability. 
On the other hand, the use of ratio as an indicator of affordability is denounced as 
deceptive (Fallis, 1986; Hancock, 1993). A classic illustration is a well-off household 
which spends a large proportion of its income on luxurious accommodation, yet still has 
enough income remaining to five a comfortable fife. Conversely, a poor household, 
although spending very little of its income on housing, would be forced to live in 
poverty, because of a meagre total income (Hancock, 1993). 
However, it is argued in chapter three that there is doubt about whether opportunity 
cost should best be represented by an absolute value of income. There is evidence 
showing that a proportional relationship between income and housing expenditure can 
be equally valid. Meanwhile, using a ratio to indicate a household's financial burden 
stems from Engel's Law in household expenditure research, which also supports the use 
of the ratio measurement in relation to affordability. 
Nonetheless, the essential weakness of the traditional residual income measurement is its 
confusion with poverty measurement. The definition of residual income measurement 
used in the literature on affordability is similar to the poverty measurement used in the 
DSS HBAI series and other poverty research, which bears little relation to housing 
affordability. The residual income measurement, in the form expressed by its original 
proponents (e. g. Bramley et al, 1990; Hancock and Munro, 1992), is in fact merely one 
form of normative measurement of absolute poverty. Using a poverty measurement to 
assess housing affordability creates considerable confusion, apart ftom the consideration 
of the poverty measurement used being a notional measurement of absolute poverty, 
which is increasingly challenged by other more recently developed approaches. 
one method for unravelling the measurement of affordability from poverty, as suggested 
in chapter three, is to consider only those households which are not poor before housing 
cost which become poor after housing cost as experiencing an affordibility problem. 
Households which are poor both before and after housing are in poverty rather than 
unaffordability (refer to chapter three for a more detailed discussion). 
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This chapter will advance arguments around these two versions of residual income 
measurement. The former is referred to as the traditional version of residual income 
measurement which is described in formula 6.1. Whilst the latter is referred to as the 
modified residual income measurement which can be summarised in table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 Modified Residual Income Measurement 
(6.1) 
Poverty Before Housing Costs Poverty After HousinR Costs 
Poor Not Poor 
Poor Poverty Unclassified 
Not Poor Unaffordability Affordabilitv 
Given the importance of the poverty line to both versions of residual income, the 
selection of a poverty line should not be taken lightly. However, there is no consensus 
in the literature on poverty as to which definition is preferable. Thus, the choice of a 
poverty fine is complex and contestable. A summary of the various approaches to 
poverty measurement will be made in the next section before any decision on the 
selection of a poverty line is made. 
6.3 THE CHOICE OF POVERTY LINE 
Modem studies of poverty began with the works of Booth in London and Rowntree in 
York at the turn of the century. At that time, a normative approach was taken towards 
the issue of poverty, which focused on problems surrounding human subsistence. Since 
then, a number of approaches to the study of poverty have been developed which reflect 
the Oferent views on the nature of the problem. Various measurement strategies have 
emerged based on the different approaches to poverty. 
Hagenaars (1986) summarised three approaches to the measurement of poverty g 
1. [Poverty is] having less than an objectively defined absolute minimum 
2. [Poverty is] having less than others in society. 
3. [Poverty is] feeling you do not have enough get along (Hagenaars, 1986: 37): 
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Such categorisation. largely matches the classification of Piachaud (1987), who classified 
poverty measurements into budget standards, relative deprivation and the social 
consensus approach. 
The budget standards approach defines poverty as consuming necessities or having an 
income less than some standards defined by some experts (or governments). There are 
several approaches to poverty measurement which can be considered to fall into the 
budget standards approach. Earfier attempts include the classification of 'primary' and 
'secondary' poverty as defined by Rowntree (1901), the US poverty line described by 
Orshansky (1965), the cost of food to income ratio (Watt, 1967) and the cost of 
necessities to income ratio (Love and qa, 1967). 
More recently the Family Budget Unit has attempted to develop a modem budget 
standard for the UK (FBU, 1990; Bradshaw and Ernst, 1990). This is described as a 
composite budget standard approach (Piachaud, 1987). Another measurement, the 
official definition, refers to state benefit levels as poverty lines. Such an approach was 
pioneered by Abel-Smith and Townsend (1965), and this is also classified as the budget 
approach because it is believed that the earliest development of the benefit rates were 
heavily influenced by the work of Rowntree in the 1930s (Cooke and Baldwin, 1984; 
Spicker, 1993). 
Unlike a budget standard approach to poverty, which is essentially a perspective based 
on the notion of an objectively defined absolute minimum, the behavioural approach 
considers poverty as a relative concept which sterns from the actual behaviour of people 
in the community. The relative deprivation concept and its corresponding measurement 
approach, pioneered by Townsend (1979) and refined by Desai and Shah (1988) and 
Townsend (1991), is an eminent example of this approach. Other attempts include the 
s-curve technique established by the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (quoted in 
Nfitchell, 1985) in the United States, Mitchell (1985) and Bradshaw and colleagues 
(1987) in the UK. 
Fixing the poverty fine as a percentage of mean or median income is another 
measurement approach which explains poverty by the behaviour of people. It was used 
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by Abel-Smith and Townsend (1969) and the OECD (Mitchell, 1991; Johnson and 
Webb, 1991). The DSS reports on Low Income Families also changed from using the 
benefit level as a reference line to using half of the mean national income in the new 
Household Below Average Income series after 1988. 
The social consensus approach, on the other hand, rejects the notion of an objectively 
defined poverty fine which the two approaches mentioned in this section adopt. This 
approach relies on the subjective evaluation of people according to the extent of their 
poverty against the perceived poverty fine of society. It was developed by Geodhart 
(1977) in Leyden University in the Netherlands and expanded by colleagues at the 
University (Hagenaars, 1986; Hagenaars, and de Vos, 1988). 
A similar approach, termed 'consensual', was pioneered by Mack and Lansley (1985) 
who attempted to develop an acceptable fist of essential items which would be 
congruent with the minimum, income society is prepared to provide. However, there is 
no direct relationship between measurement regulated in accordance with the consensual 
approach and the setting of a poverty line. The socially accepted list of necessities was 
described only as a complement to the relative deprivation approach, while the perceived 
minimum income level was a'financeable poverty level' (Piachaud, 1987). 
Given the information available in the FES, upon which the residual income 
measurement is based, the choice of a poverty line in this research is limited. There are 
no poverty fines derived from food or other necessities in relation to income for the UK. 
The S-curve technique by Mitchell (1985) and Bradshaw and colleagues (1987) was not 
completed (although it was continued in the work of composite budget standards). It is 
thus not possible to employ poverty fines that are based on these approaches. 
Meanwhile, the FES data lacks essential items employed by Townsend (1979) in 
constructing a deprivation index. Although the use of secondary analysis from national 
surveys, which combine the FES and the GHS to construct a similar index, has been 
attempted (Hutton, 1991), the results are unsatisfactory. Research on the social 
consensus approach in a UK context remains in a vacuum, and information in the FES 
does not aid the development of a poverty measurement based on such an approach. 
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Hence the official definition, the composite budget standard and a percentage of mean 
income are the only choices possible. 
The "official" definition of poverty refers to the current income support scale as the 
Poverty line. However, current benefit levels are criticised as being too low to sustain a 
modest but adequate standard of living (Bradshaw and Holes, 1989; Bradshaw, 1993). 
Instead, the figure of 14(r/o of the benefit level is preferred. A poverty line at 14(r/o of 
income support level is also roughly equal to the poverty fine derived from the relative 
deprivation approach, where there is a disproportionate withdrawal from social 
participation owing to the lack of resources (Townsend, 1979; Desai and Shah, 1988; 
Townsend, 199 1). For these reasons 1401/o of Income Support level will be used as a 
poverty line in this chapter. Since there is an implicit equivalence scale already 
incorporated in the benefit level, equivalisation is not necessary. 
The second poverty line which is employed is income level at half the national average 
income. The choice of 50% is arbitrary, but has been popular in recent official poverty 
statistics. It is used by the DSS in the HBAI series and the European Community in its 
Second European Poverty Programme (EC, 1991). In using half the average income 
measurement equivalisation is necessary; the McClements' scale, which is described in 
chapter four, will be used. 
Poverty fines which apply to income both before and after housing are required for the 
modified version of residual income measurement. However, the Income Support level 
only refers to income after housing and lacks a corresponding scale for income before 
housing. Thus only the 50*/o average income measurement can be employed. The 
income of a household both before and after housing are equivalised in the 
corresponding McClements scale. 
6.4 RESIDUAL INCOME MEASUREMENT: A GENERAL 
PROFELE 
In 1991, there was a substantial variation in residual income among "paying" 
households in England. The highest residual income (unadjusted for household size 
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and characteristics) was over MOO per week whereas the lowest was virtually none. 
Similar patterns were found in equivalised residual income and equivalised income 
before housing (table 6.2). The wide spread of residual income is also reflected in 
the large values of the standard deviation in all income measurements. Such 
distributions were highly skewed toward the lower end of the scale, as indicated in 
the difference between the mean value and the median value in table 6.2 and the 
distribution curve in figure 6.1. In fact, around 60% of households had one or the 
other residual income below the corresponding mean value. 
Table 6.2 Residual Income: Descriptive Stafistics 
f pw Residual Income Equivalised Income 
Equivalised Unequivalised Before Housing 
Mean 207 230 333 
Median 172 187 274 
Standard Deviation 159 196 146 
Maximum 2579 2579 3347 
Minimum 0.3 0.2 32.8 
Source: AnaIN'sis of FES 1991 
Figure 6.1 Distribution of Residual Income 
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Note: UERINC ( Unequivalised Residual Income) EBH ( Equivalised Income Before Housing 
EAH ( Equivalised. Income After Housing) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
The standardised unequivalised residual income (UERINC)" is heavily skewed toward 
the lower income end. In part this reflects the uneven distribution of income, and in part 
it is due to the concentration of single person households in this group. After 
equivalisation, the residual income after housing (EAH) spreads more evenly toward 
both ends of the distribution. At the same time, there are more households with low 
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Household Income 
equivalised income before housing than after housing. This indicates the mediating 
effect of housing benefit which fiunishes a more equitable distribution of income after 
housing as well as the higher housing cost of households on higher income. 
Figures 6.2 to 6.6 show the distribution of household income before and after housing 
broken down into tenure and household characteristics. Social tenants had the lowest 
level of both equivalised and unequivalised income after housing. But housing 
association tenants have a marginally higher median as well as a wider spread of 
equivalised income before housing, probably because housing association tenants enjoy 
higher income, although this is eroded by paying higher rent. At the same time, it may 
also reflect the higher housing benefit to enable payment of the higher rent, thus 
boosting their before housing income. 
The income of private tenants in the fiu-nished sector and mortgagors were apparently 
much higher, indicating a superior economic situation among these households. The 
larger difference, between before and after housing reflects the higher level of their 
housing costs. The wide spread of before and after housing income represents the wide 
variation of income and housing costs in these households (figure 6.2). 
Regional differences between households were less striking but there is evidence of a 
north south divide. Median income before housing among households in the south of 
the country was higher than in the north, as was the spread of the distribution. On the 
other hand, income after housing shows a smaffer difference, probably a result of the 
mediation of housing benefit and the higher housing cost for households in the south 
(figure 6.3). 
The worst situation of residual income were those whose head of household was aged 
over 60. They have a much lower level of both equivalised and unequivalised income 
before and after housing. These households also showed little difference in the level of 
income among themselves, indicating a relatively homogeneous situation with regard to 
residual income. The distribution of income among other groups was similar, with 
middle aged householders being in a slightly better position (figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.2 Residual Income and Equivalised Income Before Housing by Tenure 
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Figure 63 Residual Income and Equivalised Income Before Housing by Region 
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Figure 6.4 Residual Income and Equivalised Income Before Housing by Age of Head 
of Household 
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Lone parents had the lowest level of all, apparently because of the meagre income 
available to them. Single person households had a similar level of median after housing 
income, but showed a larger variation toward the higher end of the distribution as well 
as a higher level before housing income. This suggests that the category of single 
person households was not a homogeneous group. Single elderly persons, who made up 
the bulk of such households, had only a limited command of resources, whilst the 
remaining were young single persons with very varied earning power. This explains the 
relatively low level of median income with a large spread in the upper quartile and the 
long tail at the higher end of the distribution (figure 6.5). 
Householders which were either unemployed or retired were in circumstances similar to 
lone parents. It is not surprising that households whose head was working full time 
were in a much better economic position and enjoyed a higher level of both before and 
after housing income (figure 6.6). 
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Figure 6.5 Residual income and Equivalised Income Before Housing by Type of 
Household 
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Preliminary results which emerged from the analysis in this section suggest that 
households with a lower level of residual income which were likely to have an 
affordability problem were social tenants, single elderly persons, tone parents, and those 
who were either unemployed or retired Married couples who were working full time, 
young to middle aged, and buying a home with a mortgage or renting furnished 
accommodation from a private landlord were characteristics associated with households 
having a higher level of residual income. More detailed confirmatory analysis is not 
necessary in this section since qualitatiVe classification is the main focus of the chapter 
and will be advanced in the next section. 
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Figure 6.6 Residual Income and Equivalised Income Before Housing by Economic 
Status of Head of Household 
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6.5 HOUSEHOLDS IN UNAFFORDABLE HOUSING 
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As mentioned in section 6,2 of this chapter, three schemes of residual income 
classification of affordability will be used (table 6.3): two are based on the traditional 
residual income approach. The first scheme uses 140% income support level as the 
poverty line, which is referred to as Scheme R,, and the second scheme, Scheme R, 
employs half the average equivalised income after housing as the poverty line. Thirdly in 
the modified version of residual income approach, Scheme R3. only households which 
are not poor before housing but are poor after housing are considered in relation to 
unaffordable housing, Half of average income is used as a poverty line in the modified 
residual income measurement. In subsequent analysis, the poverty category in Scheme 
R3 (poor both before and after housing) is included for reference. 
Table 6.3 Residual Income Approach to Affordabilitv: Classification 
Scheme Definition 
Scheme R, Traditional residual income approach with 140% Income Support Level as 
Poverty Line 
Scheme R, Traditional residual income approach with 50% Average Equivalised 
Residual Income as Poverty Line 
Scheme R, Not Poor Before Housing. Poor After Housing 
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In 1991, among the "paying" households in England, slightly less than one third (29%) 
had a level of income, after housing cost, less than 1401/6 of the income support level 
appropriate to the size and characteristics of the household. They were, by definition, in 
unaffordable housing (Scheme R). Meanwhile, as measured by the equivalised residual 
income against a poverty fine at half of the national average residual income, a similar 
proportion of households (28%) were in unaffordable housing (Scheme R2). 
There is a high degree of agreement of between Schemes R, and R2: 97% of households 
are classified alike in the two schemes. This is statistically significant, as measured by 
the Kapper coefficient K (refer to appendix A4 for a technical description of the 
coefficient) (table 6.4). The choice of a poverty line in this case does not affect the 
results of the measurement. By comparison, using 140% of benefit level should produce 
an overestimate of the number of households in unaffordable housing, if 100% benefit 
level had been otherwise employed. Yet, if such "overestimation" was at the same level 
as that derived from another independent poverty fine, it suggests that such 
"overestimation" was in fact a genuine representation of the affordability situation. It 
implies that using I W16 benefit level as the poverty fine in assessing affordability would, 
on the contrary, "underestimate" the problem of affordability. 
Hence agreement, when using 140% of income support level as a poverty fine with 
another independent poverty line at half national average income, suggests indirectly an 
inadequacy in using income support as a poverty fine (as used by much research on 
affordability) because it would underestimate the proportion of households in 
unaffordable housing. 
Table 6.4 Agreemegmt of Scheme R, and Scheme R, 
Scheme R, (1/6) Scheme R, VY6) Kapper t Vale 
Affordable Unaffordable 
Affordable 70 1 0.91 79.8 Unaffordable 2 27 
Source : Analysis of FES 1991 
if measurement were made by the modified version of residual income measurement 
(Scheme R3), around 6(YYo (16% of the total) of unaffordable households classified by 
the traditional measurement would be re-classified as being in poverty, while the 
remaining 40% (11% of the total) would be considered to be in unaffordable housing 
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(Figure 6.7). Thus the traditional measurement would include the majority of 
households in the "unaffordable" category which lack adequate resources for both 
housing and non-housing consumption. 
Figure 6.7 Households in Unaffordable Housing: Residual Income 
Approach 
Percentage 
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Although only less than a third of households were classified as being in unaffordable 
housing by the traditional residual income measurements (Scheme R, and RA it was not 
evenly distributed across tenure. Whilst about a tenth of mortgagors were in 
unaffordable housing, the majority of tenants in the social rented sector were assessed as 
being in unaffordable housing. The proportion of such households among private 
tenants was around 30% to 45%. Classifications made by the two schemes R, and R2 
were in agreement in the majority of tenure groups. 
Conversely, whilst there was still a sharp contrast in the proportion of households in 
unaffordable housing between tenants and mortgagees, as measured by the modified 
residual income measurement scheme R3. the difference between private and social 
tenants was sma. Many households in unaffordable housing in schemes R, and R, were 
re-classified as being in poverty by the modified version, scheme R3 (figure 6.8). 
Whilst households unaffordable to housing were concentrated in the social rented sector, 
regional differences in the proportion of households which could not afford housing 
were less marked than for tenure. The highest proportion was 36% in the North and 
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West Mdlands (Scheme R, ) as against 19% in the South East (Scheme R2). It is in 
general, higher in the north and lower in the south; London is an exception with 50% 
more households in unaffordable housing than the South East Region. 
Figure 6.8 Households in Unaffordable Housing by Tenure: Residual Income 
Approach 
Percentage 
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Figure 6.9 Households in Unaffordable Housing by Region: Residual Income 
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Distribution of households in unaffordable housing by the modified residual income 
measurement was similar to the pattern amongst tenure groups and varied across regions 
at 9% to 12%. London was an apparent exception with 15% of households in 
unaffordable housing (figure 6.9). It is clear that the regions with the least affordability 
problems (Scheme R3) were those with the lowest housing costs, for example the North, 
Yorkshire and Humberside. The pattern is reversed for regions with high costs, such as 
London. 
A pattern of unaffordability is also apparent across household type. The overwhelming 
majority of households headed by a lone parent were in unaffordable housing, 74% of 
them in scheme R, and 69% in scheme R2. They were four times more likely than a 
married couple to be in unaffordable housing. Around half the people who lived alone 
also experienced an unaffordability problem. 
However, about half of lone parent households which were in unaffordable housing 
could be re-classified under the modified version of residual income measurement as 
being in poverty, leaving only around one fifth (I Wo) apparently experiencing 
unaffordable housing. The corresponding reduction in single person households was 
comparatively small. Twenty two percent of single persons were in unaffordable 
housing according to the modified residual income measurement (47% of those 
originally classified as unaffordable in scheme R). Married couple households are the 
least likely to be in unaffordable housing (figure 6.10). 
The age of the head of household exhibits a close relationship with affordability. A 
pensioner head of household was four times more likely than a middle-aged head of 
household to be in unaffordable housing. This result is unsurprising given that single 
persons were likely to be experiencing unaffordability (refer to figure 6.10) and the 
majority of single person households consisted of one elderly person. 
Whilst the modified version of residual income measurement had the effect of 
reclassifying differently across households of different characteristics, it is remarkable 
that such an effect was constant across age groups. Elderly households were still the 
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most likely, and households with middle aged householders the least likely, to be in 
unaffordable housing (figure 6.11). 
Figure 6.10 Households in Unaffordable Housing by Types of Household: Residual 
Income approach 
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Figure 6.11 Households in Unaffordable Housing by Age of Head of Household: 
Residual Income Approach 
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Perhaps the characteristic associated most strongly with unaffordability is the situation 
of the household with regard to the labour market and the benefit system. The 
proportion of households in unaffordable housing increased with a decreasing 
involvement in the labour market. Whilst only 4% of households were in unaffordable 
housing (both Scheme R, and R. ) when both the householder and partner were in full 
time employment, it increased to 14% (both R, and R2) when only the householder was 
in fun time employment and the partner unemployed. The worst situation was when the 
householder was retired or unemployed; the majority of these occupied unaffordable 
housing, regardless of the employment status of their partner. 
Although the relationship between unaffordability in the modified version of residual 
income measurement (Scheme R, ) and involvement in the labour market follows a 
similar pattern to the traditional residual income measurement, the difference between 
households in varying degrees of labour market involvement became narrower, Using 
the traditional measurements, households with both the householder and partner 
excluded from the labour market were 18 times more likely to be in unaffordable 
housing than households with both the householder and par= employed fiffl time. In 
the modified version Scheme R3, it was only six times more likely, 
On the other hand, households which were excluded from the labour market were 46 
times more likely to be in poverty than those who were not. In scheme R3, it is 
noteworthy that unaffordability is related to the number of earners in the household. 
The incidence of unaffordability was higher when the householder was working part 
time and the partner worked fidl time than when the householder worked full time but 
the partner was unoccupied. This is a pattern not found in the traditional measurements 
(figure 6.12). 
As being in unaffordable housing increases with the degree of exclusion from the labour 
market, it is unsurprising to find households which were claiming housing benefit or help 
from social security toward mortgage interest payments more likely to be experiencing 
unaffordable housing than households that did not, given the increased reliance on 
benefit with increased marginalisation from the labour market. In fact, claimants of 
housing benefit (or help from social security towards housing costs) were six times more 
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likely to be in unaffordable housing than non-claimants (figure 6,13), Surprisingly, the 
proportion of households with unaffordability problems did not vary between those 
which were on full benefit and those whose housing costs were partly covered by 
benefit. It is because households which only received housing benefit for part of their 
housing cost had to top up the difference in their income from other sources. The high 
taper of housing benefit withdrawal would not allow such recipients to experience an 
appreciably better situation than if their housing costs were the same and they were in 
receipt of full benefit (whereas their housing costs would be covered in fUll). 
Figure 6.12 Households in Unaffordable Housing by Economic Status of Head of 
Household and Partner- Residual Income Approach 
Economic Status (HoH-+- Wife) 
Note: A (Both FT) B (HoH FT Wife PT) C (HoH FT Wife Unoccupied) 
D (HoH PT Wife FT) E (HoH PT Wife Unoccupied) F (HoH Unoccupied Wife FT/PT) G 
(Both Unoccupied) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Among households in unaffordable housing (traditional measurement), those which did 
not claim housing benefit had a higher average gross and net income, but had to spend 
more on housing. Consequently, their equivalised residual income was marginally higher 
than for those who claimed benefit (table 6.5). Households which did not claim housing 
related benefit, but which were in an unaffordability situation, were likely be mortgagees 
or private tenants who were in full or part time employment, 
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Figure 6.13 Households in Unaffordable Housing by Housing Benefit: Residual 
Income Approach 
Percentage 
100 M RI Unqgr D R2 Unqff 0 R3 Unqff Fl R3 Poverty 
80 
60 
40 
20 
Non Claimants Claimants Full Beneflt Part Beneflt 
Housing Benefit 
Note: Rcfer to Appendix A3 for meaning of the abbreviations 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Table 6.5 me and Housing Cost between Housing Benefit Claimants and Non-claimants 
pw tiousenoias in unattorgame tiousing 
Scheme Non-claimants Claimants F Value 
Equivalised Income After Housing R, 76 72 6.5* 
R, 71 70 0.9ns 
Gross Income R, 168 107 250** 
R, 175 105 302** 
Net Income R, 145 82 470 
R, 149 79 519** 
Net Cost R, 66 20 641 ** 
R, 70 20 670** 
Gross Cost R, 66 44 125** 
R, 70 45 254** 
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.0 I ns Not Significant 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
It is argued that the design of the current housing benefit should have protected 
households from affordability problems, especially under the residual income 
measurement, since it guarantees a socially minimum level of non-housing consumption 
(Hancock, 1993). On the contrary, as shown by analysis in this section, the majority of 
housing benefit claimants experience housing unaffordability, suggesting an inadequacy 
of housing benefit in protecting households from an unaffordability problem. This will 
be taken up again in chapter nine when different affordability measurements are 
considered. 
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in the modified residual income measurement (Scheme 113), more housing benefit 
claimants who were in unaffordable housing in Schemes R, and R2were reclassified as 
being in poverty whilst relatively more non-claimants remained in an unaffordability 
situafion. This indicates that more claimants were in unaffordable housing because of a 
lack of resources, and more non-claimants because of high housing costs, 
The contrast between households which were in affordable and unaffordable housing in 
the traditional residual income measurements, scheme R, and R2, can also be illustrated 
by their income level and level of housing expenditure. Households which were in 
unaffordable housing had a lower level of both gross and net housing cost than 
households that could afford housing. At the same time, the former group also 
experienced a lower level of household income but had to spend a much higher 
proportion of their income on housing (table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 Affordabilitv, Income and Housing Costs (Scheme R, and 
Mean Value 
Aff 
Scheme R, 
Unaff F 
Scheme R 
Aff Unaff 
, 
F 
Gross housing cost fpw 80.4 52.5 260** 79.3 53.6 208** 
Gross income fpw 477.1 129.3 208** 468.0 129.9 1465** 
Net housing cost fpw 78.9 36.8 560** 77.5 37.6 560** 
Net income fPw 375.9 104.6 1825** 369.1 104.4 1613** 
Gross Housing Cost to Income Ratio % 18 42 3823** 19 43 3826** 
Net Housing Cost to income Ratio % 22 33 537** 22 33 563** 
Note: Aff (Affordable) Unaff (unaffordable) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
When households in unaffordable housing were differentiated into unaffordability and 
poverty in the modified measurement of residual income (scheme R3), it was observed 
that households in poverty, with the lowest level of both gross and net housing cost also 
experienced the lowest level of gross and net income. Households which were defined 
as unaffordable had a level of housing cost closer to the "affordable" group but their 
income level was closer to the "poverty" group. Thus, they had to spend the highest 
proportion of their income on housing (table 6.7). This illustrates the modified version 
of the residual income measurement scheme R3has achieved its intended objective of 
differentiating those who had low income and low housing cost (the poverty group) and 
households which had high housing cost but low income (the unaffordable group). 
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Table 6.7 Affordabilitv, Income and Housiniz Costs (Scheme R 
Mean Value 
Aff 
Scheme R, 
Unaff Pove rty F Value 
gross housing cost fpw 79.4 70.3 41.9 747** 
Net Housing cost fpw 77.7 54.9 25.4 288** 
Net income fpw 369.7 127.3 88.3 817** 
Gross Income fpw 469.3 163.5 106.4 259** 
Gross Housing Cost to Income Ratio % 19 45 42 1940** 
Net Housing Cost to Income Ratio % 22 38 30 333** 
Note: AFF (Affordable) Unaff (Unaffordable) ** p<0.01 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Furthermore, the distribution of housing cost of households in unaffordable housing 
(Scheme R, ) exhibited a pattern of relationship with household income very different 
from households in affordable housing or in poverty. It is shown in the Lowess curves 
(a technique which produces a fitted regression curve without any prior assumption of 
the form of functional relation, refer to appendix A7 for details) in figure 6.14 to 6.17 
that although both gross and net housing cost in general increased with the increase in 
household income among all three groups, households in affordable housing and in 
poverty showed surprisingly quite similar pattern of relationship. 
On the other hand, households in unaffordable housing exhibited a steeper increase of 
housing cost with respect to household income. It suggests that the relationship 
between housing cost and household income showed a more systematic relationship with 
household income among the "unaffordable" group. At the same time, signs of a change 
of course in the smooth curve were apparent. It occurred at the range around gross 
income of 1200 and net income L 100, roughly the range of income within which 
households were more likely to get partial housing benefit than full housing benefit. 
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Figure 6.16 Gross Income By Gross Housing Figure 6.17 Net Income By Net Housing Cost 
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6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There are three definitions of residual income measurement used in this chapter- Scheme 
R, compares the unequivalised residual income with 140% of the appropriate income 
support level; Scheme R2 matches the equivalised residual income with the poverty line 
at half the national average equivalised residual income. These two schemes are referred 
to as the traditional residual income, in contrast to the modified version which 
differentiates unaffordability from poverty. Scheme R3, the modified version, identifies 
unaffordability as those households which are not poor before housing but become poor 
after housing, where half the average equivalised income is used as the poverty line 
before and after housing. 
The two traditional measurements are in close agreement, not only at an aggregate level 
but also when the sample is broken down into groups of tenure and household 
characteristics. Measured by the traditional schemes (R, and R, ), nearly one third of 
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households experienced an unaffordability problem. Households most likely to be in 
unaffordable housing were social tenants, those living in the north of the country, lone 
parents, single person households, the unemployed or retired, and those in receipt of 
housing benefit or social security benefit toward their housing costs. 
Measured by the modified version of residual income measurement (Scheme R3), the 
general pattern in the distribution of households in unaffordable housing remained more 
or less the same as those measured by schemes R, and R2. Some of the households in 
unaffordable housing under the traditional measurement schemes were reclassified as 
being in poverty which narrowed the difference between households in affordable and 
unaffordable housing. 
This latter observation was particularly apparent in the contrast between lone parent and 
single person households on the one hand, and fitmily households on the other; between 
householdswith householders in ffill time employment and households with an 
unemployed or unoccupied head of household. In addition, the contribution of a second 
earner was observed to be related to whether the household was in unaffordable housing 
under the traditional schemes R, and R2, but it was no longer significant in scheme R3. 
However, the most apparent change was between social and private tenants. Whilst 
under schemes R, and R2social tenants were more likely to be experiencing unaffordable 
housing, under the modified version, scheme R3, their chance of being in unaffordable 
housing was virtually the same. 
The modified version, scheme R3, also shown to be successful in achieving its intended 
purpose of identifying households which had a high housing cost but, at the same time, 
had a low level of income. It is also shown that the "unaffordable" group in scheme R3 
exhibits a different pattern of relationship between the amount such households spent on 
housing and the level of their household income. 
Several implications can be drawn from the analysis of this chapter which could help in 
the further understanding of affordability, especially with reference to the residual 
income measurement. First, there was evidence pointing to the inadequacy of housing 
benefit as a strong associated factor of the affordability problem. Notwithstanding the 
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housing benefit system is designed so as to protect recipients from high housing cost, 
evidences in this thesis suggests its failure to achieve this goal. The reasons for this are 
complex and require further investigation. Second, social tenants, despite the high level 
of subsidy which brings down the level of rent, were equally as vulnerable to 
unaffordability as private tenants, the majority of whom had to pay market rents. Third, 
the residual measurement of affordability in its traditional form is not sensitive to the 
choice of poverty line between 1401/6 of income support level and half average national 
household income. Whether this applies to other poverty lines has yet to be explored. 
Fourth, the modified version of residual income measurement was successful in 
identifying the group of households which had to pay high housing cost but possessed 
little resources in terms of income. This group also exhibited a marked difference in the 
pattern of consumption on housing relative to their income level from other households 
which were in affordable housing and households which were poor. This differentiation 
would help in the fine tuning of policy on affordability. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RATIO MEASUREMENT 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Housing cost to income ratio is the preferred measurement indicator of affordability in 
many of the industrial countries. With a long history of development, it has been widely 
adopted because it is simple to both comprehend and implement. However, this 
property attracts censure: it is criticised as an inappropriate indicator of the financial 
burden of a household, and as too simple to provide a precise representation of 
affordability among households of varied size and characteristics. 
Despite these criticisms, there are merits underpinning the use of the ratio measurement, 
which is still widely used. It has roots in the empirical tradition, especially Engel's Law 
on household expenditure research, which gives the ratio approach strong support 
among housing academics and practitioners. Compared with an alternative 
measurement, the residual income approach, it is free from entanglement with the 
concept of poverty and associates the notion of affordability more closely with the cost 
of housing, which is a more immediate concern in housing policy than the notion of 
poverty. 
Nonetheless, detailed empirical studies of ratio measurement in the UK are sporadic and 
superficial, probably owing to preconceptions among many housing academics against 
this measurement. Thus, to fill the gap in understanding on the ratio measurement 
against a backdrop of changing housing markets and policy on social housing, this 
chapter attempts to provide an objective empirical examination of ratio measurement of 
affordability. A new approach to fixing a cut-off reference ratio (or ratios) will also be 
explored. 
This chapter is divided into nine sections. The first section provides a review of the 
development of ratio measurement of affordability, and of past attempts to fix reference 
ratios. The second section delineates the details of a composite method of establishing 
the cut-off ratio. As a preliminary exploration, regression analysis linking residual 
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income and housing cost to income ratio will be examined in the third section. Whilst 
the distribution of housing cost to income ratio between the "poor" and the "non-poor" 
group will be examined in section four, the results of the logistic regression models 
linking housing cost to income ratio and poverty status which form the base of the 
establishment of cut-off ratios are described in the section that follows. The seventh 
section will evaluate the actual level of the cut-off ratios and section eight will explore 
the need to establish separate ratios for households with different characteristics. 
Finally, the last section examines the household and housing characteristics of 
households in unaffordable housing as evaluated by the cut-off ratios generated in the 
preceding sections. 
7.2 RATIO MEASUREMENT: A REVIEW 
The use of the proportional approach to the study of housing expenditure can be traced 
back to the nineteenth century, to Ernst Engel and Hermann Schurake (Lane, 1977). 
This has had an influence on the early use of affordability measurement, As early as the 
1920s, the US Federal Government used housing cost to income ratio as an indicator of 
affordability in housing policy and legislation (Lane, 1977; Nelson, 1993). This 
approach was also adopted by the Canadian goverment (Fallis, 1985), the Australian 
government (National Housing Strategy, 199 1) and most countries in the European 
Union (Kearns, 1992). The ratio measurement deflned a household as being in 
unaffordable housing if the ratio of housing cost to household income exceeded the 
threshold ratio (Equation 7.1): 
Yff - r*DVC 
if r> r* Houebw is omfonlabk 
Whem Tjr - HamAv Cmd 
r- Affordabdify Ratio 
r*- Thr#&Wd Rate 
, VVC - Homwhdd Imome 
However, this simple quotient of housing cost to income, referred to in this thesis as the 
traditional ratio measurement, has been criticised as ignoring the effect of housing cost 
on affordability. A household may try to avoid an affordability problem by living in a 
substandard dwelling which costs less than good housing. Conversely, well-off 
households may be misclassified as being in unaffordable housing because they are 
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consuming housing services at a level well above the socially accepted level (Sueke et al, 
1981; Faffis, 1985; Lerman and Reeder, 1987). Thus, two modified versions of ratio 
measurement have been developed: the quality based ratio measurement (Lerman and 
Reeder, 1987) and the core need measurement (Sueke et al, 198 1) take into account the 
quality of housing in the measurement of affordability (refer to chapter three for a more 
detailed discussion of the measurements). 
More critical comments on ratio measurement have been made by commentators in the 
UK. The ratio measurement is portrayed as an inappropriate indicator of the notion of 
opportunity cost and merit good, as well as a misleading expression of financial burden 
on a household, all these being pivotal concepts in the definition of affordability 
(Hancock, 1993; Bramley, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the use of ratio measurement remains robust. First, it is easy to 
comprehend and simple to implement, unlike the residual income measurement which 
involves a complicated process of locating the appropriate poverty line before 
affordability status can be assessed. Second, the basis of the ratio measurement rests on 
the empirical tradition, and its close association with Engel's law gives ratio 
measurement status as a valid indicator. 
Notwithstanding the robustness of ratio measurement, fixing the threshold ratio remains 
arbitrary and subjective. The origin Of the commonly used 25% is unknown. it is 
speculated that this norm ratio probably stemmed from survey results in the nineteenth 
century (Lane, 1977). The ratio became well established as a reference for mortgage 
loan applications by the end of the 1930s (mortgage potential is discussed in chapter 
ten). The United States Federal government in the 1920s and 1930s used a rent to 
income ratio of 2YYo to 25% as a guideline in housing related legislation for housing 
assistance. In 1967, consultants to the Presidential committee on Urban Housing in the 
United States suggested a ratio of 20% rent to income ratio as a reference for housing 
assistance to low income families (Lane, 1977). 
However, there were reservations regarding its objectivity, and the recommended ratio 
was only regarded by the said committee, as "a convenient ratio rather than a value 
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statement" (quoted in Lane, 1977). The use of these threshold ratios in discussions of 
United States housing policy, as commented by Lane (1977), were merely a "rule of 
thumb" rather than having a base in solid theoretical argument or empirical evidence 
The process of setting a reference ratio, without a sound theoretical or empirical 
foundation, has not changed even in the 1980s. In the United States, the Reagan 
administration raised the threshold ratio from 25% to 3(yYo but, again, with no solid 
justification. The succeeding Bush administration retained the ratio in the new housing 
legislation in 1990 without modification. Likewise in Australia and Canada, where ratio 
measurement predominates, the choice of threshold ratio in the discussion of housing 
policy, 30% in Canada (Faffis, 1987), and 25% for tenants and 30% for owners in 
Australia (National Housing Strategy, 1991), remains subjective and arbitrary. 
The importation of ratio measurement to the UK began in the mid 1980s when the 
government proposed a change in the subsidy system to housing associations. It 
required the associations to charge tenants rents that could, on the one hand, 
compensate for the reduced government grants, and on the other hand, be "affordable" 
to low income tenants. The National Federation of Housing Associations (NFHA) 
opined that affordable rents for housing association tenants should be not more than 
20% of their net income (Best, 1990). 
This figure was derived by looking at the amount people were actually paying for 
housing. The NFHA found that housing association tenants in 1986 on average spent 
18% of their net income on rent, whilst first time buyers spent 21% on mortgage 
repayments. At the same time, mortgage lenders would assume that mortgage 
outgoings did not absorb more than 25% of a household's income. An international 
comparison also revealed that rent payment in most European countries represented 
14% to 19% of income (Best, 1990). The final threshold ratio adopted by the NFHA, 
though admittedly it had considered ratios in other tenures and countries, still lacked 
convincing arguments for the selection of this particular measurement. 
The establishment of the threshold ratio has not settled the debate within the housing 
association movement. There is still argument as to whether the use of gross or net 
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income would be more appropriate, and also whether a single ratio should be applied to 
tenants both on housing benefit and in employment. Because of such debates, the 
NFHA threshold ratio was once changed, and was based on 22% of gross income. It 
was described merely as a technical alternation, but it nevertheless could not conceal the 
diversified arguments within the movement. Soon after this, another compromise was 
reached which set the threshold ratio at 25% of net income (HA Weekly, 17 Dec 1993). 
This latest figure only applied to "working" households. Nevertheless, as argued by the 
NFHA, an "affordable" rent should, at the same time, not force tenants on housing 
benefit into the poverty trap (Housing Association Weekly, 17 Dec 1993). Again, no 
convincing arguments justifying the choice of this latest threshold ratio have been 
offered. 
Other proposals for threshold ratio are not in short supply. In a single conference in 
1988, several ratios were suggested. Clive Betts, a practice defender of council housing 
proposed 10%; Alan Cherry, a private housing developer suggested 25%, whilst David 
Edmond, the Chief Executive of the Housing Corporation advocated 3 5% 12 (quoted in 
Maclennan and Williams, 1990). These ratios were criticised as being "offered without 
definition or much justification" (Maclennan and Williams, 1990: 11). 
The ratio suggested by David Edmond, as head of the Housing Corporation, attracted 
particular attention. It is believed that the Housing Corporation has an implicit 
affordability ratio in calculating the Housing Association Grant rates, albeit the 
Corporation continually refused to disclose its precise figure. It instead asks the housing 
associations to set their own affordability criteria (Housing Corporation, 1989). Even 
the disclosure of a ratio by its Chief Executive in the conference was denied a week later 
(Housing Association Weekly, 21 July 1989). It was not until early 1993 that Sir 
George Young, the Housing Nfinister, when giving evidence to the Environment Select 
Committee, admitted that the Housing Corporation is using 35% as the working 
definition of affordability (Select Committee of the Environment, 1993). Still no 
detailed justification of using such a ratio was given. 
Yet, it is equally unsatisfactory to accept a particular threshold ratio without query. It is 
urgent therefore to develop methods which establish a scientifically based threshold 
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ratio. This chapter will explore the possibility of using a composite method of fixing 
threshold ratios which is based on households' actual expenditure on housing and what 
society would regard as a household's financial burden. 
7.3 CUT-OFF RATIO: A COMPOSITE APPROACH 
In chapter six of this thesis, a modified version of residual income measurement is 
developed which defines unaffordability as those households which were in financial 
Miculties because of the high housing cost they paid. Because there is no direct 
indication of housing cost using residual income, an indirect inference has to be adopted 
instead: households which are in financial difficulty because of high housing cost are 
households which are not poor with reference to their income before housing cost, but 
poor if income after housing is a concern. 
Based on the same definition, a more direct implementation of affordability measurement 
will be explored in this chapter, combining the ratio and residual income approaches. 
The level of housing cost can be represented by the housing cost to income ratio while 
the financial difficulties of the household can be measured with reference to whether the 
household is in poverty or not. Poverty status is in turn measured by comparing the 
household's residual income with the poverty line. If a high housing cost to income ratio 
can be shown to be associated with the poverty status of a household, a cut off 
affordability ratio can be fixed at the point where crossing that ratio, the household 
changed from a "not-poor" to a "poor" status. 
Technically, this composite approach can be implemented by constructing a model which 
uses housing cost to income ratio to predict the incidence of poverty in a household. 
Since the incidence of poverty is a dichotomous state - either poor or not poor - it is 
more convenient in quantitative analysis to predict the probability of occurrence of the 
incidence rather than the actual state of the incidence. If housing cost to income ratio is 
a satisfactory vehicle for classifying the incidence of poverty, the shape of the predicted 
probability function with reference to the explanatory variable should ideally be a step 
shaped curve 13 where the state of incidence changes completely once it passes through 
the cut-off value. 
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However, some criteria would have to be fulfilled for this composite approach to be 
effective. First, it should be demonstrated that there is a reasonably close relationship 
between residual income and housing cost to income ratio so that it is justifiable to use 
housing cost to income ratio to predict the incidence of poverty. 
Second, if housing cost to income ratio were to be used as a predictor for the incidence 
of poverty, there should be a marked difference in the distribution of housing cost to 
income ratio between different states of poverty. Only when there is a distinctive 
distribution is the differentiation by housing cost to income ratio possible. 
Third, the cut-off ratio is reliable only if the distribution of the predicted probability is 
close to a step shaped curve. It implies that the sensitivity of classification around the 
cut-off ratio should be reasonably high. 
The fulfilment of these conditions will be tested in the following three sections. As there 
is no definitive conclusion on whether the gross housing cost to income ratio or the net 
ratio is superior, both ratios will be employed in the model (referred to by the 
corresponding suffixes G and N). Meanwhile, two poverty lines, which have been used 
in chapter six, will be used in this analysis: Model TI, which makes reference to the 
poverty line at 140% of the income support level, and Model T2, taking half the average 
equivalised income after housing as the poverty line. Hence, four models will be 
constructed: TIa, T2G, TINand T2N. 
7.4 HOUSING COST TO INCOME RATIO: REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS 
This section will examine whether there is a close relationship between housing cost to 
income ratio and residual income where regression analysis is used to indicate the 
proximity of the relationship. It was shown in previous research that income did not 
relate to household expenditure in a linear way (e. g. Prais and Housthakker, 197 1). This 
may also apply to the relationship between residual income and housing cost. Thus, 
beside the linear relationship, some other functional forms relating the two variables 
should be considered. 
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Regression analysis involving non-linear functions may be complicated. It is a common 
practice in regression analysis to look for a suitable transformation of either the 
independent or explanatory variable, or sometimes both, so that the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) method can applied. This process of finearisation requires the 
transformed dependent variable to be expressed as a linear combination of the 
transformed explanatory variables while, at the same time, the assumption of OLS is 
adhered to (SPSS, 1990; Fox, 1991; Gujarati, 1992). The search for an appropriate 
functional form for linearisation is largely a matter of trial and error, but a similar 
operation was suggested by Prais and Housthakker (1971) and Gujarati (1992) which 
will also be used in this section (table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 Definition of Functional Forni 
Label Functional Forni 
Linear RINC =a* (IND) +b 
Double Log Log (RINQ =a* Log(IND) +b 
Semi Log RINC =a* Log (IND) +b 
Log Inverse Log(RINC)=a* (I /IND) +b 
Hvverbolic RINC =a*(I/ IND) +b 
Note: RINC (Residual Inoome) IND (Independent Variable) Log (Natural Logarithm) 
Two criteria were used to select the best models: models with the highest explanatory 
that have the fulfill the assumptions of OLS will be chosen. Yet, because of the 
functional form of the regression equations were not the same, the R sqaure values, 
which is used to compare the explanatory of the models, could not be compared directly. 
instead, the R square statistics have to be transformed so that the dependent variables 
have the same functional form (Gujarati, 1992). Results of the regression analysis are 
presented in table 7.2 (with the R sqaure statistics already transformed so that they were 
comparable). Among the various models, the double log transformation yields the 
highest explanatory power measured by the R square statistic which assesses the 
proportion of variation explained (in a statistical sense) by the fitted equation (SPSS, 
1990a). The linear models relating the unequivalised and equivalised residual income 
and gross housing cost to income ratio can only "explain" (in a statistical sense) about 
4(r/o of the variation in the data, but a double log transformation can achieve, 
respectively, approximately two thirds and half of the variation. Models for the net ratio 
in general explain less of the variation than gross ratio, whereas only a third of the 
variation can be explained by the double-log models. 
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Table 7.2 Regression Models: Unequivalised Residual Income by Housing Cost to income 
Ratios 
Dependent variable Une quivalised Residual Income* 
Explanatory variable Gross Ratio* Net Ratio* 
Functional Form R Sq B RSq B 
Linear 0.45 -7.4 0.18 -5.7 
Double Log 0.62 -1.1 0.27 -0.82 
Semi-log 0.56 -201 0.25 -166 
Log Inverse 0.32 10.2 0.16 9.3 
Hyperbolic 0.38 2222 0.12 2206 
Dependent Variable E quivalised Residual Income 
Linear 0.38 -5.5 0.17 -4.1 
Double Log 0.52 -0.82 0.23 -0.62 
Semi-log 0.47 -147 0.20 -114 
Log Inverse 0.28 7.9 0.13 7 
Hvmbolic 0.31 1664 0.11 1547 
Note: * Refer to Table 7.1 for the exact form of independent and dependent Variables 
R Sq (Adjusted R square, transformed to a form that can be comparable) 
B( Unstandardised Regression Coefficient) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
it is not surprising that a logarithmic transformation is more appropriate, given that both 
variables have a roughly log-normal distribution. Nevertheless, it is not common in 
regression analysis to include independent variables that are derived from the dependent 
variable because it will produce undesirable effects which may violate the assumptions of 
regression. In the case of housing cost to income ratio and residual income, though 
strictly speaking the former is not derived directly from the latter, these two variables 
are derived from the income of a household and there may still be some chance that 
systematic but undesirable effects would be produced that violate regression analysis 
assumptions. 
Thus, inspection of violation of OLS regression assumptions is necessary before the 
double-log models can be accepted. An examination of the distribution of the regression 
residual terms and the degree of heteroscedasticity of all the fitted models in Appendix 
A8 suggest that the double-log models are not only models that offer the most 
explanatory power, but they also best comply with the regression assumptions. The 
regression residuals of the double log models have a normal distribution; no systematic 
relation exists between the residuals and the expected value of the fitted equation, which 
is an indication of homoscedasticity (refer to Appendix A8 for a description of OLS 
assumptions). Hence, the first condition set up in section 7.3, of a close relationship 
between housing cost to income ratio and residual income, is fulfilled. 
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7.5 HOUSING COST TO INCOME RATIO BY INCIDENCE OF 
POVERTY 
in order that housing cost to income ratio can be used as an effective predictor of the 
incidence of poverty, the distribution of housing cost to income ratio between 
households in poverty and those not in poverty should be relatively distinctive. It is 
shown in table 7.3 that the mean value of gross and net ratio between households that 
were classified as poor and those that were not, in both Model TI and Model T2, were 
statistically different (p<0.01). 
Table 7.3 Mean Values of Housinjq Cost To Incorne Ratio and Pov 
Mean Gross Rafio % Mean Net Ratio % 
Model T, Not poor 19 22 
Poor 42 33 
F Value 3823** 537** 
Model T2 Not Poor 19 2T- 
Poor 43 33 
F Value 3825** 563** 
Note: Refer to Text for meaning of Models, ** p<0.01 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
However, significantly different mean values is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
to test whether a variable in the classification model will be effective. The distribution of 
the observed incidence in relation to the predictor is equally important. A closer 
inspection of the distribution of the housing cost to income ratios with reference to 
incidence of poverty revealed that net ratio would not be an appropriate predictor of 
classification. Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show that net ratio of both the "poor" and the 
"not-poor" groups in the two models clustered in more or less the same range and it is 
impossible to identify the incidence of poverty based on net housing cost to income 
ratio. A large error margin would have been produced if classification had been by net 
housing cost to income ratio. 
On the contrary, although there were overlapping areas of gross housing cost to income 
ratio for both the "poor" and the "not poor" groups, the degree of overlap was 
acceptable (figure 7.1, figure 7.2). The accuracy of prediction using gross housing cost 
to income ratio is expected to be superior to models using net ratio. The second 
condition set out in sections 7.3 and 7.4, that housing cost to income ratio should be 
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able to classify the incidence of poverty reasonably well, is partially fulfilled. It is 
expected that gross ratio will create a more superior classification model. 
Figure 7.1 Distribution of Gross Housing 
Cost To Income Ratio by Poverty Group 
(Model TIG) 
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Figure 7.3 Distribution of Net Housing 
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(Model TIN) 
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Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Figure 7.2 Distribution of Gross Housing 
Cost To Income Ratio by Poverty Group 
(Model T2. ) 
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Figure 7.4 Distribution of Net Housing 
Cost To Income Ratio by Poverty Group 
(Model T2. ) 
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7.6 HOUSING COST TO INCOME RATIO: LOGISTIC 
REGRESSION ANALVSIS 
Having shown in the previous section that gross housing cost to income ratio could be 
reasonably good predictor of the poverty status of a household, the next step is to 
specify the exact relationship between these two variables. Regression analysis, using 
OLS, is a popular choice when constructing such a predictive model. However, using 
the OLS method requires the dependent variable to be a numeric continuous variable. If 
the dependent variable is a limited dependent variable which can only take a limited 
number of values (states), similar to the incidence of poverty in the present context, 
evaluation of the OLS model square would no longer produce the best estimate 
(Gujarati, 1992). 
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Alternative methods of constructing predictive models involving a limited dependent 
variable have been developed; logistic regression, probit model and discriminant analysis 
are examples of such models. Logistic regression is perhaps the most popular method of 
this kind as it imposes the least restrictions on the distribution of the explanatory 
variables (Kennedy 1991). It provides relative ease of computation and more readily 
interpretable results. It is because of these advantages that logistic regression is adopted 
in this chapter. 
Logistic regression belongs to the family of probability models in which the expected 
probability of occurrence of the reference state of the dependent variable is evaluated 
instead of the actual states. it poses little limitation on the distribution of the 
explanatory variable. Parameters of logistic regression models are evaluated using the 
maximum likelihood logarithm and confidence intervals of the parameters can be 
computed where a t-test is used to assess their significance. However, unlike the 
consensus of R square statistics in OLS regression analysis, there is no consensus on 
which statistics should be used to indicate the goodness of fit of logistic regression 
models (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). 
Within these limitations, in this chapter more than one test statistic has been employed in 
order to safeguard a more reliable representation of the goodness of fit. However, 
although a number of such test statistics are developed, not all of them are available in 
popular statistical programmes. To choose a more appropriate test statistic, evaluation 
of the logistic regression was converted from SPSS to SAS where the Akaike 
Information criterion (AIC), the Log Likelihood Ratio Test and the Table of Prediction 
are available. Technical details of logistic regression are presented in appendix A9. 
The results of the logistic regression analysis are presented in table 7.4, which indicates 
that both the gross and net housing cost to income ratios were significant in predicting 
the poverty status of a household (the reference status is whether the household is in 
poverty). Although the regression coefficient in logistic regression is not so readily 
interpretable as in OLS regression analysis, generally the larger the absolute magnitude 
of the coefficient is, the more powerful is the explanatory variable as a predictor. Thus, 
gross ratio is a more powerful predictor of poverty status than net ratio. 
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However, in the case where there is only one explanatory variable, the statistics for 
assessing the goodness of fit of the model can be a more reliable indicator of the 
predictive power of the explanatory variable. Both the AIC and the log Likelihood ratio 
indicate a better performance of models T,,, and T2(, than models T1Nand T2N(for both 
statistics, the smaller the better). Furthermore, using 0.5 as the cut-off probability (the 
event is deemed to have occurred if the probability of occurrence is more than 0.5; less 
than 0.5 for an non-occurrence), Models T,,, and T2,, could predict over 86% of the 
cases correctly, whilst for TINand T2N, it was three quarters. 
Notwithstanding that the overall predictive power of Models TIN and T2N was 
reasonably accurate, it is a poor model for predicting households in poverty. Less than a 
quarter of households in poverty can be predicted correctly by Models TIN and T2N, (the 
equivalent figure for Models TIO and T2., is 70%).. This is merely a reiteration of the 
weak relationship between residual income and net housing cost to income ratio and the 
poor performance of net ratio as a variable of classification presented in earlier sections. 
Table 7.4 Logistic Regression: Prapfiqg Poverty Status 
N= 4272 Dependent Variable: Household in Poverty 
Gross Ratio Net Ratio 
Model T,,, Model T,,, Model T,,,, Model 
Gross/Net Ratio 0.16** 0.16** 0.05** 0.05** 
Intercept -5.5 -5.7 -2.3 -2.4 
AIC 0.62 0.56 1.1 1.07 
-2 U)gLikelihood 2759 2659 4708 4548 
Correctly Predicted as Poor 70% 69% 22% 22% 
Correctly Predicted as Not Poor 93% 93% 95% 96% 
Correct Prediction 86% 87% 74% 76% 
Note: AIC Akaike Infonnation Criterion ** p<0.0 I 
Source: FES 1991 
To check the accuracy of prediction of the models, distribution of the predicted 
probability can be plotted against the actual occurrence of the event. A clear cut 
distribution towards the respective extreme ends rather than clustering in the centre 
would indicate a model of better predictive power in which the alleged accuracy of 
prediction would not be sensitive to the choice of cut-off value. If many households had 
a predicted probability around this cut-off probability point, a small change of cut-off 
probability value would lead to a classification of the opposite state. Figures 7.5 to 7.8 
show the distribution of predicted probability for the models. It indicates that the 
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predicted probabilities in Models T,,, and T2, matched well with the observed poverty 
status of the household, where the classification would not be sensitive to the choice of 
out-off point of 0.5. On the contrary, Models T, x and T2N could not be considered good 
models as it is apparent that they failed to produce an accurate prediction of households 
in poverty. 
Figure 7.5 Logistic Regression: 
Distribution of Predicted Probability, 
Gross Ratio (Model Tl,, ) 
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Figure 7.6 Logistic Regression: 
Distribution of Predicted Probability, 
Gross Ratio (Model T20) 
Figure 7.7 Logistic Regression: 
Distribution of Predicted Probability, Net 
Ratio (Model TIN) 
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Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
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Figure 7.8 Logistic Regression: 
Distribution of Predicted Probability, Net 
Ratio (Model T2N) 
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7.7 CUT OFF HOUSING COST TO INCOME RATIO 
As described in section 7.3, a cut-off point can be located where the probability of being 
in poverty is greater than the probability of not being in poverty, or when the predicted 
probability is 0.5. Alternatively, this point can also be located where the change in 
predicted probability is greatest. Demonstrably, the cut-off ratio evaluated by both 
methods did arrive at the same result for all models. For Model T, ', the cut-off ratio was 
34% and for Model T,, was 35%. The corresponding values for Models T,, and T2N 
were 44% and 45%. 
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In addition, it was argued in section 7.3, that the cut-off ratio would be more effective if 
the curve relating the explanatory variable and the predicted probability were close to a 
step shaped curve. Figure 7.9 shows the predicted probability of the four models in 
relation to both gross and net housing cost to income ratios. it is apparent that Models 
T,,, and T2G(gross ratio) generate curves closer to a step shaped curve whilst Models 
TINand T2Ndo not. 
In fact, at the cut-off points, the rate of change of predicted probability is 0.04 for both 
Models T,,, and T2., an equivalent of a change of 4 percentage points of predicted 
probability for a one percentage point change in gross ratio. Increasing the gross ratio 
from one percentage point below the cut-off point to one percentage point above the 
cut-off point would have produced a change of predicted probability from 0.45 to 0.53. 
For Models TlNand T2N, the rate of change of predicted probability at the cut-off point 
was only 0.001, which is a comparatively low value. 
This suggests that net housing cost to income ratio is not a good predictor of the 
incidence of poverty and thus the cut-off net ratio is not a reliable cut-off for 
affordability. This conclusion is supported by evidence from the earlier analyses. 
Hence, it is more appropriate to use only those models involving gross housing cost to 
income ratio in subsequent analyses. 
Figure 7.9 Logistic Regression: Predicted Probability, All Models 
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7.8 CUT-OFF RATIO AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
it is argued that a single cut-off ratio should not be applied across households with 
varied composition and characteristics (Brownill et al, 1990; Bramley et al, 1990). 
Empirical results in chapter five also show that there were significant differences in 
gross ratio among households with different socio-economic characteristics. Thus, it 
appears to be necessary to explore whether different cut-off ratios should be applied 
to households with different characteristics. 
Logistic regression models involving the gross housing cost to income ratio were run 
for some selected characteristics of the household and the results of the cut-off ratios 
for each of the characteristics selected are summarised in table 7.5. It indicates that 
the cut-off ratios amongst households of different characteristics vary substantially 
and the use of a single cut-off ratio for all households would appear to be 
inappropriate. 
However, it is impractical to set a separate cut-off ratio for each of the characteristics 
because it will make the process of evaluating affordability exceedingly complicated. To 
compromise in the search for a simple process, which nevertheless retains the precision 
of evaluation, it should be possible to identify the household characteristics which exert 
the strongest influence on the prediction of the incidence of poverty, and to establish a 
separate cut-off ratio for each of the subgroups in the category. In doing so, the burden 
of such a complicated evaluation can be minimised, and the resulting model is accurate 
enough to account for most of the variation in the data. Identifying those 
characteristics which are most influential can be achieved by comparing the relative 
effect of the relevant characteristics in a multivariate logistic regression model, which 
was implemented on SPSS VAX/VMS V4. Results of these two models (Models T3. 
and T4,, ) are presented in table 7.6. The SPSS output uses the R statistic (Appendix A8) 
to represent the partial correlation of the variable with the dependent variable, which can 
be used to assess the relative contribution of a variable to the whole model. 
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Table 7.5 Cut-off Ratio by Household Characteristics 
Characteristics Model T,,, % Model T... % 
AR households 34 35 
Tenure 
Local Authority Tenants 26 28 
Housing Association Tenants 27 31 
Private Tenants (Unfumished) 31 34 
Private Tenants (Fumished) 41 42 
Mortgagors 45 45 
Region 
North 30 33 
Yorkshire and Humberside 31 33 
North West 33 33 
East Midlands 32 34 
West Midlands 31 32 
East Anglia 34 34 
London 38 38 
South East 40 41 
South West 35 36 
Household Type 
maffied Couple 37 37 
Single Person 35 37 
Lone Parent 28 29 
Others 32 33 
Size of Household 
I Person 29 35 
2 Pemns 51 51 
3 Persons 48 48 
4 Persons 47 47 
5 Persons or More 45 42 
Housing Benefit 
Claimant 24 26 
Non-claimant 41 42 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
This indicates that gross housing cost to income ratio makes the greatest contribution. 
its contribution to the goodness of fit of the whole model was far higher than that of the 
sum of the other variables. Comparing the accuracy of prediction in table 7.4, gross 
ratio alone would predict around 70% of poor households as poor, while adding the 
other variables improved the accuracy of this prediction to around 80%. The second 
greatest contributing variable was tenure, while the effect of household type was not 
significant, and that of region and housing benefit were only moderate. Size of 
household made a substantial contribution, although this was smaller than the effect of 
tenure. 
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Table 7.6 Multi-variate Logistic Regression Models: Housing Cost To Income Ratio and 
Household Characteristics 
Characteristics Model T , Model T,,, 
R Exp B R Exp B 
Gross Ratio 0.36 1.19** 0.36 1.19** 
Tenure 0.2 0.17 
Local Authority Tenants 0.11 3.64** 0.1 2.48** 
Housing Association Tenants 0.05 2.30** 0.02 1.58** 
Private Tenants (Unfurnished) 0.02 1.56* 0.01 1.43** 
Private Tenants Turnished) 0.05 0.42** -0.02 0.56ns 
Mort-gagors r 0.25 r 0.31 
Region 0.08 0.07 
North 0 1.1 Ins 0 0.99ns 
Yorkshire and Humberside 0.03 1.58* 0.02 1.40ns 
North West 0 1.20ns 0 1.11 ** 
East Midlands 0.02 1.47* 0.03 1.60* 
West Midlands 0 1.25ns 0.01 1.35* 
East Anglia 0 0.89ns 0 1.02** 
London -0.06 0.50** -0.03 0.65* 
South East -0.06 0.55** -0.06 0.53ns 
South West r 1.05 r 0.88 
Size of Household 0.11 0.15 _ 1 Person -0.08 0.48** -0.12 0.33** 
2 Persons -0.06 0.64** -0.07 0,58** 
3 Persons 0 0.88ns 0 0.87** 
4 Persons 0.02 1.28* 0.04 1.44* 
5 Persons or More r 2.88 r 4.16 
_ Housing Benefit 
_ Claimant -0.09 0.58** -0.09 0.59** 
Non-claimant r 1.7 r 1.68 
-2LogLL (Base Model) 5173 5028 
-2LqgLL (Ratio Only Model) 2413 2368 
-2LogLL (Full Model) 1967 1976 
N 4253 4253 
Correctly Predicted Not Poor 0.96 0.95 
Correctiv Predicted Poor 0.81 0.8 
Note: ** P<0.0 I* P<O. IN Not significant r Reference group 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Thus, to establish a different cut-off ratio for each of the tenure groups will, on the one 
hand, improve the accuracy of prediction while, on the other hand, it will improve the 
efficiency of evakwion and reserve a single method for assessing affordability. 
A check for the sensitivity of the cut-off ratios for each of the tenure groups for both 
models T,,,, and T. is presented in figure 7.10. It illustrates that the ten distributions of 
predicted probability deviated little from the pattern of overall distribution shown in 
figure 7.6. Thus, it is appropriate to employ the ratio at a predicted probability of 0.5 as 
the cut-off ratio for each of the tenure groups. 
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However, having two cut-off ratios for each of the tenure groups is clumsy to 
implement. For most of the tenure groups, the cut-off ratios for the two models were 
either identical or very close to each other, with the exception of housing association 
tenants. Hence, as a compromise for the sake of simplicity and precision of prediction, 
the arithmetic mean of the two cut-off ratios for each of the tenure groups will be taken 
as the final cut-off ratio. A list of the final cut-off ratios employed for subsequent 
analysis are presented in table 7.7 
Figure 7.10 Logistic Regression: Predicted Probability, Gross Housing Cost To 
income Ratio by Tenure 
Pre&ctedprobabdity 
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Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Table 7.7 Cut Off HousinR Cost To Income Ratio 
Tenure Cut-off Gross Ratio % 
Local Authority Tenants 27 
Housing Association Tenants 29 
Private Tenants (Unfurnished) 32.5 
Private Tenants (Furnished) 41.5 
Mortp-a2ors 45 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
7.9 HOUSEHOLDS IN UNAFFORDABLE HOUSING 
With the cut-off ratios established in the preceding section, the characteristics of 
households in unaffordable housing can be examined. The results of this examination 
are shown in table 7.8. Social tenants were apparently very likely to be experiencing 
unaffordable housing, to a factor of eight when compared with mortgagees. The 
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situation of private tenants was between these two extremes, but private tenants in 
rented furnished accommodation were nevertheless in a preferable situation to their 
counterparts in the unfurnished sector. 
Regional differences in unaffordability were less distinct than the variation amongst 
tenure groups. However, a north south divide was observed. Yet households in the 
south of the country were not in more unaffordable housing than their counterparts in 
the north because of the high housing cost in the south. On the contrary, the South East 
and South West had a lower proportion of households in unaffordable housing than the 
northern regions. London, with a very high level of housing cost, was an exception, 
having the second highest concentration of households in unaffordable housing. 
Lone parents were also susceptible to affordability. Over two thirds of lone parents 
were in unaffordable housing compared with only about one tenth of married couple 
households. The situation of single person households was little better, with a majority 
expenencmg an affordability problem. Conversely, larger households appeared to fare 
better, with only a very small proportion of households with three or more members 
having difficulty with affordability. 
The effect of dependent children on affordability was not obvious. Households with no 
dependent child were slightly more likely to be in unaffordable housing, but this effect 
was strongly influenced by the poor affordability situation of single person households 
rather than as an effect of dependent children. Having school age children appeared to 
reduce the likelihood of experiencing an affordability problem, but the difference was 
minor. 
The age of the householder was related to affordability, and the affordability situation of 
elderly households were extremely poor. The youngest householders had an average 
affordability situation, whilst their middle aged counterparts appeared to be much better 
off. 
Employment status had a clear effect on affordability. It is apparent from table 7.8 that 
the greater the households' involvement in the labour market, the less likely the 
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household was to be in unaffordable housing. When the householder was out of 
employment, the likelihood of being in unaffordable housing was fifteen times more 
likely than for a household whose head was in full time employment. The employment 
status of the partner of the head of household was also significant. When the 
householder was in full time employment, the likelihood of being in unaffordable 
housing would double if the partner was unemployed. 
Because claiming housing benefit was closely related to participation in the labour 
market, it is not surprising that, given the unfavourable affordability situation of people 
out of work, housing benefit claimants experienced a worse affordability situation. In 
fact, the largest diflerence in the level of unaffordability was between housing benefit 
claimants and non-claimants. Households on housing benefit or a related social security 
benefit were seven and a half times more likely to be in unaffordable housing than those 
which did not have to depend on housing benefit. 
Table 7.8 Household in Unaffordable Housing by Household 
Characteristics (Ratio Measurement) 
Characteristics % 
All Household 25 
Tenure 
Local Authority Tenants 58 
Housing Association Tenants 56 
Private Tenants (Unfurnished) 43 
Private Tenants (Furnished) 25 
Mortgagors 7 
Region 
North 31 
Yorkshire and Humberside 28 
North West 26 
East Midlands 24 
West Nfidlands 30 
East Anglia 20 
London 29 
South East 18 
South West 23 
Household Type 
married Couple 12 
Single Person 53 
Lone Parent 67 
Others 19 
Size of Household 
I Person 53 
2 Persons 22 
3 Parsons 14 
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Table 7.9 Household in Unaffordable Housing by Household 
Charactmistics (Ratio Measurement) 
Characteristics % 
4 Persons 11 
5 Persons or More 12 
Dependent children 
No dependent Child 28 
have Child aged Under 5, No 5 to 15 25 
No child Under 5, Have Child 5 to 15 16 
Have Children under 5 and 5 to 15 17 
Age of Householder - Under 30 2ý 
30-39 14 
40-49 10 
50-59 19 
Over 60 57_ 
Economic Status of Householder and Partner 
Both Full Time 4 
HoH Full Time Partner Part Time 4 
HoH Full Time Partner Unoccupied 9 
HoH Part Time partner Full Time 28 
HoH Part Time partner Part Time / Unoccupied 38 
HoH Unoccupied Partner Full Time / Part Time 60 
Both Unoccupied 61 
Housing Bencfit 
Claimant 10 
Non-claimant 75 
Note: **P<0.0 I *P<O. IN Not significant r Reference group 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
7.10 SUMAMRY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite a long history of the use of ratio measurement for affordability it was imported 
to the United Kingdom only as recently as the 1980s. Although it is widely used in 
many industrial countries, it was received in the UK with much scepticism, especially 
among the academic community. It is criticised as being unrepresentative of household 
financial burden, and as an inappropriate indicator of opportunity cost, and hence a 
misleading measurement instrument. Nevertheless, the origin of a proportional 
approach to affordability measurement has strong empirical support and the use of ratio 
measurement is still robust. Moreover, its simplicity increases its attractiveness and 
popularity among housing practitioners. 
Despite the popularity of the ratio measurement, the cut-off ratio was only established as 
a "rule of thumb". Whilst it creates few problems in other industrial countries where 
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there is some consensus on the level of the threshold ratio, the situation in the UK is 
somewhat chaotic. Although a number of threshold ratios have been proposed, none 
can gain authoritative status because of the lack of solid theoretical, empirical or 
argumentative backing. Refusal by the government to disclose officially its own 
threshold ratio only increased contention around the dispute. In this chapter, an 
empirical investigation of housing cost to income ratio has been conducted in an attempt 
to establish empirically cut-off ratios based on a composite approach to affordability. 
A composite approach to establishing a cut-off point for housing cost to income ratio 
was attempted which combined the ratio approach and the residual income approach. 
Housing cost to income ratio was used to indicate the relative level of housing cost 
whilst residual income was employed as an indicator of household financial burden. 
Thus, as a derivative from the definition of affordability, a household would be in 
unaffordable housing if it reached a particular ratio, and it was likely the household 
would be in financial difficulty. Half of average equivalised residual income and 14CP/o 
of income support level were used as the poverty levels in the residual income approach 
mentioned above. 
several steps to check the feasibility of the composite approach were undertaken. First, 
it was shown that there was a close relationship between both gross and net housing 
cost to income ratio and residual income where the double log regression models 
provided the greatest explanatory power. This close relationship between residual 
income and housing cost to income ratio suggests a similar relationship between housing 
cost to income ratio and the incidence of poverty. 
Second, mean values of both gross and net housing cost to income ratio between 
households who were poor were significantly different from those which were not. 
However, the distribution of the two ratios with reference to the poverty status of the 
household suggests that only the gross ratio is appropriate for the purpose of 
classification. Distribution of gross ratio between households who were poor and those 
who were not was distinct, allowing poverty status to be clearly classified by the gross 
ratio. in contrast, the distribution of net ratio between these two groups clustered in the 
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same range and classification using the net ratio would produce a very large margin of 
error. 
Third, logistic regression models were constructed employing both gross and net ratio as 
predictors of the incidence of poverty. The models generated, using respectively 14(r/(, 
income support level and half average income as the poverty line, all had a satisfactory 
level of goodness of fit. But net ratio could only produce a model with a low degree of 
prediction accuracy. Thus, only gross ratio was considered appropriate to be used as a 
predictor of the status of poverty. 
Finally, the cut-off ratio was fixed at the point where the predicted probability was 0.5, 
above which the chance of being "poor" was higher than the chance of being "not poor". 
it was also the point where the change of predicted probability with respect to the 
change in gross ratio was greatest. 
However, there were considerable ditTerences between subgroups of households having 
different charaaeristics. It is thus not appropriate to apply a single ratio across all 
households but, nonetheless, it is impractical to fiu-nish each subgroup with a different 
ratio. As a compromise, it seemed appropriate to apply a separate cut-off ratio to 
household characteristics which most influenced the prediction of poverty incidence, 
together with gross housing cost to income ratio. 
Based on the multi-variate logistic regression models including gross ratio and other 
relevant socio-economic characteristics, tenure was found to be the most influential 
characteristic, next to gross ratio. Thus, a list of cut-off ratios was generated for each 
tenure group by taking the arithmetic mean of the corresponding cut-off ratio of the two 
models using, respectively, 140*/o of income support level and half average income as 
the poverty line. With reference on the cut-off ratios established, social tenants, people 
living in London and the northern regions, single persons, lone parents, households with 
the householder unemployed or retired and housing benefit claimants were found to be 
more likely to be experiencing unaffordable housing. 
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CHAPTER 8 
BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO 
AFFORDABILITY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Measurement of affordability has been dominated by the normative approach, in which 
the ratio measurement and the residual income measurement are the two most popular 
methods. However, it was argued in chapter three that other measurement approaches 
to affordability, for instance the behavioral or the subjective approach, are also plausible. 
it was shown in chapter seven that a behavioural perspective can be incorporated into 
the normative approach to determine threshold affordability ratios. This chapter will 
explore the feasibility of a purely behavioural perspective on affordability measurement. 
This chapter consists of nine sections. The first section presents a review on the 
behavioural approach to affordability measurement. It is followed by an examination of 
the lesson learned from the behavioural approach to poverty measurement. The third 
section will describe the methods of investigation that will be used in this chapter. An 
exploration of an appropriate functional form for the non-finear regression model will be 
reported in the section that follows. Non-linear regression models are evaluated in 
section 8.6, based on information provided by the preceding section. To examine 
whether cut-off ratios have been established in households with different socio-economic 
characteristics, multivariate regression analysis is employed in section 8.7. This 
regression analysis is also used to contrast results of earlier research on affordability. 
Finally, cut-off ratios for each sub-group of the important socio-economic parameters 
are then estimated. 
8.2 A REVIEW ON THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO 
AFFORDABILITY MEASUREMENT 
The normative approach has been the dominating, perhaps the only, approach to 
affordability measurement since the early development of the concept. The two most 
popular methods in implementing this approach, the residual income and the ratio 
method, have to rely on benchmark values for assessing the affordability status of a 
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household. Notwithstanding the authoritative stamp these benchmark values bear and 
their adoption with few challenges, they are less authoritative than they are claimed to 
be. It is argued in chapter seven that the commonly used affordability ratio is little better 
than a "rule of thumb", which may have been based on arbitrary choice; nor were later 
modifications grounded on solid scientific or argumentative justification (see Lane, 
1977; Maclennan et al, 1990). 
The residual income approach, on the other hand, is based on the poverty line as a 
benchmark value. This is less arbitrary than the threshold affordability ratio. Yet the 
establishment of poverty lines on which the judgement of affordability is based is 
complicated. A poverty fine can be established using a variety of approaches, of which 
the normative approach to poverty is one among many. Thus, whether the residual 
income approach is normative depends on the approach used in the reference poverty 
fine, rather than the use of residual income per se. In fact, many of the poverty lines 
commonly used in the literature of poverty are not based on the normative approach. 
in addition, contrary to the argument of Maclennan and Williams (1990), affordability 
measurement need not involve the judgement of a third party. This is particularly the 
case if the allegedly authoritative judgement of the third party does not have the 
necessary scientific or argumentative justification. Besides measuring affordability fi-om 
a normative perspective, approaching the problem from the actual behaviour of people is 
a viable alternative. It can be based on what people are actually prepared to spend on 
housing, given the socio-economic characteristics of the household. Alternatively, 
difficulties in paying for housing are an indicator of unaffordability and approaching 
affordability measurement from this direction should also be feasible. 
The former approach has been incorporated in research by NFHA (1990), Fein and 
colleagues (1977) and Maclennan and colleagues (1990) whilst Bramley (1990), Ford 
(1992), Ford and Wilcox (1992), Coles (1992) and Kearns and colleagues (1993) have 
conducted a thorough investigation of households which experience difficulties in paying 
their housing costs. 
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In an attempt to establish a threshold affordability ratio for housing association tenants, 
which in turn acts as a reference for fixing affordable rents in new housing association 
lettings, the NFHA looked at the amount home owners spent on housing. However, it 
was the average proportion of home owners' income that was devoted to housing that 
interested the NFHA, not the systematic relationship between housing outgoings with 
income and socio-economic characteristics. This ignores the difference in both the level 
of income and socio-economic characteristics between home owners and housing 
association tenants. 
Fein and colleagues (1977) conducted a thorough and detailed examination of the 
housing expenditure of American households in the 1960s and 1970s. Where housing 
expenditure was analyzed systematically with socio-econornic characteristics, the main 
focus of the research was on the historical trend of housing costs. There was no attempt 
to uncover any relationship between housing cost on the one hand and household 
income and socio-economic characteristics on the other. 
Households in financial difficulty form the second line of investigation, especially those 
in arrears with rent or mortgage repayment or facing repossession. Ford and Wilcox 
(1992) analyzed home owners, in the early 1990s, who were in repayment arrears from a 
national sample survey. Ford (1992) studied the characteristics of households whose 
homes were repossessed, selecting a sample from the lenders' records, whilst Coles 
(1992) examined the characteristics of households in similar conditions based on 
information supplied by building societies. However, the focus of these researches were 
to describe the characteristics of the arrears or repossessions and the characteristics of 
the households in difficulty. Little emphasis has been placed on the relationship of 
household socio-economic characteristics or the level of housing expenditure to 
affordability problems, nor the affordability situation of such households. In addition, 
such research concentrates on the problems of home owners but does not focus on 
households in financial difficulties in general. 
In contrast, research by Branfley et al (1989) and Kearns et al (1993) on household 
financial stress inclines more explicitly toward the understanding of the affordability 
problem. Bramley and colleagues (1989), using survey data from the JRF Housing 
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Finance Survey in the Bristol area, analyzed the problem of meeting housing costs 
employing arrears as an indicator. Kearns and colleagues (1993), on the other hand, 
examined the problem of financial stress among housing association tenants in Scotland 
employing the subjective assessment of the respondents on their states of financial stress 
as an indicator. Because of the limitation of sample size, where the number of 
households in the samples with financial difficulties was small, it is impossible to 
evaluate beyond simple description. 
A detailed examination of housing costs in relation to household income and socio- 
economic characteristics was conducted by Maclennan and colleagues (1990) in "Paying 
for British Housing", the first volume of the final report of the JRF Housing Finance 
Survey. Apparently, the thrust of the analysis was to argue, explicitly, against the use of 
a single ratio of affordability and implicitly against the use of an affordability ratio per se. 
It has nevertheless provided valuable empirical evidence for the examination of housing 
cost, household income and household socio-economic characteristics. 
in their analysis, Maclennan and colleagues (1990) found that other factors besides 
income had an influence on the level of housing cost and it was not appropriate to 
consider income alone: 
A 'crude' ratio which sought to influence rent or subsidy levels solely with regard to 
income would disregard other influences of household expenditure or housing needs. 
As income, age, ethnicity, family composition etc can be inter-related then it is not 
good statistical practice to examine housing spending separately for each 
'explanatory' variable. They should be examined simultaneously. (Maclennan et al, 
1990: 92) 
Four regression models were then constructed relating housing expenditure with 
household composition, ethnicity, income, location of the household and housing 
quality, with each of the four models further broken down into sub-models by housing 
tenure. Several findings were highlighted by the authors: 
1. Explanatory power of all the models was small 
2. Models for the whole sample could explain the variation in the data more than the 
individual sub-models in individual tenure groups. This indicated "the correlation of 
socio-economic variable and tenure rather than spending contribute to the overall 
explanation level" (Maclennan et al 1990: 92). 
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3. Variables in the models could only explain a very small proportion of the level of 
gross rent in the social sector, and the authors conclude that "existing rents in Britain 
could neither be used as a guide to housing demand nor spending needs" (Maclennan 
et al 1990: 92). 
4. Models explaining net housing expenditure can explain more of the variation than 
models explaining gross housing expenditure, whereas "the explanation of this shift... 
is the operation of the housing benefit system - socio-economic parameters determine 
benefit eligibility and payment which reduce net ratio" (Maclennan et al 1990: 92). 
Whilst the empirical aspect of the analysis was a significant piece of work on 
affordability, there were a number of inadequacies in both the statistical process and the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis. First, point four of Maclennan and colleagues' 
comment on housing benefit and the level of housing expenditure is a poorly supported 
conclusion. It is true that the housing benefit system would have a significant influence 
on the level of net outgoings on housing, but socio-economic parameters are not the 
major determining factor of housing benefit eligibility. It is the level of net income that 
is more influential. Thus, the effect of socio-economic characteristics could not be a 
proxy for housing benefit. 
Second, their comment on the level of social sector rent as a reliable guide to housing 
demand or needs was based on an inappropriate interpretation of the results. The 
observation that income and socio-economic; characteristics explained very little 
variation in rent in the social sector does not wan-ant a causal relationship between 
housing need and social sector rent. If household composition and other socio- 
economic characteristics were used as a proxy for housing need, as Maclennan and 
colleagues apparently intended to do, then it is housing need that could not explain the 
variation of housing cost rather than the converse causal relationship. Moreover, it is 
not legitimate to extend the results, from samples of arbitrarily selected six cities, to the 
whole of Britain. As a minor footnote, the sub-models in the analysis did not include the 
same set of parameters because the author had excluded the "eliminated" parameters in 
some of the sub-models (with unspecified elimination criteria). Thus, many of the 
alleged proxies of housing need were not in the model. 
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Third, the second point of their comment on tenure, socio-economic characteristics and 
spending on housing is totally misleading. The unstandardised regression coefficient did 
not provide information sufficient to compare the relative contribution of different 
explanatory variables to the model because it depends also on the standard error of that 
coefficient, the unit of measurement and the presence of other variables (Guijarti 1992, 
Hardy 1993). In addition, the effect of tenure could not be inferred from the goodness 
of fit of submodels on different tenure groups. Such models only reflect the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable within each tenure group but not the 
effect of tenure on the dependent variable. The only valid method of producing 
evidence is to include tenure as an explanatory variable so that the significance as well as 
its contribution relative to other variables can be assessed (refer to Hardy ( 1993) for a 
detailed discussion of regression involving dummy variables). 
Finally, the low explanatory power of much of the model could be possibly explained by: 
first, the sample size of some of the tenure groups was small: 120 housing association 
tenants and 308 private tenants. The error margins of the models for these two groups 
may be very large which leads to low explanatory power. In addition, there were many 
sub-models that included many "eliminated" variable. The explanatory power of 
regression with fewer explanatory variables is generally lower. Second, and perhaps the 
more likely explanation, is that statistics in a regression model are valid only if the 
assumptions for ordinary least square regression are flafflued (Fox 199 1, Hardy 1993). 
Since it is shown in this thesis that both housing cost and income follow a log-normal 
distribution, it is unlikely that the distribution of these two variables in the sample would 
follow a normal distribution, It is thus very unlikely that a linear model involving these 
two variables would not violate the regression assumptions, especially the conditions of 
homoscedasticity and normal distribution of the residuals, albeit the authors provide no 
information on this independent validation. 
The work of Maclennan and colleagues (1990) is a pioneer work in the investigation of 
affiordability, but it did not go far enough to develop a behavioural approach to 
affordability measurement. In fact, no previous attempts in measuring affordability were 
based on the behavioural approach. To develop a behavioural approach to affordability, 
lessons should be taken from elsewhere. 
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8.3 LESSONS FROM THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO 
POVERTY MEASUREMENT 
There are a number of attempts to develop a behavioural approach of poverty in the 
literature on poverty. Given the close relationship between poverty and affordability, it 
is acceptable to adapt methods used in poverty measurement to develop a behavioural 
approach to affordability measurement. Several methods in determining the poverty line 
can be termed behavioural: the S-curve method developed by the American Bureau of 
Labour Statistics, the relative deprivation approach pioneered by Townsend and, to a 
lesser extent, the percentage of national average income. Amongst these approaches, 
the S-curve can best be modified and adopted as a method with which to establish a 
threshold affordability level. 
The S-curve method was developed from the "quantity to income elasticity" technique 
which was first used by the American Bureau of labour Statistics (BLS) in the 1930s. 
The "quantity to income elasticity" technique considers households as poor if their 
consumption level is below a certain overall budget standard. Such standards are 
established with reference to the "standards of adequacy" of the consumption of some 
selected goods and services, 
The "standards of adequacy" are in turn determined by plotting the quantity of 
consumption of the selected groups of goods and services, the point where the increase 
in the quantity of consumption shows a tendency to decline relative to income is the 
level of adequacy. This technique was founded on Engel's Law which states that the 
consumption of food (or other daily necessities) increases with increases in household 
income. As income increases, the quantity of consumption will increase among 
households on low incomes but for higher income households, it is the quality and 
variety of consumption that is associated with the increase. Hence, there is a cross-over 
point where the concern for quantity, which is associated with poverty, will give way to 
the concern of quality and variety, an indication of affluence. This cross-over point can 
then be regarded as a transition from poverty to affluence and thus is the poverty line 
(quoted in Nfitchell 1985). 
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A modified version of the "quantity to income elasticity" method, the S-curve method, 
was used in Nfitchell (1985) in an attempt to establish a poverty line for the UK and the 
results were later incorporated into the works of Bradshaw and colleagues (1987) as a 
preliminary work in establishing a modem budget standard for the UK. Instead of using 
the quantity of consumption, which is inconvenient to measure from social surveys, the 
level of expenditure is used as a proxy for the quantity of consumption. Expenditure of 
a selected good and service is then plotted against household income, an inflection point 
in the curve thus indicates a qualitative change in the consumption pattern. The shape of 
the curve with an inflection point looks like the letter S, which is the reason it is so 
named. 
However, because the method was originally founded on the relationship between 
income and the quantity of consumption, a change from quantity of consumption to level 
of expenditure would affect the integrity of the method. Despite this weakness, the 
inflection point on the curve relating expenditure and income could still be an indication 
of a change "where expenditure on a commodity gives way to a preference to save or 
spend on the less necessary commodities" (Bradshaw et al 1987: 174) and by and large 
can be a valid proxy for the level of adequacy. 
A similar logic for determining the poverty line was adopted by Townsend (1979). He 
used a relative deprivation index to represent the participation of individuals in society 
which increases with the decrease in participation. Townsend observed that the 
resources commanded by an individual are positively correlated with the level of social 
participation. A poverty fine can then be defined at a point where there is a 
disproportionate increase in the relative deprivation index with respect to a change in 
household income (Townsend 1979). 
In this chapter, the S-curve technique will be adopted to determine the affordability 
level. It is derived from arguments delineated by Nfitchell (1985), Bradshaw and 
colleagues (1987) and Townsend (1979) in their attempts to determine a poverty line. 
The point of assumed qualitative change is established by locating the inflection point in 
the curve relating the relevant variables: expenditure on a particular commodity and 
household income in the case of Mitchell's study, or relative deprivation index and 
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household income in Townsend's research. In the context of affordability measurement, 
the cut-off affordability level is located at the point where housing consumption shows a 
qualitatively different relationship with respect to household income. 
Technical details of locating the inflection point vary in the studies mentioned in the 
preceding paragraphs. Mtchell (1985) and Bradshaw and colleagues (1987) plot a line 
linking the mean values of banded expenditure (expenditure values were grouped into 
bands, but not of equal range, and mean value for each band was calculated) and mean 
banded income. Then the inflection point is located by eye inspection where the curve 
appears to indicate a change of course, Likewise, a similar eye inspection method was 
employed by Townsend (1979) with reference to a banded deprivation index and banded 
income. The work of Townsend was later improved by Dew (1986) who showed that 
when two regression fines were fitted to Townsend's data set to, respectively, two 
subsamples divided by Townsend's poverty line, the two curves provide a better fit than 
a single curve for the whole sample. Townsenas conjecture that there were two 
qualitatively different relationships between the two variables in the two different income 
ranges was thus confirmed statistically. 
More recently, Townsend (1993) elaborated his own method by the use of discriminant 
analysis and cluster analysis. He confirmed that, based on the items of deprivation 
measurement and using the technique of cluster analysis, it was optimal to divide the 
sample into two clusters. Experimenting with cut-off points at various income levels, he 
successfially located the income level where the deprivation items could best discriminate 
between the two groups divided by the cut-off income, which was then taken as the 
poverty fine. 
Townsend (1979), NIfitchell (1985), Bradshaw et al (1987) and Desai (1986) all used 
banded values instead of the actual values, mainly to take advantage of the reduction in 
computational complexity. It is difficult to identify an inflection point within a large 
number of data given the complexity of fltting several regression curves accurately. 
Taking the average of the grouped data greatly reduces the number of points to be 
handled and thus allows regression lines to be drawn by hand. Inflection points can then 
be identified by eye inspection. However, establishing the inflection point in this way 
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lacks the necessary confirmative power which would be conferred by a statistical 
procedure. 
Desai's method of fitting two regression fines and comparing the degree of fit is an 
improvement over the previous piece of work by Townsend because it offers more 
confirmatory power to the model. However, it is only valid if the regression lines plotted 
with mean banded values are representative of the whole sample. However, like the 
studies of Townsend (1979), Nfitchell (1985) and Bradshaw et al (1987), aggregation 
greatly reduces the information provided by the much larger number of individual cases. 
it affects the representativeness of the subsequent regression lines- evaluated from the 
aggregated data points and would in turn jeopardises, the accuracy of location of the 
inflection point. In addition, the cut-off point has to be located manually which makes 
the fine-tuning of such cut-off value a tedious task. 
Despite the justification of aggregation that this method can avoid sources of error "both 
in sampling error and the accuracy of any equation derived to describe the S-Curve" 
(Bradshaw et al, 1987: 167), it could not be demonstrated that this method was immune 
from sampling error; nor was there any gain in not specifying a regression equation for 
the curve. On the contrary, information of sample error and the fitted equation can 
provide details that are necessary to assess the degree of accuracy of the evaluation. 
8.4 METHODS OF EWESTIGATION 
It was shown in chapter three and chapter five that the demand for housing can be 
expressed as a function of household income and the unit price of housing (formula 3.3) 
and housing price and quantity can be jointly observed as the household expenditure on 
housing. This can then be expressed as a function of household income, household size 
and other demographic characteristics (formula 5.1) 
First assuming the effect of household size and other demographic characteristics are 
constant or have a lesser influence than the effect of household income (the effect of 
such variables will be examined in a later section), Housing expenditure can then be 
expressed as a function of household income (formula 8.1): 
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if an explicit function can be established, which links the cost of housing to household 
income, it would be possible to employ the S-curve method mentioned in the previous 
section. Based on principles similar to those used by Nfitchell (1985), Bradshaw et al 
(1987), Desai (1986), and Townsend (1993), as outlined in the previous section, a 
threshold affordability level could be located where the relationship between the cost of 
housing and household income changes qualitatively. 
Other than the methods of implementing the S-curve technique used by the 
aforementioned researches which were described in the preceding section, another 
technical method of implementation, the non- linear regression method, can be used as 
an altemate method of implementation. This later method will be used in this chapter. 
Before going into the technical details of this method of investigation, the distinction 
between market and non-market provision of housing should be reiterated. As 
mentioned in section 5.2 in chapter five, because of the difference in the operation 
between the market and non-market Provision of housing, the functional relationship 
between housing cost and household income between these two sectors may be 
difIerent. Yet, on examination, the difference between these two modes of provision, at 
least in the context of the English housing system, goes beyond a simple dichotomy of 
market and non-market distinction. Thus, advancing the investigation in this way would 
have resulted in the creation of several models rather than just two (section 5.2 of this 
thesis). Because both gross and net housing cost were used in this thesis, there would 
be an over-complicated array of non- linear models which are difficult to comprehend. 
The decision was therefore made that no distinction between the market and non-market 
provision would be considered at this stage, until an appropriate functional form of the 
equation has been identified. Further investigation will be conducted for households with 
different socio-economic characteristics. It is expected, as argued in section 5.2, that 
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the distinction between the market and non-market provision of housing can largely be 
captured by the tenure variable. 
The S-curve method, adopted by Mitchell (1985) and Bradshaw et al (1987) in their 
research on poverty in the UK, will be employed here to examine housing affordability in 
England. The main task is to locate an inflection point where there is a qualitative 
change in the relationship between housing cost and household income. if the 
proportion of housing outgoings, relative to household income for households with 
income below the inflection, increased at a faster rate than households whose income 
was above the inflection point, the former group could be regarded as being in 
unaffordable housing. Such households are obviously pressed harder by the housing 
costs they have to pay. 
it is argued in the previous section that identifying the inflection by including data in 
only their aggregate form would greatly reduce the richness of the information provided 
by the data. Thus, to utilise fiffly the information provided by the data, the average 
values of the banded variables are not used in this chapter. Instead, regression analysis is 
applied to the whole sample. This is termed a "two phase regression" model if there is 
only one inflection point. Such a regression model cannot be satisfactorily evaluated by 
the ordinary least square method. A non-linear regression logarithm is a more 
appropriate analytic tool for such models. In non-finear regression (NLR) models, 
different functional forms (regression equations) can be specified over a range of the 
independent variable, where the parameters of the equations, together with the "joint 
points" (the points that separate different part of the curve), can be evaluated 
simultaneously in a single procedure. 
Since more than one set ofjoint points and equations can be specified in a single model, 
the specification can be very complicated. To facilitate evaluation, several 
simplifications have to be made: first, it is assumed that there is one joint point in the 
model and thus only one "cut- off" point is allowed. The two regression equations will 
share the same functional form but with different parameters below and above the joint 
point. Evaluation of the non- linear regression model is implemented on SPSS for 
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VAX/VMS V4. O. (technical details of non-finear regression analysis are presented in 
Appendix AIO). 
Several types of information must be supplied by the investigator before any NLR 
models can be evaluated. Two important pieces of information are the functional 
specification of the model and the initial value of the parameters. The importance of the 
functional form of the model is obvious but it is also vital for the appropriate initial value 
of the parameters to be specified. Otherwise, no significant parameter estimates can be 
evaluated. 
In order to offer an appropriate functional form as well as the initial parameter values of 
the model, several steps were taken: 
1. In order to provide a rough picture of which functional form of the equation best fits 
the data, a smooth fine based on the Lowess technique (Appendix A9 provides 
technical details of the technique) is fitted to a scatter plot of housing cost and 
income. This helps to identify the appropriate functional form of the regression 
equation. 
2. To identify an exact functional form of the regression equation and the initial 
parameter values, an indirect step must be taken. First, probable functional forms 
identified in step one would be "linearized" so that regression by the OLS method can 
be employed. The advantage of this method is thus exploited without the need to 
supply an initial parameter estimate Models that fit best would be used in the 
evaluation of the NLR models by restoring the linearized functional form to its 
original form, and the functional form of such a model is adopted for the non- linear 
regression The use of this procedure assumes that a better fit "linearised" model is 
also a better fit NLR model. 
3. To estimate the initial parameters is more complicated, especially for the joint point 
because the OLS regression is unable to supply such a value. A second step of 
indirect estimation must be taken. A non-finear two-phase regression model is 
evaluated with the functional form and initial value of the parameters supplied by the 
parameters of the best fitted model in step two, whilst the initial value of the 
inflection point is identified by eye inspection from the smooth curve. Instead of 
using the actual functional form, the linearised functional form will be retained, since 
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the evaluation of a linear two phase model is easier than a non-linear model. This 
exercise aims to provide fine-tuned initial values for parameter estimation in the next 
step. 
4. With more "reliable" initial values of the parameters and the joint point provided by 
the parameters estimated from step three, non-finear equation taking the actual 
functional form (the original form of the linearisation) and the back-transformed 
parameter estimates, the evaluation of the NLR wifl be advanced. Estimating the 
parameters in this step, and the relevant statistics, wiU be taken as the final result. 
Whether an inflection point or a two phase regression model exists Will be tested by the 
confidence intervals of the regression parameters and the parameters of the inflection 
point. The housing cost to income ratio at the inflection point will then be taken as the 
threshold ratio, to place the results of this empirical research in fine with the current 
debate on affordability. 
The same exercise will then be repeated with selected socio- economic charactaistics of 
the household to check whether the cut-off ratio differs significantly across such 
characteristics. As in the situation in chapter seven, whether a single ratio or different 
ratios for different households has to be applied depends on whether significant 
Merences exist across households. It is crucial to check whether there is a dominating 
characteristic which influences housing cost besides income. Then, applying a set of 
ratios to the different subgroups in that category would simplify the situation. The latter 
hypothesis will be tested by multivariate regression analysis involving all the relevant 
characteristics. 
8.5 INITIAL ANALYSIS: LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS 
To proceed with the investigation of the behavioural approach to affordability 
measurement, the functional form of the regression equation has to be assessed. 
Following the outline described in section 8.4, this section will explore the functional 
form most suitable for subsequent non-linear regression analysis. This will be achieved 
in two steps. First, smooth curves will be fitted to the scatterplots relating income and 
housing cost using the Lowess method, in order to determine a regression curve that is 
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most probable for the given data set (a technical description of the Lowess method is 
presented in Appendix A7). 
Second, likely functional forms of the regression equation will be derived based on 
information from the fitted smooth curves. If the functional form is non-linear and more 
than one probable ftinctional forms are derived; only the model with the greatest 
explanatory power will be chosen for further analysis. To simplify the selection, the 
regression equations will be linearised and OLS regression will be conducted to assess 
the explanatory power. The linearised regression equations will also be examined to 
assess whether they pass the OLS assumptions (a discussion of a similar method was 
presented in section 7.4 of chapter seven). 
Figure 8.1 and figure 8.2 show the scatterplots of gross and net income with the 
corresponding housing cost and the smooth curve fitted by the Lowess method. It is 
apparent that the smooth fitted curves for net income and net housing cost are not 
linear. Although the curves for gross income and gross housing cost were closer to a 
straight line, it is still safer to proceed using non-linear functional forms. 
Figure 8.1 Scatterplot: Gross Income by Gross Housing Cost 
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Figure 8.2 Scatter Plot: Net Income by Net Housing Cost 
250.1 
200 
150 
100 
4ý 
CA 50 
4) 
Z 
150 250 350 450 550 650 750 
Net Income 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991. 
As used in section 7.4 of chapter seven and outlined earlier in this section, regression 
analysis will be applied to the "linearised" form allowing for the use of the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) Method in the analysis. Linearisation is the process of transforming 
the dependent or the independent variables, or both, in a non-linear regression equation, 
so that the transformed variables can be expressed as a linear combination of each other. 
OLS will then be applied as if it were an ordinary linear regression model. The original 
non-linear equation can be recovered using the inverse transformation. This method is 
common when dealing with non-linear regression models and also in rectifying 
regression models that have a high degree of heteroscedasticity (Gujarati 1992 and refer 
to Appendix A8 for a technical description). 
Judging from the shape of the curves in figures 8.1 and 8.2, logarithmic and hyperbolic 
transformation will produce curves of similar shape. Several such functional 
transformations have been suggested by Prais and Housthakker (197 1) and Gujarati 
(1992); among the suggested transformations five have been selected in this section and 
they are presented in table 8.1 -. 
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Table 8.1 Definition of Functional Form 
Label Functional Form 
Linear DEP =a* (IND) +b 
Double Log Log (DEP) =a* Log(IND) +b 
Semi Log DEP =a* Log (IND) +b 
Log Inverse Log (DEP) =a*(I/ IND) +b 
HvmTWlic DEP =a*(I/ IND) +b 
Note: DEP (Dependent variable) IND (Independent Variable) Log (Natural Logarithm) 
Similar to the methods employed in section 7.4, two criteria were used to select the best 
models: models with the highest explanatory that have fulfilled the assumptions of OLS 
will be chosen. Yet, because of the functional form of the regression equations were not 
the same, the R sqaure values, which is used to compare the explanatory of the models, 
could not be compared directly. Instead, the R square statistics have to be transformed 
so that the dependent variables have the same functional form (Gujarati, 1992). Results 
of the regression analysis are presented in table 8.1 (with the R sqaure statistics already 
transformed so that they were comparable). The aim of this exercise is to identify the 
functional form of a regression model that fit the data most so that it can be used for the 
analysis in subsequent non-linear regression model. The double log models produced 
the highest fit in both gross and net income to housing cost in which about a third of the 
variation of the data relating gross income and gross housing cost and more than half the 
variation in net income and net housing cost could be "explained" (in a statistical sense) 
by the respective models. 
These are not surprising results given the log-normal distribution of both income and 
housing cost. Thus the double log model can be considered for further analysis. It is 
also noteworthy that models involving net income and net housing cost in general 
explained more of the variation than the corresponding models relating gross income 
and gross cost. It suggests that net income is a better determinant of net income than 
gross income to gross housing cost. This is contrary to the higher explanatory power of 
gross housing cost to income ratio in chapter seven where gross ratio is a better 
determinant than net ratio of the poverty status of a household. 
198 
Table 8.2 Repression Models: Household Income and Housing Cost 
Dependent Variable Gross Cost Net Cost 
Independent Variable Gross Inc(xne Net Income 
Functional Fonn R Sq Beta R Sq beta 
Linear 0.34 0.55 0.51 0.62 
Double Log 0.35 0.59 0.55 0.74 
Semi Log 0.21 0.52 0.43 0.60 
Log Inverse 0.28 -0.53 0.50 -0.71 
Hyperbolic 0.34 -0.42 0.26 -0.48 
Note: Refer to Table 8.1 for the exact functional form of the regression equation, 
R sq (R Square, have bow transfivmed to comparable forms), 
Beta (Standardised regression coefficient) 
All regression coefficients were significant at 5% confident level, N= 4272 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Whilst R square is a commonly used reference of the goodness of the fit of a regression 
model and can be used to compare the explanatory power between models, the R square 
statistic is easily distorted by the existence of extreme values and deviations from OLS 
assumptions. Thus, an inspection of the distribution of residuals and the violation of 
OLS assumption is necessary. Detailed analysis of the plots of residuals of regression 
against income suggested that there existed extreme outliers for most of the models, but 
none was serious enough to exert a significant distortion on the R square value. On the 
other hand, many models exhibited evidence of heteroscedasticity in which the variance 
of the residuals were not constant throughout the range of the explanatory variable (see 
Appendix A8). The double log models were the exceptions whereas the sign of 
heteroscedasticity was the least (Figure 8.3, figure 8.4) and the distribution of the 
residuals were relatively random with reference to income. 
The test of normality of the residual, which is vital to the validity of the inference 
statistics, was conducted by the normal probability plots of residuals, in which the 
distribution of the residual normal distribution. If the distribution is normal, the 
expected cumulative probability is close to the expected cumulative probability. 
Amongst the various models, only the double log models passed the test (figure 8.5, 
figure 8.6). Hence, the double log models will be chosen for further analysis in the 
subsequent sections. A description of the assumptions of OLS, together with the test 
for residual distribution and normal probability plots are presented in appendix A8. 
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Double Loia Model 
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8.6 DETAILED ANALYSIS: NON-LINEAR REGRESSION 
MODELS 
As revealed in the section 8.5, the double log models were considered to be the most 
appropriate function form relating income to housing cost. These models produced the 
highest explanatory power as well as the least extent of deviation from OLS 
assumptions. To examine whether there exists an inflection point in the regression 
function, the variables (housing cost and income) have to be restored to their original 
form. This is done by reversing the process of linearisation in section 8.5. A double log 
function could then be backwardly transformed to a power function relating income and 
housing cost in their original forms (equation 8.1): 
Log r. aLog x+ b( Do" Log Modd ) 
Log T- Log(b1. XIO) ( Reonming ) 
T. b,. x. ( And-4 ) 
8.1 
Based on the assumptions outlined in section 8.4, an inflection point is presumed to have 
divided the data into two portions. To reduce the burden of complex computation, the 
regression models fitting these two portions are also assumed to be having the same 
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functional form but with different parameters. The power function is then re-arranged 
to aflow for the expression of the two phase regression function divided by the inflection 
point X0. (equation 
8.2): 
if X<X8 &m r-b, *Xgd 
VX2A OMn r' b2*Xa7 ( T" Aoh" Model 8.2 
Since the function is continuous at the inflection point X0 (referred to as the joint point), 
this property can be incorporated into the two phase regression model so that upon a 
suitable re-arrangement, the value of the inflection point X0 can be included as one of the 
parameters in the equation. Then whether a two phase model exists and the location of 
the inflection point can be assessed by evaluating whether the parameters C and X0 are 
not significantly equal to zero. If either of the values equals zero, the inflection point 
does not exist in the given model. This is not only a more convenient way to evaluate 
the inflection point, but also the only means by which the confidence levels of the 
inflection point, i. e. the significance of the parameter, can be assessed directly from the 
model (equation 8.3). 
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8.3 
Non-linear regression (NLR) procedure in SPSS VAX/VMS V4.0 was used to evaluate 
the model in equation 8.3. In NLR procedure, unlike regression with OLS, the initial 
value of the parameters, which should be reasonably close to the actual value, have to be 
supplied by the investigator and these initial values are vital to the final evaluation. The 
initial values were obtained from two preliminary exercises which are described in more 
detail in Appendix Al I together with the technical details of Non-linear Regression 
analysis. 
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In NLR, there are no corresponding inference statistics similar to the Mest and F test in 
OLS regression for testing, respectively, the significance level of individual parameters 
and the joint hypothesis that all parameters except the intercept are zero. Only the 
confidence intervals of the parameters can be estimated (not the exact interval but only 
an estimate). The parakneter is regarded as being significantly different from zero at 5% 
confidence level, in other words, it is a "significant" explanatory variable, if zero is not 
included in the 95% confidence intervals of the parameter. In addition, evaluation of the 
NLR parameters relies on iteration alogarithm and it is common that no definite value 
can be reached, especially when a poor initial value is supplied. Thus, a fitted model 
may fail to be established because of the non-convergence of the parameters. 
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Results of the parameter estimation of the NLR models, Model N, (equation 8.4) and 
Model N2(equation 8.5) with reference respectively to gross and net housing cost in 
relation to their corresponding income definitions are presented in table 8.3. The two 
models can converge and confidence intervals of all the parameters can be estimated (i. e. 
all parameters were significant at 5% confidence level). 
Table 8.3 Non-linear Re Cost by Income 
Model Model N, Model N, 
Dependad Variable Gross Housing Cost Net Housing Cost 
Explanatory Variable Gross Income Net Income 
A 6.07* 0.56* 
B 0.42* 0.87* 
c 0.20* -0.19* 
X0 335 196 
Ratio at X0 20.6% 27.6% 
R Sauarc About Mean 0.30 0.38 
Note: * p<0.05 N= 4272 X0 Inflection Point 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
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The inflection point for Model N, was located where gross income equals L334 per 
week with a corresponding gross housing cost of 169 per week whilst the corresponding 
figures for Model N2were f 196 per week and E54 per week. Figure 8.7 shows the 
predicted values of housing cost in relation to household income. It can be seen that 
gross cost rose more rapidly than net cost before the inflection point was reached, whilst 
beyond the inflection point, it was net income that rose more quickly. This description 
seems to match what would happen in a real situation. Because housing benefit helps 
mainly the poor, it thus assists in boosting the gross housing cost of poor households 
relative to gross income but has little effect on net housing cost or net income until 
housing benefit begins to be withdrawn. 
Under a progressive tax system, the higher the income level, the greater the difference 
between gross income and net income. Wealthier households with income beyond the 
inflection point should not be benefiting from housing benefit and thus their gross and 
net housing costs should be the same. For such households, with a reduced net income, 
net housing costs would appear to be increasing faster, relative to net income, than the 
increase of gross housing cost relative to gross income. 
Figure 8.7 Predicted values: NLR analysis of Gross and Net Housing Cost 
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To keep in line with current debates on affordability, it is more appropriate to express 
the threshold value in terms of a housing cost to income ratio. It is fixed as the housing 
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cost to income ratio at the inflection points. Hence, the cut-off gross housing cost to 
income ratio was 20.6% and the net ratio 27.6%. The level of these two cut-off ratios 
seems to be counter-intuitive, nor did they match with results of previous analysis. First, 
all previous analysis showed that the level of gross ratio for a household was in general 
higher than the net ratio, but in this analysis, the cut-off for gross ratio is lower than the 
net ratio. Second, these cut-off ratios would have included more households in 
unaffordable housing than is regarded as reasonable. 
Twenty nine percent of households were classified as being in unaffordable housing 
when assessed by residual income measurement in chapter six whilst in chapter seven, 
25% of households were deemed to be in unaffordable housing with reference to their 
gross housing cost to income ratio and the threshold ratio established by the composite 
ratio measurement. In this chapter the threshold ratios established by the behavioural 
approach would put over half (54%) of the households in unaffordable housing, if 
measured by their gross ratio. The corresponding figure for net ratio was at the lower 
level of 3 5%. If half of all households were in unaffordable housing, the level of public 
concern should have been high. 
Apparently, these two threshold ratios were considered to have included too many 
households in unaffordable housing, which did not correspond with the scenario 
presented by previous analyses. Thus, whether this threshold level is actually 
overestimating the problem of affordability has to be subjected to further validation. 
However, it was observed in chapter five that housing cost to income ratio varied 
considerably between households with different characteristics. Thus, it is also 
worthwhile to explore the necessity of establishing Merent cut-off ratios for households 
with different characteristics. The steps taken in chapter six are a useful reference for 
this chapter. First, identifying whether there exists a single most influential characteristic 
can simplify the task of establishing separate cut-off ratios by concentrating only on sub- 
categories of the dominant characteristics. Second, the process of establishing cut-off 
ratios win be replicated among the sub-group with the influential characteristics, The 
final set of cut-off ratios will then depend on the results of these steps. 
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8.7 HOUSING COST AND INCOME: MULTIVARIATE, 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
To examine the relative effect of the socio-economic characteristics on housing cost, it 
is necessary to conduct a multivariate regression analysis. However, evaluating a NLR 
model involving many parameters is a painstaking process because of the complexity 
involved in fixing and fine-tuning the initial value of the parameters. To simplify the 
investigation, the "linearised" model was used for the multivariate regression analysis. 
In section 8.5, the double log models were those with the highest explanatory power as 
well as with the least violation of OLS assumptions; this functional form was also used 
in the multivariate analysis. Models were constructed using OLS method and the 
stepwise procedure was used for model selection with the criterion of inclusion at 0.05 
and exclusion at 0.1. Parameters of the two models, relating respectively gross and net 
housing cost with their corresponding income definitions and the selective socio- 
economic characteristics, are presented in table 8.4. 
Household income, tenure, region, housing benefit, employment status of head of 
household, age of head of household, household size and dependent children were all 
significant determinants of housing cost. Type of household was significant in 
determining net housing cost but was insignificant for gross cost. 
Although housing cost relate to an array of household and housing characteristics, 
income was by far the most influential. Gross income alone could account for over one 
third of the variation in the data whilst the rest of the characteristics in the model could 
only improve the explanatory power of the model by another ten percent. The 
contribution of net income was even more dominating. It alone accounted for over half 
of the variation in the model whilst the rest of the significant factors only accounted for 
a ftirther nine percent. This indicates that the contribution of the other characteristics 
was limited. 
Next to income, tenure was the most important variable in the determination of gross 
housing cost; however, regarding net housing cost housing benefit was more important. 
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Nevertheless, tenure was the third most influential factor for net housing cost. Age of 
the head of household, household size and the numbers of dependent children were also 
important for both models. This suggests that both the effect of life cycle and household 
composition are important to housing cost. On the contrary, type of household was 
insignificant for gross housing cost. This is because other factors, such as household 
composition, represent variation of household type. Type of household was significant 
in net housing cost, probably because of the large contrast between the net cost of 
housing for lone parents compared with other types of household. 
Employment status of head of household was significant in both models, but the 
influence was larger for gross housing cost than for net cost. This is in part because of 
the relatively influential effect of housing benefit which could represent variations in 
employment status. 
Regional variation was only marginally significant in both models. Its effect was 
particularly weak for net housing cost because housing benefit had already levelled out 
many of the differences in housing cost between regions. 
Table 8.4 Multivariate Regression: Housing Cost by Income and Socio-economic 
Parameter Beta Beta 
income (Gross/Net) (Log) 0.54** 0.50** 
tenure 
Local Authority Tenants -0.23** 
Housing Association Tenants -0.10** -0.05** 
Private Tenants (Unfurnished) -0.09** -0.04** 
Private Tenants (Furnished) -0.06** -0.05** 
Mortgagors 0.0or 0.0or 
Region 
North -0.05** elim 
Yorkshire and Humberside -0.03** elim 
North West -0.04** elim 
East Midlands elim elim 
West Midlands elirn elim 
East Anglia elim elim 
London 0.10** 0.07** 
South East 0.09** 0.08** 
South West 0.0or 0.0or 
Household Tvpe 
married Couple elim Ohm 
Single Person elim 0.03* 
Lone Parent elim -0.05** 
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Table 8.4 Multivariate Regression: Housing Cost by Incom and Socio-economic 
characteristics 
Dependent Variable Gross Housing Cost Net Housing Cost 
Others elim 0.00r 
Size of Household . 0.07* -0.10** 
Employment Status 
Full Time -0.08** 0.04** 
Part Time -0.03* elim 
Unemployed/Reored 0.0or 0.0or 
Age of HoH 
Under 30 0.14** 0.08** 
30-39 0.16** 0.08** 
40-49 0.05* elim 
50-59 -0.04* -0.06** 
60 and Over O. Oor O. Oor 
Child 0-4 0.05** 0.04* 
child 5- 15 0.04** 0.04* 
Housing Benefit Claimant -0.15** -0.21** 
Adjusted R Square 0.44 0.64 
F Statistics 168** 443** 
Note: Beta (Standardised Regression Coefficient) ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 r (reference group) 
efirn (eliminated) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
In order to contrast the results with those of Maclennan and colleagues (1990), the 
multivariate models were applied to tenure groups; results of the analysis are presented 
in tables 8.5 and 8.6. When these two models were applied to different tenure groups, 
there were fewer significant variables in the submodels for tenure groups than for the 
whole sample. The number of significant variables also decreased with the size of the 
subsample. There were nearly equal numbers of significant factors for mortgagees 
compared with the whole sample, but among housing association tenants there were 
only two significant factors. Because the number of significant factors were greatly 
reduced in the submodel for housing association tenants, the level of R square was also 
lower. 
The smaller sample size and fewer significant variables were not unrelated. Forced entry 
of all variables indicates that there were a number of unselected variables (which failed 
to reach the criteria of inclusion or exclusion) with magnitude of the regression 
coefficient comparable to the selected variable. But at the same time, they had a larger 
standard error and were therefore excluded from the model selected by the stepwise 
method. Since standard error increases as the size of the sample decreases, more 
variables in models of smaller samples would be more likely to fail the inclusion test. 
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Table 8.5 Multivariate Regression: Gross Housing Cost by Gross Income and Socio-economic 
Characteristics bv Tenure 
Dependent Variable Gross Housing Cost 
Tenure/ Beta LA RA PRSU PRSF MORTG 
Gross Income (Log) 0.41** elim. 0.39** 0.54** 0.41 
Region 
North elim elim. -0.14* elim -0.06** 
Yorkshire and Humberside elim elim, elim elim -0.05** 
North West elim elim elim elim 0.04* 
East Midlands elim elim. elim elim elim 
West Midlands 0.06* elim elim elim elim 
East Anglia elim elirn ehm elim elim 
London 0.23** elim elim -0.17** 0.11 ** 
South East 0.14** elim Clim elim 0.12** 
South West r r r r r 
Household Twe 
married Couple elim elim elim -0.17* elim 
Single Person elim elim. elim -0.34** elim 
Lone Parent 0.13** elim. elim elim elim 
Others r r r r r 
Size of Household 0.19** 0.25** ohm elim 
Employment Status 
Full Time elim. elim elim, elim -0.06** 
Part Time elim elim ehm ehm elim 
Unemployed/R ýhred r r r r r 
Age of HoH 
Under 30 -0.09** elim. 0.24** elim 0.29** 
30-39 -0.06** elim 0.21** elim 0.29** 
40-49 elim elim elim elim 0.14** 
50-59 chm elfin elim elim elim 
60 and Over r r r r r 
Child 0-4 elim elim elim elim 0.06** 
child 5- 15 elim. 0.25** elim elim elim 
Housing Benefit Claimant 0.18** elim 0.19* 0.22** elim 
Adjusted R Square 0.31 0.19 0.24 0.52 0.31 
F Statistics 57** 20** 14** 43** 105** 
Note: Beta (Standardised Regression Coefficient) ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 r (reference group) 
elim (eliminated) LA (Local Authority) HA (Housing Association) PRSU (Private Renting 
Unfignishod) PRSF (Private Renting Furnished) MORTG (Mortgagor) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Table 8.6 Multivariate Regression: Net Housing Cost by Net Income and Socio-economic 
Characteristics bv Tenure 
Dependent Variable Net HousinR Cost 
Tenurc/Beta LA HA PRSU PRSF MORTG 
Net Income (Log) 0.36** 0.27** 0.42** 0.66** 0.48** 
Region 
North chm clim -0.16** chm -0.37* 
Yorkshire and Humberside chm elim clim clim efirn 
North West chm chm clim elim elirn 
East Nfidlands elim chm chm elijm elim 
West Nfidlands elim clim chm elim clim 
East Anglia chm elim clim clim elim 
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Table 8.6 Multivariatc Regression: Net Housing Cost by Net Income and Socio-economic 
Characteristics bv Tenure 
Dependent Variable Net Housing Cost 
Tenure/Eleta LA HA PRSU PRSF MORTG 
London 0.07** elim chm elim 0.11** 
South East 0.07** clim elfin clim 0.13** 
South West chm ehm Chm clim elim 
Household Jýý 
married Couple elim Chm elim elim Clim 
Single Person -0.13** elim elim elim ohm 
Lone Parent elim elim effin 0.11* -0.6** 
Others elim elim elim elim elim 
Size of Household elim elim elim elim -0.15** 
Employn=t Status 
Full Time elim elim elizn clim elim 
Pan Time CHM elim elixn elim ehm 
Unemployod4tetired efim elim efim elim elim 
A-ge of HoH 
Under 30 -0.04* elim elim elim 0.25** 
30-39 -0.05** elim elim elim 0.25** 
40-49 elim elim elim elim 0.11** 
50-59 elim elim elim elim elim 
60 and Over CHM elim elim elim elim 
Child 0-4 elim OHM CHM elim 0.10** 
child 5- 15 elim elim elim elixn 0.09** 
Housing Benefit Claimant -0.44** -0.53** -0.34** -0.27** elim 
Adjusted R Square 0.62 0.53 0.50 0.65 0.36 
F Statistics 265** 95** 68** 123** 122** 
Note: Beta (Standardised Regression Coefficient) ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 r (reference group) 
efirn (eliminated) LA (Local Authority) 
HA (Housing Association) PRSU (Private Renting Unfurnished) PRSF (Private Renting 
Furnished) MORTG (Mortgagor) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Nevertheless, there is still valuable information that can be drawn from the sub-models. 
First, it is interesting to observe that neither gross income nor housing benefit were 
significant in determining the gross housing cost of housing association tenants. On the 
contrary, household size and presence of school age children were the only important 
factors. The explanatory power of this model was so small that these two factors were 
of no help in explaining the variation of gross housing cost among housing association 
tenants. 
Second, housing benefit was a more important factor than net income in the 
determination of net housing cost amongst tenants. It is a reiteration of the importance 
of the housing benefit system in this sector. In fact, this influence was particularly 
strong among housing association tenants and tenants who rented unfurnished 
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accommodation from a private landlord. Among housing association tenants, housing 
benefit was the only other factor which was significant in the determination of net 
housing cost beside net income. Yet, it does not mean that housing association tenants 
were very special compared with tenants in other sectors, because the other significant 
factors in the models involving other tenants had a relatively small influence. The 
exceptions were single person households among local authority tenants, the north 
region for private tenants in the unfurnished sector and lone parent households for 
private tenants in the fiu-nished sector. These factors had a relatively stronger influence 
albeit they were not comparable with the influence of housing benefit. 
Moreover, the analysis conducted in this section contrasted with the regression models 
investigated by Maclennan and colleagues (1990) and supports the comment made in 
section 8.2 on Maclennans models. First, it was confirmed that housing benefit is a 
strong determinant of housing cost. Arrival at this conclusion is only possible if housing 
benefit is one of the explanatory variables. Even if housing benefit is a relatively more 
significant determinant, other socio-economic factors can still account for some of the 
variation. Thus it is difficult to separate out the effects of housing benefit and socio- 
economic factors per se. it is thus premature to judge from the influence of socio- 
economic factors alone, as was the case in Maclennan's model, on the importance of 
housing benefit. 
Second, tenure was established as being the most influential factor besides income. 
However, the contribution of a particular variable in a regression model can only be 
conditional upon the presence of other variables. It was demonstrated that when similar. 
variables were applied to separate tenure groups the results can vary enormously. In 
fact, nothing relating to the contribution of tenure can be derived from information from 
submodels in different tenure groups because tenure has not been compared with the 
other variables in the regression models. Therefore its effect relative to other variables 
is unknown. 
Third, the relation of income and housing cost was demonstrated as being non linear. 
Therefore, the linear models constructed by Maclennan and colleagues (1990) may not 
have been a correct description of the relationship. Therefore they could have suffered 
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from the problem of heteroscedasticity. Meanwhile, the increased explanatory power of 
the double log models analyzed in this chapter, together with the absence of OLS 
assumption violation in such models, provide indirect evidence of a lack of fit of their 
linear models. Compared with the results of Maclennan! s linear models, the explanatory 
power of the double log models in this chapter could explain more than two thirds of the 
variation of net housing cost, which is a good model when contrasted with the poor fit 
by Maclennan and colleagues (1990). 
8.8 CUT-OFF RATIO BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Multivariate analysis in the preceding section showed that there was no single 
characteristic, apart from income, which was more influential than any other in 
determining housing cost in both models. Tenure was more important in determining 
gross housing cost, but housing benefit was more important for net housing cost. 
In the absence of a single significant variable, and proceeding with the analysis with 
caution, it is appropriate to explore the cut-off ratios for each of the important socio- 
economic characteristics. Non-linear regression models were constructed for a sub- 
sample of households with different characteristics using the same method as described 
earlier in this section and the parameters of the models were presented in tables 8.7 and 
8.8. One noticeable feature is that the majority of models fail to establish significant 
values for all the parameters. Although it is common in regression analysis for one or 
more parameters in a model to fail to establish a value significantly different from zero, 
the model can still be valid with the remaining significant parameters. A similar situation 
in non-linear regression, especially regarding the models in this section, creates 
confusion. 
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Table 8.7 Non-linear Regression: Housing Cost by Income by socio-economic Characteristics 
(Model NJ 
Dependent Variable: Gross Housing Cost Indep endent variable: Gross Income 
Parameter A B C X. Ratio % 
All households 6.1* 0.4* 0.2* 335* 20.6 
Tenure 
Local Authority Tenants 1.6ns 0.7* -0.6* 96* na 
Housing Association Tenants 10.5* 0.3* -0.3* 177* 28.4 
Private Tenants (Unfurnished) 6.2* 0.4* -2. Ons 520* na 
Private Tenants (Furnished) 7. Ons 0.4* 0.3* 355* na 
Mortgagors 6.6* 0.4* 0.2* 581* 16.5 
Age of Householder 
Under 30 5.2* 0.5* 0.04ns 164ns na 
30-39 6.5* 0.4* 0.3* 342* 19.7 
40-49 4.4* 0.5* 2.0* 1543* 9.1 
50-59 8.0* 0.4* 0.3* 586* 15.5 
60 and Over l6ns 0.3ns 0.3ns 288ns na 
Housing Benefit 
Claimants 1.4ns 0.6* 0.2* 92* na 
Non-claimants 5.6* 0.3* 0.2* 460* 17.2 
Note: * p<0.05 ns Not Significant na Not Applicable Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Table 8.8 Non-linear Regression: Housing Cost by Income by socio-economic, Characteristics 
Dependad Variable: Net Housing Cost Ind ependent variable: Net Income 
Parmeter A B X. Ratio % 
All households 0.6 0.9 -0.2 196 27.6 
Tenure 
Local Authority Tenants 0.7* 0.8* -0.58 181* 22.6 
Housing Association Tenants 2.1* 0.6* -I. Ons 427* na 
Private Tenants (Unfurnished) 0.7ns 0.9* -0-3ns 123ns na 
Private Tenants (Furnished) I. Ons 0.8* 0.03ns 190ns na 
Mortgagors 4.7ns 0.5ns 0.2ns 67ns na 
Under 30 0.6* 0.9* -2* 564* 25.9 
30-39 0.4ns 0.9* -0.2ns, 207* na 
40-49 2.2* 0.6* 1.1* 988* 13.9 
50-59 0.2ns 1.1* -0.4ns 196* na 
609 and Over 0.7ns 0.8* -0.4* 753* na 
Housing benefit 
Claimants 0.7* 0.7* -0.6* 188* 24.2 
Non-claimants 4.5ns 0.7ns 0.2ns 67ns na 
Note: * p<0.05 ns Not Significant na Not Applicable 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
First, parameters in NLR are evaluated by the iteration alogarithm. A parameter is said 
to have been established only if successive iterations converge within a range preset by 
the investigator. Thus, a value for a Parameter cannot be established if fail to converge. 
Such non-convergence may only relate to inadequacy in the iteration process. 
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Second, aH parameters in these NLR models were closely linked with each other and if 
one was established as zero, the model would colIapse. For example, if the parameter A 
is zero, the expected value of the whole model would be zero. Meanwhile, if C was 
zero then the presence of a two phase model would be overturned and X0 should 
simultaneously be zero. Conversely, the same situation would apply to C ifXo was zero. 
Third, the failure to establish significant parameters might reflect the inadequacy of the 
assessment procedure used. The confidence level was evaluated with the asymptotic 
method which relies on a large sample. Small sample size would jeopardise the accuracy 
of estimation. Another method, the bootstrap method, was used to increase the 
accuracy of estimation. This generates a large number of random sub-samples so that 
the evaluation of the confidence levels can be evaluated numerically. However, it 
demands considerably more computer time, and so is constrained by both the time and 
the resources allowed by the research. 
In addition, successfid evaluation of a significant parameter relates to the quality of the 
initial values supplied. This quality can be improved by a more systematic 
experimentation, although this is a time consuming task. Limitation of time and 
computer resources made this tedious task prohibitively costly. The majority of models 
failed to establish a significant cut-off ratio, therefore the use of the ratios of the 
remaining models as reference ratios is not practicable. 
8.9 SUMNMRY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A behavioural approach to affordability is a viable alternative to the commonly used 
normative approach which has dominated the measurement of affordability since the 
concept was developed. The normative approach, although it is alleged to be 
authoritative, has not been developed on a scientific basis. The use of a behavioural 
measurement approach may not possess similar status to the normative approach, but it 
can provide an independent validation of the threshold affordability level established by 
the normative approach. 
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Investigation of affordability from the behavioural perspective, generally, can be 
approached along two fines. The first approach is to look at the actual spending of a 
household on housing and to relate this spending level to income and other household 
socio-economic characteristics. Alternatively, households having difficulty in paying for 
housing or experiencing financial stress can also be regarded as indicators of 
unaffordability. 
There are a number of empirical studies following similar lines of investigation but none 
make specific reference to the fixing of non-arbitrary threshold affordability levels. 
Without prior experience in the attempt to fix affordability levels from a behavioural 
perspective, it is essential to seek help from examples of a similar discipline. The S- 
curve technique in the poverty literature is regarded as an appropriate example, albeit it 
has shortcomings such as the lack of strong theoretical backing and technical 
sophistication to provide confirmative results. 
in adopting this technique in the investigation of the threshold level of affordability, the 
variation of housing among households was examined in relation to household income. 
The inflection point in such a relationship, which indicates a qualitative change of 
expenditure pattern, was regarded as the threshold affordability level. It was then 
converted to housing cost to income ratio to render it in line with current affordability 
debates. 
Technicaffy, in using this S-curve method, one improvement has been made. Instead of 
assessing the inflection by the crude and over-simplified pencil and paper method, the 
inflection point was determined by the non-linear regression technique on a fast 
computer. Unlike the use of aggregate data in previous attempts, it does not only make 
use of all the information in the data, but can also provide a statistical estimation of the 
degree of accuracy of the threshold level. The process was technically complicated and 
required the facilitation of other graphic and statistical procedures. 
Unfortunately, the threshold values evaluated were unsatisfactory. The threshold 
housing cost to income ratio was so low that it consequently included the majority of 
households in unaffordable housing, which is regarded as unreasonable. In addition, the 
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threshold gross ratio was at a level lower than the net threshold ratio which contrasted 
with empirical evidence presented in earlier chapters, and poses difficulties in the 
interpretation of the results. Furthermore, the analysis in chapter seven has 
demonstrated the necessity of establishing different ratios for households with various 
socio-economic characteristics; a similar attempt was also conducted in this chapter. 
Despite the results in multivariate analysis which indicated that the influence of other 
socio-economic; characteristics was significant to housing cost, their magnitude was not 
comparable to that of income. Meanwhile, the attempt to establish threshold ratios for 
different socio-economic characteristics was unsuccessfid. This failure does not 
immediately warrant the dismissal of the S-curve method in affordability measurement, 
but may simply reflect the lack of time and computer resources to achieve the 
sophistication such methods require. 
Notwithstanding the unsuccessful empirical experimentation, it nevertheless has merit. 
First, it demonstrates a methodologically more sophisticated procedure in the 
investigation of threshold affordability ratio. Experience has been gained in this attempt, 
together with improvements in computational technique. It warrants another attempt. 
Second, the analysis in this chapter has revealed the shortcomings of an earlier empirical 
analysis by Maclennan and colleagues (1990) and helps to improve future similar 
investigations. 
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CHAPTER9 
THE INCIDENCE OF UNAFFORDABILITY 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding three chapters, the residual income measurement, the composite 
measurement and the behavioural approach to measuring affordability have been 
examined, with varied success, in establishing thresholds for affordability. These 
approaches produce different classification schemes in classifying affordability. This 
chapter will provide a summary of these schemes as well as comparing and contrasting 
the results produced by the schemes. Once the measurement schemes are established, 
several issues around housing affordability can be examined. It was found in previous 
chapters that affordability had a strong association with tenure, employment status and 
housing benefit, as well as an apparent relationship with life cycle effect. Whilst analysis 
in the previous chapter could only reflect individual components of such effects, this 
chapter is able to provide a more holistic analysis at the multivariate level. Logit 
modelling and categorical principal component analysis will be employed in this analysis. 
Housing consumption pattern is also believed to be affected by affordability. The 
burden exerted by high housing costs among households in unaffordable housing could 
have an undesirable effect on their other consumption. This chapter will use principal 
component analysis and logistic regression to examine the relationship between 
household expenditure and housing affordability. 
Finally, it is argued that housing quality should be an important component in 
affordability measurement. Whilst previous discussion on the measurement issue 
deliberately ignored this aspect in order to make the development of measurement 
instruments less complicated, this chapter will examine the relationship between the 
quality of housing occupied and housing affordability in the light of the measurement 
schemes which were established in the preceding chapters. An attempt is made to 
examine the role of quality of housing in the measurement of affordability. 
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9.2 INCIDENCE OF UNAFFORDABILITY: A GENERAL 
PROFILE 
Three different approaches to measuring housing affordability have been examined in 
preceding chapters, although not all were capable of successfully determining threshold 
affordability values. Chapter six employed the residual income measurement, which is a 
normative approach, to assess the affordability of a household. Three models of residual 
income measurement were developed: Model R, using 140% of Income Support level as 
the reference poverty fine; Model R2, using half of average equivalised residual income 
as the poverty fine, and Model R3, a modified version of residual income measurement in 
which poverty was differentiated from housing unaffordability. 
In chapter seven, a composite approach to affordability was used which combined the 
ratio measurement with the residual income measurement to fix the threshold 
affordability ratio. It was found that only gross housing cost to income ratio was 
appropriate as an instrument of affordability measurement in this context, where 
separate threshold ratios had to be set for different tenures. This will be referred to as 
Model T. A summary of these four classification schemes is presented in table 9.1. 
Chapter eight demonstrated experimenting with a behavioural approach to affordability 
measurement, employing the S-curve technique to determine the threshold affordability 
ratio. However, after extensive and laborious manipulation of the data, no reliable 
threshold ratios could be established. Despite this failure, this approach still remains a 
powerful instrument of investigation, given that the resources spent on this 
computational-intensive procedure could be increased. 
Table 9.1 Classification Schemes of Housing Affordability 
Scheme T Gross housing cost to income ratio higher than the cut off ratio in the 
corresponding tenure moup established by the composite method 
LA HA PRS-Unf PRS-Fur Mortgagor 
27% 29% 32.5% 41.5% 45% 
Scheme R, Residual income less than 140% of the income support entidement relevant to the 
-given 
household 
Scheme R, Equivahscd residual income lower than half the national average 
Scheme R3 Equivalisod Income before housing cost higher that half the national average but 
eauivalised income after housine cost lower then half the national average 
Note: LA ( Iocal Audxr4 Tenants ) HA ( Housing Association Tenants) PRS-Unf ( Private Rented 
unfi, mished ) PRS-Fur (Private Rented Furnished ) 
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Although the successful implementations were based on different assumptions and 
strategies, they show a high degree of agreement in classification. It was demonstrated 
in chapter six that Scheme R, and Scheme R2 already had a high degree of concordance 
at 97%. The degree of agreement between these schemes and Scheme T was also high. 
Scheme T agreed with either Scheme R, or R2 in 90% of classifications. 
However, the schemes agreed with each other more in the "affordable" groups than in 
the "unaffordable" groups. Whilst the highest agreement of classification in the 
"affordable" group was 98% (between R, and R2), agreement in the "unaffordable" 
group was at the more moderate level of 76% (between Schemes T and R, ). 
Nevertheless, around 7% of households regarded as affordable by Scheme T were 
considered unaffordable by either Scheme R, or R2, both being residual income 
measurements. Conversely, around 4% of households classified as unaffordable by the 
ratio measurement were classified as affordable by the residual income measurement. A 
Kapper test (Refer to Appendix A4 for technical details of the kappa test), indicated that 
this agreement was statistically significant (table 9.2). 
Table 9.2 Agreement of Affordability Measurements 
% of Households Scheme T Scheme R, Scheme R, 
Aff Unaff Aff Unaff Aff Unaff 
Scheme T Aff 75 68 7 69 6 
Unaff -- 25 3 22 4 21 
Concordance 100% 90 90 
Kappa -- 0.76 0.74 
t value -- 49.9 48.8 
Scheme R, Aff 68 3 71 -- 70 1 
Unaff 7 22 -- 29 3 27 
Concordance 90 100 97 
Kappa 0.76 -- 0.91 
t value 49.9 na 79.8 
Scheme R3 Aff 69 4 70 3 73 0 
Unclassified 0.3 0.1 0.2 0 0.3 0 
Unaff 38 .7 11 0 11 Poverty 3 13 0.1 16 0 16 
Note: Aff (Affordable) Unaff (Unaffordable) -- (Not Applicable) 
As revealed in chapter three, Hancock ( 1993) argued that there could be an anomaly in 
the measurement of housing cost to income ratio where households whose housing cost 
to income ratio was high could, by definition, be in unaffordable housing. These 
households could, at the same time, still have more resources after housing expenditure 
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than their counterparts who were considered to be in affordable housing. Evidence from 
the analysis in this section supports the existence of this, but the degree of such an 
anomaly was not high. Only 4% of households regarded as being in unaffordable 
housing by the ratio measurement were considered affordable by the residual income 
measurement. Thus, although by definition such an anomaly could exist, in reality such 
an anomaly was not more serious than the discrepancy between different residual income 
measurements based on different poverty lines. Hence, the validity of ratio measurement 
should not be undermined by this low level of anomaly but rather it may represent only 
the discrepancy between different affordability measurements. 
Scheme T showed a high degree of agreement between schemes R, and R2and, like 
these two later schemes, demonstrated a similar discrepancy to the modified residual 
income measurement scheme R3. Only 8% of households classified as being in 
unaffordable housing by scheme T were in unaffordable housing under scheme R3while 
the majority (14%) were reclassified as being in poverty. If scheme R3was used as a 
yardstick, scheme T was unable to differentiate successfully between households which 
were unaffordable because of high housing cost from households which were 
unaffordable because of poverty. The proportion of households reclassified as in 
poverty in scheme T was similar to the proportions in scheme R, and scheme R2. 
Not only did the overall classification for schemes T, R, and R2match with each other, 
but the distribution of socio-economic characteristics of households classified as 
founaffordable" by these three schemes were also similar. Social tenants, private tenants 
in the unfurnished rented sector, lone parents, single people, households with no 
dependent children, elderly people and households with unemployed or retired 
householders and housing benefit claimants were over-represented in the "unafFordable" 
group under schemes T, R, and R2; whilst home owners, married couple households, 
households with more than one person, middle aged householders, households with a 
working householder, those with school age children and non-claimants were under- 
represented. 
There was a difference in the regional distribution of unaffordability between the ratio 
measurement and the residual income measurement where households living in the 
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northern regions were in general more likely to be in unaffordable housing than 
households living in the south of the country, yet the regional difference was very small. 
The South East and London were the exceptions. Households living in the South East 
would have a very much lower chance of being in unaffordable housing, measured by 
schemes T, R, and R2, than the average. London, conversely, had considerably more 
households in unaffordable housing, measured by the housing cost to income ratio, 
though the level of households in unaffordable housing as measured by residual income 
was only about average. This reflects the situation of high housing cost in London 
where the wealthier households spend considerably more on housing, and thus had a 
high average housing cost to income ratio. Yet, these households had a higher amount 
of residual income left because of the more favourable initial financial situation. 
Conversely, the proportion of households which were claiming housing benefit in 
London were slightly higher than the national average, which also explains the slightly 
higher than average level of households in unaffordable housing in London under the 
residual income measurement. 
It is also noteworthy that one of the largest differences between households was the 
characteristic regarding households which were on housing benefit and those which 
were not. This pattern was consistent in all four measurement schemes T, R1, R2and R3. 
Housing benefit should have been so designed that claimants on full housing benefit 
were protected from the burden of high housing costs, yet the above evidence suggests 
that it did not offer the protection it should have provided. In addition, other household 
characteristics are associated closely with unaffordability: social tenants, unemployment, 
lone parents and the single elderly are closely linked with the characteristic of claiming 
housing benefit (table 9.3). 
This suggests the inadequacy of housing benefit in the protection of claimants from high 
housing cost and the failure to achieve one of its intended goals. Yet several arguments 
should be considered before reaching a definite conclusion. 
First, the definition of housing cost used in this thesis includes not only rent and 
mortgage interest payments but other related costs such as repair and maintenance, 
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because housing benefit only guaranteed claimants a minimum level of income after 
housing cost to the applicable amount (in most cases, the income support level) which 
was less than the poverty line used in scheme R,. 
Third, housing benefit is an endogenous variable in relation to the household's socio- 
economic variables that were considered in this section. Other household characteristics 
such as social tenants, unemployment, lone parents and the single elderly, which are 
typical attributes of housing benefit claimants, were also significantly related to housing 
unaffordability. In another word, housing benefit was acting only as a proxy to income 
and other household socio-econornic characteristics, upon which determine the eligibility 
of housing benefit claiming rather than housing benefit being an attributing factor to 
housing affordability. 
Yet there was a consistent pattern of inadequate protection of housing benefit against 
unaffordability demonstrated in alternative affordability measurements: the ratio 
measurement in Scheme T and the use of half average household income as the poverty 
fine in Scheme R2, provide support for such inadequacy to be real. There are several 
explanations for such inadequacy. First, it is only tenants who have fuH protection from 
high housing cost; home owners could only get support from social security if they were 
on income support, thus excluding home owners who are in employment. At the same 
time, only part of the housing cost is supported during the first sixteen weeks for new 
claimants on income support. Consequently, many home owners have to pay their 
housing cost, unsupported by social security, from other income sources and this 
reduces their level of residual income. 
Third, the problem of non-take-up contributes to this situation. Although a thorough 
analysis of take-up based on the FES is possible, it is not pursued in this thesis because 
of its complexity and the constraint of time. A preliminary analysis shows evidence of 
take-up as a problem. Among non-claimants who experienced unaffordable housing 
about a third had an income below the inaome support level, and the majority of this 
group were public or private tenants. Thus, around a fifth of households which were 
experiencing an unaffordability problem did not take up housing benefit for which they 
might be eligible. 
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The latter two factors relates to the functioning of the housing benefit system. Whether 
they are variables being able to offer distinct explanation of the incidence of 
unaffordability or whether the presence of the exogenous variables (the other socio- 
economic variables that determine housing benefit claiming) is enough to represent the 
effect of housing benefit needs further exploration. 
Table 9.3 Incidence of Unaffordability by Socio-Economic Characteristics by Classification 
Schemes 
% of Household Sch T Sch R, Sch EL, Scheme R, 
Unaff Unaff Unaff Poverty Unaff 
All 25 29 28 16 11 
Tenure 
Local Authority 58 63 58 39 19 
Housing Association 56 60 52 36 17 
Private Rented (Unfurnished) 43 45 40 22 18 
Private Rented (Furnished) 25 30 29 12 17 
Owned With Mortgage 7 11 11 4 7 
North 31 36 32 23 9 
Yorks & Humberside 28 35 32 22 to 
North West 26 33 30 20 11 
East Midland 24 30 29 17 12 
West Midlands 30 36 35 23 12 
East Anglia 20 26 25 15 10 
London 29 30 30 15 15 
South East 18 20 19 8 10 
South West 23 27 24 12 t2 
Household Type 
Married Couples 12 19 18 to 7 
Single Person 53 51 47 25 22 
Lone Parent 67 74 69 50 19 
Others 19 27 23 17 8 
Household Size 
I Person 53 51 47 25 22 
2 Persons 22 25 23 15 8 
3 persons 14 20 18 12 7 
4 Persons 11 20 19 11 8 
More dm 5 Persons 12 27 28 20 9 
Age of Head of Household 
Less 30 25 27 26 16 11 
30-39 14 19 19 11 8 
40-49 10 14 15 8 7 
50-59 19 21 21 14 7 
Over 60 57 64 55 32 23 
Em oyment Status of Head of Houwliold and Paliner 
Both Full Time 4 4 4 1 3 
Hoh FT Wife PT 4 6 7 1 5 
Hoh Fr Wife Unocc 9 14 14 5 to 
Holi PT Wife Fr 28 30 30 23 17 
Hoh PT Wife PT/Unocc 38 40 36 17 18 
Hoh Unocc Wife Fr/PT 60 66 61 38 23 
Both Unoccupied A1 72 65 46 20 
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Table 9.3 Incidence of Unaffordability by Socio-Economic Characteristics by Classification 
Housing Bencfit 
Claimants 75 82 78 24 54 
Note : Refer to Appendix 3 for abbreviations 
Source: Analvsis of FES 1991 
Most of the socio-economic characteristics, when considered individually, show some 
degree of association with the state of unaffordability, but they only represent isolated 
pictures of the relationship. To determine which household socio-economic or housing 
characteristics were more important in connection with housing affordability is not an 
easy task since the majority of the socio-economic characteristics are inter-related: for 
example, the unemployed and those on benefit were concentrated in the social rented 
sector, and elderly people were likely to be living alone. It is, therefore, not possible to 
isolate the relative importance of each characteristic and consider it individually. The 
next section examines the inter-relationship between socio-economic characteristics and 
affordability. Because the dependent variables, housing affordability, and many of the 
socio-economic characteristics are qualitative variables, a limit is placed on the choice of 
analytic tools. The particular analytic procedure selected, loglinear modelling, in turn 
sets a limit to the number of variables that can be involved. Thus, not all relevant 
characteristics can be investigated simultaneously in a single model. Subsequent analysis 
will focus on two issues around affordability and household socio-economic 
characteristics: first, between affordability, housing benefit, tenure and the employment 
status of the head of household; second, the effect of the life cycle on affordability. 
9.3 AFFORDABILITY, TENURE, HOUSING BENEFIT AND 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
It was found in the previous section that housing benefit was an important factor 
associated with unaffordable housing where an overwhelming majority of the households 
in unaffordable housing were also housing benefit claimants. However, a similar sharp 
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No Dependent Child 28 31 28 12 16 
Children Aged Under 5 No Child Aged 5-15 25 32 27 12 15 
No Child Under 5 Children 5-15 16 24 24 8 16 
Children Under 5 And Aged 5-15 17 32 33 13 19 
contrast was found between social tenants and home owners as well as between 
households which had double earners and those without a wage eamer. To examine the 
interaction between housing affordability and the household's socio-economic and 
housing characteristics, so as to identify the relatively more important characteristic 
attributing to affordability, a multivariate technique was employed. 
Regression analysis is a powerful tool for investigating a multivariate model which has 
been used in chapters six and seven. However, since the relevant dependent variable is 
housing affordability, which is a qualitative variable, able to take only a limited number 
of values, the use of OLS regression analysis is not appropriate. The alternative choice, 
logistic regression analysis, which was used in chapter six is also unsuitable because the 
explanatory variables are 0 qualitative. Therefore in this chapter it is necessary to 
resort to loglinear modelling and categorical principal component analysis as tools for 
investigation. 
The analysis of categorical variables relies, traditionally, on the use of contingency 
tables. When more than two variables are involved, conventional contingency table 
analysis is no longer capable of handling the complexity of the analysis. Loglinear 
modelling tackles the problem by expressing the marginal totals of a contingency table as 
a linear combination of the related cell frequencies. Using mathematical transformations 
and statistical manipulations, the relationship between the variables and the interaction 
between the variables in the model can be examined. The main focus of the examination 
is whether alternative models can be produced from a reduced number of variables 
without losing any statistically significant information. Given two models with the same 
degree of significance, the simpler model is always preferred. With this method, 
variables whose effect on the model are minimal are excluded in the final model. It is 
the interaction effect of variables, and whether the effect of a variable is "independent" 
of the effect of other variables present in the model, which is the focus of concern 
(Fienberg, 1977; SPSS, 1990b; Demaris, 1992). 
A variation of loglinear modelling, logit modelling, is used to investigate schemes T, R, 
and R2whilst hierachica I loglinear modelling will be used for scheme R3. Logit 
modelling is based on the same principal as loglinear modelling, but arranges the 
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variables so that one variable can be expressed as a linear combination of all the other 
variables. This is equivalent to the dependent variable which is used in other statistical 
analysis (SPSS, 1990b; Demaris, 1992). Only a dichotomous variable can be used in 
this way and thus only affordability in schemes T, R, and & can be used in logit 
modelling, whilst scheme R3has to use loglinear modelling. 
Despite the usefulness of loglinear modelling in the analysis of categorical variables, it 
places a limit on the number of variables which can be analysed. This is partly because it 
is cell frequencies in a continency table rather than individual case values which are used 
in the analysis, and empty cells in the continency table would hamper the evaluation of 
the model. This situation is inevitable if a large number of variables are involved. 
Another difficulty of using too many variables is the complexity of the interpretation of 
the final model. Since the focus of concern is the interaction effect between variables, 
the number of interaction terms would increase logarithmically with the increase in the 
number of variables. Too many interaction terms render the final model beyond 
comprehension. The implementation of logit and loglinear modelling was conducted on 
SPSS VAX/VMS V4 and the technical details of logit modelling are presented in 
Appendix A12. 
Although loglinear modelling is powerful in investigating the interaction between 
categorical variables, the effect of individual subgroups in a variable is not easy to 
understand. The effect of a subgroup is usually embedded in the complex web of 
interaction and the contribution of an individual subgroup can be far from apparent. 
Another technique, principal component analysis, can be used to facilitate the 
visualisation of the contribution of an individual subgroup. 
Principal component analysis is basically a dimension reduction technique. Its main 
purpose is to construct some new "variables" which largely represent the variation in the 
data with no significant loss of information. The new "variables", termed components in 
the analysis, are a linear combination of the original variables. It is so designed as to 
make the number of components the same as the number of variables so that the total 
variation of the variables can be exactly reproduced by the components. 
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To reduce the dimensionality of the data, a few "principal components" will be used 
instead of the complete set. Because the contribution of each variable is represented by 
the coefficient of that variable in the component function (the loading of that 
component), the relationship between variables can be visually represented by plotting 
the loadings of the variables of the most influential components on a graph (SPSS, 
1990b; Dunteman, 1989; Jolliffe, 1986). 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was first designed for numerical variables only. For 
use with categorical variables, the method has been modified to use a non-linear 
component function so that the effect of categorical variables can be accommodated 
(SPSS, 1990c; van de Geer, 1993). The non-linear PCA in this section and the 
conventional PCA in section 9.5 are implemented respectively by the PRINCAL and the 
FACTOR procedure on SPSS VAXIVMS V4 and a technical description of PCA is 
presented in Appendix A 11 
it has been shown in previous chapters that residual income, housing cost and housing 
cost to income ratio all varied considerably between housing benefit claimants and non- 
claimants where claimants were found to be likely to be experiencing unaffordable 
housing in section 9.2 of this chapter. However, reliance on housing benefit may in fact 
be a manifestation of other characteristics, for instance, participation in the labour 
market. Tenure is another influential factor. Not only were housing related benefits 
used difTerently by owners and tenants, but the level of housing cost varied between 
tenures. Thus, housing benefit, employment status and tenure are better considered 
simultaneously when assessing the effect on affordability of these factors. 
Table 9.4 shows the results of the logit models relating housing affordability, 
employment status of the head of the household, housing benefit and tenure for models 
T, R, and R2. Employment status was divided into subgroups of full time, part time and 
unemployed or unoccupied, which roughly represented the degree of involvement in the 
labour market. Housing benefit had two categories: claimants and non-claimants, but 
whether the claimants were on full benefit or not was not further differentiated. The 
simplest model for model T was that which involved the main effect of tenure, 
employment and housing benefit and the interaction between housing benefit and tenure. 
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For models R, and R2, beside the main effects, the interaction between employment and 
tenure which was significant. 
Table 9.4 Logit Models: Affordabdity by Tenure. Employ ment and Benefit 
Scheme Final Model G2 1) 
Scheme T [TBI M [31 [El 18.69 0.41 
Scheme & [TE] (T] [B] [El 19.72 0.14 
Scheme R, [TEI M [B] [El 20.04 0.13 
Scheme R, * FTEI M FBI fTBI 34.74 0.52 
Note: G' Likelihood Ratio Chi Square p Probability (T)enure (E)mployment (B)cnefit 
Hierarchical Loglinear Model Refer to appendix A 15 for the assessment of the final 
models 
These results indicate that the effect of all three variables, when considered singly, were 
significant. In other words, combining the effect of any two variables could not 
satisfactorily represent the effect of the third. Because of the exclusion of the 
interaction term, these effects were shown to be independent of each other. 
In scheme T, affordability not only varied between tenures but, given the same tenure, it 
was dependent on whether or not the household was on benefit. Since affordability in 
scheme T was measured in terms of gross housing cost to income ratio, it suggests a 
close relationship between the level of gross ratio with both tenure and housing benefit. 
it is not surprising, given the current system of housing benefit which buffers the impact 
of high housing cost on very poor households, and it is not uncommon for households 
on benefit to have a high housing cost to income ratio. It is the result of the differential 
impact of housing benefit on the numerator and denominator of the housing cost to 
income ratio formula which increases the numerator at a much faster rate. Thus, the 
higher the cost of housing for a claimant, the higher the subsidy will be. This leads to an 
increase in the gross housing cost to income ratio and, consequently, the dependency of 
the household on benefit. In schemes R, and R2, the basis for measuring affordability 
was residual income. For these two models, the interaction between employment status 
and tenure was the most important. This is because, given the importance of the level of 
earned income on the level of residual income, and the close relationship between 
employment status and the level of earned income, unearned income - for instance from 
housing benefit - would have no effect on the level of residual income. 
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The results also indicate the relative importance of tenure over the other two variables. 
Given the close relationship between employment status and housing benefit, it was 
expected that the interaction between these two would be great enough to represent the 
variation of other variables. However, in the event the variation of housing benefit and 
employment status between tenures was even more substantial. This reiterates the 
notion of the marginalisation of social tenants, not just in terms of their involvement in 
the labour market or their reliance on benefits, but also in their inferior housing 
affordability situation. 
Logit modelling cannot be applied to scheme R3because affordability in this scheme has 
more than two categories. Instead, hierarchical loglinear modelling was employed. The 
results of a backward selection indicate similar significant factors to those in schemes R, 
and R2. The final model for scheme R3was identical to the final models for schemes R, 
and R2, except for the three way interaction of benefit, tenure and employment". Hence, 
the relationship of the modified residual income measurement with tenure, employment 
and benefit was the same as the traditional residual income measurement. 
Whilst loglinear modelling has revealed, in the preceding paragraphs, an interaction 
between affordability, tenure, employment status and housing benefit, the relationship 
between individual categories of the characteristics could not be explicitly depicted. 
Principal component analysis (PCA), on the other hand, is capable of presenting, 
graphically, the contribution of individual categories by expressing the "weight" of each 
category in the two most important components. These two components, when put 
together, reproduce most of the variation in the original sample. 
Figure 9.1 to 9.8 show the category quantification of all categories of the relevant 
variables evaluated as multiple nominal variables individual category was treated as if it 
was separate variables). The relative positions of the individual categories in the first 
and second components indicate their relative contribution to the variation in the data as 
well as their similarity to each other. Categories closer to each other would imply their 
similar contribution to the first and second component (refer to appendix A 13 for more 
technical details). Figures 9.1 to 9.4 show the results of principal component analysis on 
affordability, tenure, housing benefit and employment for schemes T, R,, R2and R3. All 
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displayed a similar picture of the relationship between the four characteristics. In all 
four schemes the first component could explain three times as much of the variation in 
the data as component two (an eigen value of about 0.7 in component one as against 
about 0.25 in component two). 
The variables affordability, unaffordability, local authority tenants, home owners, full 
time employment and unemployed/unoccupied and housing benefit dominate the first 
component, indicating their influence on the variation in the data. This component could 
be explained as the contrast between deprivation and affluence: households which were 
likely to experience deprivation consisted of benefit claimants and the unemployed or 
unoccupied; regarding more affluent households: those whose heads were in full time 
employment were thus in possession of the resources necessary to support an acceptable 
standard of living. Households which were in affordable housing had a close association 
with the characteristics of households in the latter groups, while local authority tenants 
and those which could not afford housing were linked closely with the former group. 
The second component was the contrast between private tenants who were in the 
unfurnished sector and their counterparts in the fiumished sector. This component could 
account for the variation that was not represented by the first component. Categories 
which were heavily represented in the first component had a very small value in the 
second component. It indicates that these characteristics could be explained by the 
poverty-affluence component. Yet it accounted for hardly any of the variation among 
private tenants in the fin-nished sector, and little among private tenants in the unfin-nished 
sector, nor for households whose householder worked only part time. 
There were some underlying characteristics in this latter group that were distinct from 
the characteristics explained by the poverty-affluence attribute. Private tenants in the 
unfurnished sector, housing association tenants and part time workers were closer to 
unaffordability than home owners, whilst private tenants in the furnished rented sector 
had a relatively neutral affordability situation. Meanwhile, housing association tenants 
acquired relatively larger values on both components. This suggests that housing 
association and private sector tenancy did not have an obvious relationship with 
employment, affordability and benefit. 
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The relative positions of all the categories remained the same in scheme R3, with the 
exception of private tenants in the unfurnished sector, poverty and unaffordability. 
Unlike the category of unaffordability in the previous schemes, in which the first 
component satisfactorily represented variation in the data, poverty and unaffordability 
had to be represented by both components. Poverty and unaffordability were of the 
same sign in the first component, but differed in the second. This indicates that they 
were basically similar but with small differences. 
Whilst poverty was still close to households on benefit, local authority tenants and 
unemployed/unoccupied householders, it was not as close as the "unaffordability" 
categories in schemes T, R, and R2. On the contrary, "unaffordability" in scheme R3was 
further away from the position of unaffordability in the other scheme, and was closer to 
part time workers and private tenants. This suggests that the incidence of 
unaffordability was more likely to be observed in these groups than in the other groups. 
The distance between benefit and poverty was closer than the distance between benefit 
and unaffordability, indicating a simflarity between poverty and benefit. The position of 
private tenants in the unfinmished sector in the first component remained relatively the 
same compared with the other schemes, whilst the position in the second component had 
changed - probably because of its closeness to unaffordability, so that the position in the 
second component had to be altered correspondingly to the change in position of 
unaffordability. 
The results of the PCA do not contradict the results of the logit modelling earlier in this 
section. They demonstrated a Close relationship between tenure, employment, housing 
benefit and affordability. This relationship was consistent in an four measurement 
schemes. However, the PCA also indicated that in the ratio measurement scheme T and 
the two traditional residual income measurements R, and R2, private tenants, and 
households whose head of household worked part time and, to a certain extent, housing 
association tenants did not fit well with this pattern. 
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Figure 9.1 Principal Component Analysis: Affordability, Tenure, Employment Status 
and Housing Benefit (Scheme T) 
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Figure 9.2 Principal Component Analysis: Affordability, Tenure, Employment Status 
and Housing Benefit (Scheme RI) 
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Yet, under the modified residual income measurement, scheme R3, these groups came 
closer to the reclassified "unaffordable" group than local authority tenants, housing 
benefit claimants and households with unoccupied or unemployed householders. This 
suggests that private tenants and households with the householder working part time 
were in unaffordable housing because of the high cost of housing they had to pay and 
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not as a result of a lack of resources. It reflects the increasing housing cost in the 
private rented sector as a result of deregulation and the diverse situation of people 
working part time. 
Figure 9.3 Principal Component Analysis: Affordability, Tenure, Employment Status 
and Housing Benefit (Scheme R2) 
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Figure 9.4 Principal Component Analysis: Affordabi. lity, Tenure, Employment Status 
and Housing Benefit (Scheme R3) 
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9.4 AFFORDABILITY AND LIFE CYCLE EFFECT 
It was found in section 9.3 that the proportion of households in unaffordable housing 
varied between households of different household type, age of head of household and 
size of household, as well as presence of dependent children. Such factors constituted 
the dimensions of a fife cycle effect. Thus, the influence of the life cycle on affordability 
is worthy of investigation. One approach to examining the life cycle effect is through 
the concept of a fife cycle group, as proposed by Bradshaw and colleagues (1988), who 
employed the concept in the analysis of income distribution and income transfer within 
the fife cycle of a household. Eleven life cycle groups (Appendix A 16), which were 
intended to embrace "a progression of stages through which a household might pass" 
(Bradshaw et al 1988: 230), were defined. Whilst 88% of households were covered in 
the UK in Bradshaws sample, which was based on the 1996 FES, only 75% of the 
sampled households studied in this thesis were covered by the fife cycle groups 
(Appendix Al 6). 
The percentage of households in unaffordable housing is shown in table 9.5, with an 
apparent pattern of fife cycle effect on housing affordability. The "young singles", a 
period of "relative" want, had a lower than average chance of being in unaffordable 
housing. Households in this group were more likely to be in unaffordable housing 
owing to high housing cost rather than through a lack of resources. Those in the "young 
married" group, which was a period of "relative plenty", had the lowest chance of being 
in unaffordable housing. However, these two groups exhibited a higher chance of being 
in unaffordability on the ratio measurement, which reflected the high starting cost of a 
home owner's housing career and the pressure of market rent in the private rented 
sector. Progressing to the period of family formation and child rearing brought a higher 
pressure on housing affordability. Although the chance of being in unaffordability was 
slightly lower than average, it showed considerable deterioration compared with the 
young married group. Contrary to the situation of young single and young married 
households, the chance of the family formation and child rearing group being in 
unaffordability, as measured by the residual income measurement, was greater than it 
would have been by ratio measurement. This reflects both the lower income of these 
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two groups and their higher housing costs. These two groups also had a higher level of 
both "unaffordability" and "poverty" in scheme R3than the young married group. 
The affordability situation improved among households with middle aged householders. 
The Complete Family, Early Disposal and Two generation groups had the lowest levels 
of unaffordability, indicating the effect of increased earnings and a reduced burden of the 
children. However, there was some inconsistency between ratio measurement and 
residual income measurements for the Early Disposal group, probably due to sampling 
error, as the number of households in this group was very small. Thus, more 
information regarding the affordability situation of the "Early Disposal" group should be 
substantiated before any conclusion is drawn. Upon retirement, ageing households enter 
a period of relative need. Their afflordability situation deteriorated rapidly when the 
householders were retired so that when they reached old age and had to live alone, the 
overwhelming majority of them experienced unaffordable housing. They were also more 
likely to be in poverty than in unaffordability as measured by scheme R3, indicating a 
lack of resources among these households. 
in addition, lone parent households, which are supposed to be at odds with the 
principles of the life cycle classification, were included in the life cycle analysis because 
of their growing importance in contemporary British society. These households also 
showed a high incidence of unaffordability and, as with households in the later stage of 
their life cycle, exhibited a higher chance of being in poverty To determine the relative 
importance of the elements of the fife cycle effect in relation to affordability, analysis at 
the multivariate level was employed. In the course of analysis, some simplification had 
to be adopted: the age of head of household, household type and the composition of 
dependent children were used as a proxy for fife cycle effect. Although these factors 
could not reproduce the life cycle effect exactly, it was nevertheless possible to depict 
the relationships between the influential elements. 
Figures 9.5 to 9.8 show the results of the principal component analysis of schemes T, 
R,, R2and R3. The relative positions of the categories in all four schemes were very 
similar. The first component could be interpreted as the contrast between a single 
elderly household and that of a couple with children. Affordability showed the same 
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sign for couple families, households with dependent children, lone parents and middle 
aged and young householders in the first component; whilst unaffordability was shown 
for elderly, single and no dependent children. 
Table 9.5 Afford, 
Life Cycle Group 
% 
Schcmc 
r /,, p( 
Young Single 24 19 21 1 () II 
Young Mamed 7 3 3 2 1 
Family Formation 15 23 20 1 () 10 
Middle Child Rearing 11 23 26 12 13 
Complete Family 6 11 10 9 9 
Early Disposal 0 32 34 6 29 
Two Generation 2 4 5 3 2 
Empty Nest 13 18 17 5 11 
Early Retirement 49 64 57 17 40 
Old And Single 95 95 91 42 50 
Lone Parent 68 75 70 1 50 
Unclassified 21 25 22 1 13 
All 25 29 28 1 16 
Note: Unaff (Unaffordable) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Although the first component could explain around a third more variation in the data 
than the second component, it was not enough in itself to account for most of the 
variation in the data. Thus, the majority of the categories acquired a high value in the 
second component. The second component could be viewed as the contrast between 
young householders who were in their twenties and thirties, with pre-school age 
children, against householders who were in their forties and fifties with no pre-school 
age child; the former group was closer to unaffordability. For scheme R, the same 
descriptions apply in general. In addition, both poverty and unaffordability had the same 
sign in the two components, indicating their similarity with respect to a life cycle effect. 
There are a number of implications from the analysis in this section: first, the main 
contrast in the life cycle effect was between younger families with dependent children 
against households with elderly people, in which unaffordability was associated with the 
latter group. Second, there was a contrast between younger householders with 
preschool children and middle aged householders with school age children. The former 
group was more likely to be in unaffordability. Third, the relatively small value of 
affordability in both components suggests a small influence of life cycle effect on 
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afflordability. Instead, life cycle effect has a close relationship with unaffordability 
Finally, with reference to the modified version of residual income, poverty was close to 
unaffordability with respect to life cycle effect, which was contrary to their relative 
positions in the models in the previous section. 
Figure 9.5 Principal Component Analysis: Affordability, Household Type, Dependent 
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Figure 9.6 Principal Component Analysis: Affordability, Household Type, Dependent 
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Figure 9.7 Principal Component Analysis: Affordability, Household Type, Dependent 
Children Tenure and Age of Householder (Scheme R2) 
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Figure 9.8 Principal Component Analysis: Affordability, Household Type, Dependent 
Children Tenure and Age of Householder (Scheme R3) 
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9.5 AFFORDABILITY AND HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 
Housing affordability is defined as the state in which high housing cost is exerting a 
financial burden on a household, where the high housing cost would either have forced 
the household to forgo other areas of consumption, or to have their quality of housing 
consumption adjusted to a sub-standard level in order to lessen the financial burden. 
These two deliberations were subject to empirical testing in this section and the section 
that follows. In this section there will first be an examination of the pattern of 
household consumption expenditure in respect of housing affordability. 
Because of the high housing costs of households in unaffordable housing there is an 
expectation that these households would exhibit a Merent pattern of household 
consumption. A straightforward conjecture is that households experiencing 
unaffordability will be consuming fewer "luxury" items in order to spend an adequate 
level on "necessity" items. A similar fine of investigation was pursued by some 
researchers on poverty (e. g. Love and Oja, 1977. Lahiri, 1990) in which the difference in 
the consumption of necessity and luxury items between poor and rich households was 
compared. 
Expenditure on "necessity" items, which was defined in this section as the expenditure 
on food eaten at home, housing and clothing whilst the rest of the expenditure items 
were defined as "luxury" items (a complete fist of expenditure items used in this chapter 
are presented in Appendix A17). Table 9.6 indicates that the "affordable" group in all 
four schemes had substantially higher mean expenditure on both necessity and luxury 
items than both the "unaffordable" and the "povertyll group. It is more apparent, from 
the proportion of luxury and necessity items in a households total expenditure, that 
there was evidence showing that households in unaffordable housing had to forgo 
expenditure on luxuries. Households in unaffordable housing could only spend 41% to 
42% of their expenditure on luxury items whilst about 60% of their resources had to be 
devoted to necessities. Conversely, households in affordable housing only had to spend 
slightly less than half of their resources on necessities, leaving half for luxury items. 
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Table 9.6 Households Ex 
Expenditure Item Scheme T 
and L. uxurN Items 
Aff Unaff Aff Unaff AfT Unaff Aff Unaff Poverty 
Mean Household Exnenditure (f t)er week) 
Total Expenditure 322 132 334 132 328 136 328 174 109 
Necessity 
Luxury 
136 
185 
73 
58 
142 
192 
71 
61 
139 
198 
72 
63 
140 
182 
92 
91 
59 
50 
Mean Percentage in Houschold Total Expenditure (0/o) 
Necessity 
Luxurv 
47 
53 
59 
41 
46 
54 
58 
42 
47 
52 
58 
42 
47 
54 
59 
42 
58 
42 
Note: Aff(ordable) Unaff(ordable) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Yet, differentiating "necessity" from "luxury" items in contemporary British society may 
create considerable ambiguity. Many consumption items which were traditionally 
regarded as a "luxury" may have become "essential"; for instance, leisure activities may 
be regarded as a means of participation in society (Townsend 1979) and thus an 
essential expenditure item. In contrast, public transport, under certain circumstances, 
may be more expensive than private transport, which was traditionally associated with 
affluence. Thus, a dichotomous categorisation overlooks the complex pattern of 
household consumption. In this section an attempt will be made to retain as much 
information as possible and to use a fourteen item expenditure list which is used in the 
FES, to summarise the pattern of household consumption. 
As with the distribution of expenditure on "necessity" and "luxury" items, there is an 
indication in table 9.7 that the level of total expenditure and the level of all constituent 
expenditure items of the "affordable" group in Scheme T, R, and R2 were substantially 
higher than in the "unaffordable group" and such differences were statistically 
significant. Likewise, differences were observed in scheme R3, between the "affordable" 
and the "unaffordable" groups as well as between the "unaffordable" and the "poverty" 
groups. The mean total expenditure of the "affordable" group was 2.5 times that of the 
"unaffordable" group in schemes T, R, and R2, whilst in scheme R3 it was two times that 
of the "unaffordable" group and three times that of the "poverty" group. 
Among the individual constituent expenditure items, the largest difference between the 
"affordable" and the "unaffordable" groups was in expenditure on motoring, leisure 
services, and food eaten out of home in schemes T, R, and R2- In scheme R3, these 
three were among the items with the largest differences between the "affordable" with, 
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respectively, the "unaffordable" and the "poverty" groups, but the expenditure items 
demonstrating the greatest difference was expenditure on alcohol. It was also noted, in 
scheme R3, that the mean expenditure of the "unaffordable" group on all expenditure 
items was between the corresponding level of expenditure for the "affordable" group 
and the "poverty" groups (table 9.7). 
in terms of the proportion of individual items in total expenditure in table 9.8, it is 
apparent in schemes T, R, and R2. that the "unaffordable" group had to spend a larger 
proportion of household income on housing, food eaten at home and tobacco and spent 
relatively less on motoring, leisure services, food eaten out, clothing and alcohol. The 
remaining items showed a minimal difference between the two groups. 
In scheme R3 such observations on the whole held between the "affordable" group with, 
respectively, the "unaffordable" and the "poverty" groups, but the "unaffordable" group 
spent the highest proportion of their income on housing whilst the level for the 
"affordable" and the "poverty" groups was the same. Although it seems to support a 
conclusion that the "affordable" group could spend more on luxury goods whilst the 
"unaffordable" group had to consume more on necessities, yet such evidence is not 
conclusive. 
Table 9,7 Household Expenditure by Affordability Groups 
Expenditure Item Mean Household Expenditure (f per week) 
Scheme T Scheme R, Scheme R, Scheme R, 
Aff Unaff Aff Unaff Aff Unaff Aff Unaff Povertv 
Total Expenditure 322 132 334 132 328 136 328 174 109 
Net Housing 74 43 79 37 78 38 78 55 25 
Food (in) 41 25 41 27 41 28 41 29 27 
Food (out) 14 4 15 4 15 4 15 6 3 
Alcohol 15 5 15 5 15 5 25 7 4 
Tobacco 6 4 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 
Clothing 21 6 22 7 21 7 27 9 6 
Household Goods 25 10 25 10 25 10 25 13 8 
Household Services 15 8 16 7 16 7 16 8 6 
Personal Goods & Services 12 5 14 5 13 5 13 6 4 
Motoring 45 8 47 10 46 10 46 15 7 
Fares 8 4 8 3 8 3 8 3 3 
Leisure goods 15 5 15 6 15 6 15 8 5 
Leisure Services 30 7 31 7 31 7 30 10 5 
Miscellaneous 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 1 
Note: Aff(ordable) Unaff(ordable) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
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First, whilst the "affordable" group spent relatively more on leisure services, they spent 
relatively less on leisure goods. Second, difference in the proportion of expenditure 
items was actually very small. Finally, one of the strongest indicator of a higher level of 
spending on luxury items was the difference in the expenditure on motoring. Yet, this 
may only reflect locational factor and the avadability of public transport which may have 
nothing to do with affordability. 
Table 9.8 Distribution of the Proportion of Household Expenditure Bv Affordability Group 
Expenditure Items Mean Percentage in Total Expenditure 
Aff Unaff Aff Unaff Aff Unaff Aff 
Net Housing 25 31 26 29 26 29 26 
Food (in) 15 24 14 25 15 25 15 
Food (out) 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 
Alcohol 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 
Tobacco 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 
Clothing 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 
Household Goods 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Household Services 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Personal Goods & Services 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Motoring 12 4 12 4 12 5 12 
Fares 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Leisure goods 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Leisure Services 8 5 8 5 8 5 8 
Note: Aff(ordable) Unaff(ordable) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
2 
26 
27 
3 
4 
5 
4 
7 
5 
4 
4 
3 
4 
5 
However, conclusions drawn ftom a comparison of aggregate expenditure may be 
misleading. First, a few extremely high values might have raised substantially the mean 
value of a particular expenditure and distorted the conclusion based on the comparison 
of the means. Although a formal statistical test comparing means can identify such an 
anomaly, since the test considers the standard deviation at the same time, there is a 
second problem with this kind of simple comparison. Because there were altogether 
fourteen expenditure items, to examine individual expenditure items as if they were 
unrelated would hamper the intended objective in this section: the pattern of inter- 
relationship between expenditure items. What is more important is the distribution of 
expenditure of the individual household, which is the focus of concern; it is 
inappropriate to investigate the distribution of expenditure within an individual 
household without using multivariate analysis. 
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Principal component analysis (PCA) is one among several possible analytic tools suitable 
for this purpose. As described in a previous section, PCA is intended to reproduce 
variation of the data by the reconstruction of new "components" so that individual data 
in the sample can be expressed as a linear combination of those components which are 
not correlated with each other. The structure of the data can be simplified if the first 
few components represent the major part of the variation. Another reason for using 
PCA is the attempt to make sense of the most influential components so that the 
"underlying structure" of the data can be uncovered (refer to Appendix A 13 for a 
detailed technical description of PCA). 
Results of the PCA on the fourteen expenditures items were shown in table 9.9 and a 
graphical display of the component loadings of the first two components are presented in 
figure 9.9. All the component loadings in the first principal component were positive 
and this can be viewed as a general indication of the expenditure level where a high level 
of total expenditure was associated with a high level of expenditure in all constituent 
expenditure items. At the same time, items of housing cost, food eaten in and out of the 
home, and clothing had a higher magnitude of component loading. These items could be 
regarded as basic necessities of fife and thus the first component was also a 
representation of the level of expenditure on daily necessities. 
The second component represents that part of the remaining variation in the data not 
accounted for by the first component. These items are food, alcohol, tobacco, clothing, 
personal goods and services, motoring, fares for public transport and miscellaneous 
expenses which had positive loading as against expenditure on housing, household 
goods and services, leisure goods and leisure services which had negative value in this 
component. Where the absolute sign of the component loading is arbitrary and 
unimportant, it is the contrast in the sign of the loadings, besides their magnitude, which 
provides the interpretive interest. Thus the second component can be viewed as a 
contrast between essential goods such as food and clothing and luxury goods and 
services such as leisure and household goods and services. 
However, alcohol and tobacco, which cannot be considered necessity items, acquire 
large magnitude in this component and bear the same sign as the necessity items. This 
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appears to be inconsistent with the interpretation. A similar anomaly was observed in 
previous research on poverty where a relatively high level of spending on such items, 
especially on tobacco, was often associated with households living on benefit (Bradshaw 
and Morgan 1987, Bradshaw and Holmes 1989). This indicates a discrepancy in the 
interpretation of necessity and luxury between those who make the normative judgement 
and those who actually make the consumption decisions. 
The third component is less readily interpreted. It is not uncommon in PCA involving a 
large number of variables for some components to show no obvious pattern (Jolliffe 
1986). The variations in the data in the remaWng components were considered to be 
too trivial and were therefore not listed. 
The first two components, when put together, represent approximately one quarter of 
the variation in the data, and were used as a proxy for the variation of fourteen 
expenditure items among individual households. Reducing the number of dimensions to 
two permits the expression of the variations on a two dimensional graph, where it is 
possible to grasp visually the relationship of expenditure patterns between affordable and 
unaffordable groups. 
one method by which to take advantage of the dimension reduction PCA technique, as 
suggested by Dunteman (1992), is to use a scatter plot. The component scores of the 
first two components of each individual household are plotted before inspecting the 
clustering effect of the individual cases so that a comparison can be made with a pre- 
defined classification scheme. The component score is the summation of the products of 
standardised expenditure for each item, and the corresponding component loading 
represents the relative position of the case for that component. Because of the relative 
nature of the sign of the component loading, the sign of the component score has no 
intrinsic absolute interpretation. 
Figures 9.10 to 9.14 show the scatter plots of the component scores of the affordable 
and unaffordable groups in the four classification schemes T, R1, R2, R3. It is evident 
that there is much overlapping of the "affordable" group with the "unaffordable" group 
in all four schemes, as well as with the "poverty" group in scheme R3, and thus no 
243 
apparent clustering effect can be observed. It is therefore not possible to distinguish the 
"affordable" group from either the "unaffordable" group or the "poverty" group based 
on the pattern of household expenditure. 
Nevertheless, two additional points should be considered. First, the pattern of 
distribution of the component scores of the "unaffordable" and "poverty" groups relative 
to the "affordable" group is that the former tend to concentrate in the bottom left comer 
of the distribution, while that of the "affordable" group tends to spread over a much 
larger range. This suggests the wider freedom of how much to spend on necessities and 
luxuries of the "affordable" group relative to the "unaffordable" and the "poverty" 
groups. Thus, while there is no evidence that the "affordable" group spent more on 
luxury items, they have more choice on how much to spend, and on what. 
Second, the first two components could only account for around a quarter of the 
variation in the data. Thus, even if a clear pattern could be established, there is still 
much variation in the data that is not represented by these two components. A low 
percentage is not a typical pattern of highly correlated data, and the chance of 
uncovering any dominant pattern behind the distribution of expenditure is reduced. 
Table 9.9 Principal C Anal ysis: Household ExDe nditure 
Expenditure Items Compo nent Loading 
Coravonent I Co mponent 2 Component 3 
Net Housing 0.62 -0.30 -0.18 
Food (in) 0.62 0.18 0.36 
Food (out) 0.71 0.07 -0.31 
Alcohol 0.50 0.44 -0.40 
Tobacco 0.13 0.77 -0.08 
Clothing 0.59 0.11 0.17 
Household Goods 0.41 -0.09 0.38 
Household Services 0.36 -0.38 -0.01 
Personal Goods & Services 0.56 0.01 0.20 
Motoring 0.34 0.01 0.12 
Fares 0.36 -0.10 -0.52 
Leisure goods 0.39 -0.02 0.23 
Leisure Services 0.41 -0.38 -0.23 
Miscellaneous 0.35 0.05 0.29 
Eigenvaluc 3.18 1.22 1.11 
% Comvonent Accounted for 22.7 8.7 7.9 
Sourcc: Analysis of FES 1991 
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Figure 9.9 Principal Component Analysis: Household Expenditure 
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Figure 9.10 Scatter Plot: Principal Component Score (Scheme T) 
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Figure 9.11 Scatter Plot: Principal Component Score (Scheme R, ) 
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Figure 9.12 Scatter Plot: Principal Component Score (Scheme R2) 
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Figure 9.13 Scatter Plot, Principal Component Score (Scheme RAO 
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Figure 9.14 Scatter Plot : Principal Component Score (Scheme R. 3) (2) 
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Despite the absence of evidence of distinct expenditure pattern among the "affordable" 
and the "unaffordable" groups, as indicated by the PCA earlier in this section, logistic 
regression technique is used below to provide an independent validation. Logistic 
regression is used here as a classification tool where the level of household expenditure 
on items was used to predict the state of affordability, with "unaffordable" as the 
reference group. Logistic regression, although less efficient in computation than 
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discriminant analysis, requires less restricted assumptions of the distribution of the 
variables (Kennedy, 1991) while providing the necessary confirmatory power lacked by 
PCA (Joffdle 1986). 
Table 9.10 shows the results of the logistic regression models on schemes T, R,, R2and 
R3evaluated by the stepwise method of inclusion. The unstandardised logistic 
regression coefficient (B) can be used to indicate the change of log odds of being in 
affordable housing over being in unaffordable housing. A positive coefficient implies an 
increase in the level of expenditure on that item, which would lead to an increase in the 
log odds of being in unaffordable housing and vice versa if it were negative. However, 
because of the lack of a standardised coefficient in the model, it is not reliable when 
comparing the relative contribution of an individual variable based on the unstandardised 
coefficient. The partial correlation (R) is a more useful indicator. 
Expenditure on tobacco, household goods and miscellaneous items was not significant in 
determining the probability of the household of being in unaffordable housing in all three 
schemes. Whilst net housing cost was insignificant in scheme T, it was the most 
important parameter in schemes R, and R, Conversely, expenditure on food eaten at 
home was important in schemes R, and R,, and was insignificant in scheme T. 
Notwithstanding that most of the variables in the models were significant, the goodness 
of fit of the models is poor. The log likelihood statistics, which is an assessment of the 
overall goodness of fit of the model, show a very large number in all three models. This 
indicates a lack of fit whereas a perfect model should have a log likelihood statistic of 
zero. At the same time, a measurement of the degree of deviation from a correct 
prediction can be assessed with a plot of deviance and a perfect model should show a 
normal distributed deviance. However figure 9.15 to figure 9.17 show that all three 
models deviated from the normal distribution, which was another indication of a lack of 
fit. 
This evidence suggests the inappropriateness of using household expenditure to classify 
affordability and thus also implies, conversely, that the expenditure patterns of 
households in affordable housing and those in unaffordable housing showed little 
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difference. This confirms the results of the PCA in the earlier part of this section. 
Table 9.10 Logistic Regression: Household Expenditure by Affor-dability Groups 
Expenditure Item Logistic Regression Coefficients 
Scheme T Scheme R , Scheme R, 
B R B R B R 
Net Housing ns - -0.0 1 -0.13 -0.01 -0.12 
Food (in) -0.03** -0.12 ns -- ns -- 
Food (out) -0.03** -0.06 -0.05** -0.1 -0.05** -0.09 
Alcohol -0.03** -0.1 -0.03** -0.09 -0.03** -0.09 
Tobacco ns -- ns -- ns -- 
Clothing -0.0 1 -0.06 -0.0 1 -0.06 -0.0 1 -0.05 
Household Goods -0.00* -0.02 -0.01** -0.05 -0.0 1 -0,05 
Household Services ns - ns -- ns 
Personal Goods & Services -0.01 -0.02 -0.02** -0.04 -0.0 1 -0.04 
Motonng -0.03** -0.14 -0.02** -0.12 -0.02** -0.11 
Fares -0.02** -0.04 -0.0 1 -0.03 ns -- 
Leisure goods -0.0 1* -0.03 ns -- ns -- 
Leisure Services -0.02** -0.09 -0.02** -0.08 -0.02** -0.08 
Miscellaneous ns -- ns -- ns -- 
Intercept -1.3 1.5 1.15 
-2LogL 3361 3518 3634 
Correctly Predicted as 0.63 0.71 0.65 
CorrectIv Predicted as 0.93 0.9 0.91 
Note: ** p<0.0 I 8*p<0.05 ns Not Significant 
B Unstandardised logistic Coefficient R Partial Correlation 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Normal Probability Plot: Logistics Regression Residuals 
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9.6 QUALITY OF HOUSING AND AFFORDABILITY 
As argued in chapter three, the quality of housing occupied is an integral part of 
affordability measurement whereas the assessment of affordability should take into 
consideration the level of housing consumption. Households which choose to consume 
a higher level of housing than they can properly afford should not be classified as being 
in "unaffordable" housing, whilst households living in inadequate housing because they 
could not afford better housing should be classified as being in unaffordable housing 
(Sueke et al 1980, Fallis 1985, Lerman and Reeder 1987). 
On the other hand, Hancock (1993) argues for a more relaxed definition of affordability. 
Whilst households in inadequate housing should be regarded as in unaffordable housing 
regardless of whether they are assessed to be so by the affordability indicators, 
households assessed as unaffordable while over-consuming housing beyond their level of 
income should have their assessment relabelled "voluntary" unaffordable. This latter 
scenario should be considered as a grey area of affordability because, as Hancock 
contends (1993), it may not be possible to adjust the consumption of housing towards a 
prescribed standard. Altering housing consumption by a snudl amount is not possible 
owing to the discrete nature of a unit of housing consumption with respect to cost, and 
other non-econornic considerations may over-shadow the decision for this kind of 
change, for exwnple, the fact that social housing allocations are administered on the 
basis of assessed need, not consumers' choice in the market place. 
As outlined in chapter three, this thesis favours the extended definition of affordability. 
Thus, it is desirable to identify households which were not in unaffordable housing as 
assessed by the measurement schemes proposed so far, in order to explore whether such 
households should be reclassified as being in unaffordable housing. Households which 
were in unaffordable housing should have the quality of their accommodation taken into 
consideration so that those which were over-consuming housing could be identified. 
However, as argued in chapter four, it is not easy, technically, to evaluate the quality of 
housing, given the complexity of housing consumption in general and the lack of 
relevant information in, particularly, the present data set. Among the various evaluation 
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methods described in chapter four, over-crowding is the only possible indicator of 
quality of housing, albeit it is only a weak representation. Occupancy norm was 
considered a more appropriate indicator of over-crowding, whilst occupation density 
(room density) can be used simultaneously as a reference. 
occupation density, which is expressed as the number of persons per room including the 
living room and kitchen, was used in the Census of 1991 to indicate overcrowding in a 
dwelling. In 199 1, households in Britain were fairly well-housed, with nearly all 
households having an occupation density of less than one person per room. Only a very 
small minority, 0.3% of households, had to five in dwellings with an occupation density 
of over 1.5 persons per room. 
In the FES 1991, "paying" households in England enjoyed even better living space 
compared with the Census figures, with only 0.5% of households living in a house with 
more than one person per room, and 0.1 % households with a density of over 1.5 
persons per room. Breaking down the density of occupation into affordability groups 
reveals that households in unaffordable housing were more likely to be living in 
dwellings with a higher occupation density. Households in unaffordable housing in 
schemes R, and R2were almost two times more likely to be in dwellings with a density 
of more than 1.5 persons per room than households in the "affordable" group. The 
situation of households in the "poverty" group regarding occupation density was closer 
to the "unaffordable" group than to the "affordable" group measured by the modified 
residual income measurement in scheme R3 (Table 9.11). 
However, although there appears to be evidence showing under-consumption of housing 
among households in unaffordable housing, such evidence was weak because the 
number of households involved was few: less than 10 households were both in 
unaffordable housing and experiencing high occupation density in all schemes. This 
makes the conclusion subject to large sampling error and also hampers further statistical 
analysis. Thus, it is not appropriate to pursue finther this line of investigation. 
At the same time, it was observed that households in unaffordable housing were not only 
more likely to occupy dwellings of higher occupation density, but also more likely to be 
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over-consuming housing. This situation was also observed when the occupancy norm 
was used as an indication of over-crowding and the implication of this will be discussed 
later in this section. 
Table 9.11 Housing Affordability and-OPORPSUiPPAPMS-i 
Affordability Measurement Occupation Density (Person per Room) 
(% of Households) 
Less than or equal Over 0.5 less Over I less than Over 1.5 
to 0.5 than 1 1.5 
Affordable 54 45 0.5 0.1 Scheme T Unaffordable 76 24 0.4 0.1 
Affordable 57 43 0.4 0.1 Scheme R, Unaffordable 66 33 0.5 0.2 
Affordable 58 42 0.4 0.1 
Schemep-2 Unaffordable 65 34 0.5 0.2 
Affordable 58 42 0.4 0.1 
Scheme R3 Unaffordable 70 29 0.6 0.4 
Poverty 61 38 0.4 0 
All 60 40 0.4 0.1 
1991 Census 98 1.6 0.3 
Source: Analysis of FES 199 1; OPCS, 1993b 
The occupancy norm was another indicator used by the Census for assessing over- 
crowding. The intention was that the Census would use this variable only in Scotland. 
However, it will be adopted, with minor alterations, for use in this thesis for households 
in England. Details of the alteration have been set out in chapter four of this thesis and a 
summary of the occupancy norm is fisted below. A household needs one living room 
and one bedroom for each of the following combinations of household members: 
* Each married couple 
* Each single person aged 21 or above 
* Each pair aged 10-20 of the same sex 
* Each pair formed from a remaining child aged 10-20 with a child aged under 10 of 
the same sex 
* Each pair of children aged under 10 
* Each child unable to form a pair 
Using the occupancy norm as an indication of the quality of housing also showed that 
households in England in 1991 were well housed with nearly two thirds of the "paying" 
households occupying dwellings over the occupancy norm and the remaining one third 
at the norm, Only 3% of households were living in dwellings below the norm (table 
9.12). Breaking down this latter group of households into "affordability" groups shows 
252 
that households which were in "affordable" housing were more likely to be under- 
consuming housing than households in "unaffordable" housing (in all residual income 
measurement schemes). 
Yet a case by case scrutiny of the households which were in affordable housing but, at 
the same time, under-consuming housing reveals that among the ninety five households 
in this group, six households, all of them single persons or couples, were living in a one- 
room house or flat and should not be considered as having inadequate housing. Another 
forty one households were one or two rooms short of the standard only if their baby 
sons or daughters were counted. The overcrowding of such households should not be 
severe. A further thirteen households had taken in non-relatives, who were likely to be 
the partner of the head of household or that of his son or daughter. They should be able 
to make pairs with one of the members of the household. 
This left thirteen households, about 0.8% of the total sample, who were actually short of 
space. Almost all of them were one room short of the norm. Together with the 
observation made concerning the density of occupation, the problem of under- 
consuming housing by living in over-crowded dwellings can neither be regarded as a 
significant problem, nor is there an adequate sample size to pursue this further. 
However, this only warrants the conclusion that, measured in terms of over-crowding, 
there is insufficient evidence showing that some households, apparently, maintained 
affordability only by the deliberate containment of their housing consumption at a level 
that was inadequate for their need. Over-crowdedness can only capture one dimension 
of housing consumption, whereas other aspects of housing inadequacy such as the lack 
of amenities and repairs, poor dwelling conditions and so forth cannot be provided by 
the present data set. Given that 1.5 million dwellings in England in 1991 were 
considered unfit for habitation, and 101/6 of the housing stock was in need of urgent 
repair, or households incurred additional cost by making the dwelling fit to live in (DoE 
1993), there was plenty of "opportunity" for a household to keep down their housing 
consumption by occupying these unfit dwellings. Investigation into this aspect of the 
unaffordability problem requires more substantial information on housing conditions 
than is available from the present data set. 
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Conversely, over half the households which were in unaffordable housing were 
occupying dwellings above the occupancy norm appropriate to their households' 
composition (table 9.12). The over-consumption of housing was significantly related to 
affordability in all four schemes. Households in unaffordable housing which were over- 
represented among households over-consuming housing. A similar pattern was also 
observed in an analysis earlier in this section using density of occupation as an indicator 
of over-crowding. 
Table 9.12 Housing Affor&bilitv and-OWCUJIPýNi®rm 
Affordability Group Number of Rooms Under/Over the Occupancy Notm 
% of Households) Just Right Over the Norm Below the I Roorn 2 Rooms or More Norm 
Aff 31 41 25 3 Scheme T Unaff 47 34 17 2 
Aff 29 42 26 2 
Scheme R, Unaff 47 35 15 4 
Aff 30 41 26 2 Scheme R2 Unaff 47 35 15 4 
Aff 30 41 27 2 
Scheme R3 Unaff 39 39 19 3 
Poverty 52 32 12 4 
Total 34 40 24 3 
Note: Aff(ordable) Unaff(ordable) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
It begs the question whether households which were both in unaffordable housing and 
over-consuming housing should be classified as experiencing a voluntary but not a 
genuine affordability problem. However, further analysis suggests that among 
households which were both in unaffordable housing and, at the same time, occupying 
dwellings at a standard above the occupancy norm, a surprisingly high proportion were 
on housing benefit. Over half the households in this group were claiming housing or 
related benefit as against one fifth of households in the general sample. This resembles 
the socio-economic characteristics which were closely related to benefit claimants who 
were also over-represented in this group: local authority tenants, tenants in the 
unfurnished private rented sector, the single elderly, lone parents and households with 
unemployed or retired householders (table 9.13). 
Housing association tenants were an exception to this later generalisation. Although the 
chance of claiming housing benefit was as high for their counterparts in the public rented 
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sector, they were not so likely to be in both unaffordable housing and, simultaneously, 
consurning housing above the occupancy norm. 
A breakdown of the "unaffordable group" into "unaffordability" and "poverty" in scheme 
R, did not change the basic socio-econonfic characteristics of households which were 
both over-consuming and in unaffordable housing, albeit the polarisation of 
characteristics for this group was less extreme in scheme R3than in the other schemes. 
As far as the current housing benefit system in Britain is concerned the over- 
representation of benefit claimants, local authority tenants and single elderly people in 
the unaffordable group who were, at the same time, over-consuming housing above the 
norm poses several quaies regarding the previous proposition of reclassifying this group 
as affordable (Lerman and Reeder 1987, Sueke et al 1980). 
First, the majority of people in this group were already on housing benefit, and there was 
little incentive for these households to diminish their level of housing consumption since 
this would be deducted pound for pound from their benefit. 
Second, over half the households in this group were local authority tenants, so even if 
there was some incentive to persuade these households to adjust their level of housing 
consumption, the feasibility of such a change is doubtful, given the difficulties involved 
in exchanging houses in the public rented sector. 
Finally, over a third of households in this group consisted of single persons. If these 
people were to reduce their level of housing consumption, it is unclear whether the 
housing system could provide accommodation at a level appropriate to the need of such 
people, given the slow adjustment of the housing stock to the changing demographic 
and economic structure. 
In addition to HancocWs analysis of the difficulties, both economic and non-economic, 
of fine tuning the level of housing consumption would be controversial if it excluded 
households which were over-consuming housing, while unable to afford this level of 
consumption, from the "unaffordable" group. Empirical evidence in this section adds 
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impetus to the controversy of such an exclusion. Rethinking is required about treating 
households which are over-consurning housing as affordable regardless of their actual 
financial or housing situation. At least, as suggested by Hancock (1993), more detailed 
information is required before an assessment can be made. 
Table 9.13 Households in Unaffordable Housing by Socio-Economic Charactenstics by 
OvercrowdmR 
Socio-economic Households Over the Occupancv Nonn (%) 
charactcristics Sch T Sch R. Sch R, All 
I T-- IV I 1--or I T-- - IY' II-- 
Local Authority 60 53 53 43 62 26 
Housing Association 4 4 4 2 6 4 
Private Rented (Unfum) 10 8 8 7 9 5 
Private Rented (Fumished) 2 3 2 3 1 5 
Owned With Mortgage 24 32 33 45 22 60 
Household Tvpe 
Married Couples 41 48 49 48 50 65 
Single Person 45 38 37 41 34 24 
Lone Parent 8 8 9 6 11 5 
Others 5 6 5 4 6 6 
Household Size 
I Person 45 38 37 41 34 24 
2 persons 35 35 33 26 40 31 
3 persons 9 12 13 12 14 18 
4 Persons 9 16 14 17 11 19 
More than i Persons 6 2 3 3 2 9 
Age of Head of Household 
Less 30 12 11 11 12 10 20 
30-39 14 14 16 19 13 25 
40-49 10 11 13 16 10 21 
50-59 12 11 13 11 14 14 
Over 60 52 53 48 42 53 21 
Employment Stato of Head of Household and Partner 
Full Time 19 19 22 37 8 63 
Part Time 4 4 4 5 3 4 
Unemploved/Retired 77 77 74 59 89 33 
Housing Benefit 
Claimants 58 52 52 37 67 21 
Non-claimants 42 48 48 63 33 79 
Note: Sch(eme) Unaff(ordable) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
9.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Three approaches to affordability measurement have been attempted in the previous 
three chapters, with varied success. The residual income measurement and an approach 
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combining ratio and residual income measurement have been successful in establishing a 
threshold level of affordability, while the behavioural approach failed. 
The two successful approaches have created four measurement schemes: scheme T, 
which is based on the composite approach merging ratio and residual income 
measurements schemes R, and R2which are based on the residual income approach and 
made reference to, respectively, 140% of the income support level and half the average 
income as the poverty line; and scheme R, which attempted to differentiate 
unaffordability from poverty. 
In schemes T, R, and R2, there was a very high degree of agreement in classification, 
with a concordance rate of over 90%. This agreement was higher in the classification of 
the "affordable" group but less so among households which were "unaffordable". 
Because of this high degree of agreement between the three schemes, they shared a 
similar relationship with scheme R3, which was a modification of the traditional residual 
income, and intended to differentiate poverty from unaffordability. Around half of the 
households which were classified as "unaffordable" by scheme T, the composite 
measurement scheme, were reclassified as in "poverty" by the modified residual income 
measurement scheme R3. It suggests that if nearly half of the households were regarded 
as in unaffordable housing by the traditional measurement because of high housing cost 
but not a lack of resources, a fine tuning of the affordability measurement is thus 
necessary. These two groups may require different policy prescriptions to solve their 
problems. 
Nevertheless, characteristics of households which were more likely to be in unaffordable 
housing, as revealed by these four schemes, were similar. Social tenants, lone parents, 
single elderly people, households with unemployed or retired heads and households with 
no dependent child were over-represented in the "unaffordable" group. Although when 
a more refined classification was made in scheme R3, which further differentiated 
unaffordability and poverty, these basic characteristics were more appropriate to the 
"poverty" group than the "unaffordable" group, although the description still applied in 
general to households in "unaffordability" in this latter scheme. 
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Multivariate analysis was used to examine the combined effects of tenure, employment 
and benefit on affordability, as well as that of the life cycle. It was demonstrated in logit 
modelling that when the composite measurement approach, scheme T, was used, the 
interaction effect of benefit with tenure had more influence on affordability than the 
effect of employment. In schemes R, and R2the interaction of employment and tenure 
was more significant. A hierarchical loglinear model of scheme R3 showed a similar 
relationship between these factors and affordability to that in schemes R, and R2. This 
suggests that while the significance of tenure in affordability was unequivocal, benefit 
was significant to ratio measurement; but in residual income, employment (and implicitly 
earned income) was more influential. 
With the help of categorical principal component analysis, a detailed picture locating the 
inter-relationship of affordability, tenure, employment and benefit was portrayed. It was 
found that affordability was closer to home owners, fiffl time employment and non- 
claimants of benefit, whilst unemployment/retirement, local authority tenants and benefit 
claimants were associated closely with "unaffordability". This pattern could be observed 
in all four schemes. However in scheme R3 "unaffordability" had moved closer to part 
time workers and private tenants while "poverty" had largely taken the place formerly 
occupied by "unaffordability" in the other schemes. This suggests there may be a 
different course of unaffordability among private tenants, which was the high level of 
housing cost due to rent deregulation in the sector in contrast to the lack of resources 
among social tenants. 
An analysis of the fife cycle effect on affordability, employing the life cycle group 
perspective, depicted a pattern which roughly matched the periods of "relative want" 
and "relative plenty" portrayed by other research on life cycle effects (e. g. Bradshaw et 
al 1987). Yet such an observation was not conclusive owing to the small sample size in 
some of the fife cycle groups. At the same time, if household type and composition, and 
age of head of household were used to reproduce the life cycle effect, it was shown that 
affordability was closer to married couple households and households with school age 
children, while unaffordability was closer to elderly and childless households. However, 
the association between affordability and the components of the life cycle effect was, in 
general, not strong. 
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As households in unaffordable housing had to spend relatively more on housing, it is 
worthwhile to investigate whether they had to forgo consumption in other areas in order 
to maintain the high cost of housing. A preliminary analysis of household expenditure 
showed that households in unaffordable housing had to spend a higher proportion of 
their income on necessities, which included housing costs, but the difference in 
consumption patterns of luxury and necessity goods between "affordable" and 
flunaffordable" households was not great. 
Notwithstanding this difference at the aggregate level, analysis of the expenditure 
pattern of individual households, using principal component analysis on the major 
expenditure items, revealed that the distribution of "luxury" and "necessity" items 
expenditure between the "affordable" and the "unaffordable" groups overlapped to a 
large extent. The "affordable" group had a wider choice of both types of consumption 
in contrast to the "unaffordable" group, which had no choice but to restrain their 
consumption in both areas. 
On the other hand, it was confirmed by logistic regression analysis that using level of 
expenditure could not satisfactorily predict whether the household was in affordable 
housing or not. The model generated, though largely interpretable, did not fit the 
original data well, thus indicating that it was not a good predictor. 
Quality of the dwellings occupied, as argued in previous chapters, was an integral 
component in assessing the affordability situation of a household. This thesis adopts the 
position that households occupying dwellings below the minimally accepted standard 
were unable to afford housing regardless of their affordability situation. On the other 
hand, this thesis suggests a view similar to the extended definition of affordability 
delineated by Hancock (1993), which calls for caution when dealing with households 
which were in unaffordable housing but, at the same time, over-consuming housing. 
They should not be categorically regarded as being in a voluntary unaffordability 
situation, but more information about the households is necessary before an assessment 
of affordability can be made. 
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In using overcrowding as an indicator of housing under-consumption, empirical 
evidence showed that only a very small proportion of households had to keep housing 
affordable by restraining their housing consumption to a standard below the socially 
accepted minimum. Such a pattern still held when a more relaxed indicator of over- 
crowding, the occupancy norm, was used. Hence, where over-crowding was concerned, 
there was no indication of unaffordability owing to under-consumption of housing. 
However, other areas of under-consumption must be explored before any conclusion can 
be reached because overcrowding can explain only a minor element of housing 
consumption. 
Conversely, using occupancy norm as a yardstick for housing over-consumption, there 
was evidence of unaffordability through housing over-consumption. Indeed, the 
majority of households which were in an unaffordable position were over-consuming 
housing. Yet empirical evidence showed that a large proportion of households in this 
group were either single person households, benefit claimants or local authority tenants. 
The willingness of such households, or the opportunity available to them, to adjust their 
level of housing consumption were questionable. Thus, it would be unfair to such 
households if they were categorically reclassified as in voluntary unaffordability. 
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CHAPTERIO 
ACCESS TO HOME OMWERSHIP 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The empirical investigations carried out in previous chapters have been concentrated on 
the current cost of housing and its relation to income and socio-economic characteristics 
of the household. This can be seen as a concern about the affordability of sustaining 
current housing arrangements. Yet it did not address one of the key problems that 
triggered the concern about affordability in the 1980s, namely the problem of access to 
home ownership. 
Throughout the 1980s the Conservative governments pursued home ownership as the 
primary goal of housing policy. They introduced a range of measures aimed at 
extending home ownership down the income scale. A particular focus of attention was 
in encouraging council tenants to buy their dwellings. Initiatives such as the right to buy 
at a substantial discount (and more recently, the rent to mortgage scheme) were 
introduced to make it possible for council tenants to achieve home ownership. On the 
other hand, the new financial regime for local authority housing aimed to increase rents 
in real terms, in part in order to increase the cost of renting relative to buying (Forrest 
and Murie, 1988; Bramley, 1994). 
Whilst the "right to buy" reduced the obstacle of council tenants' access to home 
ownership in the 1988s, prospects for potential home buyers in the private market in the 
past decade were less promising. House prices increased, both absolutely and relative to 
income, throughout the 1980s. Such increases were expected to have exacerbated the 
access problem of many prospective new home buyers. Yet the concomitant changes in 
the financing of home buying might have partly offset such adversity. On the one hand, 
the deregulation in the financial markets in the 1980s triggered a more relaxed lending 
policy of budding societies so that mortgages were made more easily available. Home 
buyers who were previously excluded from the housing markets because their income 
was regarded as too low to afford home ownership found themselves able to borrow 
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from building societies; other home buyers were also aflowed to borrow more (Jones 
and Maclennan, 1984; Bank of England, 1992). Hence, despite the high level of 
property price, easily available mortgages lessened, to a certain extent, the hurdle of 
access to home ownership. 
On the other hand, the differential increase of house price in different parts of the 
country, deteriorated employment markets and volatile interest rates, which were partly 
a result of the deregulation in the financial markets and easier borrowing, had entangles 
many home buyers who had bought in the latest boom period in difficulties regarding 
repaying their mortgages (Forrest and Murie, 1990; Bramley, 1994). This led to a new 
concern about the "sustainability" of home ownership (Maclennan, 1994) and also 
created an unclear situation of new buyers' ability to afford home ownership. 
Thus, to assess whether a prospective buyer could afford to buy and to sustain their 
early years of home ownership become a critical and important tool in the analysis of 
access to home ownership at a time when changes in the housing market are complex. 
Yet measuring access to home ownership entails considerable measurement problems. 
Unlike the measurements of affordability in the previous chapters which were based on 
current costs of housing, housing costs of a prospective buyer could only be 
hypothetical. This was achieved in previous research by estimating how large a 
mortgage a household could obtain, given the household income and other parameters 
set by the researchers, and to assess whether this was enough to cover the purchase cost 
of a dwelling at some given reference prices (e. g. Littlewoodý 1986; Bramley 1990b, 
1991). The lack of reliable behavioural models in this area makes the work of setting 
such assumptions difficult and survey data was of little assistance. 
Despite the difficulties in obtaining accurate and reliable estimates of the housing costs 
of prospective home buyers, and subsequent affordability of prospective home buyers, 
there is still enormous interest among academics to focus their work on affordability in 
this area. Owing to the continuous surge of people moving into owner occupation and 
its importance in relation to social and economic policy, issues such as whether there is 
still room for further development of owner occupation and its impact on the social and 
economic development of society became important issues in housing and social policy. 
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Measurement of the ability of prospective home owners to afford owner occupation 
forms a crucial part of the empirical investigation of such issues. 
This chapter attempts to outline previous efforts to examine the ability of prospective 
buyers to afford home ownership and to portray the situation of prospective home 
owners in the late 1980s with regard to their ability to afford home ownership. It begins 
with a review of previous research on such issues dating back to the early 1970s, and is 
then followed by a summary of the technical measurement used in this thesis. The 
dimension of tenure preference will also be incorporated into this measurement. A 
profile of the affordability situation of prospective home owners will be described in the 
third section whilst logit modelling on the mortgage potential, a measurement of home 
buyers' ability to buy, will be delineated in the section that follows. The last section 
looks at the sensitivity of the assumptions made on the measurement adopted in this 
chapter and the impact of the Right to Buy discount on the affordability of sitting 
tenants. 
10.2 MEASURING THE ABELITY TO BUY: A REVIEW 
The proportion of owner occupiers has been steadily increasing since the turn of the 
century (Merrett, 1982). The impetus of such an upsurge showed no sign of declining 
even after the mid-1960s, when the majority of households in Britain were already home 
owners. It is believed that tax incentives, the availability of mortgages, capital 
appreciation and favourable government policy all fuelled the momentum of this upsurge 
(Wbitehead et al 1993). 
As with the "non-e)dstence" of any general discussions on affordability before the 1980s, 
whether or not prospective buyers could afford to buy was not a public concern. It was 
regarded as a conventional wisdom that only those who could afford to buy would take 
such action. As already described in chapter two of this thesis, it was the escalation in 
house prices in the 1980s, and the related issues of a high level of mortgage arrears and 
property repossessions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that aroused considerable 
public concern about whether people could afford to buy, and the difficulties of entry to 
home ownership became one of the first affordability issues to interest researchers. 
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However, early empirical studies of the affordability of prospective buyers were not 
motivated by such concerns. In the early 1970s, the Housing Research Foundation 
conducted a survey, based on samples from the National Readership Survey, on the 
household characteristics, income and attitudes toward home ownership. The most 
important finding highlighted by the survey was that there were over one million 
households at that time which could afford to buy a home who were still renting 
(Housing Research Foundation 197 1). The tenure preference surveys in the 1960s 
complemented this finding and showed that the majority of households would prefer to 
buy (BSA 1983), apparently giving support to policies that encouraged further 
expansion of home ownership. 
Toward the mid 1980s, when the proportion of home owners was approaching two 
thirds of the population, and house prices began to surge, sceptical views on whether 
home ownership was affordable for the majority of potential buyers began to emerge 
(e. g. Littlewood, 1986). Such scepticism was reinforced by a series of measures 
introduced by the government, such as the RTB and a series of low cost home 
ownership initiatives, apparently aiming to promote home ownership among households 
further down the income slxýc which might not, in the past, have aspired to owner 
occupation. 
Littlewood, (1986) conducted a secondary analysis on the 1978 GHS on the ability of 
potential home owners to buy. She found that nearly 70% of tenants under the age of 
sixty, who were believed to be the main source of potential home owners, lacked the 
ability to buy a cheap house at the lower end of the housing market. 
As already described in chapter two of this thesis, the 1980s saw a rapid upsurge in 
house prices, especially during the latter part of the decade. The problem of access to 
home ownership had reached the political agenda. Commissioned by the Association of 
District Councils and the Federation of House Builders, Bramley (1990a) published the 
reports titled "Bridging the Affordability Gap", in which he estimated that less than a 
quarter (22%) of new households could afford to buy a three bedroom house in the open 
market using a conventional mortgage; 41% could afford such a house if the price was 
discounted by 30%, while over two thirds (68%) could afford to buy on a shared 
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ownership basis. If the new household was only aiming for a starter home of one 
bedroom, the affordability situation would improve, with the corresponding proportions 
increased to, respectively, 55%, 69% and 80% 
Contrary to previous research on access to home ownership, Bramley's reports 
highlighted the demand for social rented housing. This was defined as the residual 
demand after all those households which could afford some form of house purchase had 
bought their homes. In 1989,32% of new households could not afford to buy a three 
bedroom house, but this was reduced to a fifth if a one bedroom dwelling was required. 
This emphasised the need to maintain a certain level of social housing in the portfolio of 
housing stock and is, apparently, a response to the decline of resource input into social 
housing, and consequent decline in output throughout the 1980s. 
In the fight of rapid fluctuation in house prices in the late 1980s, which was believed to 
have worsened the affordability position of potential buyers, estimates of the 
affordability problem based on the 1989 data soon became obsolete. The report was 
thus updated in 1991. It was found that the affordability of prospective home owners 
had deteriorated substantially over the year. Only 29% of new households could afford 
a one bedroom house and those which could afford to buy a one bedroom house were 
45%. Thus 38% of households had to rely on social tenancies (Bramley 1991). 
As the increase in house prices varied between local areas in Britain, so did the impact of 
the affordability of prospective home buyers. Unsurprisingly, access became most 
difficult in the south of the country, where both the level of house prices and the degree 
of increase were higher than in other regions. Littlewood (1986) found that only around 
one fifth to a quarter of tenants in the South East, East Anglia and London areas could 
afford to buy. Bramley (1989) also demonstrated that the proportion of new households 
in these areas which could afford a new one bedroom house was lower than the national 
average, and that the demand for social housing was higher than in other regions 
(Bramley 1991). 
SERPLAN (South East Regional Planning Conference) was concerned about the 
worsening affordability situation in the south east region. It identified two levels of 
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affordability problem: the primary level, which applies to households which will always 
need some form of social housing. This includes the unemployed and households on 
very low incomes. The secondary level comprised those which could not get access to 
housing in the open market because of a "cyclical shortage in local housing markets" or 
"fiscal conditions governing the house purchase" (SERPLAN, 1990: 3). Obviously, the 
affordability problems of prospective buyers were regarded as a variety of problems at 
the secondary level, which is essentially short term. 
10.3 THE MEASUREMENT OF ACCESS TO HOME 
OWNERSHIP 
The technical measurements of prospective home buyers' ability to pay used in the 
studies mentioned in the previous section are all based on an assumed relationship 
between house price and household income. They apparently attempt to fink ability to 
buy with the likelihood of the household to obtain a mortgage, since the formulae for 
calculation deliberately emulate what was believed to be the building societies' practice 
of assessing mortgage loan applications. The term mortgage potential, used in 
Littlewood's research, vividly reflects such a fine of thought. Although other authors did 
not use this term explicitly, their studies were based on the same principle in assessing 
the ability of prospective home owners to purchase their homes. it was shown in 
chapter three of this thesis that the mortgage potential measurement is a variation of the 
ratio measurement of affordability. 
Basically, mortgage potential is expressed as a certain multiple of a household's annual 
income, and if the amount is larger than the reference house price, the household is 
deemed to be in affordable situation (refer to formula 3.5 for an illustration). While such 
deliberations were used in this general form by all authors, they differ in minor details: in 
the choice of both the income multiple and the reference house price, as well as in their 
methods of estimating household income. 
The Housing Research Foundation (1971) used the crudest measurement of mortgage 
potential. it assumed that households whose head was under the age of forty and whose 
gross income exceeded L1250 (11500 in London) would be regarded as being able to 
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buy. No justification for the use of such figures was given. If the average home 
purchase price of 197 1, the year the survey was conducted, was used as a reference 
(which was E5631 (DoE, 1972)), the income multip le used in this survey is 
approximately 4.5. Figures of household income were collected in a specially designed 
household survey. 
Littlewood (1986) made a more sophisticated adjustment of both the multiple and the 
reference house price. She used house prices at the median and the bottom quartile of 
distribution of purchase price paid by first time buyers in the region, provided by the 
Five Percentage Sample Survey on Building Society Mortgages, as reference house 
prices. At the same time, the multiple was set at three times the income of the head of 
the household and partner, but was systematically reduced when the age of the head of 
household was over forty, to take into account the effect that age would have on the 
period of mortgage repayment. Income figures were supplied by the 1978 GHS, which 
were differentiated only at the regional level. 
Bramley (1990,199 1) paid more attention to rectifying the crudeness of regional income 
figures, as well as to providing a large variety of housing options, which reflected the 
diversity of the routes to owner occupation. He estimated the distribution of income at 
the county and district levels based on information from the New Earnings Survey. Four 
options of housing were provided: market sales, low cost sales, shared ownership and 
housing association tenancy. The costs of the options were calculated on the assumed 
regional cost of development, the proportion of properties that were to be purchased, 
the proportion of mortgage that could be obtained and the amount of HAG for the rental 
portion. The multiple was set to three for single earner households and 2.5 for double 
earner households. 
These kinds of assessment are criticised as static and mechanical. First, because the 
calculations rely heavily on the price purchase (or the price of land in Bramley's 
calculation), cyclical fluctuations in the price of houses would quickly render such a 
snapshot calculation out of date. This would be especially true during a period of rapid 
price fluctuation (Whitehead et al 1993). 
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Second, the mortgage potential calculation ignores contributions from savings and 
inheritance which would reduce the cost of access. Thus, it tends to produce an 
overestimate of the problem of access (Whitehead et al 1993). On the other hand, as 
was highlighted in chapter three of this thesis, the assumption of a one hundred percent 
mortgage assumed in all mortgage potential evaluations would underestimate the 
problem, owing to the difficulty of accumulating enough savings for the deposit which is 
normally required for a purchase. 
Third, such a calculation takes no account of the structure and distribution of house 
prices in the locality (Bamet et al 1990) because it is often a particular point in the house 
price distribution that is used as the reference. Thus, the sensitivity of the results would 
depend both upon the distribution of house prices and the choice of the particular 
point. 
Finally, it is questionable whether such estimates match actual behaviour. Whitehead 
and colleagues (1993) point out the discrepancy in Bramley's estimate of a more acute 
problem of access in the south east region, while the number of first time buyers in this 
region were also the highest. 
Many of these comments are valid, and reflect the lack of sophistication of the mortpge 
potential measurement, especially its failure to tackle diversity of both income and house 
prices within the locality. This estimate also failed to take into account the decision of 
an individual household given its own particular characteristics, income constraint and 
the distribution of house prices in the local area. 
Nevertheless, there has been some effort to rectify such drawbacks. Bramley (I 990b, 
1991) attempted to employ more sophisticated income and house price data to model 
the variation in income in a small locality. Integrating the calculation of mortgage 
potential with the vast literature on tenure choice and tenure preference can also help to 
establish behavioural models which enable a more accurate estimate of future housing 
outgoings. 
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On the other hand, problems imposed by the fluctuating price of houses are not specific 
to mortgage potential but are a general problem of cross-sectional survey studies. A 
modification has been attempted by Bramley (1991), who provided a statistical update 
when more recent data became available. A more satisfactory solution awaits a 
comprehensive longitudinal study. 
Despite the shortcomings described above, assessment by mortgage potential is the most 
sophisticated method available for investigating the affordability of prospective home 
buyers. It is an improvement on attempting assessment of the access problem without 
the backup of any solid quantitative data (as in the discussions in SERPLAN, 1990). 
Another small advance to match more closely estimates of access and the actual 
behaviour of home buyers was made by Littlewood (1986) who incorporated the 
element of tenure preference into estimates of ability to buy. Her original intention was 
to estimate the proportion of tenants who preferred home ownership who were in a 
position to realise their aspiration. However, it also enabled a differentiation of 
households which could afford home ownership who wanted to be home owners from 
those who, while having the ability, preferred to rent. This latter estimate can help to 
fine tune the situation of access. The simple assumption that all households would 
prefer to become home owners if resources allowed would lead to an overestimate of 
the problem of access. In addition, the characteristics of households with reference to 
tenure preference and ability to buy would help to establish behavioural models in this 
area. 
As discussed in chapter two of this thesis, contrary to the general belief that the majority 
of households would prefer home ownership, preference varied much among tenures 
and households with different socio-economic characteristics. Surveys on tenure 
preference found that public and private tenants, the young and the elderly had a 
substantially lower preference for home ownership than married and middle aged home 
owners (Littlewood 1986, Coles 1991). Littlewood (1986) also discovered that over 
I Mo of households, although capable of buying, preferred to rent. Among households 
lacking the required mortgage potential, only around two thirds preferred to own. 
These are not trivial figures when estimating the size of the problem of access. In the 
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following sections the ability of prospective owners to buy in the light of their preference 
in the late 1980s will be examined. 
10.4 MORTGAGE POTENTIAL AND TENURE PREFERENCE: 
A GENERAL PROFILE 
The deflnidon of Mortgage Potential 
The empirical analysis in this and the following sections is based on samples from the 
1988 GHS. Only tenants who were under the age of sixty, living in England, and renting 
from either the local authority or private landlords were selected for detailed analysis. 
The 1988 GHS was selected because a question on tenure preference was included in 
the questionnaire of that year the first time after 1978 when such question was first 
asked . Details of the sample selection as well as 
the characteristics of the selected 
households were described in chapter four. 
The ability of tenants to afford home ownership was measured by the mortgage potential 
of the households as used by Littlewood (1986). Mortgage potential is defined as the 
product of the income multiple and the annual income of the head of household and 
partner. When the head of household is above forty years of age, mortgage potential is 
systematically reduced by the age factor as listed in table 10.1. The result is considered 
to be the amount of mortgage loan available to the household for house purchase. 
Two types of mortgage potential are defined, A household is deemed to have "average 
mortgage potential" if it can afford a house at the median price paid by first time buyers 
in the household's region. If the household cannot afford a house in the lower quarter of 
the price range paid by first time buyers in the region, the household is considered to 
have , marginal mortgage potential" (formula 10.1). 
The use of marginal mortgage potential as an indicator allows more relaxed criteria for 
assessing the problem of access. It can serve as a lower threshold for becoming a home 
owner because only a quarter of first time buyers in the region could have bought a 
house at a price lower than the corresponding reference price. 
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Data from the regional median and lower quarter of the house price distribution were 
based on an unpublished table from the 1988 Five Percent Sample Survey of Building 
Society Mortgages supplied by the DoE on request. Part of the analysis presented in 
this and the following sections have been published in Yip and McLaverty (1993), 
McLaverty and Yip (1993) and McLaverty and Yip (1994). Before the relationship 
between the ability to buy and tenure preference is analyzed, a general profile of the 
socio-economic characteristics of households which prefer to be home owners will be 
presented in the next section to provide contextual information. 
Table 10.1 Aw Factor in the Calculation of Mortgage Potential 
A-Re of Head of Household % of Reduction 
Under 40 0 
40-44 10 
45-49 20 
50-54 35 
55-59 65 
Source: Littlewood (1986) 
As mentioned in the previous section, household savings should also be crucial to the 
calculation of the access to home ownership. Ignoring the contribution of savings 
would undermine the ability of the household to buy but assuming all households would 
have enough savings to pay for the down-payment may, on the contrary, over-estimated 
their ability to be home owners. However, it is not possible to include the contribution 
of savings in the evaluation of mortgage potential in this thesis owing to the lack of such 
information. There is no information on savings in the 1988 GHS. From the 
information of income from gross interests received by the respondents, proportion of 
households having savings of one form of another was small and the amount of their 
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savings was not big". Although there may be a possibility that prospective home buyers 
could have other assets or they could get help from other sources, without reliable 
information, the assumption that they have no savings (or other realisable assets) to pay 
for downpaying should not be too far from reality. 
Tenure Preference 
As already described in chapter two of this thesis, various surveys conducted since the 
1960s all found a preference for home ownership among households in Britain 
(BSA, 1983,1986,1989; Coles 1991; OPCS, 1979,1989). There was no exception to 
these findings in 1988. Over three quarters (79%) of households in England in 1988 
preferred home ownership. Those which preferred to rent formed less than one sixth 
(16%) of all households. 
To match the sample of households which was used to analyze mortgage potential, 
further analysis on tenure preference and socio-economic characteristics was performed 
on public and private tenants under the age of sixty who had expressed a definite 
preference for either renting or home ownership. A profile of this analysis is presented 
in table 10.2 
A substantial Merence is apparent in the preference to own between younger tenants in 
the public and private sectors. Less than three quarters (7 1 %) of public tenants wanted 
to buy compared with 84% in the private sector. Such preference varied less between 
the regions. Although it is, in general, local authority tenants in the south of the country 
who preferred home ownership, the difference was small. The Merence was small even 
among private tenants and a reverse pattern was observed: private tenants in the north 
preferred home ownership more than their counterparts in the south. 
Households with heads who were in full time employment: professionals, employers, 
intermediate and junior non-manual workers and skmed manual workers, would be more 
likely to prefer to own. Married couples had a high level of preference to buy compared 
with both lone parent and single person households. Those with educational 
qualifications (GCSE or above) and those who were in good health were also more 
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likely to prefer home ownership. 
The relationship between the preference to own and the age of the householder was 
more complicated. Nfiddle aged householders were the most likely to prefer to buy, 
younger householders less so, and their older counterparts had the least inclination to 
purchase a home. Preference for home ownership also increased with the increase in 
income of the households. Less than two thirds (W/o) of public sector tenants and 
around three quarters (73%) of private sector tenants in the bottom quartile of the 
income distribution preferred to own. The corresponding proportions of households in 
the upper income quartiles were 95% and 87%. 
When comparing preference with figures from a decade ago, it was found that while 
home owners and tenants in the private furnished sector showed an increased preference 
for home ownership, preference among other tenants remained the same. Whilst the 
proportion of households which preferred to own had increased in the south, fewer local 
authority tenants in the northern regions preferred home ownership (Littlewood, 1986; 
Yip and McLaverty, 1993). 
Table 10.2 Preference to Own by Socio-economic Characteristics By Tenure (Tenants Under 
60 in EnpJand) 
Socio-economic Characteristics Tenure Preference Tenants Prefer to Own % 
Current Tenure Local Authority Private 
All Tenants 71 84 
Region 
North 77 100 
Yorks and Humberside 64 78 
East Midlands 61 100 
East Anglia 73 86 
I, ondon 81 86 
South East 76 76 
South West 79 90 
West Midlands 65 86 
North West 92 80 
Emplovinent Status (HoH) 
Full Time 81 90 
Part Time 67 85 
Uneinployed/Retired 75 56 
Others 57 76 
S 
Profcssional/Managa/Employcrs 77 93 
Intermediate and Jun Non-Manual Workers 78 91 
Skilled Manual Workers 78 79 
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Table 10.2 Preference to Own by Socio-economic Characteristics By Tenure (Tenants Under 
60 in EnpJand) 
Socio-economic Characteristics / Tenure Preference Tenants Prefer to Own % 
Current Tenure Local Authority Private 
Semi-skilled and Personal Service Workers 67 80 
Unskilled Workers 54 63 
Household Type 
Married Couple 79 87 
Single Person 57 81 
Lone Parents 66 87 
Others 72 85 
Qualifications of HoH 
Have Qualifications 82 86 
No Qualification 65 75 
Health Condition of HoH 
Good Health 76 87 
Fairly Good Health 70 80 
Not Good Health 59 79 
A, qe of HoH 
Under 30 76 87 
30-34 78 100 
35-39 80 90 
40-44 76 94 
45-49 73 74 
50-54 60 50 
55-59 46 63 
Bottom Quartile Group 60 73 
Second QuarWc Group 71 88 
Third Quartile, Group 91 89 
Top Quartile group 95 87 
Number of Households 884 294 
Note: Percentage in italic denotes number of cases less than 10 
Source: Analysis of GHS 1988 
The ability to buy 
In 1988, less than a quarter of tenants who were under the age of sixty, renting from 
local authorities or from private landlords, could afford to buy a cheap house in the 
bottom quarter of the price range for first time buyers in the region. Only half of these 
(12%) would be able to afford a house at the median price. 
The situation among private tenants was slightly better than that for their counterparts in 
council housing. Less than a quarter (22%) of local authority tenants had marginal 
mortgage potential, of whom only half (11%) had average mortgage potential; over a 
quarter (28%) of private tenants had at least marginal mortgage potential, and half of 
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these (14% of the total) could afford to buy at the median house price paid by first time 
buyers in the region. 
Since house prices across regions varied more than income, it is not surprising to find a 
Oference in the proportion of households which would be able to buy. Households in 
yorkshire and Humberside were more than three times more likely to be able buy than 
households in the South East, and more than six times than households in London. As 
with the pattern of regional house price levels and the findings of similar studies (e. g. 
Bramley, 1990,199 1), households in the south and south east were least likely to be able 
to afford home ownership. 
Married couple households were found to be in a more affordable situation than single 
person households and lone parents; those with an educational qualification and those in 
good health were more likely to be able to afford home ownership. 
Fewer households with young householders could afford to buy compared with middle 
aged householders. Because of the systematic reduction of mortgage potential once the 
householder was older than forty and the severe reduction when he approached 
retirement, only a few households with a householder over the age of fifty were in a 
position to buy. 
There was also an apparent fife cycle pattern in the ability to afford home ownership. 
Employing the life cycle group model (Bradshaw et al, 1987) used in the previous 
chapter, a period of "relative need" can be observed. The young single and family 
formation stages were periods in the life cycle when households were less able to afford 
home ownership. On the other hand, periods of "relative plenty": the young married, 
two generation and early disposal stages included the highest proportion of households 
which could afford home ownership. 
However, the clearest patterns were found among households with varying income and, 
consequently, groups of households which were more likely to enjoy higher income. 
Whilst over 80% of local authority tenants and 61% of private tenants in the top income 
quartile could afford home ownership, none could who were in the bottom quartile. 
273 
Households with a householder working full time or in the professional, employers and 
managers group had the highest chance of being able to afford to buy. Those who were 
working part time, unemployed or in unskilled manual work were the least able to do so. 
Such a result is not surprising given the importance of household income in the 
definition of mortgage potential (table 10.5). 
Comparing these with figures on affordability from a decade ago, it was found that the 
proportion of tenants below the age of sixty, in both the public and private sectors, who 
had average mortgage potential, remained the same. Those with marginal mortgage 
potential increased (Littlewood, 1986; Yip and McLaverty, 1993). This indicates that 
while affordability for an average tenant remained constant, for poorer tenants the 
situation had deteriorated over the decade. Such deterioration occurred in almost every 
region in England. Although this may be the effect of being at different position in the 
house price cycle, 1978 was at the ebb of the cycle whereas 1988 was just before the 
peak, at least the Merential effect of house price changes on households at different 
points of the income spectrum. 
Because only around three quarters of the households in the sample preferred to own, 
not all households in either the "affordable" or the "unaffordable" group are expected to 
prefer to be home owners. It is not surprising to find that households with mortgage 
potential would prefer home ownership, given the higher preference to own among 
households with higher incomes and the close relationship between the level of income 
and mortgage potential. Table 10.3 shows that among tenants who had the ability to be 
home owners, the overwhehning majority (90%) would prefer to own as against 7(r/. of 
those who could not afford home ownership. 
This pattern holds for all groups of households when broken down into housing and 
other socio-economic characteristics. However, it is difficult to observe the relationship 
between mortgage potential, the preference to own and socio-economic characteristics 
of the households by inspecting the descriptive statistics because of multi-dimensional 
interaction effects. This will be explained in the following section using logit modelling 
and logistic regression. Meanwhile, one thing about mortgage potential and tenure 
preference is certain. If a conclusion were to be drawn on the ability of access to home 
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ownership from the mortgage potential figures alone, there would be a 10% over- 
estimation of households who might buy because some of those who had the ability to 
buy would prefer to rent. 
Table 10.3 Socio-economic Characteristics By Mortgage Potential by Preference to Own 
(Tenants Under 60 in England) 
Socio-economic Charactenstics /% of Have MP Prefer to Own 
Households MMP AMP HaveMMP NoMMP 
All Tenants 23 12 90 70 
Tenure 
Local Authonty Tenants 22 11 96 67 
North 34 21 87 74 
Yorks and Humberside 38 19 80 60 
East Midlands 37 18 91 60 
East Anglia 22 11 92 74 
London 6 3 100 91 
South East 13 6 96 73 
South West 18 5 93 81 
West Midlands 29 11 89 60 
North West 28 16 90 56 
Employment Stabs (HoH) 
Full Time 43 22 89 80 
Part Time 8 3 100 59 
Unemployed/Retired 7 2 92 70 
Others 3 0 75 59 
Profess ional/M anager/Employers 46 28 91 80 
Inten-nediatc and Jun Non-Manual Workers 15 7 97 90 
Skilled Manual Workers 31 17 89 74 
Semi-skilled and Personal Service Workers 19 7 82 0 
Unskilled Workers 16 8 88 48 
Household Type 
Married Couple 40 23 88 75 
Single Person 15 5 90 64 
Lone Parents 4 0 90 67 
Others 18 6 93 78 
Qualifications of HoH 
Have Qualifications 28 14 93 80 
No Qualification 19 9 83 62 
Health Condition of HoH 
Good Health 30 16 89 75 
Fairly Good Health 18 8 90 69 
Not Good Health 10 4 79 60 
Age of HoH 
Under 30 21 8 93 77 
30-34 38 25 90 78 
25-39 35 19 88 76 
40-44 35 20 92 75 
45-49 25 to 81 70 
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Table 10.3 Socio-econornic Characteristics By Mortgage Potential by Preference to Own 
(Tenants Under 60 in England) 
Socio-cconomic Characteristics /% of Have MP Prefer to ONNn 
50-54 Jj 
Young Single 15 5 88 77 
Young married. 43 32 100 75 
Family Formation 41 Is 83 99 
Middle Childrearing 54 32 86 77 
Complete Family 55 31 85 92 
Early Disposal 36 21 82 81 
Two Generation 26 13 90 72 
Empty Nest 5 4 33 58 
Early Retirement 0 0 0 
Old and Single 0 0 0 0 
Lone Parent 4 0 89 69 
Note: Percentage in italic denotes number of cases less than 10 
Source: Analysis of GHS 1988 
10.5 LOGIT MODELLING 
Marginal mortgage potential was related to most of the tenure and socio-economic 
characteristics when each of these characteristics was examined in turn with marginal 
mortgage potential. Bivariate analysis of socio-economic characteristics with marginal 
mortgage potential shows significant chi-square or F statistics in nearly all of the 
characteristics, which indicate the existence of association (table 10.4). Households 
having a child below the age of five were an exception in which there is no association 
between the presence of pre-school children and the marginal mortgage potential of the 
household. A multivariate technique was employed to examine the relative importance 
of these socio-economic characteristics. Logit modelling and logistic regression 
analysis, which have been used in previous chapters, are used in this section to examine 
such effects. Logit modelling (Appendix A] 2) is appropriate for investigating the 
interaction effect of three or more categorical variables and three logit models are 
examined in this section. 
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Table 10.4 Bivariate Analysis: Marginal Mortgage Potential by Tenure, 
region and socio-economic characteristics 
Socio-economic characteristics Chi-squ 
Tenure 4.4** 
Region 8 1.0** 
Tenure Preference 37.4** 
Socio-cconomic Status HoH 51.1** 
Household Type 154.5** 
Employment Status HoH 227.3** 
Children Under 5 6.7ns 
Children 5 to 15 lg** 
Children 16 to 24 4.9** 
Children over 25 17.3** 
Qualifications 13.3** 
Health 40.2** 
Employment status of spouse 31.7** 
F Value 
Age 15.5** 
No of Persons 39.5** 
No of Children 0.58ns 
Note: ** p<O. 01 ns Not Significant 
Source: Analysis of GHS 1988 
These three logit models were intended to test the interaction of mortgage potential, 
tenure preference and a number of selected socio-economic characteristics. The first 
model explores the interaction of marginal mortgage potential with tenure preference, 
tenure and region. The second examines the interaction of mortgage potential with 
tenure preference, household type and household composition. The final model 
examines the interaction of mortgage potential with tenure preference, employment 
status and household income. The results of these logit models are presented in table 
10.5. 
Table 10.5 Logit Models: Marginal Mortgage Potential by Household Socio- 
economic CharacterMcs 
Variable: Marjýnal Mortgage Potcntial 
Final Model G2 p 
1. [M] [P] [R] [M*P] [M*R] 20.8 0.65 
2. [M] [P] [E] [Q] [M*Pl [M*Ej [M*Qj 18.2 0.20 
3. [W [P] HIUC5-151 [M*Pl [M*Hl [M*C5 151 75.9 0.11 
Note: M (Marginal Mortgage Potential) P (Tenure Preference) R (Region) E (Employment 
Status of HoH) Q (Income Quartile Group) H (Household Type) * denotes the interaction 
effect 
Source: Analysis of GHS 1988 
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In model one, marginal mortgage potential was set as the dependent variable and the 
initial model region, tenure preference and tenure as the independent variables. The 
most appropriate model was selected with reference to the log likelihood statistics, with 
one variable at a time taken from the saturated model (the model that contains all the 
relevant interactions among all variables). 
However, the final model, where an exclusion of any of the terms in the model will lead 
to a significant drop in the likelihood statistics, was simple. Tenure was found to be 
insignificant in the model, as were the two-way and higher order interaction effects. 
This indicates that, although tenure was found to be significantly related to mortgage 
potential when it was considered alone, the effects of tenure preference and region could 
explain the variation of mortgage potential between public and private tenants. All other 
factors in the model were independent of each other where mortgage potential was 
concerned. It is not surprising that the effect of region was significant given the 
importance of regional price variation in defining mortgage potential. However, it is 
interesting to note that this could not account for the effect of tenure preference on 
mortgage potential. This indirectly indicates that tenure preference is not shaped only by 
the level of house price but may act as an independent factor. 
The second set of models looks at the effects of employment, income and tenure 
preference on the ability to buy. The final model of this set was simple, with only two- 
way interaction effects. Tenure preference, employment status of head of household and 
income quartile group, if considered individually, all showed a significant difference 
between households which could afford to buy and those which could not. The effects 
of these three factors on ability to buy were independent of each other. In other words, 
given that the households belonged to a particular income quartile group, there was no 
difference in the ability to buy between households which preferred to buy and those 
which preferred to rent. A similar relationship existed with other combinations of 
factors (table 10-2). The direct relationship between household income and mortgage 
potential is clear, but the independent effects of tenure preference and employment need 
some explanation. The independent effect of tenure preference was attributed to a 
similar factor mentioned in the previous paragraph, whilst the effect of employment not 
only represented a source of income (which should be accounted for by the income 
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variable) but was a proxy for other attributes not represented by income, for instance: 
age, education level and health (which were also significant for the detemination of 
mortgage potential). 
In the third set of models the effect of tenure preference is examined, with household 
type and household composition, on the ability to buy. The initial model included tenure 
preference, household type and whether there were children at various ages within the 
household. It was found that household type, tenure preference and having children 
aged 16 to 24 were significant in explaining the variation in ability to buy. The presence 
of children in other age ranges could be explained by other factors in the model. As 
with the two sets of models examined in this section, only the two-way interaction 
effects were significant. It is a more complicated model than the two described, which 
reflects the complexity of life cycle effect on with affordability. 
The goodness of fit (the G' statistics) of the three models also indicates how well the 
explanatory variables fit the model. It is evident that the model involving income and 
employment status fits best, suggesting a strong effect of income on mortgage potential 
whilst the fife cycle effect was the weakest. The inclusion of tenure preference in all 
three models would also suggest it as an independent factor influencing mortgage 
potential. This indicates that tenure preference is an informative intervening variable 
which plays a significant role in the study of affordability for prospective home buyers. 
10.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The ability of a prospective home buyer to afford owner occupation was evaluated in 
this chapter by the measurement of mortgage potential, which is only an estimate based 
on some assumptions about the behaviour of prospective buyers. A more formal way of 
validating this measurement is to compare the estimated outcome with real life data. 
However, the available data does not make this Idnd of validation feasible. Sensitivity 
analysis is a second-best option which provides a means ofjudging whether the estimate 
is acceptable by testing how the results of the analysis vary with a change in 
assumptions. Though sensitivity analysis cannot offer a definitive test of the validity of 
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the estimate, it does at least provide some clues on how sensitive the choice of 
assumption would have to be to affect the results of the analysis. 
There are two parameters in mortgage potential evaluation in formula 10.1 in which 
explicit assumptions have to be made: the income multiple flictor and the age factor. 
The importance of the sensitivity of selection of a particular value for these two 
parameters will be tested in this section. Likewise, although the levels of regional house 
price were based on behavioural data, implicit assumptions are also involved. A 
decision was made to select the average and the lower quartile of the price range as the 
reference price. This would have produced a different definition of classifications if 
different reference prices had been selected. Testing the use of an alternative reference 
house price because of the price reduction sitting tenants could enjoy under the Right to 
Buy Scheme was also significant. Therefore the variation in house price in results from 
previous analyses will also be examined. 
The age factor used in the calculation of mortgage potential was set out in table 10.1 
which was adapted from Littlewood (1986). It is assumed that the mortgage loan has to 
be paid back before the head of household retires, so the period of repayment for an 
older householder will be reduced. In order to take into account the reduced period of 
repayment, the amount of each regular repayment has to be increased. Thus because of 
a higher repayment, the mortgage potential of older householders is reduced. 
Littlewood did not explain explicitly such assumptions nor did she provide any 
information justifying the levels of age factor chosen. Yet this can be tested against the 
increase in mortgage repayment as a result of a reduced period of repayment. An 
illustrative calculation is presented in table 10.6. Suppose that a household takes a 25 
year repayment mortgage of 110,000 at an interest rate of 101/6 per annum. The normal 
monthly repayment of interest and principal is L9.19. If the length of repayment is to be 
reduced, the extra repayment in relation to the reduced period of repayment can be 
calculated. 
it is shown that the percentage of reduction in mortgage potential using the age factor is 
close to the percentage of increase in mortgage repayment when the head of household 
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is younger than fifty. However, for older householders, the level of reduction by the age 
factor is not enough to reflect the increase in mortgage repayment. It is thus expected 
that the mortgage potential of older householders would be worse than the level 
calculated in formula 10.1. This sensitivity analysis is also sensitive to the choice of 
interest rate level and the reference period of repayment and should be interpreted with 
caution. 
Table 10.6 Age Factor and Reduction of Mortgage Potential 
Age of HoH Age Factor Mid Point of Age 
Range 
MOntl* Outgoing of 
Repayment fvw 
% of increase over base 
reference 
Under 40 0 Reference Group 9.19 0 
40-44 10 42 1017 10 
45-49 20 47 11.74 22 
50-54 35 52 16.68 41 
55-59 65 57 33.51 73 
Note: The Reference Mortgage Outgoings am based on the repayment of a mortgage loan of 
j 10,000 at 10% interest repaying over 25 years 
Source: Age Factor (Littlewood, 19966); Monthly Outgoings (BSA, no date) 
Another parameter in the evaluation of mortgage potential is the income multiple. 
Littlewood (1986) took the value of 2.5 which is also used in this thesis. This level of 
income multiple implies that the household is able to obtain a mortgage loan two and 
half times the annual income of the head of household and partner. Since Littlewood 
(1986) assumes that the mortgage would be one hundred percent of the house price, 
statistics on income to price ratio would provide a comparison of the adequacy of this 
assumption. 
The price to income ratio has varied substantially over the past two decades. The peak 
of this ratio for first time buyers was in 1974 (when such statistics were available) when 
first time buyers could, on average, obtain a mortgage loan 2.8 times their annual 
income. The ratio fell for the remainder of the 1970s, reaching a ebb of 2.06 in 1982. 
The 1980s saw a rise and in 1990 it was 2.66 (DoE 1991). In 1978, the price to income 
ratio was, on average, 2.25, a stricter ratio than the 2.5 level used by Littlewood (1986). 
In 1988, it was 2.54 which is close to the level used in this thesis. However, the income 
counted towards mortgage potential in Littlewood (1986) and in this thesis includes the 
income of the partner of the head of household, which may not always be the case when 
a building society considers a mortgage application. Because the income figures in the 
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price to income ratio statistics are based on information related to the mortgage 
application, the level would be reduced if the income definition used in Littlewood 
(1986) and this thesis was employed. 
Another related assumption is the advance to price ratio. Littlewood (1986) assumed 
that a household could obtain a mortgage equal to the price of the house. However, 
this assumption of one hundred percent advance was not a close approximation to the 
mortgage first time buyers could actually secure in 1978, which was only 76% (DoE 
1979) of the purchase price. Thus Littlewood (1986) over-estimated the potential of 
prospective buyers in getting adequate mortgage loans. 
In 1988, the average advance to price ratio rose to 95% (DoE 1989), and many first 
time buyers could have an advance close to, or more than they needed, to cover the 
house purchase. In 1989, half of first time buyers could secure an advance of more than 
94% of the price of the house, and a third could have borrowed more than the house 
purchase price (Bank of England 1991b). Thus, the scenario of obtaining a one hundred 
percent advance for first time buyers was more likely in 1988 than in 1978. In addition, 
the estimation of mortgage potential in Littlewood's study and this thesis does not take 
into account the transaction costs of home purchase and the lower value of surveyor's 
valuation, to which building societies make reference when granting mortgage loans, 
than the actual purchase price. It further widens Littlewood's over-estimation. This 
situation would be less serious in 1988 when a considerable proportion of first time 
buyers could get a loan more than the purchase home price. 
The choice of income multiple might largely reflect the situation of first time buyers in 
1988, but is nevertheless a suggested figure which was not precisely evaluated from 
behavioural data. A sensitivity test on the income multiple can be illuminating in judging 
the validity of the measurement. Figure 10.1 shows a simulation of the change in 
households having mortgage potential on a Merent assumption of the income multiple. 
It is apparent from the graph that the proportion of households having both marginal and 
average mortgage potential increased as the level of income multiple increased. The 
change in proportion of both measures of mortgage potential followed a quadratic 
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regression function, with a high degree of fit, in relation to the change of income 
multiple (values of the R square statistics of the regression equations are shown). 
Marginal mortgage potential is more sensitive to the change of income multiple than 
average potential and the change of marginal mortgage potential at the lower end of the 
income multiple level is yet more sensitive. An increase of income multiple from 2 to 
2.01 would produce in a 2.91/o increase in households with marginal mortgage potential. 
The increase is smaller at 1.3% when the income multiple changes from 4 to 4.01. 
A change of income multiple would have a different impact in relation to the ability to 
buy on Merent groups of households. Table 10.7 shows the regional, tenure 
composition and socio-economic characteristics of households having marginal 
mortgage potential under three scenarios of income multiple. When the income multiple 
is changed from 2.5 to 3, there are 3% more households with marginal mortgage 
potential. This would increase to 13% if the income multiple were 4. 
This change of income multiple would have a great effect among private tenants and 
households living in regions where house prices were higher. Eleven percent of 
households in London would be able to buy if the income multiple were 3, an 80% 
increase over the level able to buy when the income multiple was 2.5. It is also, 
generally, households which were less likely to be in an affordable situation who would 
gain more if the income multiple were to be increased. The proportion of households 
which have mortgage potential and who, at the same time, preferred to buy, showed 
little change when the income multiple changed. Whilst 89% of households having the 
ability to buy preferred home ownership, the proportion decreased to, respectively, 88% 
and 85% when the income multiple changed to 3 and 4. 
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Figure 10.1 Mortgage Potential and Change of Income Multiple 
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Table 10.7 Scnsitivitv Analvsis: Income Multinle 
Households Having MMP % 
Income Mul! jple 2.5 3 4 
All Tenants 23 29 36 
Tenure 
--- Local Authority Tenants 22 27 33 
Private Tenants 28 35 44 
Region 
North 34 42 48 
Yorks and Humberside 38 43 52 
East Midlands 37 42 49 
East Anglia 22 26 46 
London 6 11 16 
South East 13 19 27 
South West 18 22 29 
West Midlands 29 35 40 
North West 28 32 39 
Mý loym t Status (HoH) 
Full Time 43 51 .......... -- ----- 61 
Part Time 8 13 18 
Unemployed/Retired 8 11 21 
Others 3 2 
Socio-economic QLou 
Professional/Manager/Employers 46 55 66 
intermediate and Jun Non-Manual Workers 15 20 33 
Skilled Manual Workers 31 38 54 
Semi-skilled and Personal Service Workers 19 24 35 
Unskilled Workers 16 19 29 
Household Tym 
Married Couple 40 51 27 
Single Person 15 20 25 
Lone Parents 4 8 12 
I Mar MP Rsq 0. §l 
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Table 10.7 Sensitivitv Analvsis: Income Multivle 
Households Having MMP % 
income Multiple 2.5 3 4 
Others 18 21 33 
Age of HoH 
Under 30 21 27 34 
30-34 38 48 56 
25-39 35 45 55 
40-44 35 39 50 
45-49 25 30 36 
50-54 7 11 16 
55-59 2 2 7 
Average Age of Holl 35 35 35 
Average Income of HoH+Partner f. 15599 14599 13589 
with mmP and Prefer to Buv 89 88 85 
Note: MMP Marginal Mortgage Potential 
Source: Analysis of GHS 1988 
As mentioned earlier in this section, house price is the parameter. No explicit 
assumption has been made in the mortgage potential calculation, and a sensitivity test 
could be illustrative. House prices were not stable in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was 
shown in chapter two of this thesis that house prices escalated towards the later part of 
the 1980s, but plummeted in the early years of the 1990s. At the same time, the change 
in interest rates may have an effect similar to the change in house price, an increase in 
either house price or interest rate would force the monthly repayment upward. There 
was a substantial increase in the mortgage rate in 1988 from 10% in January to 13.5% in 
the early months of 1989. This produced an effect on outgoings equivalent to a 30% 
increase in house price. 
Local authority tenants are given the right to buy the accommodation they currently 
occupy at a substantial discount under the Right To Buy Scheme. In 1988, the 
maximum discount available to a sitting tenant was 60% for a house and 70% for a flat. 
Simulating the effect of a change in house price on the mortgage potential would 
illustrate the effect that the fluctuation of both house price and the interest rate would 
have on mortgage potential, as well as the effect of the RTB policy on the affordability 
of local authority tenants. 
Figure 10.2 shows the change in the proportion of households with average and 
marginal mortgage potential when house prices change. In a similar manner, the change 
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in mortgage potential with the change of income multiple might fit well with a quadratic 
regression equation in relation to the change in house price. 
The shift in mortgage potential was slightly more sensitive to house price change if the 
reduction in house price was large. If the house price was reduced from I OWN0 to 99O. Y'O' 
a corresponding finther 0.3% of households would have marginal mortgage potential; 
but the same percentage change for around a 50% discount, the corresponding change 
was I%. Marginal mortgage potential was more sensitive to price change than average 
mortgage potential. Yet the effect of house price change on both types of mortgage 
potential was small if there was only a small fluctuation around the 100% mark. 
In 1988, the average discount available to sitting tenants from RTB was 5 1%. The 
average valuation of dwellings sold in 1989-89 under the RTB was 136600 (HM 
Treasury 1989). This was close to the average price of 138028 paid by first time buyers 
in the market in 1988 (DoE 1989). Thus, simulating the change in average mortgage 
potential at a51% price reduction would be a close approximation of the ability to buy 
under the RTB. These results are presented in Table 10.8. 
Only I I% of local authority tenants could afford to buy an averagely priced house in the 
market. Twenty two percent had the ability to buy a cheaper house in the lower quartile 
of the price range. Under the RTB, nearly a third (3 1%) of local authority tenants could 
afford to buy. Tenants living in regions with high house prices in general gained greater 
benefit from the RTB- Whilst a small minority of local authority tenants in London and 
the South East could afford an average priced house in the market, over a quarter (28%) 
in the South East and about one in six (16%) in London could afford to buy under the 
RTB. Although the RTB narrowed the gap in the ability to buy in the regions, London, 
the South East and the South West had the lowest proportion of local authority tenants 
who could afford home ownership. 
Notwithstanding the RTB, there was an increase in ability to buy among groups which 
were less likely to be in an affordable situation in the open market: households living in 
regions with high house prices, those working part time, the unemployed, serni-skilled 
and unskilled workers, single persons and households on low incomes. These groups 
288 
remained among those with the least ability to afford home ownership. Local authority 
tenants who most likely to be able to afford to buy under the RTB were married couple 
households, with householders in their thirties and forties, in full time employment, who 
belonged to the socio-economic group of professionals, employers and managers. One 
exception to this was the group of households headed by manual skilled workers, which 
saw a three fold increase in the likelihood of being able to afford to purchase under the 
RTB, and reached a level comparable to that of the professionals and employers. This 
picture largely matches findings on the profile of council house buyers, in which 55% 
were aged between 35 and 44; 70% were in full time employment; and 86% were 
manual skilled workers (Kerr 1988). 
Table 10.8 Sensitivitv Analvsis: House Price Change (RTB 
Local Authoritv Tenants Havinj R Mor(RaRe Potential 
Reduction of House Price AMP MMP 
No Reduction 51% No Reduction 
Reduction 
All Tenants 11 31 22 
Reuion 
North 20 41 33 
Yorks and Humberside 18 45 32 
East Midlands 15 36 32 
East Anglia 6 33 12 
London 1 16 4 
South East 3 28 10 
South West 4 28 17 
West Midlands 12 30 27 
North West 15 30 24 
Employment Status (HoH) 
Full Time 23 61 44 
Part Time 3 12 7 
Unanployed/Retired 1 12 7 
Others 0 5 2 
Soci Grout) 
Professional. /Manager/Employers 23 50 40 
intermediate and Jun Non-Manual Workers 5 18 12 
Skilled Manual Workers 18 47 32 
Semi-skilled and Personal Service Workers 7 25 18 
Unskilled Workers 7 22 15 
Household Type 
Married Couple 21 53 38 
Single Person 3 17 12 
Lone Parents 6 3 
Others 8 24 16 
Alze of HoH 
Under 30 9 29 22 
30-34 20 51 34 
35-39 17 47 31 
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Fable 10.8 Sensi I iý it\ Anal% sis_ý House Price Cliangc (R'l [3) 
_,. _. 
Lo. cal, _, 
Auth. 9 ty Tenants 1-14yýng, Mortgage Potential 
Reduction of House Price ___AMP 
MMP 
40-44 20 44 32 
45-49 8 35 23 
50-54 3 14 9 
55-59 
Average Age of HoH 36 36 36 
Average Income of HoH+Partner f1 7517 13349 14277 
With MP and Prefer to Buy 90 95 86 
With MP Considering to Buy (RTB) 11 34 23 
Note: MMP Marginal Mortgage Potential AMP Average Mortgage Potential 
Source: Analysis of GHS 1988 
Figure 10.2 Mortgage Potential and Change of House Price 
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10.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLtISIONS 
The problem of sustaining current tenure is examined in chapters five to eight; attention 
is diverted, in this chapter, to the affordability of prospective home buyers. The problem 
of access to home ownership was one of the issues that triggered concern about the 
problem of affordability in the mid 1980s. An investigation of affordability would be 
incomplete if it lacked an exploration into this aspect of affordability. 
Mortgage potential was used in this chapter to assess prospective home buyers' ability to 
afford home ownership. It is defined as a multiple of the income of the head of the 
household and partner which is systematically reduced once the head of household 
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reaches forty years of age. It is supposed to be the maximum amount of mortgage a 
prospective buyer can obtain from a building society. ff the assessed mortgage potential 
is larger than the average purchase price paid by first time buyers in the region, the 
household is deemed to have average mortgage potential. Another benchmark of 
mortgage potential, marginal mortgage potential, is defined with reference to the price in 
the lowest quartile of house price distribution paid by first time buyers. This latter 
benchmark aflows a less strict assessment of access to home ownership by referencing 
the purchase at the lower end of the market. 
This measurement of the ability to access home ownership was first used by Littlewood 
(1986). Her achievement was to incorporate the notion of tenure preference into the 
investigation of affordability of prospective home buyers. This could help to identify 
those who could afford, but did not wish, to buy and those who wished to buy but who 
lacked the ability to do so. It enhances the fine-tuning of the expanded access problem 
and, at the same time, informs the debate on the feasibility of the further development of 
home ownership. 
The discussion in this chapter largely replicates Littlewood's study on the problem of 
access to home ownership in 1978. It adapts mortgage potential as the principal 
measurement of the ability of prospective home owners to buy and also embodies tenure 
preference in fine-tuning the access problem. Tenants in the public and private rented 
sectors from samples of the 1988 GHS were used for analysis, with house price figures 
from the 1988 Five Percent Sampled Survey Of Building Society Mortgages as the 
reference house price. 
In 1988, only one in ten (I I%) local authority tenants and around one in six (14%) 
private tenants could afford to buy an average priced house in the market. If a cheaper 
purchase option was considered, in the lowest quartile of the house price range, only 
around a quarter of local authority tenants (22%) or private tenants (28%) would have 
been in an affordable situation. Compared with the situation a decade ago, the average 
mortgage potential of tenants remained the same, but marginal mortgage potential 
deteriorated. This reiterates the situation of residualisation and marginalisation in the 
rented sector, particularly in the public rented sector. 
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Tenants with the least ability to buy were those living in London and the South East, 
householders who were approaching retirement age, single persons, lone parents and 
households with a low income. There was also evidence of a life cycle effect in relation 
to the ability to buy. A period of relative plenty in a household's life cycle was also 
period when the household was more likely to be able to afford home ownership. 
Tenants who preferred home ownership were more likely to be able to afford to buy, 
and those who had the ability to become home owners were more likely to prefer owner 
occupation. However, it would be imprecise to assume that all households which had 
the ability to buy would do so given the constraints they were facing and their 
preference. Whilst over W16 of tenants who had the ability would prefer to buy, only 
70% of those who could not afford it preferred home ownership. Thus, there was over- 
counting if those who could afford it but did not wish to buy were regarded as potential 
home buyers. 
While a systematic relationship between the ability to buy, the preference to own and 
households' socio-economic characteristics was not apparent, multivariate analysis of 
these factors reveals a simple pattern of relationship. When compared with tenure 
preference and region, the tenure of a household was insignificant in explaining the 
variation of the ability to buy whilst the effects of the former two variables were 
independent of each other. Tenure preference was also independent of income and 
employment status of the head of household in relation to the ability to buy. Whilst 
household type and tenure preference could explain the variation in ability to buy, 
household composition was insignificant except for the presence of school age children. 
Goodness of fit of the model shows the relative significance of income and region (a 
proxy for regional house price) on mortgage potential and the effect of tenure 
preference as a strong intervening variable. The life cycle effect on mortgage potential, 
which was significant, was weak. 
The assessment of mortgage potential in this chapter depends on certain assumptions in 
the formula of evaluation. Analyses were undertaken to test the sensitivity of these 
assumptions in comparison with the choice of alternative values. The age factor in the 
mortgage potential formula appears to reflect the increase in monthly outgoings owing 
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to the shortened length of repayment period for an older head of household. However, 
the burden of increase of the repayment, and thus the reduction in mortgage potential 
for householders who were close to retirement age, is underestimated. 
The income multiple in the evaluation of mortgage potential was set at 2.5. This 
provides a closer approximation to the mortgage loan available to an average borrower 
as a multiple of his income in 1988 than in 1978, the year on which Littlewood's study 
was based. A simulation of the change of the proportion of households in an affordable 
situation regarding home ownership with the change in income multiple shows that 
marginal mortgage potential was slightly more sensitive to the change of income 
multiple than average mortgage potential. It would have produced a larger effect among 
private tenants and those living in regions with higher average house prices. The 1980s 
also saw a period of more relaxed lending policy among building societies, with the 
apparent consequence of an increase in price to income multiple. Thus, a more 
favourable effect on households in high price areas should have been produced for those 
who could only afford to buy a house at the lower end of the price range. 
At the same time, a change in house price would also affect the households' ability to 
buy. Not only did the late 1980s experience a period of rapid house price escalation, it 
was also a time of interest rate fluctuation. The increase in house price and mortgage 
rates decreased the purchasing ability of prospective owners. A simulation of house 
price change in respect of the change in mortgage potential indicated that the effect of a 
short term house price change on the proportion of households having mortgage 
potential would be weak. Thus, unless the short term house price change was 
substantial, it would not affect the estimate of mortgage potential. 
Under the Right to Buy Scheme, local authority sitting tenants are entitled to a 
substantial discount when buying the accommodation they occupy. The effect of such a 
price change cannot be ignored as it would have a significant effect on the mortgage 
potential of local authority tenants. A simulation of the effect of such a price change on 
mortgage potential shows that if local authority tenants received the average discount on 
an average local authority dwelling in 1988, nearly 5(YYo more households would be able 
to buy, compared with their ability to buy a cheap house in the open market. 
293 
Households which were less able to buy in the market, those who lived in high price 
areas, those who worked part time or were unemployed, lone parents, single person 
households and those on a low income, would benefit more than others, albeit those 
households were still the least able to afford home ownership. 
The peak of the latest house price boom was around 1988 and 1989 (house prices in the 
south collapsed earlier than in the north). The gap between average house prices and 
average income was among the highest in recent decades. The unlikelihood of being in a 
position to buy among tenants compared with a decade ago reflects this gap. The 
market slump in the early 1990s might have improved the ability of tenants to buy, 
although this was partly offset by the worsening employment conditions and instability 
of earnings. The outcome of the combined effect of these factors on ability to buy 
awaits ftuther empirical study. 
Whitehead et al (1993) have criticised the cyclical fluctuation of prices in the housing 
markets regarding estimation of mortgage potential because it is based on the price level 
at a particular moment. It is therefore capable of giving only a snapshot of the problem 
and cannot demonstrate the trend. The sensitivity of the change in households having 
mortgage potential to a change in house price reveals the stability of such a "snapshot" 
estimate with respect to house price. Unless there is a large change in the level of house 
price, the estimate of households unable to buy would fluctuate little. While it is 
important to reveal the "trend" of the affordability problem, this could not be established 
without a solid and accurate empirical basis. A snapshot is unable to indicate the motion 
of a moving object, but a series of snapshots could provide an approximate 
representation of such movement. Likewise, repeated snapshots which examine a 
problem at different points in time could reflect the trend. This is the contribution of the 
updated statistics of Bramley (199 1) when linked with Bramley (199 1), and the analysis 
of this chapter with that of Littlewood (1986) would have on the trend of the access 
problem. 
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CHAPTER 11 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 POLICY CONTEXT AND METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 
Policy Context 
Affordability, a term almost unheard of in Britain before the 1980s, became a 
newsworthy subject in the media and a topical issue in academic discourse in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Two issues are believed to have triggered such concern, namely 
the escalation of house prices, especially in the south of the country; and the new 
financial regime for housing associations, which involved a substantial reduction in 
housing association grants and a consequent increase in rent levels. 
Post war house prices were characterised by cycles of boom and bust, Yet the latest 
house price boom in the mid 1980s was unprecedented, both in absolute terms and 
relative to wages. This triggered concern over the obstacles of access to home 
ownership, particularly in London and the South East where the increase in house prices 
was greatest. Escalating house prices and fluctuations in the housing market coincided 
with the government policy to encourage home ownership to new levels. 
The great house price slump in the early 1990s followed the peak in 1988 and 1989, 
causing great social distress. Not only did the fall in nominal prices create a 
psychological lack of confidence in the housing market, but the concomitant 
deterioration in the economic environment pushed many owner occupiers into financial 
difficulties. Significant among these were people who had bought at the peak of the 
recent price boom. Both the absolute level of mortgage arrears and property 
repossessions, as well as the relative increase over previous years, were startling. Other 
recent buyers, while able to sustain repayment, found themselves trapped in negative 
equity created by the depreciation in value of their dwelling. This raised concern not 
only because of its impact on the housing market or as a hindrance to labour mobility, 
but also because of the financial burden on many low income home owners who may 
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have aspired to home ownership as a result of goverment policy and the expectancy of 
a stake in the property market. 
At the same time, the government introduced a new financial regime for housing 
associations with the aim of incorporating private finance in order to boost output and 
improve efficiency in the sector. Reliance on private finance inevitably involved higher 
risk and the need to guarantee rental income. This change, together with reforms in the 
Housing Association Grant, exerted pressure on the level of housing association rents. 
This not only ran counter to the traditional role of many associations in providing 
housing for low income households but, given the social composition of housing 
association tenants, raised doubt over tenants' ability to meet those rents. 
While housing associations were asked to keep rents of their new lettings and reletting 
"affordable" to tenantsý there were no official guidelines on what would constitute an 
affordable level of rent. Debate was thus generated on how affordability could be 
defined and measured. Despite affordability being a vital element in housing association 
rent setting policy, compromise within the movement was neither easy nor maintained. 
On the other hand, affordability goes beyond the two tenures described above which 
attracted explicit concern. The new subsidy system of council housing which aimed to 
widen rent diflerentials and to relate the level of rent to the value of the RTB valuation 
of the council's existing stock, would push up rents in the medium to long term. This 
would make affordability an even more acute problem for the already marginalised 
council tenants. Indicators of this were their increased reliance on housing benefit and a 
high level of rent arrears. 
Deregulation in the private rented sector also induced an upward pressure on rent levels 
and, 'consequently, the Cost of housing for many private tenants. It is evident that 
private tenants put an increasing relative amount of their resources into housing, as well 
as increasing their reliance on housing benefit. 
An alarming level of homeless families and the visible presence of young single homeless 
people in metropolitan areas serves as a further reminder of the acute problem of the 
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access to, and the ability to afford, decent housing, albeit there is no strong evidence 
that homelessness is directly related to affordability. 
Furthermore, with the increasing emphasis on demand side subsidies to housing in the 
past few decades, housing benefit has become an important policy instrument for helping 
those who cannot afford high housing costs. The design of the current housing benefit 
system in Britain has protected those on fiffl benefit from the increased cost of housing 
and, by default, they were immune from any affordability problem. Yet the problem of 
take up and the lack of similar protection for home owners would still make low income 
households in the latter group vulnerable to affordability problems. In addition, such full 
protection creates a poverty trap and is a disincentive to finding employment. 
Definition of Affordability 
Despite the recent popularity of affordability in the discourse of housing policy, there is 
no commonly accepted definition of the term. Yet concepts of user costs of housing, 
notions of merit good and opportunity cost are common elements found in definitions of 
affordability which are deliberated in the literature. Such deliberations also fink 
affordability to standards of housing consumption and the concept of poverty. 
Likewise, there is a lack of consensus on how the concept of affordability should be 
operationalised. The measurement methods found in the literature can be roughly 
classified into three categories: the normative, the behavioural and the subjective 
approaches. The normative approach measures ordab ty with refer ce to a aff, ili en 
yardstick value which has supposedly been fixed by experts. The use of housing cost to 
income ratio, which is the most popular approach, regards a household as being in 
unaffordable housing if the household has to spend a proportion of income on housing 
higher than the reference ratio. Quality-based measurement and core need measurement 
are variations of the ratio measurement which add the dimension of the quality of 
accommodation occupied to the measurement of affordability. With slight alteration, the 
ratio measurement can also be used to measure the mortgage potential of a prospective 
home buyer. 
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The use of residual income, another measurement of the normative approach, was 
developed in order to rectify the alleged shortcomings of the ratio measurement. It 
compares income after housing costs against the poverty line. Households are deemed 
to be in affordable housing only if the residual income is above the poverty line. 
The behavioural approach, on the other hand, measures affordability by how much 
households spend on housing or how households fall into difficulties paying for housing. 
Whilst the basic principles of operationalising the concept of affordability behaviourally 
has been proposed, no empirical implementation of this technique has been developed in 
the literature. 
Lastly, the subjective approach bases measurement on the perception of the households 
on their own affordability situation. It is as yet a primitive approach to measurement, 
and development of both the theoretical basis and empirical implementation are required. 
Method of Investigation 
This thesis has attempted to construct a comprehensive definition of affordability which 
allows the concept to be operationalised by Merent approaches. It contains two 
elements: households living in inadequate housing should be regarded as being in an 
unaffordable situation regardless of how much they spend on housing. For those whose 
housing consumption is at, or above, an acceptable standard, housing costs should not 
impose an unreasonable burden on their household resources. The financial burden on 
the household should allow the normative, behavioural, subjective or any combination of 
these to be used as an assessment instrument, thus fitcilitating different approaches to 
measuring affordability. 
Six measurement schemes of affordability which are based on both the normative and 
the behavioural approaches are used in this thesis. The first two schemes are based on 
the traditional residual income approach which made reference to, respectively, 14(yyo of 
the income support benefit level, and fifty percent of equivalised average household 
income, as poverty lines. The third scheme was a modified form of the residual income 
approach which attempts to differentiate unaffordability from poverty. Only households 
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whose income before housing cost were above the poverty level, but fell below the 
poverty line after housing cost, would be counted as being in unaffordable housing. 
Those who were poor both before and after housing cost would be regarded as in 
poverty. In this measurement, fifty percent of average equivalised household income 
was used as the poverty line. 
The fourth scheme seeks to rectify an alleged shortcoming of the ratio measurement, 
namely an arbitrarily fixed reference ratio. This scheme employs the poverty line as a 
reference of household financial burden; the threshold affordability ratio can then be 
fixed where it crosses that particular housing cost to income ratio at where the 
household would be likely to be in poverty. The fifth scheme attempts to operationalise 
the behavioral approach in which the threshold affordability ratio is fixed at the ratio 
where expenditure on housing shows a qualitatively different relationship when crossing 
that particular ratio. The last scheme, the mortgage potential measurement, is used to 
assess the mortgage potential of prospective home owners. This latter scheme belongs 
to the normative approach and is effectively a variation of the ratio measurement. 
The first five measurement schemes were implemented with data from the 1991 Family 
Expenditure Survey. This was also used to explore the problem of housing affordability 
in the early 1990s. To allow subsequent discussions of relevant policies to have a 
sharper focus, only households in England were selected for analysis. The sample was 
further restricted to "paying" households so that the affordability problem could be 
reflected in their current expenditure rather than as a consequence of past investment or 
special living arrangements. In order to incorporate tenure preference into the 
understanding of the affordability of prospective home owners, the 1988 General 
Household Survey was used, which provided information on tenure preference as well 
as relevant information for affordability assessment. Analysis of the affordability of 
prospective home owners was restricted to public and private tenants in England who 
were under the age of sixty. 
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11.2 NUIN FINDINGS 
Measurements 
The first three measurement schemes used the residual income as the measurement 
indicator. These were straightforward normative measurements, with no noteworthy 
findings where the measurement per se was concerned. Likewise the sixth measurement 
scheme, the mortgage potential measurement, which was based on the ratio 
measurement but. with the threshold ratio implicit, yielded no notable findings on this 
aspect. 
Conversely, the fourth and the fifth measurement schemes were behaviourally based and 
the analysis in this thesis produced several important findings on the behavioural (the 
fifth scheme) and semi-behavioural (the fourth scheme) approaches to affordability. It 
was found in the fourth measurement scheme, which attempted to fix threshold 
affordability ratios referencing to a normative poverty fine, that the gross housing cost to 
income ratio was a better predictor of whether a household was in poverty than net 
housing cost to income ratio, and thus was also a better indicator of affordability in the 
context of this measurement scheme. Whilst it was shown to be inadequate in fixing one 
affordability ratio for households with varying characteristics, it was not manageable to 
set an array of threshold affordability ratios for each of the important characteristics. 
instead, it was shown that establishing different threshold ratios for different tenure 
groups would be sufficient. 
Furthermore, the cut-off ratios established in this way would make little difference to 
whether the 140% benefit level or 50*/o average household income was used as the 
reference poverty fine. Cut-off ratios were established at: 27% for local authority 
tenants, 29% for housing association tenants, 32.5% for private tenants in the 
unfurnished sector and 41.5% for those in the fin-nished sector. The ratio was 45% for 
home owners with a mortgage. 
using the fifth scheme, based on the behavioral approach, a cut-off ratio could be 
established from examining the relationship between household income and housing 
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expenditure. Yet the ratio so established was regarded as unstable and unreliable. On 
the one hand, assessing affordability with the ratios so established would have included 
the majority of households in unaffordable housing which did not match perceived 
reality. On the other hand, contrary to the evidence that it was not adequate to establish 
one threshold ratio for all households, it failed to establish threshold ratios for 
households with various characteristics. It was therefore dropped from further analysis. 
Households in Unaffordable Housing 
There was a high degree of agreement between the measurement schemes. The two 
schemes based on traditional residual income measurements showed agreement in 97% 
of cases. The concordance rate was as high as 90% between these two schemes and the 
scheme which was based on ratio measurement. 
More than a quarter of households were in unaffordable housing according to 
measurements based on these three schemes. Social tenants and private tenants in the 
unfin-nished sector were more likely to be in unaffordable housing than private tenants in 
the furnished sectors and home owners with mortgages. Affordability varied less across 
regions, but households in the north were slightly more likely to be in unaffordable 
housing. Lone parent households and people living alone also had a higher chance of 
experiencing unaffordable housing, as did elderly people and households with 
unemployed or retired householders. Notably, households on housing benefit or home 
owners claiming income support were seven times more likely than non-claimants to be 
in unaffordable housing. 
The modified residual income approach, the third scheme (Scheme R3) referred to in this 
thesis, on the other hand, reclassified over half of the households previously classified by 
the traditional residual income measurement schemes (the first and the second 
measurement scheme, R, and R2) as "unaffordable" into the "poverty" group. These 
households were unaffordable because of a lack of general resources rather than because 
of high housing costs. Regardless of whether the traditional or a modified scheme was 
used, housing benefit claimants and home owners on income support were more likely 
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to be in the "unaffordable" group, as were single persons, lone parents, elderly people 
and households with employed or retired householders. 
Conversely, under the modified scheme, social tenants were as likely as private tenants, 
and households living in the north as Rely as their counterparts living in the south, to be 
experiencing unaffordable housing. Social tenants and households in the north were 
considered to be less unaffordable in the traditional measurement scheme. Households 
in London were an exception. Almost fifty percent more were likely to be in the 
"unaffordable" group compared with their counterparts in the north. 
Mortgagepotendal 
Only a quarter of tenants could afford to buy in 1988. This number had decreased 
compared with a decade previously, probably attributable to an elevated price level in 
the private housing market, the exodus of better-off tenants in the 1980s, which left 
behind the poorer ones and the lesser involvement of both public and private tenants in 
the labour market. Tenants in London and the South East, single person households, 
lone parents, householders who were approaching retirement age and householders on a 
low income were the least able to afford home ownership. Households which could not 
afford to buy also had a lower preference for home ownership. Seventy per cent of 
them would have preferred to be home owners compared with 90% of those who could 
afford it. 
A sensitivity analysis on the assumptions on income multiple and house price in the 
assessment of mortgage potential indicated that the choice of the income multiple in the 
formula used in this thesis was appropriate; a small change in the house price would not 
have produced a significant effect on the assessment of mortgage potential. However, if 
the discount on house price was substantial, as in the case of the Right to Buy, it would 
produce a far more favourable affordability situation among local authority tenants. 
A simulation of discounted sales under the RTB scheme shows that 5(r/o more local 
authority tenants would be able to afford home ownership under the RTB than would on 
the open market. Householders who lived in high priced areas, those who worked part 
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time or were unemployed, lone parents, single people and those on low incomes would 
have benefited from the RTB, although they were still the groups who were the least 
able to afford home ownership. 
Affordability, Tenure, Employment, Housing Benefit and Life Cycle 
.. Fý Effect 
Consideration of affordability relative to tenure, employment and housing benefit 
demonstrated that the effect of housing benefit on affordability, when measured in terms 
of gross housing cost to income ratio, the preferred ratio mentioned in section 11.2, was 
more important than the effect of employment status. This reflects the relative 
importance of housing benefit over employment status (a proxy for income) on the 
housing cost to income ratio. Conversely, when affordability was measured in terms of 
residual income, the effect of employment was more influential then housing benefit. 
This finding illustrates the effect of employment, which indicates implicitly the relative 
importance of earned income on residual income. At the same time, tenure was 
important in both measurements, and its effect was independent of the other two factors. 
Analyses breaking down these factors into their respective subcategories shows that 
affordability is closely associated with home ownership, full time employment and non- 
receipt of housing benefit, while unaffordability is associated with local authority 
tenancy, unemployment/retirement, and benefit claiming. The situation of housing 
association tenants, private tenants and those working part time, with reference to 
housing affordability, was less clear. However, when the modified residual income 
scheme attempted to differentiate between "poverty" and "unaffordability", the new 
Ifunaffordable" group moved closer to private tenants and part-time workers, while the 
original position of the "unaffbrdable" group was taken up by the "poverty" group. it 
suggests that the problem of unaffordability of the latter groups may be attributed to 
different causes, notably the deregulation of the private rented sector, which increased 
the rent burden of private tenants, in contrast to the lack of resources among social 
tenants. 
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There was also an apparent life cycle effect on housing affordability. Households in 
periods of "relative want" were more likely to be having an affordability difficulty, while 
those in a more favourable affordability situation were likely to be in a period of 
"relative plenty". There was no evidence that this relationship was strong. 
Affordability and Household Expenditure 
It is generally expected that because of the heavier housing burden which is borne by 
households in unaffordable housing, they spend relatively more on necessity items 
(including housing) in order to maintain a reasonable standard of living. Thus they 
would have to forgo the consumption of other items, particularly luxury goods and 
services. Empirical evidence in this thesis shows that on the aggregate level, households 
in unaffordable housing did spend a higher proportion of their income on necessities, 
while households without an affordability problem spent relatively more on luxury 
items, although the difference was not great. 
At the household level, no distinct pattern in the distribution of necessity and luxury 
consumption between these two groups could be found. Generally, however, 
households with an affordability problem would have a more limited choice of how 
much they could spend on both necessity and luxury items, which did not necessarily 
preclude the consumption of hvaxy items. On the other hand, household expenditure 
pattern was not a good predictor of whether or not the household was having an 
affordability problem. 
overcrowding and Affordability 
With over-crowding as an indicator of housing consumption, empirical evidence in this 
thesis did not support the proposition that households were deliberately under- 
consuming housing in order to keep their housing cost within their means. On the 
contrary, the majority of households occupying unaffordable housing were consuming 
housing at a standard above the occupancy norm appropriate to the size and 
composition of the household. This begs the question of whether households in 
unaffordable housing, which are over-consuming housing services, should be regarded 
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as in voluntary unaffordability, or should be treated leniently (still regarded as in 
unaffordability) as Hancock (1993) suggests. 
The evidence in this thesis shows that the majority of households which were both in 
unaffordable housing and were over-consuming were the single elderly, local authority 
tenants and those on housing benefit. Whether it was feasible for these households to 
adjust their housing consumption to a level deemed to be affordable, in the case of an 
administrative housing allocation system in social housing, or whether such adjustment 
would lead to a lower financial burden, as the present system of housing benefit would 
imply, remains unclear. Thus, grey areas of assessment of affordability in these 
situations still e)dst. Hence, it may be inappropriate to reclassify households in 
unaffordable housing which are over-consuming as affordable. 
11.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Measurement Issues 
Arew APMWACI to AffgakAUj&-Mcmremen 
The measurement of affordability has been dominated by the normative approach in 
which affordability is assessed with reference to some authoritative threshold values, 
which were either explicitly designated by government or advocated by experts. 
Notwithstanding that threshold value is a housing cost to income ratio of 25% or having 
a residual income less than the benefit level, such threshold values are established not as 
a result of any scientific research, nor have they any solid theoretical backing. Such an 
approach was perceived to be the only method of affordability measurement. However, 
this thesis has introduced alternative approaches: the behavioural approach and the 
subjective approach. Because of the limitations of the data set used in this thesis, only 
the behavioural approach could be implemented in detail. 
The behavioural approach is a purely empirical method of establishing threshold 
affordability values which reflects the actual behaviour of households and is free from 
any arbitrarily predetermined values. A more sophisticated method of determining such 
305 
threshold values is also presented in this thesis, although owing to the limitations of the 
data set, reliable results could not be successfiffly generated. 
The behavioural and the subjective approaches advance the understanding of the 
affordability problem from a perspective distinct from the normative approach. These 
two approaches are in the early stages of development and have yet to be consolidated 
into strong, stand-alone measurement methods. Nevertheless, they could offer an 
independent validation of the commonly accepted normative approach. 
The use of housing cost to income ratio has the longest history in normative 
measurement of affordability. Yet the threshold reference ratio, which has been used for 
several decades, has been shown to have originated from a rule of thumb rather than 
being based on solid theoretical or empirical work. It is shown in this thesis that the 
gross housing cost to income ratio can be used, to a reasonable degree of accuracy, to 
predict the incidence of poverty. It thus provides an empirical method for determining 
the threshold affordability ratio: using housing cost to income ratio as an indicator of 
housing burden, and residual income as an indicator of household financial burden, a 
threshold ratio could be identified at the point above which the household would have a 
high probability of being in financial difficulty. It was also shown that different threshold 
housing cost to income ratios should be established for different tenure groups. 
Establishing a threshold affordability ratio using empirical methods also demonstrates 
the possibility of combining the behavioural approach and the normative aspect of 
affordability measurement. What is more interesting is the close agreement between 
different affordability measurement schemes. Not only was there almost perfect 
agreement between the two measurement schemes, based on the traditional residual 
income approach but reference to different poverty lines; the difference in classification 
between these two measurement schemes and the scheme that was mentioned in the 
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previous section, which combines the behavioural approach and the normative approach, 
was very small. 
This indicates that if a suitable threshold ratios could be chosen, the distinction between 
ratio and residual income measurement could be blurred. Thus, the allegedly 
antagonistic contrast between ratio and residual income measurements, as claimed by 
most advocates of residual income measurement, should not be over-emphasized. 
Residual income, which has been advocated as a better alternative to the ratio 
measurement of affordability, suffers from a serious weakness as an indicator of 
affordability. It was used initially, and still is being used, as an indicator of poverty. 
Confusion is created if a measurement indicator of affordability virtually equates 
affordability with poverty. This confusion would undermine not only the usefulness of 
residual income as an affordability indicator, but also the concept of affordability per se 
as a functional concept. 
it is suggested in this thesis that when residual income is used as a measurement 
indicator, a method should be developed for differentiating poverty om u ordabili fr naffi ty. 
A new residual income measurement, referred to as the modified approach to distinguish 
it from the traditional approach, was developed to achieve this. It was shown that, 
under this modified version of residual income measurement, the relationship between 
income and housing cost among the "affordable" and "poverty" groups was similar; but 
those households in the "unaffordable" group exhibited quite distinct characteristics. 
The "poverty" group in the modified version was part of the "unaffordable" group in the 
traditional version; because this former group was more numerous in terms of size, its 
characteristics would have over-shadowed the "unaffordable" group in the traditional 
measurement. Although poverty can be regarded as a form of affordability, yet analysis 
in chapter nine also indicates that the cause leading to unaffordability between the 
Ifunaffordable" and "poverty" groups (in scheme R3) may be different. Thus, the inability 
to differentiate unaffordability from poverty in the traditional measurement would easily 
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lead to a policy prescription which inclines towards those in poverty rather than solving 
the problems of those in unaffordability. 
Against the background of a continuous surge in the demand for home ownership, a 
measurement of affordability would not be comprehensive if the affordability of 
prospective home buyers were ignored. The potential of prospective owners to buy is 
usually estimated by their mortgage potential, which is in turn derived from information 
on income, house price and other factors related to mortgage lending application. it has 
been shown that most of the measurements popular in the literature are a variation of the 
ratio measurement, and could be used to measure the mortgage potential of a 
prospective home buyer. Thus, development of other forms of affordability 
measurement would also have an influence on the measurement of the affordability of 
potential buyers. Mortgage potential measurement, as a variation of the ratio 
measurement, carries a strong undertone of the normative approach. 
The incorporation of a behavioural element into the measurement of affordability of 
prospective home buyers would help to rectify the liability to bias of the normative 
approach. In this thesis, the preference for home ownership was used to adjust the 
measurement of mortgage potential. However, if the estimation of mortgage potential is 
to reflect more accurately the actual behaviour of potential buyers, more sophisticated 
models of tenure choice and demand would have to be incorporated into the analysis. 
Given the popular current concern, measurement issues of affordability are under 
developed. This is especially so for measurement instru en oI In ts f aff ty Ordabili , where the 
rule-of-thumb housing cost to income ratio has been used for decades without scientific 
enquiry. This thesis is an attempt to reverse the under-development of the affordability 
measurement instrument and it has been successful in filling the gap in developing a 
scientific method for fixing reference affordability values. Yet in experimenting with 
alternative approaches to affordability measurement, the results were not promising. 
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It is also short of the ideal that no longitudinal perspective, nor any corresponding 
measurement instrument for such a perspective, has been adapted in the analysis of the 
affordability problem. Yet the contribution of a snapshot measurement of survey data 
advocated in this thesis is nevertheless significant. Not only does the economy of using 
this method facilitate a more efficient and inexpensive method of enquiry but, because 
income, housmg cost and other household circumstances are relatively stable in the short 
term, it provides a close approximation in the short term. In addition, repeating 
measurements of this kind over time, although a second best solution, could serve as an 
indicator of the trend with regard to affordability. 
Policy Issues 
Eawt Qf The 4ffjmdabft AWAAM 
This thesis paints a rather gloomy picture of affordability: over a quarter of the 
households in England in the early 1990s suffered from a problem with affordability. 
Compared with the situation found in other research at the local level (Hancock 1993) 
or within a particular tenure (Kearns et al 1993), the extent of the problem at the 
national level was more serious and more widespread. It is even more noteworthy that 
the majority of social tenants experienced a problem of affordability; more than half the 
housing association tenants, and almost two thirds of those in local authority housing 
were regarded as being in unaffordable housing. 
Empirical evidence also points to the importance of tenure and the assistance to housing 
costs (housing benefit and help from social security to home owners) in relation to 
affordability. social tenants, housing benefit claimants and home owners getting help 
from social security towards their housing costs, were in a far less favourable 
affordability situation relative to other groups. The strong relationship between housing 
association tenants and affordability problems is understandable since it is the change in 
subsidy policy in this sector that arouses concern about affordability. The evidence in 
this thesis serves as a confirmation that such concern is justified. 
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Whilst local authority tenants were traditionally believed to have been protected against 
high housing costs because of the rent policy and a substantial subsidy from the 
government, it has been shown in this thesis that the new financial regime and its 
concomitant rent policy have eaten into this safýty net. Using the modified version of 
residual income measurement, the majority of those classified as being in unaffordable 
housing were reclassified as poor; around a fifth of social tenants were still categorised 
as being in the "unaffordable" group. 
This has added a new element to notions of marginalisation and residualisation in the 
social sector. Not only are social tenants excluded from the labour market and 
increasingly dependent on welfare, but the increasingly high cost of local authority 
housing has led to a new form of deprivation. 
Likewise, the housing benefit system, which should have protected poor tenants from 
falling below a certain level of deprivation, is shown to be inadequate in achieving this 
aim. The majority of households which were on housing benefit were also in 
unaffordable housing. Fine-tuning of the residual income measurement by the modified 
version of measurement diffenmtiated unaffordability into unaffordability and poverty, 
but still housing benefit claimants formed the majority of households in an unaffordable 
situation with regard to housing. In addition, home owners receiving help from social 
security towards their housing costs were in a position similar to housing benefit 
claimants. 
Reasons for this outcome are complex and findings from this research is not rich enough 
to provide an explanation. - It may in part relate to the particular poverty line chosen for 
the affordability measurement that was different from that implicit in housing benefit 
calculation. It may also due to the non take-up of benefit that leaves households who 
need the help outside the safiAY net. 
The findings in this thesis help to inform debates on affordability aimed at the housing 
association movement. Whether to include income from housing benefit in the 
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evaluation of affordability, and the level at which housing cost to income ratio should be 
fixed as a reference, have long been troubling the NFHA. Their most recent choice of 
employing net rent to income ratio of tenants not receiving housing benefit in the 
calculation of affordability (Housing Association Weekly 17 Dec 1993) avoids the "blind 
spot" of affordability measurement using net income, because of zero housing cost 
among tenants on fiffl housing benefit. 
Yet because of the exclusion of tenants on housing benefit in the assessment of 
affordability, the NFHA has to supplement the measurement to take into account the 
consequences of an increasing reliance on housing benefit by the addition of an 
additional qualification to the rent setting policy so that increased rent in the sector 
would not lead to increased dependency on housing benefit (Housing Association 
Weekly 17 Dec 1993). This indicates the importance, as well as the complexity, of the 
housing benefit system in the assessment of housing affordability. This thesis has 
demonstrated a method of integrating the effect of housing benefit into affordability 
measurement without resorting to complicated methods of evaluation. 
At the same time, the threshold ratio for housing association tenants established in this 
thesis can also serve as an indicative figure for setting affordable rents in that sector. 
Although the figure settled on in this thesis is considerably higher than that 
recommended by the NFHA, 291/6 as against 22%, it nevertheless provides an 
independent validation of principles advocated by the NFHA- It demonstrates, at least, 
that the NFHA figure is already quite lenient, offering a large margin to cater for 
anomalies among tenants in the housing association rented sector. 
There were several questions raised in chapter two relating to the policy implications of 
affordability: namely, the question of whether affordability is an income problem or a 
housing affordability problem; whether it is one, or actually several problems; whether 
such problems are cyclical or enduring; and whether it is merely a myth with no basis in 
reality. Empirical evidence in this thesis has shed light on these questions. 
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The use of the traditional form of residual income as an affordability measurement 
inevitably implies taking affordability as an income problem, regardless of whether or 
not any explicit assumptions have been made on the nature of the problem. This is so 
not simply because the measurement looks only at "income!, but mainly because residual 
income is itself a measurement of poverty. The cost of housing, and consequently 
housing per se, could easily become invisible. Considering the affordability problem as 
merely one of income undermines the role of the housing system in solving it. 
Yet to distinguish affordability from an income or housing problem is far from 
straightforward. First, the inability to pay for the cost of housing could be regarded as a 
component of the problem of poverty. Second, the effect of a change in income on the 
change in housing cost is complex. Third, housing affordability is an intermediate 
concept whose calibration has to rely on other indicators, plausibly indicators of 
poverty. These factors all make the interaction between affordability and poverty 
difficult to dfferentiate satisfactorily. 
Although empirical evidence in this thesis could not provide a solution to the relative 
nature of the affordability problem, it has contributed to the debate on affordability in 
this aspect. First, it argues that the traditional form of residual income measurement is 
itself indistinguishable from poverty measurement; this leads to further confusion about 
whether affordability is a housing or an income problem. Second, ratio measurement, 
which bears a high degree of agreement with the traditional residual income 
measurement, would not be sufficiently powerful for the purpose of differentiation. 
Finally, a modified version of the residual income measurement provides the necessary 
instrument enabling finther investigation of this issue. 
Affordability drew attention from the media to the difficulties of entry into home 
ownership. This could be perceived as a problem of the rising aspiration among the 
middle class which needs to be real for the majority of households. Evidence in this 
thesis shows, on the contrary, that the problem of affordability was a real one for many 
households, notably those on a low income and which had to rely on state benefits. Not 
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only did many tenants face a high housing cost burden, but the chance of becoming 
home owners was increasingly unrealistic given the gap between their income and the 
level of house prices. Although it is unclear whether the aspirations of the ambitious 
middle class to trade up exists or not, affordability is a problem based more in reality 
than in myth for many households. 
Yet one myth requires finther exploration. It was shown that among social sector 
tenants who were in unaffordable housing many were, at the same time, over-consuming 
housing services above the occupancy norm. It was argued that there were difficulties in 
adjusting the level of housing consumption for these households, and that the adjustment 
of housing consumption would not necessarily reduce the affordability problem. Thus, 
whether or not it is possible to mitigate the affordability problem by adjusting downward 
their level of housing consumption remains unclear. 
The problem of affordability attracted media attention in the mid 1980s because of the 
unprecedented upsurge in house prices. But the historical price peak in the late 1980s, 
and the price slump that followed, seemed to create a perception that the problem of 
affordability is merely the result of a cyclical movement of house prices. Conversely, the 
problem among housing association tenants continues to attract attention both in the 
media and among housing professionals (Bran-dey 1994). 
Evidence in this thesis shows that difficulties, of affordability faced by tenants in all 
sectors already e)dst. This problem has endured longer than was once thought likely 
owing to the changes in rent setting policy in the social rented sector and deregulation in 
the private sector. In addition, an analysis of the ability to buy indicates that the 
downturn in house prices may not have eased entry to home ownership by a substantial 
amount. First, a rise in real interest rates in the early 1990s offset the benefit of reduced 
house prices. Second, a simulation of changes in affordability with respect to house 
price changes suggests that unless the reduction was substantial, the gain would not be 
significant. Thus, the affordability problem for prospective home owners can fluctuate 
relatively, but the absolute level of the problem may not have been reduced. 
313 
One Problem or 
The above analysis would suggest that addressing affordability as one problem would 
over-simplify the issue. It involves problems of insufficient income as well as an 
inadequacy to contain housing costs within the reach of those on a low income. It 
reflects not only the need of the aspiring middle class, but rather a real problem for those 
who have insufficient resources to pay for the cost of housing. It is more enduring, and 
affects many more tenants in the social rental sector as well as in the private rented 
sector, than was once thought. Likewise, although the relative level of affordability 
among prospective home buyers fluctuates with the variation in the volatile housing 
market, the absolute level of the problem should not be under-estimated. 
Affordability is a multi-dimensional issue. It involves both the distribution of income 
and the cost of providing housing. It also embraces a spatial dimension and should be 
understood in a temporal perspective. This thesis addresses only a very limited aspect of 
the problem, namely the issue of how to provide a benchmark against which affordability 
can be measured, yet already formidable difficulties, have been encountered. Whether 
such a measurement should be approached from a relative perspective or an absolute 
perspective; whether an objective assessment is possible, or if the problem should only 
reflect a subjective evaluation, are unresolved issues. 
11.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis has systematically summarised and critically evaluated the major approaches 
to affordability measurement. It has also successfully revealed, with the measurement 
instrument established in this thesis, the affordability situation in England in the early 
I 99os. yet, owing to the limitation of time, resources and the experience of the 
investigator, there are still several important areas which warrant further exploration, in 
addition to the problems inspired by the findings in this thesis. Three topics for further 
investigation are suggested: 
This thesis suggests a behavioural approach to measuring affordability. Neither 
the theoretical basis nor the technical implementation of the measurement could 
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be dealt with in depth. Examining the relationship between household income 
and housing expenditure empirically would help to develop a behavioural 
pattern of the problem of affordability. 
2. A subjective approach to the evaluation of affordability, pioneered by Kearns et 
al (1993), is another area in measuring affordability which it would be useful to 
explore. Both the theoretical basis and the technical methods of implementation 
of the subjective measurement of poverty advocated by the Leyden School 
could be adopted. it would help to inform how the major actors involved in the 
issue, namely the tenants and home owners themselves, perceive their own 
problem and help in a cross examination of the threshold values implied by 
other affordability measurements. 
3. This thesis shows the strong influence of both the housing benefit system and 
tenure on the problem of affordability. The problems of the current housing 
benefit and proposals for its improvement have been examined elsewhere (e. g. 
gills 199 1, Kemp 1992b, Webb and Wilcox 199 1). It would also be 
worthwhile to examine in greater detail the effect of the current system, as well 
as that of the proposed alternatives, in relation to affordability. 
315 
Note 
The average income of a first time buyer in 1979 was L6290 whilst the average price 
to income ratio was 2.37 and the advance to price ratio was 75.4%. This would 
enable the household to take up a loan of L 14097, about W/o of the average house 
price paid by all first time buyers. The average mortgage rate in 1979 was 11.94%. 
In 1989, an income of L6290 would equivalent to an income of 16126, adjusted by 
index of earnings rather than the retail price index. The corresponding ratios, interest 
rates and eligible loan were 2.61,82.9,13.61% and 116126 (DoE, 1990). The 
monthly outgoing, assuming a repayment mortgage of 25 years, would be 1138 in 
1979 and L286 in 1989. The corresponding percentages of outgoings to income 
were 24% and 28%. Using the same mortgage rate in 1989 as that in 1979, the 
outgoing would be E369 per month, or 28% of the household income. 
2. Assuming a repayment mortgage at 25 years, the repayment of mortgage interest and 
principal would be L9.54 per month per II ooo of loan at a mortgage rate of 10.5% 
(BSA, no date). If the mortgage rate increases to 15.41/o, the corresponding 
outgoing is 113.21. 
3. Surveys on Tenure Preference 
Year Commissioned by Conducted by Unweighed 
Sample 
1967 Building Societies Association Opinion Research Centre - 
1975 National Economic Development British Market Research 1597 
1978 Office of Population Census and Office of Population Census and 11185 
Statistics statistics 
1983 Building Societies Association British Market Research Bureau 2501 
1986 Building Societies Association British Market Research Bureau 2455 
1988 Office of Population Census and Office Of PoPulation Census and 8693 
statistics statistics 
1989 Building Societies Association British Market Research Bureau 1 0215 
1991 Council of Mortgage lenders & BBC British Market Research Bureau 2260 
4. Although the two types of tenancy differ in the protection of security of tenure, it is 
easy for a landlord in a market favourable to the supply side, to opt for the assured 
shorthold tenure which provides no security beyond the period of the contract. 
5. Suppose the maximum eligible loan of a household can just enable it to buy a house 
at the threshold price. Given the current interest rate and the repayment terms, the 
monthly repayment of interest and principal would be a fixed amount. The repayment 
to income ratio can then be evaluated. The household is regarded as affordable to 
home ownership if the mortgage potential is greater than the threshold house price, it 
follows that the repayment to income ratio should be less than the quotient of income 
multiple and the parameter which depends on the interest rate and the mortgage 
terms. Such quotient will be the affordability ratio: 
316 
Assuming P=b* RP 
and UP >P if home ownership is affordable 
because P= NP 
then NT >b RP if affordable 
because NT =a INC 
then a* INC >b* RP if affordable 
and ( RP / INC )<(a/b) if affordable 
6. For the previous endnote, r=a/b where r is the threshold affordability ratio, a the 
income multiple and b is a constant which depends on terms of the loan. In the 
previous formula, b is expressed as P=b*H where P is the price of the house, b the 
constant and H the monthly repayment. Thus P=( Pkli) *H where i is the current 
interest rate (after MRAS), I the length of repayment and ka constant, since for a 
fixed loan monthly repayment will be directly proportion to the current interest rate 
but inversely proportional to the length of repayment. Then r= (a * i) / (k * 1). 
7. Whilst data on house price can be available on a district level, household income and 
household characteristics are more conveniently available, on a regional level through 
national surveys like the FES and GHS. 
8. The number of housing association tenants qualified for inclusion in the sub-sample 
was only 91, a number too small for some statistical manipulations to be significant. 
Housing association tenants would only constitute 3% of the sub-sample if they were 
included. 
9. P= 13933 (1.13) (NRM))1.17(GU) (Reg) (DAge) (DType) 
Where NRm Number of Rooms 
Gar Having a Garage (I if there is amd 0 if there is not) 
Reg Region where the dwelling is 
DAge Age of the dwelling 
DType Type of the Dwelling 
R square = 0.60 
Coefficients for the variables in the equation: 
indq)cndent Variable C; -e-ffi-cicnt Indelmdent Variable Coefficient 
Region Age of Dwelling 
North 1.49 Pre 1919 0.97 
Yorkshire and Humberside 1.69 1919-1939 0.92 
North West 1.61 1940-1960 0.89 
East Ndlands 1.77 1961-1980 0.90 
West Ndlands 3.28 Post 1980 1.00 
East Anglia 2.45 Type of Dwelling 
London 2.01 Bungalow 1.41 
South East 1.79 Detached House 1.13 
South West 1.71 Semi-detached, House 1.12 
Wales 1.55 jerraced House 0.95 
Scotland 1.74 Flat 1.00 
Northermn -Ireland 
1.00 
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10. Mortgagors who provided information on mortgage interest payment and who did 
not : 
Mean Value f pw Provided Information Did Not Provide Information 
(n=2293) n--272 
Interest Payment 58 -- 
Imputed Rent 36 32 
Household Income 387 295 
Interest and Princival 70 83 
Source: Analysis of 1991 FES 
mortgagors who did not provide information on mortgage interest payment were 
on a lower income, occupying dwellings of lower rateable value but who also have 
higher mortgage burden. Thus may also have a higher housing cost to income 
ratio. Replacing the mortgage payment with the imputed rent may have under- 
estimated their mortgage interest payment and consequently a downward bias of 
the housing cost to income ratio. 
The z score of the variarble with mean equIs zero and standard deviation equals 
one. 
12. It was quoted as 3 5% in Maclennan and WiHiams (1990).. 
13. Step Shape Curve 
14. A logit Model can be expressed as a hierarchical lo&ear model whereas it 
assumes the presence of all the interaction terms of the relevant variables in the 
final models are significant. A hierarchical loglinear model would assume all the 
lower order interaction terms are significant. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Al A Comparison of the Selected Sample and Excluded Cases in 
1"1 FES and 1988 GHS 
Table Al. I Exclusion of Exbvtw Cases with High Ratios (FES 1991 
% Before Excluding Ddreme cases 
Gross Ratio Net Ratio 
After ExcludinR Extreme cases 
Gross Ratio Net Ratio 
Mean 28.5 42.6 25.7 25.4 
Std Dcv 63.6 911.9 15.7 15.4 
Median 22.2 22.3 22.0 22.1 
Skewness 37.9 
- 
65.1 1.2 1.5 
N 4325 4272 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Table A 1.2 Chmacteristics of Selected and UnsclOctcd Casqcs 
Excluded Selected All 
Total 1638 (28%) 4272 (72%) 5909 (1000/0) 
Household Type 
Married Couples 
single pamons 
Lone varents 
909(55%) 
598 (37*/o) 
26(20/o) 
2772 (651/6) 
1004 (24%) 
227(5%) 
3680(62%) 
1602 (271/6) 
256 (4%) 
Odlcrs 106(70/o) 269(6%) 375 
Under 30 31 (2%) 830(20%) 961(15%) 
30-39 64 (41/6) 1059 (25%) 11233 (191/6) 
40-49 162 (91/6) 879(21%) 1031 (171/6) 
50-59 278(17%) 594(14%) 9871(15%) 
1111 16R . 910(21%) 2023(34%) 
Region 
North 86(50/o) 341(8%) 427(7%) 
Yorkshire and Humberside 194 (121/6) 422(10%) 422 (1 (r/o) 
North West 218 (131%) 558(13%) 558(13%) 
East Midlands 137(80/9) 365 (91%) 635(9%) 
West Midlands 181(110/0) 454(11%) 269(11%) 
East Anglia 81(50/o) 189(4%) 760(5%) 
L, ondon 173 (1 1*/o) 587(14%) 1297(13%) 
South East 367(22%) 930(22%) 629(22%) 
wcst, 201 (12%) 427(10%) 11 (11%) 
Size , ruevischold 
I Person 598(37%) 1004(24%) 1602 (57%) 
2 Persons 712(44%) 1337 (3 1%) 2049 (351/6) 
3 Persons 181 (114yo) 750(18%) 931(16%) 
4 persons 98 (6%) 815(19%) 913(15%) 
5 ; ons or Over 49 (31%) 566 (9%) 415 (7%) 
Emp nM-wjt Status of HoH 
Full Time 320 (20%) 2270 (53%) 2598(44%) 
Pad Time 76 (5 1/6) 15 8 (41/6) 234 (4%) 
Unemployed/ Unoccupied 1086 (661/6) 1394(33%) 2480(42%) 
Other 140 (9%) 450(11%) 598 (10%) 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
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Table At. 3A comparison of Selected Sarn ple and EXcludcd Households in England FES 1991 
Pounds per weekJ Percentage Mean Std Dev Min Max F Value 
Gross Income Excluded n= 1638 289 347 3 8968 99.7** 
Selected n= 4272 375 299 20 4349 
Net income Excluded 242 297 -22 8898 694.4** 
Selected 236 226 19 3141 
Gross Cost Excluded 32 49 1 1073 56.9** 
Selected 72 53 4 886 
Net Gross Excluded 32 49 -4 1073 471.0** 
Selected 67 56 1 896 
Gross Ratio Excluded 23 103 0 2865 1.8ns 
Selected 26 16 1 100 
Net Ratio Excluded 63 1482 -46 59779 2.7ns 
Selected 25 14 1 100 
Note: ** p<0.01 ns Not Significant 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
Table A 1.4 Cases With and Without Income Infonnation GHS 1988 
Number of Households With Income Information Without Income Infonnation_ 
Local Authority Tenants 884 183 
Private Tenants 294 58 
XI=0,13 (p=0.7) 
Prefer to Rent 845 180 
Prefer to Own 169 58 
XI=0.005 (v=0-8) 
Source: Analysis of 1988 GHS 
Appendix A2 Interpretation of the box plot 
2.5 Imter-qua=tUc lpývcngc 
From median 
-OIE- --- Upper (Quartile 
-dl ---- -- mccuen 
]Lower Quaftile 
11 -: 5 Inteir-quartUe Ranse ]Fromm mmedian 
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Appendix A3 Meaning of Abbreviations in Charts 
Abbreviation Meaninit 
Tenure 
Local Authority (ILA) Local Authority Tenants 
Housing Association (RA) Housing Association Tenants 
Private Unffimished (PRS-Unf) Private Tenants In Unfiimishad Sector 
Private Furnish (PRS-Fur) Private Tenants In Furnished Sector 
Mort-gagors (Owner) Homc Owncr with an Mortitaite 
Re-Rion 
North Northan 
Yorks Yorkshire and Hurnberside 
NW North West 
E Nfids East Nfidlands 
W Nfids West Nfidlands 
E Ang East Anglia 
London Greater London 
SE South East excluding London 
Sw South West 
Type of Household 
Couple Married Couple Household 
Single Single Person Household 
Lone Parent Lone Parent Household 
Oflicrs Other Household 
Affordability 
Aff Affordable 
Unaff Unaffordable, 
Enwloviment Status 
FT Full Time 
PT Part Tirm 
Unocc Unoccupied / Unemplo yment 
Dependent Children 
No Dep No Dependent Child 
1+ 0-4 No 5-15 At L=st One Child Aged Under 5 And No Child 5 To 15 
No o-4 J+ 5-15 Ai lAmst One Child Aged 5-15 No Child Under 5 
Both 0-4 5-15 Children Both Under 5 and 5- 15 
Housing benefit 
HB Housing benefit Clairnant 
No HB Non-Claimant 
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Appendix A4 Kappa Coefficient of Agreement Between Measurements 
The Kappa coefficient is a measure of association and a test for the degree of agreement in 
classification. For a simple contingency table with 4 cells (table A 1), the degree of agreement is 
the sum of the percentage both measurements agreed, i. e. a, + a4. However, such agreement may 
happen by chance. If it is the case, there would still be (t, x s, + t2 x s2). Cohens Kappa (calculate 
the difference of the observed degree of agreement with the degree of agreement if it happens by 
chance and is then normalised by dividing it by the largest possible difference for the marginal 
totals (I- expected agreement). 
For large samples, the distribution of Kappa is approximately normal distribution (Craemer, 1983) 
thus testing whether kapper is significantly different fiom zero is possible using z test. Other 
more conservative test, such as the t test which would approach normal distribution when the 
sample size is very large, was proposed (SPSS 1990). 7"he evaluated of kappa in this paper was 
implemented by SPSS VMS V4.0 and West was employed as the test of significance. 
Table A4.1 Kappa Coefficient: an Illustration 
Measurement 2 
State A State B Subtotal 
Measurement I State A a, a2 tj 
State B a., aA t, 
Subtotal S, S13 T 
Appendix A5 income and Housing Cost between Housing Benefit 
Chdmants and Non-cWnants 
f pw Houwholds in Unaffordable Housing 
Scheme Non-claimants claimots F 
valised Income After Housing R, 76 72 6.5* 
R- 71 70 0.9ns 
s Income R, 168 107 250** 
R- 175 105 302** 
Net Income R, 145 82 470*; 
R- 149 79 5 19** 
et Cost R, 66 20 64 1 *; 
R- 70 20 670** 
cost R, 66 44 125*; 
& 
- 
70 45 254** 
Note: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ns Not Significant 
Source: Analysis of FES 1991 
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Appendix A6 Households In Unaffordable Housing by Soclo-economic 
Characteristics: Residual Income Measurement 
Characteristics (1/6) Model R, Model R, Model R, 
Unaff Unaff Unaff povaty 
All 29 -16 
Tenure 
Local Authority Tenants 63 58 19 39 
Housing Association tenants 60 52 17 38 
Private Tenants (Unfiumished) 45 40 18 22 
Private Tenants (Furnished) 30 29 17 12 
Owners with Mortgage II 11 7 4 
Region 
North 36 32 9 23 
Yorks and Humberside 35 32 10 22 
North West 33 30 11 20 
East Midlands 30 29 12 17 
West Midlands 36 35 12 23 
East Anglia 26 25 10 25 
London 30 30 15 15 
South East 20 19 10 8 
South West 27 24 12 12 
Household Type 
Marzied Couple 18 19 7 10 
Single Person 51 47 22 25 
Lone Parent 74 69 19 50 
Others 27 23 6 17 
Age of Head of household 
Under 30 27 26 11 16 
30-39 19 19 8 11 
40-49 14 15 7 8 
50-59 21 21 7 14 
Over 60 64 55 23 32 
Employment Status 
Both Full Time 4 4 3 1 
HoH FT Wife PT 6 7 5 2 
HoH FT Wife Unoccupied 14 14 10 5 
HoH PT Wife FT 30 30 7 23 
HoH PT Wife PT/[Jnoccupied 40 36 18 17 
HoH Unoccupied Wife FT/PT 66 61 23 38 
Both Unoccupied 72 65 20 46 
Housing Benefit 
Non-claimants 14 13 8 5 
Claimants 82 78 24 54 
On Full Benefit 85 80 20 60 
PartBenefit 84 80 26 53 
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Appendix A7 Lowess Method of Curve Smoothing 
LOWESS stands for Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoother. it is a technique to produce a 
smooth curve fitted to a given scatterplot of a bivariate data set. Curve smoothing is a procedure 
"to remove accidental irregularities resulting from sampling error" (Kruskai and Tanur 1978: 428). 
A smooth curve can help to identify graphically the relationship between the variables. 
Lowess method produces a smooth curve in the following way: 
Locally weighted regressions am performed with reference to every data point in the 
scatterplot. Each regression only involves a certain fraction of the data points adjacent to 
the reference data point whereas the fraction is assigned by the investigation. The weights 
are assigned so that the reference data point would have the highest eight of I and the 
further the data point is from the reference point the lower the weight would be until it 
reaches 0 at the boundary. A regression line is then fitted using weighted least square 
method. The predicted value of the regression line at the reference point is then calculated. 
This process will be repeated for every data point in the scatterplot. 
2. Weights of outlier (data points that deviate very much from the fitted regression line) is 
down-weightod by adjusting the weights of data points with large residual. Stage one and 
two are then reiterated until it reaches the maximum iteration assigned by the investigator. 
3. The Lowess curve is then drawn by joining all the predicted values produced by the 
regression lines at each of the data point in the scatterplot. 
In this paper, the Lowess curves were produced using SPSS for Window Version 5 with 50% 
smoothing fiwfion and two iterations. 
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Appendix A8 Tests of Violation of Regression Assumptions 
There are a number of assumptions linear regression should not violated, two more important ones 
are the homoscedasticity and normal distribution of residual terms. Homoscedasticity refcrs to the 
homogeneity of variance across all observations. This assumption would be violated if there is 
unequal or non-constant variance, which vary from observation to observation. One method to 
test the degree of heteroscedasticity is to plot the residuals with the predicted values of the 
equation. The assumption of homoscedasticity holds if there is not obvious pattern between the 
residuals and the predicated values. 
Another important assumption of regression analysis is the normal distribution of the residuals, 
which is the difference between the value of the actual observation with the predicted value. it is 
important only in statistical inference of the parameter. The violation can bc detected by plotting 
the normal plot of the studentised residual. Deviation of the observed residual from the expected 
value of residual, assuming they are normal distributed, will be the an indication of such violation. 
(Source: SPSS 1990d, Gujarati, 1992) 
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ression: Net Housing Cost to Net Income Ratio by Unequivalised Residual Income 
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Log Inverse Model 
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Multivariate Regression: Housing Cost by Income and Household Socio-economic 
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Appendix A9 Logistic Regression: A Technical Description 
Logistic regression examines the probability of occurrence of an event in relation to a number of 
explanatory variables. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable which can take only the 
value of 0 and 1. The value I represent die occupance of the event whilst 0 represents its non- 
occupance. The regression equation can be expressed as 
P(EvenX e7z 
(A9. I) 
-e 
Wbem P(Evew) - ProWdity of Ocmwxw of *e Evwt 
Z'B BX B Bjý 0+ 1 1+ 2'y2+** ... + 
XIAO***, Xk A" bVidnalmy Vaidbds 
BO, B, . ...... NX am Rwwian 
Coodam 
Coefficients of the explanatory variables in a logistic regression are estimated using the maximum 
likelihood method while the significant level of the individual coefficient is evaluated band on the 
Wald Statistics: 
Wdd swisliff .( 
Cnpdw 12 
(A9.2) 
"kmAod byvrý 
The Wald statistics has a chi-square distribution whereas a chi square test is can be used to test 
whether the coefficient is significantly different form zero. At the same time, the Likelihood 
statistics can be used to test the hypothesis that all the coefficients except the mtmqA am all zm. 
This test statistics follow a chi-square distribution and thus chi-square test can be employed. 
Since the likelihood ratio is a very small number between zero and one, it is thus not convenient to 
handle. This statistics is often expressed as -2LogLL, two times the logarithm of the Log 
Likelihood statistics for easy handling. 
A number of test statistics am proposed to measure the overall goodness of fit of the fittod model: 
the likelihood ratio (SPSS 1990b, SAS 1990), Akaike Infornufion Critaia (Cramnler 1990), 
prediction table, Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989), pseudo R' (Aldrich and 
Nelson 1986), likelihood index (Train 1989) etc. But unlike the use of W in Ordinary Linear 
Regression by OLS method, there is no commonly accepted statistics to measure the goodness of 
fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). 
Because of the lack of a cDmnxmly agreed statisfics to measure the goodness of fit, this thesis will 
resort to more than one of such statistics which can provide cross-validation. But the availability 
of such statistics in popular computer programme limits the choice of test statistics. Hence, this 
theses will use the likelihood ratio, the prediction table, and AIC to test for the goodness of fit. 
The prediction table provides the accuracy of the predicted outcome, which is the cue with a 
predicted probability higher than a cut-off probability, with reference to the observed outcome, 
, as the cut-off probability used 
in this thesis is 0.5. However, the p on table d ds where redicti epen 
on the choice of the cut-off probability, in which a change of predicted probability from 0.49 to 
0.51 will result in a leap while the change is only very small. In addition, information is also lost 
in the transformation of predicted probability to predicted outcome. Hence, the prediction table 
should be used with caution and it is suitable as a assessment of goodness of fit if classification is 
the main focus of the model (Hosmer and Lcmeshow 1989). 
The AIC (Akaikc Information Criteria) is basically an average measure of the log likelihood 
statistics in which such statistics is 
fiuther adjusted by the number of fitted parameters. It is 
dcfined as (Crammer 1990): 
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AIC - (LG&LL 
(A9.3) 
Wbffl AIC - Aktike hArmafim Chärrik k- Mwdvr of riaw voiduff 
n- Soqk Siw 
LcgLL - Lag L**bood Rddo 
The AIC for a perfect model is zero and the smaller the value of AIC, the better fit the model is. 
The computation of the bivariate models were implemented on SAS on UNIX ERIS System v 
whilst the multi-variatc model by SPSS on VMS V4. The basic operations of the two progranum 
are the same except in multivariate analysis, the coding system of the categorical explanatoty 
variable used in SPSS was the deviation coding schane. This scherne, contrast with the 
commonly used indicator variable scheme, codes the last category (the reference category) as -I 
instead of o. Thus, coefficients of subgrotips in the category should then be compared with the 
average effect of the vanable instead with wo. The coefficient of the reference variable is then 
the negative value of the slim of the coefficients of the rest of the subgroups in the category (SPSS 
1990c). 
Output of SPSS includes the value of UP(B) and K M(B) is tile logarithm of the 
unstandardised c4Defficicnt (B) of the explanatory variable. Expressing the unstandardised 
coefficient facilitate the comparison of the effect of the coefficient between it is e ch ge 
log odd of dependent variable which is of interest. 
th an of the 
R statistics is logistic regression is the equivalent Of the partial correlation statistics in ordinary 
regression analysis which compam the relative contribution of individual explanatory variable in 
the model. R varies from -I to I and a positive value of R means an increase of likelihood of the 
event with an increase in the explanatory variable. A value of R close to 0 implies a small 
contribution of the variable to the fitted model. R is defined as : (SPSS 1990a) 
Wdd smitia -2k 
9 (A9.4) 
-2LagLL(O) 
-2LqU (0) - -2LaiLL (0) of t& &w J" LOKLL - Lag iAd" swütiff 
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Appendix A10 Goodness of Fit of Model TGAnd Model T2G by Household 
Socio-economic Charaderistics 
Model T 
Characteristics N AIC -2W&L Sensitivity Smificity 
All households 4272 0.62 2759 70 93 
Tenure 
Local Audxxity Tenants 1144 0.57 645 90 83 
Hmsing Associatim Tenants 168 0.47 74 91 90 
privatc Tenants (Unfimfishod) 200 0.74 144 83 86 
private Tenants (Furnished) 195 0.65 123 72 93 
M(xtgagors 2565 0.42 1095 47 99 
North 341 0.58 192 82 94 
Yorkshire and Humberside 422 0.67 277 76 91 
North West 558 0.74 409 71 91 
East Midlands 363 0.7 252 66 91 
West Midlands 454 0.57 253 92 91 
East Anglia 108 0.65 119 65 94 
w1don 587 0.65 379 69 93 
South East 930 0.59 544 56 96 
South West 427 0.52 219 74 84 
Household Type 
married Couple 2772 0.91 1692 45 96 
Single Parson 1004 0.93 623 89 86 
Lone Parent 227 0.72 159 92 67 
Others 269 0.79 207 48 93 
Size of Household 
I Person 1004 0.63 923 99 90 
2 Persons 1337 0.67 999 60 96 
3 Persons 750 0.53 399 61 96 
4 Persons 815 0.64 517 47 95 
5 Persons or More 366 0.1 292 50 114 
Housing Benefit 
Claimant 990 0.54 1827 48 98 
Note: Sensitivity is the pcnmtap of correct prediction when there is an event, SpWifi 
ft probability of corrat prediction when dmn is no event 
city Is 
Sou=: Analysis of FES 1991 
Model T, 
N AIC 72L4MU Sensitivity S; V cdfjcjtV 
AD households 4272 0.56 2659 69 93 
Tenure 
Imal Authority Tenants 1144 1.12 1278 79 51 
Housing Association Tenants 168 1.13 186 74 60 
private Tenants (Unfurnished) 200 1.20 235 47 77 
Private Tenants (Furnished) 195 1.11 213 33 97 
2565 0.52 1328 32 99 
North 341 0.53 178 91 94 
yorkshire and Humberside 422 0.69 297 73 91 
North West 558 0.74 408 65 91 
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Model T 
Characteristics N AIC -2LojtLL Sensitivity Svmiflcitv 
East Midlands 365 0.67 238 67 92 
West Nfidlands 454 0.53 236 82 92 
East Anglia 108 0.63 115 64 95 
London 587 0.66 382 69 93 
South East 930 0.56 514 56 96 
South West 427 0.43 198 77 95 
Household Twe 
nun-ried Couple 2772 0.83 2303 17 99 
Single Parson 1004 1.34 1341 53 59 
Lone Parent 227 1.16 260 87 75 
Others 269 1.06 280 19 95 
Size of Household 
I Person 1004 0.58 580 88 88 
2 Persons 1337 0.61 916 57 94 
3 persons 750 0.49 364 63 90 
4 Persons 815 0.62 503 49 86 
5 Persons or More 366 0.84 304 48 80 
Housing Benefit 
Clairnant 880 0.50 1698 45 98 
Non-claimant 3392 0.65 584 96 55 
Note: Sam" is the Pcrmtage Of OOMXA piredictkm when tbm is an event, Specificity is &e 
pr&ability of curred predicdon when there is no event 
Source: Anabrsis of FES I" I 
Appendh All Non-Unear Regression: A Technical Description 
Non-lincar regression fits a regression model which has a non-linear functional form and cannot 
be evaluated using ordinary least square or other methods employed in linear regression. The 
implementation of non-linew regression was performed by the NLR procedure of SPSS 
VAX(VMS Releaw 4 which used Lavenbag-Marguarch alogarithm to evaluate the regression 
parameters (SPSS, 1990a; SPSS, 1990b). 
The fimctional form of the regression model has to be prcd 
procedure. in addition, initial vahm of the parameters have to supplied as well. Such initial 
values are important to the parameW estimation. 
The, usual tog statistics commonly used in linear regression based on the Ordinary Least Square 
Method (OLS) is not useful in non-linm regression. The residual mean square, which is a useful 
tool in regression with OLS, is not an unbiased estimate of the error of variance, so the F ratio 
statistics testing the joint hypothesis that all parameters of the independent variables we zero used 
in the OLS regression cannot be relied on. Ldwwise, the R square statistics which indicate the 
proportion of variation explained by the model in OLS regression is not valid. Instead, SPSS 
NLR procedure produces a cAxTected R square figure which represents the sum of squared 
deviations about the mean. This statistics can be interpreted as the vanaUons about the mean that 
can be explained by the fitted model. 
In addition, the estimation of exact confident interval of the individual paramew is not possible 
with non-linear regression. Such estimation is computed using asymptotic approximation, i. e. the 
estimated value will roughly equal to the true value when the size of the sample is very imp. 
Arimptotlc estimation of the 95% confident interval of the parameters are provided in the NLR 
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output. If the cstimated interval inchi&s zero, it can be intcrprded that the pwwnda is not 
different from zero (i. e. the parmneter is insignificant) at a confident level of 5%. 
(Souroe: Hartwig and Dearing, 1979; SPSS, 1990a, 1990b) 
Appendix A 12 Logit Modelling: A Technical Description 
The logit model is a particular form of a general logtinear model. A loglinear model seeks to 
express the expected cell fiequency of a contingency table as a aMtive fimction of several eff, 
Take an illustration of a two dimensional contingency table under as 
ects. 
the suming that there is no 
association between the two variables in the table. The expected cell fi-equency of the table can be 
expressed as a product of marginal totals divided by the total number of sample. Upon some 
arrangement, the formula can be transformW in the form of Opation A 12.1 in which the 
logarithm of the expected cell fi-equency can be expressed in tam of a linear combmation of 
several effects : 
t *t. M.. ,I 
x 
m9 
logmt-logx-logx +*Iogxli 
Wbew mo - 
Bý FMPOSCY Or cdl dt rm i co&wm 
x- Tood saxpk 
t, - Toed Obmrvd hapKy of row i 
tj -Toed a%evd Aw" of cafawn i 
x... Magixd Pftportion in row i 
xi-maliad prvortim in cdxmm i 
log-Mawd Lotdrilbm 
A more general exPrcss'On Of 8 1091incw inodel with two variables Should also allow for the effect 
of the association between the two variables. This general form is shown in equation A 12.2 with 
the notations changed to the most commm ones used in the literature, : 
logmi-logn-logigi. -logg, 0- hmnU6M Irm 
-Avff«t Log Aeqawq 
»F, #W amci*W na row i 
(A12.2) 
ý.. Effar modad wa cdwm 
lko-Effea am"m lw* cag 
i 
A saturated IO&Car model is the, model where all the association tam in the model are assumed 
to exist, thus, the expected firquencies we calculated in a way that dXy would always match the 
observed frequency. An unsaturated model, on the other hand, assumes that some of the 
associated terms do not exist, so the expected frequencies may not equal to the observed 
frequency. The major finiction of loglineff model1mg is to test, with the aid of statistical tests, 
whether a particular unsaturated model can reproduce the Observed fir-quencies. Then the 
unsaturated can be manipulated in a way that the significanoe of contribution of some particular 
association terms can be tested to identify some influential or insignificant vanables in the model. 
The most common test for the goodness of fit of a model is the likelihood ratio chi-square test 
(0. it tests the hypothesis that the expectod frequencies do not deviated from the observed 
frequency. in another word, the model can represent the data even without some of the 
association term and the more parsimonious model fit the data equally well. Contrary to the 
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usual practice of hypothesis testing in contingency table using chi-square test, die hypothesis the 
new model can be rcjectod only if the level of significant of the G' is low. Whilst the GI test 
examine the joint hypothesis that the all coefficients of the sub-categories of a particular effect am 
all zero, az test can be performed to test whether a particular coefficient is zero. 
109 (Mild -0* It *k* ý-* JLU* Xv. 11# 
(A12.3) 
log (M2#)_ it - )Y k- 
)Lj* )L2i+ ; LN *I 2ij 
The logit model is a special caw of the general loglinear model. One variable is set as the 
&pendent variable but this variable can only be a dichotomous variable with value I and 2. 
Expanding the loglinear model for each of the category in the dichotomous ftendent variable, a 
new model can be established. To illustrate the transformation, a three way loglinear model is used 
with i rows and j columns whilst the third variable will be the &pendent variable taking the value 
I and 2. So in loglinear model terms : 
hIstcad of expressing the of ccil fi-equency, the odds of being in category 2 agamst category is 
substituted as the dependent valuable. many of the common terms will be cancelled out. Making 
use of the facts that parameter of categories sum to zero, the expression can be fiwther reduced to 
a linear combination of effects. 
-1%(Mjj) -log 
(m2ij) 
M24 
log(f 
mlij 
(A12.4) 
Using the cam-non notations in logit modelling, the log odds of in category 2 of the dependent 
, valuable can be expressed in terms of a linear combination of a constant and sonic parameter 
estimates : 
logoe JZ 
(A12.5) 
mwm a- tvaar of tk log od* 
Ti. #ct of row i 
-ý. - Jffiýct of CGEWM j 
191 - Effect Gf row i md cdwm i 
The logit models used in this pqw were evaluated the procedure LOGLINEAR in SPSS VMS 
V4.0. The coefficients calculated are coefficients of the additive model which compares the log 
odds of the dependent variable. Since it is sometimes difficult to grasp the relationship between 
categories by log odds, coefficients of the multiplicative model am display instead, allowing 
comparison of the odds of the dependent vafiable. Although routine computer outputs of the 
coefficients excludes that of the last category since it is statistically redundant, evaluation of its 
value Is straight forward since all coefficients across a variable should sum to zero. 
Coefficients of the logit models can be compared with the coefficients in the Sam category, A 
, aiuc large than one means the odds of 
dependent variable in that sub-category is larger than the 
average value in that category, vice versa when it is negative. The likelihood ratio test (G2) used 
to test the goodness of fit of a unsatmted loglinear model also applies to unsaturated logit 
models, and likewise, the z test for the significance of the individual parameters. To test whether 
a particular term, or a number Of terms are necessary to 
fit a model, a conditional loglikelihood test 
can W performed. supposed there am two models A and B where Model B is nested in Model A, 
i. e. all the terms in Model B are contained 
in Model A. The additional term in Model A is 
necessary to fit the model if such addition would increase significantly the goodness of fit of 
Model A. in another word, the increase of goodness of fit flrom. Model B to Model A will be 
significant. The difference in goodness of fit between two models is itself chi-square distributed 
with degree of fi-eedom equals to the 
difference of degree of freedom between the two models. if 
the chi-square statistics is not significant, the addition terms is not necessary to fit the model. 
Sourm: Denlafis (1992); Ficuberg (1077); SPSS (I 990b) 
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Appendix A13 Principal Component Analysis: A Technical Description 
Principal component analysis is basically a parsimony technique aiming at reducing the 
complexity of the data. A set of complex and correlated variables can be transformed into an 
equal number of uncorrelated'components' that retains all the information of the original data set, 
These components are linearly combination of the original variables and the weights given to each 
variable in the component are evaluated so that the variance of that component is the largest. 
There are two additional constraint to the evaluation of the weights, first, the sum of the squared 
weights across a component have to be surnined to unity, or otherwise maximum variance can be 
achieved simply by boosting the absolute values of the weights. Second, the component should 
have no correlation with the preceding components so that die aims of reproducing a set of 
uncorrelated components can be achieved. 
The sum of variance of all the components should be the same as the sum of 811 the variance of the 
original variables and it is in this sense rebtaining all of the information of the data set is referred 
to. Mathematically, principal con4ment analysis can be expressed as : 
x- diýcl+aiA+ ...... . ditz" 
(A13.1) 
Wbew yj- itb pixaý mfffmm 
x- cwgind wiable 
's v- weigik of the 
jib vaiaMe in the itb cmVmew 
Reproducing as many transformed components as the original number of variables is merely the 
first step in this twbnique. The most fimctional usage of it is to replace the c*rrelaW large 
number of original variables, with a much smaller number of components. Since the aim of the 
transformation is to retain all the information of the data and the components are so constructed as 
to maxmmse the variation of the data m that component, the first few components can be used to 
represent the original data set without losing much of the information in the original data. In 
doing so, the number of dimension of the data set is thus reduced ftorn p to the number of 
components chosen. 
Two pieces of information in the principal component analysis are of relevance in this report, the 
weight of variable each component and component scams of each cases. The weight each variable 
takes up in each component is technically referred to as the component loading, or sometimes 
factor loading, a term borrowed fim factor analysis, because of its similarity with factor analysis. 
A comparison of the component loading of the variables in a component, which is proportional to 
the correlation of that variable with the component, can reveal the pattern of interaction betw= 
the, variables in the original data set. This kind of interactions are usually too complication when 
the number of variables become very large. The similarity in the sign of the loadings represent the 
correlation of the variables with the components in the same dkection and the relatively magnitude 
portrays the relative contribution between variables, It is possible a clearer picture of the pattern 
of interaction of the original variable can be described by analysing the first few component of the 
data. 
The component score is evaluated by the equation presented in A 13.1 substituting the appropriate 
loadings in the equation. It represents the relative position of individual cam with reference to a 
particular S=e. it is sometimes illuminating by Presenting graphically the component scores of 
the cases of the first two components in a graph. Possible clustering can be inferred or outlier can 
be detected with such Plots and underlying relationship between the cases can also probably be 
uncovered 
Another figure associated with principal C0111ponent analysis output is the communality of the 
con, ponent. t is a term used in factor analysis simply referring to the percentage of variation 
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accounted for by that components. The con4mments are evaluated in a way that the first 
con4ment will account for the largest variation in the data and this p='Mtagc of explained 
variation will diminish with subsequent components. Since all the pnnmpal components put 
together will explain all of the variations in the data, it follows that the communalities of all the 
components will sum to unity. 
Basically, principal component analysis assumed all the variables be measured in a metric wale, 
i. e. continuous numeric variables, the restraint on the type of variable used limits its use in social 
sciences, because of the inevitability of using category variable. A non-linear principal component 
analysis is to be used with categorical variables, whether nominal or ordinal, included as 
independent variables. 
The linear principal component analyý was implemented by the FACTOR procedure, on SpSS 
VMS 4.0, using PC option as the method of analysis. Covariance matrix was und to estimate the 
model coefficients and other test statistics. Whilst the procedtM PRINCAL was used for the non- 
linear principal component analysis that involved categorical variables. PRINCAL can accept 
categorical variables which are assumed as single nominal, ordinal and multiple nominal. The 
same weights on all dimensions for the first two types of categorical data am applied so that all the 
sub-categories in the variable are forced on a straight line. Evaluation on multiple nominal data 
does not have this restriction and the sub-categories can he wrywbere on the plan. Ijus, whilst 
co-ordinate quantification, which is a numeric value assigned to each category such that the score 
of the cases in the data set will have large correlations with each of the variables, are calculated for 
all types of variables, component loadings am only available for single nominal and ordinal data. 
Sow= : SpSS (I 990c); joiliffe (1986); Dontamm (1989); Van do Ckm (1993). 
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Appendix 14 Lowess Smooth Curves: Housing Cost by Household Income 
Reeression: Housing Cost by Household income,, -(All 
Households) 
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Appendix 15 Logit Models: Housing Affordability, Team-e, Employment 
Status and Housing Beneflt 
Sdiem T 
Cy2 
Sdxm R, 
& p 
sdcme R2 
& p 
1. Silturatod Model 0 1 0 -1 0 - 
2. [MI [UI [BEI M [BI p 6.44 0.6 12.27 0.14 8.75 0.36 
3. [M [BEI M [BI [EI 19.36 0.08 19.35 0.08 15.75 0.20 
4. rM] [BEI M [BI [EI 15.73 0.47 27.90 0.03 30.64 0.02 
5. [MI [TEI M [BI [EI 10.93 0.36 12.81 0.23 12.51 0.25 
6. [BEI M [BI [EI 33.30 0,03 34.77 0.02 33.96 0.03 
7. [M] M p31 M 18.69 0.41 28.59 0.05 32.11 0.02 
g. (TEI M [BI [EI 23.35 0.06 19.72 0.14 20.04 0.13 
10. M v31 35.09 0.04 35.26 0.04 36.16 0.03 
11. M [BI 225.6 0.00 241.7 0.00 263.1 0.00 
12. M [EI 236.6 0.00 363.4 0.00 276.4 0.00 
13. [B] [EI 179.7 0.00 94.1 0.00 263.1 0.00 
14. Intemevt OnN 2102 0.00 2155 0.00 2156 0.00 
- '7' - tý- Aý-' --- Irr- 
Scheme A: Test For Difforence in G2 df 0 
[TBI[TEI[BEI[TI(BI[E] - [TI[BI[E] 35.09 - 6,44 - 28.64 _ 14 0.02 
[TBJ[TEI[BEI[TI[BI[E] - [ETI[BEI[TI[BI[E] 19.36 - 6.44 = 12.92 4 0.02 
[TBI(TEI[BEI[TI[BI[E] - [BTI[BEI[TI[BI[E] 10.93 - 6.44 = 9.30 8 0.3 
[TB][TEj[BEj[Tj[Bj[Ej - [BTI[ETI[TI[BI[E) 10-93 - 6.44 = 4.49 2 O'l 
FBTI[BIEIFTI -INTI[El 35.09 - 19.69 = 16.39 4 0.01 
Beg Model: [BTI[BI[EI[T] 
Schm B: Test For -- 
Diffamot in G2 df 
[TBI[TEI[BEI[TI[BI[E] - [TI[BI[E] 35.26 - 12.27 = 22.98 14 0.06 
rMj[TEjfBEj[TJ[BJ[EJ - [ETI[BEI[TI[BI[E] 27.9 - 12.27 = 7.08 4 0.10 
[TBI[TEI[BEIM[BI[E] - [BTI[BEI[TI[BIM 27.90- 12.27 - 15.62 9 0.04 
ITBI[TE)IBEIM[BI[E] - [BTI[ET][TI[BI[E] 12.81-12.27-0.54 2 0.50 
35.26 - 19-72 - 15.54 8 0.04 
Best Model: [ETI[BI[EI[T] 
Sdwm C: Tcst For Diffemce in G2_ df 
[MI[TEI[BEI[TI[BIJEJ - [TIJBI[E) 36.16 - 9.75 -27.40 14 0.02 
[TBI[TEI[BEI[TI[BI[E) - [ETI[BEIM[BI[E] 15.75 - 8.75 = 7.00 4 0.10 
[TBI[TE)IBE]ITI[BI[E] - [BTI[BEIM[BIM 30.64 - 8.75 - 21.98 8 0.01 
[TBJ[TEJ[BEI[TI[BI[E] - [BTI[ETIM[BI[E] 12.51 - 8.75 -3.76 2 0.20 
[ETA[BIEI[Tl - [Birri[El 36.16 - 20.04 - 16.12 8 0.04 
Best Model: [ETI[BI[EI[T] 
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11 Appendix A16 Definition of Life cycle Groups 
Iffe Cycle Groups Definition %in 
SaMD10 
Yotmg Single One Adult Aged Under 35 6 
Young Married Married Couple Female Under 35 5 
Famidy Formation Married Couple, Childma AJI Under 5 9 
Middle Child Rearing Married Couple, At Ixast On Under 5 Rest Aged 5-15 6 
iComplete Family Married Couple, Children All Aged 5-15 11 
Early Disposal Married Couple, One Child 5-15 One Or More 16+ 1 
Two Generation Married Couple., No Children Under 16 At Ieast One 16-24 7 
Empty Nest Married Couple Male 45-65 12 
Early Retirement Married Couple Both Pensumm 5 
Old And Single One Adult, Pensioner 7 
Lmc Parent Lonc Pamt, With Children Under 16 5 
Unclassified 25 
Somrac ; Ekadshaw ct al (1988) p230 
0 Appendix A17 A Dewription of the Expenditure hous Used In Chapter 9 
items Description 
Net Housing Rent or Mortgage PsYMMt, Plus fuel and power, plus repair and 
(H(xising) maintenance less housing benefit and help from social security towards 
mortgage intorest payment 
Food (in) (Foodin) All food it= consumed at home 
Food (out) (Foodout) Ali food items consumed out of home which include eating in a 
restmiratnt or take away 
Alcohol Beer, spirit, wine and other alcoholic drinks 
Tobwco Cigars, pipes and cigarettes 
Clothing (Cloth) ciothing and footwear 
Household Goods Cooking equilmunts, electric goods, stationary, gardeming tools, pot etc. 
, 
HhGoods) (F 
Household Services 
CHhServ) 
Pasonal Goods & 
Services (PerGd) 
Motoring 
Fares 
Lvisum goods 
(UiGoods) 
Lxisure Services 
(Ixiserv) 
Miscellaneous (miscell) 
postW, phone a&, subsaiption to tnKle union. 
Pasonal bygicne goods, cosmctics, persomad jmcb. 
Purcliase of can or parts, petrol and diesel, licence and garage fee. 
Fares for public transport 
Purchase and repair of telephone, computer, Tv and other perwnal 
equipments, books and newspapers. 
Entertainment and six)rt activities, chanty and gift 
Fee on cmdit cards, children pocket money and other miscellaneous 
items 
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Appendix A18 Standardised Residuals: Households in Unaffordable 
Housing by Socio-Economic Characteristics 
Standardised Adjusted Residuals Sch T Sch RI, Sch R, Sch R, 
Unaff Unaff Unalf Unaff Poverty 
Tenure 
Local Authority 30.6 28.9 27.2 9.4 2.5 
Housing Association 9.5 8.9 7.4 2.2 7.0 
Private Rented (Unfurnished) 5.9 4.8 3.9 2.8 2.3 
Private Rented (Furnished) -. I .1 .5 2.5 -1.5 Owned With Mortgage -33.9 -31.8 -29.4 -11.7 -25.7 Reaion 
North 2.6 2.7 2.0 -1.2 3.7 
Yorks & Humberside 1.5 2.7 2.2 -0.8 3.3 
North West 0.6 2.0 1.5 -0.6 2.3 
East Midland -0.6 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 
West Midlands 2.8 3.3 3.7 0.1 4.4 
East Anglia -1.5 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 London 2.7 0.4 1.3 2.9 0.9 
South East -5.7 -7.0 -6.9 -1.0 -7.5 South West -1.1 -1.3 -1.5 0.4 -2.2 
Household Type 
Memed Couples -26.7 -22.1 -19.7 -11.4 -14.2 
Single Person 23.6 17.4 15.6 12.5 8.2 
Lone Parent -15.1 15 14.3 3.7 14.1 
Others 2.5 -0.8 -1.7 -2.8 -0.5 
Size of Household 
I Person 23.6 17.4 15.6 12.5 8.2 
2 Persons -3.1 -4.1 -4.5 -4.3 -1.8 
3 Persons -7.9 -6.5 -6.2 -4.3 -3.8 
4 Persons -9.9 -6.7 -5.8 -3.0 -4.4 
More than 5 Persons -6.0 -1.3 0.3 -1.8 1.9 
Dependent Children 
No dependent child 7.0 2.0 0.7 1.5 -0.4 
Have child aged under 5, no 5 to 15 0.1 1.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.6 
No child aged under 5 have child 5 to 15 -6.5 -3.8 -2.2 -3.0 -0.1 
Have child both aged under 1.2 1.6 
Less dm 30 -0.2 -1.6 -1.1 -0.9 -0.6 
30-39 -9.8 -8.8 -7.1 -3.8 -5.3 
40-49 -11.4 -11.2 -9.2 -4.5 -7.5 
50-59 -3.9 -4.9 -3.6 -3.4 -1.5 
Over 60 25.0 24.0 20.7 12.1_ 14.3 
EnIploymnt StatUS: LI-U ýA I)nrhww 
Both FuH Time -16.4 -19.5 -18.2 -8.8 14.5 
Hoh Fr wifc PT -16.5 -16.9 -15.6 -6.4 -13.5 
Hoh Fr Wife UTH)cCuPicd -12.4 -11.1 -10.0 -1.9 -10.5 
Hob PT Wifc Ff 0.5 0.1 0.4 -0.9 -1.3 
Hob PT Wifc PT/Unocc 3.4 2.5 2.0 -2.4 -0.3 
Hoh Unocc Wife IFT/PT 20.2 19.8 18.9 9.6 14.9 
Both J 27.8 30.9 28.0 8.8 26.4 
Housinst Bcnefit 
mm cwmmts -41.7 -41.0 -40.0 -13.9 -35.5 
Ctai -6. 
41.7 41.0 40.0 13.9 35.5 
Some: AnaNsis of FES 1991 
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Appendix A 19 Regional House Prices Paid by First Time Buyers 1988 
Region /I Mean Lower Quartile, Median Upper Quartile 
North 21733 13751 19000 26226 
Yorkshire & Humberside 23814 15473 21542 29177 
East Midlands 28581 18080 26205 35936 
East Anglia 40720 27432 42711 50009 
L, ondon 63055 49456 61522 73600 
South East 52232 39134 52095 61975 
South West 41383 28781 39912 49535 
West Midlands 28136 16540 16540 16540 
North West 24173 15955 22031 28962 
Enj? Jand 38028 19821 32016 52021 
Source : DoE Five Percent Sample SurveY on Building SOcietY Mortgages (unpublished table) 
Appendix A20 Logistic Regression: Preference to Own by Soclo-econoinic 
Characteristics (Tenants Under 60 in England) 
Socio-economic Characteristics Variable: Prefer to Own 
BR 
Income (IA)g) 0.50** 0.09 
Age of HoH ns na 
Age of HoH (square) -0.001** -0.20 
Household Size ns na 
Number of Children -0.14* -0.06 
Preference for Type of Dwelling na na 
Prefer a House 0.71** 0.15 
Prefer a Flat -0.71r r 
Tcnure na na 
L=al Authority Tcnants ns na 
Privatc Tcnants ns; na 
Rcgion na 0.00 
North 0.37ns 0.00 
Yorks and Humbersidc -0.44* -0.04 
East Midlands -0.37ns 0.00 
Faqt Anpha -0.04ns 0.00 --- - -c7-- I, Ondon 
South East 
South West 
West Midlands 
North West 
0.44* 
-0.05ns 
0.46ns 
-O. Olns 
-0.36r 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
r 
Employment Status (HoH) 0.07 
Full Time 0. l7ns; 0.00 
Part Time O. Olns 0.00 
Uncfnployed/Rdired 0.30ns 0.00 
Others -0.4gr r 
Employment Status (Spouse) na na. 
Working ns na 
Not Working ns na 
Not Applicable ns 
na 
na, 
0.04 
Socio-cconomic Group 0 33ns 0 00 
ProfessiOnal/Manager/Employers . . 
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Socio-economic Characteristics Dependent Variable: Prefer to Own 
BR 
Intermediate and Jun Non-Manual Workers 0.24ns 0.00 
Skilled Manual Workers 0. l3ns 0.00 
Semi-skilled and Personal Service Workers -0.1 Ins 0.00 
Unskilled Workers -0.59r r 
Household Type na na 
Married Couple ns na 
Single Person ns na 
Lone Parents ns na 
Others ns na 
Qualifications of HoH na na 
Have Qualifications -0.24* -0.06 
No Qualification 0.24r na 
Health Condition of HoH na na 
Good Health ns na 
Fairly Good Health ns na 
Not Good Health ns na 
Dependent Children 
Have Children Under 5 ns na 
Have Children 5- 15 ns na 
Have Children 16 - 24 -0.47** -0.11 
Have Children Aged Over 25 ns na 
-2LogLL 931.2 
Correctly Predicted Prefer to Own 94% 
Correctly Predicted Prefer to Rent 34% 
N 1012 
Note: ** p<0.05 * p<0.01 us Not Significant na Not Applicable 
Source: Analysis of GHS 1988 
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